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AIM CONTACTS, FISCAL YEAR 1955 
The AIM Project has been, from the beginning, an experiment. The proponent and 
the sponsors in State government wished to assemble ' a team that could probe the future 
of the auto industry in Michigan. I hoped this effort might inform the State's rela- 
tions with the industry, especially on the economic cleveiopment front. During the 
past year, this experimental probe has matured into an eu:ceptional partnership between 
the public and private sectors. As the participants in the AIM Project offer the findings 
and recommendations in this 1985 Report, I wish to acknowledge, on their behalf, 
the many organizations and individuals that have aided our work, and to note the 
contributions of each member of the AIii Project team. 
Our most important debt is to the .4IM Advisoyy Board. This body of leaders 
from all segments of Michigan's automotive industry has been generous with their 
time and counsel. Each of them gave an exceptionally frank interview co the Project 
and provided access to key members of their organizations. Through the Advisory 
Board, we also thank the scores of experts in the industry who have given us interviews 
over the past months. 
The iUM Project would not have been possible without the commitment of Ralph 
Gerson and Doug ROSS, the former and present Directors of the Nichigan Department of 
Commerce. They have understood AIM as a worthy public investment. Special ap- 
preciation is offered to Deputy Director Lou Glazer, for reasons he will under- 
stand. Peter Plastrik, Executive Director of the Governor's Cabinet Council, has been a 
tolerant host of -4IM's Lansing operations and has given its Director sage counsel from 
the beginning. 
The ambitious database development work conducted within the AEvI Project would 
have been impossible without the extraordinary contribution of fourteen local economic 
development agencies that administered and processed our initial survey of automotive 
establishments. The dedication of their leaders and staff wiis exceptional. We are also in- 
debted to the Board of the.Independent Business Research Office of Michigan (IBROM) and 
to XBROM's Director, Sue Wolfram, for a generous grant that greatly facilitated AD1 
Project survey work with the local agencies. 
The Industrial Technology Institute has offered consistent support to the Project. 
Dr. Lou Tornatzky, Director of ITIts Center for Social and Economic Issues, made 
Drs. Flynn and Luria available to the Project pro bono, anti offered his own counsel at 
several crucial junctures. 
The core of the AIM Project has been the work of our Central Research Team: 
Dr. David Cole, Director of the Office for the Study of .4utomotive Transportation, 
University of Michigan; Drs. Michael Flynn and Daniel Luria of the Industrial Tech- 
nology Institute; Donald Smith, Director of the Industrial Development Division, Univer- 
sity of Michigan; and Richard Hervey, President of Sigma Associates. These five in- 
dividuals represent, collectively, over a century of experience in analysis of the auto 
industry. Each of them gave many more hours to the AmI project than their modest 
conlpensation required. Their generous commitment to our work is the foundation of 
whatever is excellent in the pages that follow. 
The work of the Central Research Team was inherently collective. The in- 
dividual chapters of this Report do, however, have principal authors. The chapters on 
the "Siting of Vehicle Programs* and "Input Sourcing" are by Daniel Luria, who is also 
the principal author of "Labor Relations." Michael Flynn wrote the chapter on 
"Manufacturer-Supplier Relations." David Cole contributed the chapter on "Emerg- 
ing Product Developments." Richard Hervey, with research assistance from Donald 
Smith, is the author of "Automotive Materials." Donald Smith wrote the body of "Produc- 
tion Technologies"; I contributed the introductory section of that chapter. Alan Baurn 
was the principal author of "AIM Database Development." 'The Contribution of LEDAs" 
was written by J. Downs Herold. 
The Preface and Executive Summary were coauthored by Daniel Luria and 
myself. 
The AIM Project might have foundered in 1ogistic:J problems; every week for 
months some aspect of AIM work was conducted at no less that nineteen different loca- 
tions throughout Michigan. .AIM remained coherent because a dedicated staff invested 
long hours in pushing the Project forward and solving problems before they disrupted 
research or were compounded by the Director. 
David Andrea was an invaluable administrator, and more. His thoughtful and 
precise interview summaries contributed substantially to the analysis embodied in our 
Report. Downs Herold provided essential coordination between .4IM and the participat- 
ing local agencies, and served as an effective advocate for their interests. My colleague 
Alan Baum has devoted most of the past half-year to leadership of .UiM's database 
development efforts. His work, assisted by Mark Everett and Lauren Hammett, con- 
stitutes the most detailed description yet achieved of auto in Michigan. During the most 
intense period of AIM interviews, we were joined by Jerry Jurek, whose wisdom and long 
experience as a manufacturing manager in the industry were a catalytic tonic. 
Throughout this first year of the Project, and in the dem,anding weeks of preparing the 
test of this Report, Lisa Hart and Susan Postema of the ORce for the Study of Automo- 
tive Transportation have contributed a resolute commitment to precision. From the very 
beginning of the -4a2 effort, Sharon Woollard, my colleague at the Department of Com- 
merce, has taken on the often vexing task of managing the Project contract; her diligence 
has shielded others from the burdens of bureaucratic conformance; her thoughtful 
L 
partici2ation in An1 meetings has been stimulating. 
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the singular contribution that Daniel Luria has 
made ,to the first year of the AIM Project. His hand has touched many sections of this 
Report. His commitment to analytical precision has been the conscience of the Project. I 
am able to pass the duties of Director to him with complete confidence. 
Those acknowledged above have worked together to make the Am1 Project a suc- 
cess. The limitations imposed on their best efforts by the original design and initial 
direction of the Project must be my responsibility. 
AIM CENTRAL RESEARCH TEAM 
Dr. Jack Russell served as director of the Auto-In-hfichiga.n Project in fiscal year 1985. 
He is the Director of the new Michigan Technology Deployment Service, Michigan Depart- 
ment of Commerce. 
Dr. David E. Cole serves as the director of the Office for the Study of Automotive 
Transportation (OSAT) a t  the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. 
OSAT sponsors a variety of activities including annual automotive management seminars 
and detailed industry forecasts. Dr. Cole is also a professor of mechanical engineering. 
Dr. Michael S. Flynn is a researcher with the Center for Social and Economic Issues a t  
the Industrial Technology Institute. Before joining IT1 in 1984, Dr. Flynn did extensive 
research with the Joint US.-Japan Auto Study on manufacturer-supplier relationships and 
on relative auto production costs. 
Richard P. Rervey is the president of Sigma Associates. Sigma Associates is a consult- 
ing firm specializing in strategic and tactical planning, technology and market assessment, 
and market development for small- and medium-sized ciients in automotive and related in- 
dustries. 
Dr, Daniel Luria, senior researcher in the Center for Social and Economic Issues of the 
Industrial Technology Institute, serves as AIM coordinator in Fiscal year 1986. Prior to 
joining IT1 in 1984, he spent eight years ai a research associate and chief automotive 
d y s t  for the UAW Research Department in Detroit. 
Donald N. Smith serves as the director of the Industrial Development Division of the In- 
stitute of Science and Technology a t  the University of Michigin. IDD serves as the central 
contact a t  the University through which industrial firms cstn develop relationships with 
faculty and research groups. 
Associated -4111 Project Personnel -
David J. Andrea is a graduate student in business admirlistration at the University of 
Michigan. Mr. Andrea sewed as AIM administrative/research assistant in fiscal year 
1985. 
Alan Baum is data resources coordinator for the Michigan Technology Deployment Serv- 
ice, Michigan Department of Commerce. -Mr. Baum is responsible for database develop- 
ment efforts within the . !  Project. 
J. Downs Heroid serves as the Director for Liaison of the Industrial Development Divi- 
sion of the Institute of Science and Technology at the University of Michigan. Mr. Heroid 
is the AIM Project LEDA Expediter. 
Others -
Mark Everett, a senior at  Michigan State University, has been responsible for editing and 
organizing the LEDA response forms. 
Lauren Hamrnett, also a senior at Michigan State Univer-sity, has been responsible for 
summarizing articles from the popular and trade press on th,e Confer system. 
ADVISORY BOARD 
The Advisory Board to the Auto-in-Michigan Project played an integral part in the 
success of the Project's first year. The twenty-two members of the Board represent a 
cross-section of the industry, and include representatives of the vehicle manufacturers, 
large and small suppliers, the United Auto Workers union., trade associations, and local 
econhmic development agencies. The foilowing table presents the industry leaders who 
have agreed to support and advise the Project. 
The initial objective of the Advisory Board was to guide the Project in its areas of 
espioration and methods of execution. Though the first formal gathering of the complete 
Board took place on May 21, 1985, many cf the,future members had already made them- 
sel.ves available for informal consultations with the Central Research Team (CRT). Valu- 
able contributions were made by the Board in reviewing areas of inquiry and the questions 
to be asked, identifying persons to contact for interviews, and giving moral support to the 
Project's research activities. 
Research activities were also greatly enhanced by the entire Board's willingness to 
participate in personal interviews. Allowing anywhere from one- to three-hour interviews, 
Board members provided the CRT with a tremendous amount of information on each of the 
eight areas (input sourcing, labor relations, materials, OElvUsupplier relations, product 
developments, production technology, siting of vehicle programs, and universal-industry) of 
investigation. The knowledge gained in these interviews has provided a substantial foun- 
dation for the material presented in this report, and for th.e investigations that will con. 
tinue into year two of the Project. 
The formal presentation of the first year -4IM Project findings to the ~ o a r d  will take 
place on October 2, 1955 at  the University of hlichigan. Each member of the Board will 
be presented an executive summary of the final report and will be briefed by the members 
of the CRT on the major findings. Areas of investigation for year two and potential state 
and local policy and program initiatives will also be discussecl. 
AIM ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS 
Name I Title I Organization 
Donald W. Abelson 
Fred Boiling 
Robert W. Carlton 





















































General Motors Corp. 
Ford Motor Company 
Greater Jackson Chamber 
of Commerce 
Clhrysler Corp. 
General Motors Corp. 
R,. J. Tower Corp. 
G,eneral Motors Corp. 
Ford' Motor Company 
Sackner Products 
S heller-Globe Corp. 
U'AW Local 600 
Donnelly Corp. 
United Auto Workers Union 
Cross Company 
Four Star Corp. 
Mlodern Engineering 
General Electric Company 
The Budd Company 
Robert M. Sinclair 
Douglas J. Smith 
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Assistant Managing Director 
Title 
Special Consultant 
to the President 
Organization 
Chrysler Corp. 
Office for Economic 
Expansion, Grand Valley 
State College 
Iletroit Tooling Association 
IJnited Auto Workers Union 
A PREFACE 
TBE PUBLIC INTEREST IN AUTOMOTIVE IZESTRUC'I'URIiiG 
The AIM. Project is based on a belief that an aware, activist State role can make a 
difference in our economic future. That view is not shared equally by all players in the 
state's automotive economy. Some skepticism toward public sector initiatives, it should be 
said, has a basis in historical experience. The private sector has certain expertise that 
government cannot c h d e n p  or hope to match. On the other hand, to the extent that 
opposition to activist policy is justified by claims that t,he Stab lacks industry-level 
knowledge and intelligence, we hope the XIiM erTort wil l  give State e f i r t s  increased 
credibility as it pursues the public's interest in the future health of its dominant rnanuf'ac- 
t h g  sector. 
Of the neariy four million Michigan residents that work for wages and salaries, 
neariy one in six is directly involved in manufacturing c:us, truck, and their parts. 
They and maay of their neighbors live by automotive payrolls. Whole communities live 
and die with particular automotive facilities. 
Many of the decisions that determine our communities' fates are made by a handful 
of individuals in WcEgan's companies. Many of the agreements that determine, 
either directly or by tradition, the living standards of Blfichiganians are crafted by 
similarly small groups of management and labor representatives. 
These "decisions at the tapn are an inevitable, and gmerally accepted, instance of 
leadershi9 in market economies, They do, however, generate costs M well as benefits, 
and some of those costs are borne more widely than by the workers and managers on 
whose behaf most private economic deals are concluded. That wider distribution of 
narrowly-originated economic outcomes ?resents the rationille for, and the first ,pide to 
zpplication of, a public rule in the state's automotive economy. 
All stakeholders in that economy are investors, either directly or indirectly. 
Businesses allocate investible funds among projeczs, unions invest labor power aEkr h e y  
bargain over the conditions of labor and the distribution of the value of sales betlveen 
stockholders and wag-smers, and govemment provides in.u^rastnrcnue, semices such as 
pubiic education, and - increasingly - tatgeted subsidies in the tax and t~aining fields. 
Each investor seeks to maximize the return on their investment. Sometimes, joinc 
mdnizat ion is possible, while at  other times objecdve functions clash. Business seeks to 
maximizle profit, Iabor to increase wage-earners' share of output, and govemen t  
net wealth created within its boundaries. When aew &Li,chigm investments are made 
that do not devalue existring ones, and which generata rising living standards for 
workers and shareholders alike, all stakeholders enjoy net, benefits. 
Unfortunately, a fortuitous coincidence of interests is not always the case. Business 
sometimes maximizes the evnings of its shareholders by &investing from ~Michigan 
facilities, imposing mighty costs on workers and those their incomes support. This is a 
diIemma pused by many outsourcing decisions that sm government's role from recipient 
of tax revenues to provider of social support for the unemployed. Likewise, a particulvly 
large wage hike may raise a particular group's living standards, but impose costs on 
others by discouraging future invesunent. Finally, new investments may be made in 
Michigan but impose costs on existing businesses with which they compete; sometimes 
those costs can more than offset the gains From the new investment. (This last situation is 
'alleged by some suppliers to apply to new Michigan investments by their foreign-based 
competitors.) 
As an example of stakeholders' interests in tension, consider the oft-cited need tc 
reduce domestic s m d  car production costs by some $:!,000 per unit. Clearly, the 
OEMs and their .domestic suppliers want to see this goal met, since sales and shares 
hang in the balance. U.S. labor unions Iikewise want auto-producing jobs here rather 
than elsewhere. Finally, government a t  all levels wants the fiscal benefits of domestic 
rather than the foreign output portended by such a larp cost gap. 
Beyond this common ground, however, interests diverge. Labor wants the cost- 
reduction effort to succeed without big pay or benefit cults, to keep existing small car 
facilities operating, and to maintain high UAW content. 1)omestic independent supplier 
shops want to sell what they produce without having to accept price cuts, so they'd 
rather see labor do more of the belt-tightening. The OEMs, for their part, want the cost. 
reduction god met without sacrificing product quality. Mortsver, unlike workars, unions, 
and smaller independent suppliers, the OE~kls retain the option of delivering For their 
shareholders even if they don't meet the U.S. cost reduction goal, by purchasing vehicles 
from abroad. 
The Skte, W y ,  wants production costs cut so the work can remain in 
Michigan. It is more willing than unions to countenance Iabor cost moderation as a tcol, 
and less insiscent that all of the Michigan content be unionized. It  wants the social peace 
of a viable distribution of output and power, and thus wouid prefer that the coso of 
regaining competiiiveness be shared more or less equimbiy among the private pades. 
The State navigates these wat2rs with two objectivcss. First, the State as an inves- 
tor needs to look after the return is e m s .  . b o n g  other approaches, it can condition cer- 
tain of its investments on particular behavior on the part of private parties. For ermple, 
it might conceivably seek promises of minimum Michigan contant in vehicles built in State- 
subsidized plants as the quid pro quo for granting or contLxuing those subsidies. Second, 
the State has an interest in seeing to it that deals are struck between management and 
labor that anchor in, or re- or attract to, .Michigan new net wealth-erearing ac- 
tivity. Such deals wilI tend to raise the State's direct returnsn-investment and pay future 
fiscal dividends. 
In the Report that folIows, we present the .XDl Project participants: major conclu- 
sions regarding the future sbtus  of the auto industry in our state and key recommends- 
tioas for State action. In considering these, the reader is asked to try to think in t e r n  
of the individual and joint mximization metaphor we've been using. Think, if you will, of 
a four-sided table a t  which the state is joined by the auto makers, their suppliers, and the 
U.4W. Imagine the parties discussing our findings, and seekirtg mutually satisfying courses 
of action to meet both the risks and the opportunities that will be generated by the automo- 
tive industry as its changes in this state over the next seven pears. 
No seat at that table is an easy chair. Perhaps the most demanding position, 
however, is occupied by the Skate, for it must pursue the general interest, considering the 
needs of each of the 'others, and of us all. To ask how the! State can serve our gilneral 
interests as Michigan passes through the continuing automotive transfomadon is to live 
with some very challenging questions: 
Can cost-justifiable public action influence which facilities are given new vehicle 
programs? 
e L it possible, and economicdy rational, for the State to understand fully the ar- 
ticulation of the establishment-specific chains of value added in the automotive 
economy, so that events at  the finished vehicle level (such as the abandonment of 
impon restraints) can be translated into detaiIed supplier plant impacts? 
~r To what extent can the State up its race of return by conditioning its inves~ments 
on particular private behaviors? mould requiring o minimum level of LMichigan 
content in return for tax or training subsidies or for support of foreign trade zone 
status succeed in its g o 4  or make business less likely to invest here? Would this 
tradeoff be worth it, bringing fewer, but "deeper," u~vestments contriluting more 
net new a c t i ~ t y ?  
o Can State action that is based on the son of rigorous "social accounting" criteria 
we've described be defended in the political arena? 
How can ~Michigan, as a high-wage, highly-unionized state, maximize the ad- 
vantages of proximity to OEM assembly and regional component operations? Are 
there public sector actions not now being taken that could provide cost-effective 
incentives to greater clustering of supplier facilities? What can the State do to in- 
crease the extent to which first-tier suppliers of modular subassemblies build up 
their modules from discrete parts produced in the sta,te? 
Are there cost-effective State actions that could provide constructive new uses For 
automotive facilities that become vacant? Is it possible for the Stab to work with 
private business and with labor to co-plan the hture of such apparently at-risk 
facilities? 
This hr; of questions could, of course, be developed further. Each poses, in dX- 
ferent ways, whether public interest c 3 n  be advanced by ulformed pubiic investment. The 
work of the AIM Project wil l  h d  its best uses in an envirorment in which these questions 
are frankly addressed and resolved by industry, labor, and govenunent. We Iook forward 
to a continuing discussion with the Advisory Board and the automotive industry 
stakeholders its members represent. 
AIM '85 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMRiIENDATIONS 
For the past ten months, a unique endeavor has been sponsored by State govern- 
ment. Under the Auto-in-Michigan (AIM) Project, a team of researchers and policy 
leaders has been at work seeking to understand the forces affecting the state's leading in- .. 
dustry and, based on that understanding, to suggest State government actions to prepare 
for likely developments in the 1986-1992 period. 
This document is the Executive Summary of the 300-page 1985 Report of the AIM 
Project. It presents, in capsule form, our major findings and conclusions. (These also ap- 
pear ir~ simplified tabular form at  the end of this Executive Summary.) Most important, 
we offer our recommendations for some key State actions that might flow from our find- 
ings. 
During the past months, we have moved within an industry that is making an im- 
pressive effort to transform the ways in which it mobilizes resources to compete in the 
international marketplace. In Detroit and Grand Rapids, in ]?lint and Sterling Heights, and 
in Lansing we have seen leaders moving an industry forwarci. 
Big ships turn slowly, however. During the rest of this decade, and well into the next, 
Michigan's auto industry leadership must navigate heavy seas. Continuing turbulence 
remains the only realistic forecast for auto in Michigan. 
Most of Michigan's nineteen car and light truck assembly plants now or soon will host 
new or nearly new vehicle programs that are aimed a t  the markets of today and tomor- 
row. A few big plants are a t  peril, however, and more might be if our now-unrestrained 
Japanese competitors claim still larger shares of the U.S. market. 
We have observed ail auto makers fully committed to a fundamental change in their 
relations with suppliers, a pr6cess that will surely reduce the number of ~Michigan firms 
with which they directly conduct business. The direct suppliers that remain in the industry 
will enjoy stable, long-term relations with their customers, but they, and the smaller sup- 
pliers that serve them, will provide less employment than in the past. Aggressive State 
actions, however, can do much to preierve and create Michigan jobs throughout the entire 
chain of automotive production. 
ATM h d s  an industry passing through the early stages of a revolution in its produc- 
tion technologies, and one in which the mix of materials in the typical product may change 
dramatically in the mid-term future. 
The application of computer technology to the design, engineering, prototyping, 
production, testing, and marketing of the automotive product will increase rapidly during 
1986-1992. The transformation, driven by digital technology, will be disruptive, but it can 
yield substantial benefits for Michigan if new efficiencies reduce costs and defend U.S. 
market share, and if Michigan grows as a center of initiative in computer-integrated 
manufacturing. 
The cars of tomorrow will contain more aluminum and engineering plastics, a 
development that brings both risks and opportunities for our state. Iron foundries dedicated 
to engine and drivetrain components will face difficult tirries as aluminum casters and 
smelters that serve them claim new automotive business in engine blocks, cylinder heads, 
intake manifolds, transmission cases, and lesser components. Plastics will challenge 
stamped steel as the "skin" of choice in a widening range of US.-produced vehicles. This 
crucial contest should be watched with care in Michigan, for whatever its resolution, many 
jobs will be lost, and others created, in the industry's home state. 
These highlighted findings, and the many others that fbllow, convince us of the need 
to strengthen the special bonds between government and the auto industry in Michigan. 
The AIM Project is an ambitious experiment in the education of government by in- 
dustry. AIM is also a public effort to provide analysis that a m  be of direct, value 
to the managers and owners and workers who are the most important stakeholders in 
Michigan's automotive economy. 
To understand the possible futures of the auto industry in this state, even to a 1992 
horizon, is no small task. The Michigan automotive economy represents America's most 
complex industry, in its highest geographic concentration, in a period of unprecedented 
volatility. In a changing environment of risks and opportunities, informed analysis is es- 
sential. The State had three objectives in commissioning the AIM Project: 
1) To Make Government a Wise Investor of PubIic Resources 
Each year Michigan spends millions on auto industry needs and interests. The State 
must maximize the public return from these expenditures. 
2) To Develop Michigan Governments as Resourceful !Suppliers 
Just as private, for-profit vendors are asked to contribute more to the industry, so 
state and local governments must become informecl, innovating suppliers of the 
public services that support competitive production in ifichigan. 
3) To Extend the Planning Horizons of Government 
In 1985, the industry is shaping the worId of the early 1990s. More of government's 
economic development programs must anticipate needs that may emerge five or 
more years in the future as today's auto decisions are implemented. 
Armed with this charter and modest state funding, the project has been hard a t  work 
during the past months. We have taken a bank of carefully crafted questions to a roster of 
experts and decision-makers from industry. These AIM Project interview questions were 
organized along seven fronts of change within the industry: 
Q Siting of OEM Vehicle Programs 
a Input Sourcing 
a Manufacturer-Supplier Relations 
Labor Relations 
a Emerging Product Developments 
a Automotive Materiais 
a Production Technologies 
In.each case, our purpose has been to assess. how developm.ents in the 1986-1992 period 
might influence the size, stability, and prospects of the auto industry in Michigan. 
Section-bysection Summaries -
Siting of Vehicle Programs 
The State's economic health depends on maintainiirtg its share of vehicle as- 
semblies. Action to replace the production that will be lost when current programs 
expire a t  Clark/Fleetwood, Pontiac Plant 8, Dearborn Assembly, and Wayne Assern- 
bly is thus a high pn'on'iy. 
Michigan is the core state of the US.-based assembly companies, for the past 
several decades accounting for approximately one-third of the nine to fourteen million cars 
and light trucks produced in North America. There is considerable basis for optimism 
that the state can retain and even increase its share of domestic builds. At the same 
time, there is every reason to expect that sharp increases in import share - already ap- 
pearing in the wake of the non-extension of the VRA - will make it extremely difficult 
for the state to maintain its current unit production, especially as Japanese competition 
begins extending further into the intermediate segment. 
Table 1 presents a summary of current and expected. future assembly programs in 
Michigan. 
Our work convinces us that five factors go a long way toward determining which of 
Michigan's nineteen current OEM assembly facilities have secure futures. These are the 
age of the current vehicle program, whether it is front or reiu wheel drive, the configura- 
tion of the plant and the cost of changing it, the extent to which its market segment is or 
is likely to come in direct competition with imports, and the likely impact of fuel prices 
and government CAFE rules. Table 2 presents our ,effort ;tt rating Michigan's assembly 
operations on these criteria. 
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F l i n t  Truck 
Ford Wixan IS, Panther 4 1 6 0 3 1 4  
Wayne ( Truclc 1 'Bronco ,F 3 0 0 0 4 7 
Wayne (Car) Erika 5 0 0 9 4 18 
Dearborn Fox 9 7 6 5 0 27 
Chrysler Jefferson K I E , ~  6* 3 0 2 0 ll 
Ste r l ing  H 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Warren D h  0** 2 0 2 3 7 
*Likely to decl ine to 0 due to  s i t i n g  of A ' s  i n  88. 
**N truck (Dakota) caning in 1986t. 
Based on the analysis underlying Table 2, it appears that four Michigan car assem- 
bly facilities are at risk in the 1986-92 period. Three of these are endangered by the 
shift toward front wheel drive: GM's ClarWFIeetwood operation and its Pontiac Plant 8, 
and Ford's Dearborn Assembly Plant. All three are old, mi~ltistory structures; none has 
on-site dedicated major panel stamping capacity or a fully modern new-style paint shop. 
By today's standards, all are lightly robotized and, with the exception of Plant 8, relative- 
ly labor-intensive. Perhaps most'important, all produce rear wheel drive vehicles intro- 
duced more than a decade ago. The fourth at-risk assembly operation is Ford's Wayne 
car assembly line, due to increased small car imports. 
We believe that two of the four endangered plants ~ v i l l  be the site of future new 
vehicle programs. Pontiac Plant 8 is reportedly the future home of the plastic-skinned 
1990 GM80 CamaroFirebird successor. Wayne Assembly, because of its quality record 
and workforce reputation, will likely be chosen for a fu.ture Ford car or light truck 
program even if, as we fear, there is no domestic successor to the EscortLynx line. That 
B 
leaves Clark/Fleetwood and Dearborn Assembly. The former, bolstered by the addition of 
remaining I3-body volume in 1986, is likely to close in 1990 or 1991. Dearborn Assem- 
bly appears destined to close a t  about the same time, as Mach 1 (reskinned Mustang) 
production phases out. - In the Recommendations subsection below, we outline some ap- 
proaches the State might consider with regard to these two facilities. 
Based on Table 2, it also appears that several other Michigan assembly plants are in 
some, albeit much less, risk. These include Chevy F l i t  Truck (scheduled tu go from two 
lines to one in 1987), Ford Wixom (if conversion to front drive platforms is postponed), 
and Chrysler Jefferson (if the late-'87 A-body successor to t,he K-body is sited elsewhere). 
Finally, there is the issue of foreign direct assembly investments: While the U.S. 
and Michigan gain when vehicles that otherwise would be! shipped from abroad are in- 
stead assembled here, our work suggests that the typical Big Three Michigan assem- 
bly plant generates a t  least twice, and potentially as much as six times, as much 
Michigan manufacturing activity as the typical foreign-owned or joint venture assembly 
operation. This, of course, is due to the former's higher U.2;. content (85098% versus 25- 
50%) and its greater propensity to purchase major inputs from existing Michigan sup- 
pliers. 
Input Sourcing 
Major sales and job losses loom for Michigan's frame, stamping and axle plants. 
New aluminum engines, and perhaps manual transerles, present fclture business 
opportunities, Efforts need to be made to increase? the .Michigan content of 
vehicles made in new foreign-owned U.S. assembly plants. 
Michigan's approximately 70,000 assembly jobs underpin 200,000 captive and in- 
dependent supplier jobs and another 280,000 state mandacturing jobs, for a total of 
about 550,000. Adding jobs at corporate and divisional headquarters, technical centers, 
and proving grounds swells the figure to 650,000, or about 55% of Michigan manufactur- 
ing employment. In our work to date, the Project has succeeded in describing, for all car 
and light truck assembly programs in Michigan, the first tier suppliers of major frame and 
body stampings or plastic panels, engines, and major drivetrain elements, including unit 
volumes. Combining that information with the vehicle program siting data summarized 
above, we have been able to identify areas of risk and opport.unity. 
The phaseout of GM B-, D-, G-, and T-body cars will impact volumes a t  Chevy 
Flint Met Fab, Grand Rapids 1, Chevy Flint Engine, Chevy (Detroit) Gear and Axle, 
and Three Rivers Hydra-Matic. Termination of the Fox (Mustang/Capri) program 
would endanger output a t  Dearborn Stamping, at the Utica and Chesterfield trim plants, 
and (to a lesser extent) at Sterling Axle. Increased imports would hurt Michigan plants 
producing stampings, engines, and transmissions for GM J-body, Ford Escort/Lynx, and 
Chxysler Ornni/Horizon models. Rising market penetration by low-U.S. content 
domestically-assembled cars will reduce traditional U.S. OEM part demand by at least 
14%, and perhaps by as much as 3472, just between now and 1987. Increased vehicle 
outsourcing by the OEMs - some of it offshore - will reduce partsmakers' volumes still 
further, with significant costs to Michigan businesses. 
In major frame stampings, the Rouge Frame Plant is at risk unless additional truck 
frame woik is added. The emerging trend, in GM at  least, tcward space frames (or "bird 
cages*) may be an opportunity for Michigan producers, within and outside the OEMs, 
especially if space. framed vehicles begin to appear in light trucks, many of whose 
frames are made in Illinois and Wisconsin. 
In body panels, vehicle program phaseouts endanger five Michigan OEM stamping 
operations. GM's Conner Stamping and Olds (Lansing) Me,t Fab #I facilities and Ford's 
Dearborn Stamping plant seem a t  greatest risk. The trend to greater use of some or all 
plastic panels in vehicle outer skins presents dangers and opportunities. Two of the five 
at-risk stamping plants, plus several other Michigan plants - OEM and independent - 
may find new openings in the plastic panel field by the early 1990s. 
In engines, the redesign of many if not most current programs will likewise 
present risks and openings. The good news is the reported possibility of siting GM's new 
3.2-L V6 engine in the former DDA (now CPC) Romulus facility. Michigan siting of some 
or all of 1991 Ccylinder Manhattan engine production is a strong possibility. Chrysler's 
Trenton Engine plant is adding a 2.5-L to its current 2.2-b line, and putting a 3.9-L V6 
truck engine in Mound Road. Ford's Dearborn En,&e Plaat has received significant in- 
vestment in its 1.9-L line, and even exports some engines to England. On the negative 
sid'e, the trend to more and more use of aluminum blocks and especially cylinder heads 
may be a high-cost event for Michigan, Some of GM's and all of Chrysler's Michigan- 
assembled engines have heads from Mexico, Brazil, or Italy. Blocks for Buick's (Flint) 
3.0-and 3.8-L V6s are being moved out of Pontiac's foundry (which closes in 1986) to 
Defiance, Ohio; foundries in 'Indiana and New York also appear to have an edge over 
Michigan facilities in aluminum casting experience. 
In automatic transmissions, Michigan is the nation's dominant state. GM Hydra- 
Matic facilities supply most GM cars and light trucks; Ford's Livoliia plant provides most . 
of the company's large car automatics. Only Chrysler, with transmission plants in In- 
diana and New York, lacks a presence here. None of this is likely to change much; 
domestic market share will determine volumes and hence risks. In manual transaxles, 
installed in over half of s m d  cars, the state has no presence a t  all. GM gets its domestic 
manual from its own and Warner Gear's plants in Indiana, and imports from Isuzu; 
Ford buys from Warner, Ford of Europe, Tremec (Mexico), and Mazda; Chrysler makes 
its own manuals, but in Syracuse, New York. The trend to front wheel drive benefits 
transmission and hurts axle plants; Michigan has many of both. 
Finally, the outlook is not terribly bright for significant new component orders for 
Michigan suppliers from the new U.S. plants of foreign-based automakers. While Honda 
has announced and Mazda is considering U.S. engine plants, the typical foreign- 
nameplate U.S. operation imports engines and transaxles, and stamps on-site using 
mostly Japanese steel. Often, new foreign-based suppliers come with these assembly 
plants, adding jobs but also competing away Big Three business from established 
Michigan suppliers. At NUMMI in California, 1450 parts are shipped from Japan and 
400 are US.-sourced. Of the latter, many are low-value added, energy-intensive inputs 
(sealants, paints, wire and cable), while many of the rest (c:.g., air conditioners) are sup- 
plied by U.S. plants of Japan-based suppliers. 
Manufacturer-Supplier Relations 
There will be substantially increased outsourcing by the OEIMs, and a shakeout of 
independent part. suppliers. The resulting supplier base will have fewer and 
larger firms, arranged in tiers under producers of complete subsystems or 
"modules." While these first-tier module suppliers will tend to cluster around as- 
sembly plants - a plus for Michigan - only the most cost-competitive and tech- 
nologically sophisticated among lower-tier suppliers czre likely to survive in the 
emerging setup. 
The internationalization of automotive competition is creating pressures for significant 
and rapid cost reductions, and as a result OEMs and major suppliers alike are shopping 
more, and more selectively, outside their own boundaries. The OEMs all intend to 
reduce their vertical integration, citing the fact that in Japan the typical OEM builds very 
few components in-house beyond engine and drivetrain assembly. - 
Five developments - the end of secure contracb to captive parts plants, the need for 
world-class quality, the desire to use Just-in-Tie (JIT) rnethods to reduce inventory 
costs and quickly identify defects, the possibility of shifting to or sharing with independent 
suppliers the responsibility for component design and engineering, and the decision to try 
to source pretested modules rather than only discrete parts -- are driving the emerging set 
of relations between OEMs and their suppliers. All five cjre closely interwoven, and all 
tend to push in the same direction. 
All of the Big Three OEMs have committed to reducing the cost of light vehicles 
by approximately $2,000 per unit, with initial emphasis on smaller cars. With 50 to 70 
percent of the value of each car originating outside the O:EMs, it makes sense to seek 
some, if not most, of the $2,000 in sought-after saving in purchased inputs, while 
malting parallel efforts in in-house stamping, assembly, engine, and transmission opera- 
tions. 
To reduce costs, rationalize delivery, improve quaiity, and reduce inventory carrying 
costs, the OEMs have decided to reduce their number of direct suppliers, opting instead 
for a more explicitly tiered arrangement in which they deal with a smaller number of 
firstt-tier suppliers, which in turn ride herd on a larger number of lower-tier suppliers. 
Wherever possible, 'the first-tier suppliers will deliver not discrete (loose) parts, but corn- 
\ pleted, built-up subassemblies or "modules," such as an instrument panel, a front suspen- 
sion, or a wheel-brake-tire "corner." Such modules will be delivered on a JIT basis, 
pretested. 
The module supplier will have had significant responsibility for the design and en- 
gineering of the module, and to remain a first-tier supplier will have to continually find 
ways to deliver the subsystem more cheaply. Early cooperation between such suppliers 
and their OEM customers will, of course, be crucial if the modules are to be combined 
efficiently into high-quality vehicles. That cooperation will include supplier-OEM 
electronic links, particularly in the CAD area. 
Such shared design and electronic linking cuts two ways for Michigan. First, to the 
extent that it makes possible lower levels of OEM vertical, integration, it results in lost 
business for Michigan's many captive supplier facilities. On the other hand, the ad- 
vantages of proximity to customers for JIT methods suggests that the state will be home 
to more and more first-tier module suppliers. To complicate things further, however, 
those &st-tier Michigan supplier operations may be reduced to mere subassembly sites or 
even, in some cases, warehouses; the real manufacturing activity - casting, machin- 
ing, stamping, extruding, molding, etc. - could be done in 1.ower-tiir suppliers outside the 
state. Finally, electronic linking makes possible, though not necessarily likely, the out- 
sourck~g of certain engineering and design work that traditionally has been sited close 
to OEM headquarter locations. 
On balance, we believe that the coming tiering of th'e supplier base bodes well for 
larger, more technologically sophisticated Michigan partsmidcers and engineering services 
firms, but on balance ill for smaller and less technically able producers. First-tier module 
suppliers will retain significant manufacturing activity (though Ohio and Indiana loca- 
tions are nearly as functional for JIT as Michigan sites), but they can be expected to 
react to OEM price-cutting pressure by sourcing the constituent elements of their 
modules more widely, including to shops in Mexico and the Pacific, something made more 
feasible by declining transport and electronic communication costs. 
While the trends described above seem inevitable, the rate a t  which they occur, and 
the extent to which they benefit or harm Michigan, are not fixed in stone. The con- 
tinued "poiitical" power of captive parts plants places some (though decreasing) limits on 
the extent and rate of OEM outsourcing. The degree to which full JIT implementation 
(first-tier supplier plants adjacent to assembly customers) is required is very much in 
doubt; to the degree that OEMs instead use JIT not as a quality driver but only to shift 
inventory costs to suppliers, the result could be more Michigan warehouses rather than 
production operations. 
In any case, some work now done in Michigan is likely to be lost to foreign sourcing, 
including drum brakes, simple steel wheels, interior fabric and soft trim, small plastic 
parts, rsmall metal starnpings, and labor-intensive subassemblies such as copper wire har- 
nesses. There is, of course, some pbssibility that such work: could return to the U.S. and 
Michigan in the future, as technology reduces labor conteat and parts complexity. One 
example, treated below under Emerging Product Developments, is the prospect of multi- 
plexing and fiber optics replacing copper wiring harnesses. Worrisomely, some of the 
Michigan independents most likely by virtue of their size and technolo,oical capabilities to 
be future first-tier module suppliers now make some of th'e parts and components most 
likely to be foreign-sourced. 
Finally, our review of the U.S. results from the U.S. J apan  Supplier Survey finds 
Michigan's large and small suppliers at  least as competent in engineering as their out-of- 
state competitors, but turns up some evidence that medium-sized Michigan suppliers 
may be lagging technologically. If true, this is a problem titat needs immediate attention, 
if such shops are to win contracts from first-tier suppliers. 
Labor Relations 
New, flexible technologies and increased competition - from abroad and from 
new foreign-owned assembly and parts plants - are likely to produce turbulence 
in the State's labor relations climate. Traditional work practices will continue to 
be eroded, and defended. Long-stable pattern bargaining relationships will give 
way to multiple agreements more tied to the competitiveness of particular plants 
and product lines. 
The period between now and 1992 is likely to set? increasingly turbulent labor- 
management interactions. On the one hand, common interests in maintaining and reclaim- 
ing market share lost to imported vehicles and parts will be a powerful motivator of 
"deals" in which labor trades wage moderation and work rille flexibility for management 
commitments to invest, and keep work, in existing organized plants. On the other hand, 
increased international competition will mean more outsourcing. That, combined with 
new U.S. parts plants of foreign-based firms, will produce pressures to pay small car 
and. parts workers less than large car workers, with sharp pattern-defending reactions 
likely. Resistance to wage and work rule demands may drive investment to lower-cost 
sites, with the resulting displacement heightening reluctance to modify job-preserving 
work practices. 
The State interest is neither in breaking pattern lablor agreements nor in freezing 
existing arrangements, but in promoting a smooth transition to a state automotive culture 
based on explicit labor-management deals covering investment, pay, and work organiza- 
tion. To promote and incentivize such deals, the State needs to promote a wide dis- 
course on the relationships between technology, skill requirements, and production costs; 
between work practices, costs,. and flexible automation invwtments; and between pattern 
bargaining, costs, and the future of automotive sector trade unionism. Our work has 
focused on these three sets of relationships. 
New technologies are increasing the skill requirements of most production worker 
jobs in OEMs and first-tier suppliers. On the other hand, machinists' and diemakers' 
traditional crafts are being devalued, while machine repair t,radespeople, millwrights, and 
pipefitters are so far little affected. New skills are required in both hydraulics and 
electrical trades. Because recent umpire decisions permit a growing share of relatively 
routine diagnostic work on electricaUelectronic hardware to be performed by production 
workers, the trades' share of auto'jobs is likely to stay con.stant a t  about la%.. But the 
scarcity of tradespeople may give this minority a great deal of power in the next few 
years, including the power to stand in the way of deals that might secure work for U.S. 
and Michigan plants in return for increased work rule flexibility. 
Under the pressure of increased imports and outsou:rcing, many of the work rule 
"horror stories" have been cleaned up since 1980. In the OEMs, the least movement has 
occurred in large car plants and in captive facilities producing their parts. Our work sug- 
gests that in 1981-83 OEM workers made small concessions (or forewent scheduled in- ! 
creases) in pay but often large ones in local work practic:es, while in many suppliers 
larger cuts in pay rather than in job rules were more typical. The key, of course, is the 
effect of workforce flexibility on costs. How much do restxtctions on how management 
deploys workers matter? Which relaxations would save the most money in which kinds 
of plants? How much? Enough to change any significant component or vehicle sourcing 
decisions? Are there "disjustifiedn investments in programmable automation that would 
be justified if work practices were changed? 
We found little hard evidence with which to attempt imswers to these and similar 
queries. The UAW made a clear distinction between combining skilled trades classifica- 
tions within versus across basic trade lines, and their position found support among plant- 
level management; both of these groups felt top managers were overreacting to past 
rigidities, and seeking a level of flexibility that might undermine needed specialization. 
Pay-for-knowledge systems tended to have the backing of top company and union leaders, 
but some plant managers feared they led foremen to promote insufficiently-trained 
workers, hurting quality. 
Existing work practices are, of course, a response to the traditionally low levels of job 
security within the industry. Where in Western Europe and Japan job security is more 
uniformly underpinned by government policy and tradition, respectively, rigid job- 
protecting local work rules have not evolved. This logic gives reason for optimism that if 
and as the U.S. industry comes to treat hourly labor more as a fixed cost, resistance to 
flexible workforce deployment may fall away. The new Job Opportunity Bank program 
is the latest and most thorough-going evidence of an evo1ut;ion in this direction: not only 
does it represent a new level of job security, but also e:rplicitly trades that for fewer 
restrictions on the assignability of Banked employees. 
Heightened competition is eroding more than traditional work practices; negotiated 
wage and benefit patterns are also under attack. More and more supplier plants have 
been split off from master agreements, and talk of similar pattern breakout among OEM 
captive parts plants abounds. Certainly, new competition from the-U.S. plants of Japan- 
based suppliers is creating pressure in this direction. The 1982 and 1984 UAW-Big Three 
contracts permit terms of the national agreement to be waived in cases in which "major 
outsourcing decisions" may hang in the balance. While pure two-tier agreements are un- 
likely, it is' probable that independent and captive parts plants alike will see lower 
starting rates, slower progression to maximums, and longer benefit grow-in periods. In 
addition, we expect OEM parts plants producing at-risk corn.ponents (some trim, batteries, 
bearings, die castings, small assemblies, etc.) to negotiate lower-cost agreements than as- 
sembly, stamping, engine, and transmission plants; this tiering could occur in 1987 bar- 
gaining, but is more likely to come in little by little over the next six or so years, driven 
by particular competitive developments in specific product linles. 
There is also some, though less, chance that small car assembly, engine, and 
drivetrain plants may come to constitute a lower tier. As of now, it appears that pay and 
benefib will be similar, but that there will be few if any restrictions on work organiza- 
tion. It seems certain that whatever arrangements eventuate a t  NUMMI, Mazda, and 
Saturn will set the post-1990 pattern for small cars, and become the quid pro quo for fu- 
ture domestic small car investments, including the domestic programs (if any) that replace 
Escof iynx ,  Omni/Horizon, Encore/Alliance, and GM J-bodies. 
Whether the erosion in traditional work practices ancl pay-and-benefit patterns we 
predict occurs in the context of bitter acriniony or of constmctive deal-making remains to 
be seen. We believe that these changes can best be nurtured and accommodated by a 
tripartite productivity coalition, but that will require much fuller articulation of the com- 
petition, cost, and work organization issues raised above. 'Without that, labor will be un- 
willing to give up long-standing pay and job practices and iaanagement will be unwilling 
to forego the exercise of its traditional outsourcing prerogatives. 
Emerging Product Developments 
By 1932, most new cars and many light trucks will have front-drive, new engines 
with much more aluminum, simpler and higherquality transmissions, and far 
more electronic controls than today. Some 10% will hczue space fiames uith plas- 
tic panels, a configuration that may dominate by 2000. Impacts on engine, 
mechanical control, steel, and stamping plants are thu:s likely. 
The market itself is an increasingly si,&cant driver of the product decisions made 
in the Michigan corporate and technical centers of the Big Three and their first-tier sup- 
pliers. Increased international competition is shortening product cycles, creating new re- 
quirements for product differentiation, and splitting the U.S. market into high-volume 
"commodity" and lower-volume specialty segments. Technology is playing and will play 
a growing role in all three of these areas. A qualitatively riew and profound sense of ur- 
gency is apparent within the industry: unless new world-class quality products that fit 
the new market demands can be produced at competitive cost, a major shrinkage in 
domestic market share is expected, with obvious dire consequences for auto-dependent 
Michigan. 
The trend to unibody and space frame structures, the need to redesign mature en- 
gines and transmissions, the replacement of mechanical with electronic controls, and the 
successful deployment of flexible automation to accomrnoda.te modular assembly and the 
other requirements of a more variegated marketplace vill dominate the efforts of 
automotive technologists in the 1985-92 period. h' emphasis on systems engineering and 
parts plant entrepreneurialism will characterize these efforts. 
In drivetrains, 72-93% of passenger cars (up from 51% in 1984) will be front wheel 
drive by 1992, with resulting increases in demand for CV joints. Over time, electronic 
controls will replace many hydraulic controls, and more McPherson strut front suspen- 
sions will be used to accommodate transverse enginejfront drive. Gore four-wheel drive 
vehicles (perhaps 15-25% by 1992) could mean major new opportunities in prop shafts, 
U-joints, and sophisticated transfer cases. More manual transaxles will be used, with 
negative impacts on Michigan (see Input Sourcing, above), with five speeds dorninat- 
ing. By 1992, if belt manufacturability problems are solved, some cars up to perhaps 
2.6-L may be equipped with Continuously Variable Transmissions (CVTs), with result- 
ing opportunities in belt-making and viscous dampers but some negative impacts on 
volumes in gears, friction surfaces, and clutches. 
Continued movement away from separate body frames in passenger cars and low- 
load light trucks is likely. By 1992, moreover, use of bird-cage or space-frame structures 
will have moved out of low-volume applications (Corvette, Fiero) into several high- 
volume vehicles. This will greatly increase the chances that many more vehicles will 
have bolt-on plastic body panels for part or all of their outer skins (see Input Sourcing 
above, and Automotive Materials below). On-site steel panel stamping will be used in- 
creasingly for new assembIy plants, but major impacts on OEM regional stamping 
facilities are not expected before the mid-1990s. 
Gasoline engines will be extensively redesigned between now and 1992, and even 
more hl  the 1993-2000 period. Four-cylinder engines will maintain their roughly 50% 
market share, but the sideight mix - now about even -- will move to about 35/15 in 
1992 passenger cars, as peppier sixes, turbocharging, and more efficient transmissions 
permit V8-type performance without the weight and fuel consumption penalties. Greater 
use of aluminum blocks and especially cylinder heads is expected (for blichigan impacts, 
see Input Sourcing above and Automotive Materials below). Electronic controls, overhead 
cams, fast burn combustion chambers, and roller lifters are expected on an increasing 
share of U.S.-made engines by 1992. Ceramics may begin to play a role in cam followers, 
piston crowns, valves, and exhaust port liners, though their biggest contributions may 
come in heavy duty diesel applications. Flexible automation and the possibility of in- 
tegrating casting and machining operations together may make economic much smaller en- 
gine module sizes than today's 400,000-unit floor. 
Electronic componentry is taking off. Some 12% of the value of 1992 passenger cars 
will consist of electronics; for the high-volume "commodit;yn segment, the figure will 
be ti-$%, while lower-volume specialty segment cars may be 15-25% by value. While 
much of the latter segment's additional use will be in "g.adgetsn and 1- features, 
concepts proved out in these lower-volume applications may spawn greater future use of 
more functional electronic features in high-volume vehicles. Michigan producers of 
hydraulic and other mechanical controls will face declining business opportunities, par- 
ticularly after 1990. 
Finally, a major engineering challenge is presented by all of the changes described 
above. There is a shortage of trained, experienced, systems-oriented people in the 
design and manufacturing areas. In some departments, such as electrical systems 
design, 100% of engineers have CAD workstations; in other departments, however, the 
figure is as low as 5%. Increasing competence in techniques such as finite element 
analysis is apparent a t  all three OEMs, and there was broad understanding - if as yet 
little action - that there needs to be greater use of FEA/kinematics/simulation in earler 
stages of the design process. Except in the ceramics area, materials technology was seen 
as an area in which the U.S. enjoys a lead over its Japanese, though not its European, 
competitors, 
Automotive Materials 
Huge increases in electrogalvanized steel demand behoeen now and 1992 will give 
way, by the late 1990s, to much.wider use of plastics in car bodies. This will im- . 
peril some steel and stamping fcrcilities, but create czn opening for a huge new 
automotive plastics indristry in the state. New engines will embody far more 
aluminum and less cast iron, endangering many Michigan foundries and raising 
the odds of increcrsed offshore souming. 
In a normal year, the auto industry consumes about one-quarter of the nation's 
steel, one-sixth of its aluminum, half its maleable iron, one-third of its zinc, and one- 
eighth of its copper. As the average weight of U.S.-made cars has declined from 3800 
pounds to 2800 pounds between 1975 and 1985, half the iron, a quarter of the steel, and 
a third of the copper has been removed. 
The period between now and 1992, and even more the years 1993-2000, will see a 
revolution of even greater impact. A major drop in carbon steel is in the offig, with 
galvanized body steels enjoying a boom as automakers m.ove toward greater corrosion 
resistance. Demand for electrogalvanized skel could exceed five million tons by 1988; 
that .could be nearly twice the U.S. capacity to produce it, creating opportunities for 
Michigan steelmakers but also an invitation to greater imports. There is also the dis- 
comforting possibility (see below) that the galvanized steel boom may be of limited 
duration, if plastic skinning comes to dominate post-1995 new vehicle designs. In the 
next decade at least, however, galvanized steel demand may be the salvation of many U.S. 
sheet steel makers, some of which could even give up some of their noncompetitive opera- 
tion in favor of cold strip "market millsn with galvanizing facilities that buy hot band 
from integrated mills. 
There is likely to be increased aluminum usage in cars by 1992, but more in castings 
than in wrought parts. Average aluminum per car has risen from 75 pounds in 1970 (of . 
which 60 pounds was in castings) to 130 in 1985 (110 in castings). This figure is ex- 
pected to rise only modestly, to perhaps 150 - 200 pounds, by the mid-1990s. Major ap- 
plications will be in cylinder heads, intake manifolds, and .- though to a lesser extent - 
engine blocks. In the case of cylinder heads, this will present opportunities for Michigan 
casting operations, but also risks of lost business to such foreign sources as Fiat-Teksid 
(maker of most of Chrysler's aluminum heads) and to more experienced domestic sour- 
ces in Indiana and New York. Wheels and possibly radialtors are among other applica- 
tions in which increased aluminum usage is predicted, with mixed implications for 
Michigan companies. The state's concentration of iron foundries, captive and independent, 
, 
however, suggests some significant negative impacts for establishments that do not 
quickly master aluminum casting technologies. 
Eveh more revolutionary in its potential future impacts is the 'accelerating use of en- 
gineering plastics in a widening range of structural ancl decorative applications. As 
redesign permits the realization of some of the system simplification and contouring 
possibilities of these materials, plastic per car should increase from about 220 pounds 
today to over 300 by 1992 and perhaps 350 by 2000. As many as a million light vehicles 
may have mostly or entirely plastic outer skins by 1992, and many more (perhaps 50- 
70%) by 2000. This will have obvious implications for steel demand, for stamping plants 
and presses, and for diemaking establishments in the state. It  will also present major 
openings for new business in molding, patternmaking, heavy presses, and the like, open- 
ings that need not,-however, be filled by Michigan h. 
Product differentiation possibilities expand at low cost with the use of plastic 
panels: common mounting points allow different panels on the same space frame, and 
tooling costs for plastic are about half those for steel, permitting 3- rather than 6-year 
reskinning cycles. Even more exciting from a cost reduction standpoint, significant parts 
consolidation is permitted when a properlydesigned plastic part replaces several welded 
subassemblies; this could revolutionize seats, underbodies, and (see below) fuel tanks in the 
1990s. 
Beyond plastic skins, bumpers, headlamps, springs, and - if legal liability issues can 
be solved - fuel tanks are all areas in which plastics promise to make major inroads. In 
the bumper and fuel tank areas, this could mean significant negative impacts for certain 
Michigan OEM plants, while presenting new opportunities to others and to certain in- 
dependents: stamping press and molding press companies, and makers of tooling for 
stamping dies and for plastic molds, are not; typically the same firms. Stamping plants 
that have received significant recent investments are probably secure; it will be 2000 a t  
the earliest before any near-complete changeover to plastic bodies could occur. 
Finally, by 1992 we may begin to see somewhat greater use of magnesium castings 
and of ceramics in engines and heat exchangers. Magnesium applications might in- 
crease *as a way for the auto industry to avoid overdependernce on aluminum suppliers. If 
that occurs, the main impacts would be felt by die casting firms supplying such castings 
as transmission and transfer cases, alternator and air condiiioner .brackets, valve covers, 
clutch housings, and steering column brackets. We know of no Michigan facilities involved 
in die casting magnesium. In ceramics, systemic use will likely remain limited to diesel 
engines; slow penetration of ceramics into cam follower facings, turbocharger hot wheels, 
piston crowns, and exhaust port liners is possible by 1992. At least one Michigan in- 
dependent and one captive plant have been cited for interest and prowess in the field, 
with regard to ceramic fiber-reinforced aluminum pistons and diesel engine applications, 
respectively. 
Production TechnoIogies 
New advances in programmable automation promise a more competitive state 
automotive economy, and make plausible a Southeastern Michigan "Automation 
Alley." These advances also pose mighty challenges $or Michigan machine tool 
and tooling firms; in the near tern, a t  leiwt, much more offshore sourcing will be 
seen in major production systems. I f ,  however, Michiga1'1 firms can master fhe new 
teclznohgies, especially in the software area, a wealthier T I M  Economyn is pos- 
sible in the 1990s and beyond. 
Emerging technological changes wilI be the major determinant of whether the U.S. 
remains the dominant producer in its home market. Those changes will also do much to 
determine where new facilities are located, which existing plants survive, how large new 
component and vehicle modules will be, the relations among tiers of'producers, and the 
demand for labor and its skill requirements. The trade and popular press already trum- 
pet a CIM Economy; the extent to which reality catches up with the rhetoric, and islands 
of automation become integrated systems, will write the industry's history between now 
and 1992. It could provide the basis on which the equities of all stakeholders are 
preserved in a more competitive future, or simply be disruptive and expensive without 
reducing costs enough to restore competitiveness. 
The nature and pace of arrival of a CXM Economy will depend on politics as well as 
hardware and software capabilities. For all stakeholders ito benefit, the transition must 
be bargained. The OEMs will seek across-the-board cost reductions, forcing suppliers to 
transform tools and methods. Labor will have to bring to the table a plan for its par- 
ticipation in a new regimen of flexible adaptation and heightened competition. State 
government must seek to maximize Michigan's share of the value embodied in the 
vehicles sold in North America. 
Flexible manufacturing systems can deliver both adaptability (the ability to sequence 
serially different designs within a part family without equipment resetting) and conver- 
tibility (the ability to switch between, say, six- and eight-cylinder blocks), and so promise 
to allow component plants to achieve high productivity despite highly variable day-to-day 
and week-to-week volume requirements for particular products. In bodies, flexible assem- 
bly promises to permit a wide range of body styles to be produced on the same line with 
the same equipment, which includes robotics and AGVs, and to convert a line much more 
quickly. This would allow elimination of mobiIe work assignments, solving the problem of 
fabrication time differences between modules. A major obsta.cle to wider implementation of 
flexible systems remains the economic justification process. 
Michigan automation suppliers are a t  various levels of readiness to play on this 
field. Some are strong in dedicated systems that may sufI'er as flexible equipment takes 
over. In other cases, e.g,, machine vision, Michigan is emerging as a leader; in robotics 
- particularly complete systems - the state is aIso doing well. The vision of a 
southeastern Michigan "Automation Alley" is increasingly p14ausible. 
Flexible systems demand flexible delivery. JIT methods, discussed under 
Manufacturer-Supplier Relations above, are being closely studied to determine the extent 
to which frequent modifications of 10- and 20day build schedules are necessary; the 
answers reached by each OEM will have a substantial effect on the degree of flexibility 
demanded of various parts producers. 
Increasing use of aluminum rather than iron castings is about to be accompanied by 
major technological shifts within aluminum casting, away from permanent molds and 
toward lost foam and similar processes that aim a t  smoo1;her and more repeatable sur- 
faces, more cast details, and hence less subsequent machining time. Mastery of lost foam 
technology could speed conversion to allmaluminum engines, with Michigan impacts al- 
ready noted in Automotive Materials above. 
Among the keys to more flexible assembly is the emergence of adhesive bonding to 
replace some welding operations. Use of galvanized and zinc-coated steels and of plastic 
composites can be expected to increase the trend to adhesives. This will have potentially , 
serious impact on Michigan producers of welding guns and other equipment, and cut 
electricity demand considerably. 
The data communications requirements of flexible systems present a major chal- 
lenge to the state's many machine tool companies as well. Nearly 30% of 1986-92 
automotive automation spending will be in the communications area, as machines and 
islands of automation are joined together and with management information systems into 
true CIM. Yet the state's two largest machine tool companies employ 38 programmers 
between them; clearly, the missing link in these companies' systems capability is in 
software skills. Michigan h s ,  'many of which began a6; tool, k ture ,  or die builders 
and later made the move to dedicated transfer machines, got good a t  meeting OEM pur- 
chasing departments' low-bid and fast-delivery demands (often producing to OEM-supplied 
process specs) but not at supplying leading-edge technology. Meanwhile, European and 
Japanese machine tool makers - many owned by auto OEMs - were used as 
lablorabries as well as job shops. This explains the increasing import share in flexible 
systems, as well as one U.S. OEM's recent equity purchase in a European-based 
automotive machine tool company. 
Tooling firms are going to have to move quickly into NC and CADICAE if quality and 
productivity are to improve. Smaller outfits are likely to lack the skills and capital to 
make the move, and those that survive may do so by forming consortia in which some 
concentrate on providing CADJCAE services, others on prototype tooling, others on NC 
machining, and still others on construction and tryout. 
Activities in tooling may also influence the rate and extent of plastics usage in parts, 
skins, and space frames. Though tooling costs for plastics :ire only 40 - 60% as high as 
for steel parts, there is a chance that a new stamping (fie production method based 
on casting rather than machining may reduce or eliminate the tooling cost gap. 
Finally, it must be noted that these and other emerging flexible technologies will 
have implications for facility size, capacity, and location. If programmable automation 
really achieves economic production at sharply lower volumes than today's dedicated 
lines, it could signal the breakup of large centralized parts plants. That would spell 
trouble for Michigan's many regional foundries and engine, stamping, and transmission 
plants. On the other hand, more and more vehicles may be! produced in low-volume runs, 
making it impossible to justify multiple sets of tools for dettmtralized partfmodule produc- 
tion a t  or adjacent to most assembly plants. 
AIM PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE 
In the very large and turbulent arena of auto in Michig,an, there is obviously much to 
do. The body of this report contains hundreds of wh;at might be termed micro- 
recommendations for State and local government, company, and trade union action. We 
recognize that for each party, and perhaps especially for the State, it is not easy to set 
priorities and invest limited resources. 
In the pages that follow, we identify twenty fronts of State activity that we believe 
are proper priorities. Success on these fronts is most likely to secure or expand industry 
opportunities for Michigan citizens, communities, and companies. 
We possess no realistic way to "costn these efforts, but the nascent strategic plan 
they represent would obviously require a major investment by the State. We believe such 
investment is justified. Indeed, we call these recommendatio.ns strategic because we think 
their successful execution will bring a high return to the Michigan economy. Just as in- 
tense competition has compelled industry to unprecedented investment, so State govern- 
ment is similarly challenged. 
We also acknowledge that even a selective effort on some of these twenty fronts 
would exert heavy pressure on the current staff capacities of the State. We hope State 
government will continue to add able staff who work with the industry, for we believe that 
in this area expanded public employment is a very sound investment. We also think it is 
time to seek support and closer cooperation from industry. The AIM Project, itseif, may be 
a good example of such partnership. 
We see these Recommendations as a "living document" constantly evolved by un- 
folding events and a continuing dialogue with the automotive industry and all its Michigan 
stakeholders. That dialogue should be lively. We are aware that some of our recommenda- 
tions are unusual in their specificity. The times require candor, and action. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION I : WORK TO SECURE EXISTING MICHIGAN 
ASSEMBLY PLANTS BEYOND CURRENT PROGRAMS 
This should be the State's most important single front of activity. 
Most Michigan assembly plants house currently healthy young programs or have 
been scheduled in solid company plans for successor programs. Thus it is possible to focus 
State attention on those few assembly plants currently a t  risk. Let there be no complacen- 
cy regarding the others, however. The auto industry is volatile as never before. The 
proposed AIM method for monitoring the prospects of each Michigan assembly plant 
should be improved, and this rough tool must never be seen as a substitute for regular, 
candid discussions between the Governor, the Commerce Director, and the senior leader- 
ship of the Big Three. 
We have identified four Michigan auto assembly planhj at  high risk in the 1986-92 
period and thus a priority for State attention. These are: 
General Motors CPC Pontiac Plant 8: The risk can be redeemed by the contemplated 
siting of the GM80 program there. The State should work tc~ consummate that investment 
and provide programs and planning that will assure a majar contribution to the program 
from suppliers in Michigan. 
General Motors BOC Clark-Fleetwood: This aged, landlocked, split complex presents 
serious dimculties. I t  is an important source of employment, for Detroit. The State should 
work with GM and with the City of Detroit to develop a post-1990 plan that will preserve 
5 a t  least some of the job-generating potential of the two sites. One possibility may be as- 
sembly of a low- volume niche vehicle less compromised by the configurations of Clark- 
Fleetwood. Another may be rededication to component fabrication within or external to 
GM. A third, but expensive alternative, is clearance of the sites for presumably less job- 
intensive new projects, an option preferable only to mothballing. 
Ford Wayne and Dearborn Assembly: The two Ford assembly facilities at  risk are best 
addressed with a coordinated strategy. As we argue in the Report, the Wayne Assembly 
plant building LynldEscort has a good reputation within Ford, but houses an import- 
vulnerable program with a secure' future at  best through 1991. The longevity of Dearborn 
Assembly, the stressed keystone of the once-mighty Rouge Complex, may determine the 
ultimate future of most of the 16,000 jobs still at  the Rouge. 
The State should set an objective of maintaining high-employment, highly Michigan- 
linkaged assembly programs at each site well into the 1990s. What those programs might 
be, their allocation between the two facilities, and their potential ties to other Ford or Ford- 
related capacity in Michigan would clearly be determined primarily by Ford's evolving 
global strategy. The contingencies of market size and segmentation, and Ford's an- 
ticipated market share, future production efficiency, labor relations and so forth will deter- 
mine what 'successor programs are at least candidates for one or either of the two 
facilities. We think there might be a number of viable combinations, Posing the State's ob- 
jective to Ford and the UAW now, and evolving a variety of ,plans for the State's participa- 
tion in and contribution 'to extension of high-volume Ford assembly in southeastern 
Michigan will, we believe, provide the best possible contest for eventual success. Such an 
approach may also be the best way to bring Alpha to Rlichigan if that project becomes a 
product;ion program. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION I1 : PURSUE NEW WHICLE PROGRAMS OF U.S. 
AUTO MAKERS THAT. WXLL REQUIRE GREENFIELD ASSEMBLY 
FACILITfES 
From the public viewpoint, adaptive reuse of existing major assembly facilities is to 
be preferred as the least-social-cost path to continuing auto employment and tax 
base. Buick City, Dodge City, and Lansing Assembly are excellent examples. 
As assembly technology rapidly evolves, however, some of Michigan's older plants 
may not remain viable, and the number of U.S.-based vehicle programs may exceed the 
stock of U.S. assembly facilities. 
The State should constantly monitor the forward plans of the auto makers to iden- 
tify new vehicle programs and siting plans. As the market becomes more segmented and 
as nichle and near-niche cars proliferate, these plans will become more complex, especially 
as more flexible production and assembly operations permit; multiple program production 
within single plants. 
Within the increased complexity, one factor is certain,, The U.S. auto makers will -
build new assembly facilities. These huge chunks of investm.ent may not come at the pace 
of the past half-decade, but constant State attention to the prospect of major greenfield in- 
vestments is essential. 
Unfortunately, greenfield development is expensive, complex, and quite "mobile" 
before the siting decision. In the post-Saturn environment, regrettable but inevitably in- 
tense inter-state competition for these flagship facilities will increase. The State's well- 
proven capacities as a competitor shouldt be reinforced with a larger staff complement 
focused exclusively on these prospects. Michigan's highly-praised effort on Saturn can 
serve as a precedent. 
Fortunately, Michigan is in a superior position to justify and redeem the large public 
investments now required to secure greenfield assembly fac.ilities. The existing agglomera- 
tion of automotive capacity in Michigan offers the State an opportunity to maximize its 
return on these investments through programs that are designed to intensify the links be- 
tween the facility and the Michigan automotive base. The higher the proportion of 
Michigan value added embodied in the car or truck, the greater the eventual state and lo- 
cal government revenues realized. To the extent that the Michigan automotive base is 
modernizing to remain competitive, sourcing from. Michigan will usually be the cost- 
efficient decision for the Michigan assembly facility. 
We do not propose a rigid "Michigan Content" policy; that would be absurd. We do 
strongly advocate direct State-OEM discussions regarding; sourcing of inputs to major 
programs on a project by project basis; Such discussions should be a regular feature of 
program development comparable to ongoing dialogues about specialized tax and 
regulatory treatment, labor training, infrastructure, and technical assistance. Success in 
encouraging high Michigan content in Michigan-assembled vehicles will be a direct function 
of success in promoting the competitiveness of the Michigan supplier base. We also suggest 
that the State constantly improve its ability to model input-output and econometric projec- 
tions of the public returns from major industrial investment. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION rn : CONTINUE A G G R E S S ~  COMPETITION FOR 
.ASSEMBLY PLANTS OF FOREIGN AUTO MAJmRS INVESTING IN THE 
U.S. 
During the next few years, a window of opportunity is open to attract a limited num- 
ber of Japanese assembly facilities that will be sited in the U.S. for both logistical and- 
political reasons. The State should seek to replicate its succe:;s with Mazda. 
The landing of Japanese (or possibly other) foreign assembly plants does pose special 
issues. These plants are likely to build vehicles that will be market winners anchoring 
secure assembly jobs. Based on past and current practice, however, their product will have 
low U.S. content, a t  least in the initial years of operation. 
In crafting the package of State incentives that dl attract and support these 
desirable facilities, special attention should be given to programs that will help the auto 
maker build up a competitive Michigan supplier base, especially among existing Michigan 
firms. In instances where a foreign supplier is considering a US ,  facility to serve the auto 
maker, the State should always explore the prospect of a joint-venture with an existing 
Michigan firm. Such relationships require care and diligence to consummate. Success on 
this front, however, will tend to contain both the economic and political costs of a rising 
tide of Japanese supplier iirms that will also quest for the business of U.S. OEMs in direct 
competition with traditional sources, often in Michigan. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION IV : COMPETE TO HOST NEW ENGINE FACILITIES 
The U.S. industry has begun a major program to redevelop its powerplants. New en- 
gine designs, new materials choices for principal components, and new machining methods 
are the order of the day. Michigan has already benefited from substantial OEM reinvest- 
ments in existing engine facilities and appears to be in line for more. Because powerplant 
transformation will surely generate several more facility decisions in this decade, engine 
plants should be a priority target for Michigan. . 
To compete aggressively, Mic,Fgan should t q  to increase aluminum smelting and 
casting capacities in the state, since a significant increase in the aluminum content of en- 
gines is certain. This may require actions focused on specific facilities (see Recommenda- 
tion VII, below). Michigan's engine plant prospects will also be advanced by the establish- 
ment of the GM CPC Prototype Production Facility in Auburn Hills, and perhaps by offer- 
ing assistance to Michigan's traditional specialists in engine machining line systems as 
they improve their relations with the OEMs. 
'ARM RECOMMENDATION V : ATTRACT ADDITION.AL GALVANIZED STEEL 
CAPACITY TO MICHIGAN 
The surging automotive demand for galvanized steel will create a projected shortfall 
of as much as two million tons by 1987 despite the five U.S. electrogalvanized mills that 
will be in production by then. If the State can confirm the magnitude of this shortfall and 
the need for new capacity, communications should be established with all potential inves- 
tors in the steel community. The State should commission a detailed study presenting the 
opportunity to serve automotive demand in the Midwest, perhaps in partnership with a 
leading utility. 
AIN RECOMMENDATION VI : ESTABLISH MICHIGAN AS A WORLD CENTER 
FOR ENGINEERXNG PLASTICS APPLICATIONS IN AUTO 
Light weight, corrosion resistance, ease of complex configuration, and low tooling 
costs for many fabrication processes are among the features increasing the appeal of en- 
gineering plastics in the automotive industry. Michigan has a solid opportunity to establish 
clear leadership in both plastics engineering and high volume production. 
With Fiero production solidly established in Pontiac and the strong prospect that the 
GM80 program will also be sited there, southeastern Michigan may host assembly of the 
only mid- and high-volume plastic-skinned cars to reach the market in the 1980s. With 
State attention and support, the demand generated by the two programs could become a 
magnet drawing additional investment in applied research; specialists in molds, presses, 
and other tooling for plastics; and parts production, especia1l:y body panels. 
The State should encourage and perhaps even help convene "vertical plastics consor- 
s tia" of materials producers, tooling h s ,  engineeringidesign services, parts makers, and 
auto OEM customers. Such consortia have promise as integrated, problem-solving teams 
that can help the industry 'build quality in." The State might use the good offices of the 
planned .Michigan Materials Processing Institute (MMPI) to accomplish this specific objec- 
tive and as an ongoing source of applied research in the area of enbeering plastics. ' 
AIM RECOMMENDATION VII : ADDRESS THJ3 0PPO:RTUNITIES AND RISKS IN 
THE SHIFT FROM IRON TO ALUMINUM 
The modest shift in automotive demand from ironlsteel to aluminum during the next 
decade could have a significant impact on Michigan if the state hosts some of the new 
aluminum-intensive ,engine programs. This shift could pose a serious challenge to 
Michigan's ferrous foundries. The most cost-efficient means for the State to address this 
risk may be to approach the leadership at  one of the largest :ferrous foundries with an offer 
to explore means of State support for conversion to aluminum capacity and expertise. 
This pro-active tack may or may not generate interest. Notlling ventured, nothing gained; 
and should Michigan be building two mostly-aluminum engines by the early 1990s, there is 
much to win, and lose. The Michigan value-added in those engines will be much higher if 
most major components are cast in our foundries. 
Should a conversion strategy prove unsuccessful, the State should aggressively 
recruit independent casting firms with expertise in aluminum. If OEM aluminum com- 
ponent demand does surge in Michigan, a timely independent, State-sponsored "market op- 
portunity" study could target both casting h s  and smelters. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION VIXI : MONITOR THE POTENTIAL SHIFT FROM 
REGIONAL TO ASSEMBLY -PLANT-DEDICATED MAJOR COMPONENT 
FACILITIES 
If flexible automation should dramatically lower the volumes at which economic 
production of some major components becomes possible, and this flexibility can encompass 
the demands of specific assembly plants with multiple programs and models, then the in- 
dustry may enter an era in which smaller stamping, transmission, and even engine plants 
are built to serve specific assembly operations. This could lead to an eventual break-up of 
Michigan's many regional component plants that now serve several assembly facilities 
here and elsewhere, a t  painful cost to Michigan's share of U.S. automotive value added. 
This is not a mid-term prospect. Major investmenk~ in key regional components 
plants by all three Michigan auto makers suggest they are viable for many years to come. 
Howevler, the possible cost of this particular aspect of a future CIM-economy does suggest 
careful monitoring and an open dialogue with the car makers to anticipate the develop- 
ment, should it come. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION M : SPONSOR PLANNING FOR MAJOR 
COMPONENT PLANTS AT RISK 
Even if regional transmission, stamping, axle, and other major component plants are 
not a t  long-term, wholesale risk from flexible automation, kidividual plants may be in im- . . 
mediate danger as demand swings away from their distinctive capacities. In the chapters 
that follow we identify some Michigan facilities that are cause for concern. The State 
should develop procedures for' handling major reductions of operations and closures at  
problem plants. 
T~vsted liaison with the auto makers and major supplier h s  on this front will yield 
early warning. With time to evaluate options, and with company, labor, and government 
stakeholders at  the table, plans for conversion to viable operations are a t  least more like- 
ly. Where rededication within the auto industry under the current ownership and contract 
is impossible, buyouts may be an acceptable if dimcult option. Even when a shutdown is 
unavoidable, a failed early effort to plan reuse may a t  least provide better mechanisms for 
managing the termination. In light of the huge social costs of a major plant closing, State 
sponsorship of plans that seek adaptive reuse, or at  worst managed shutdown, are a wise 
public investment. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION X : SUPPORT MODULAR. SOURCING "CHAINS" IN 
MICHIGAN 
Modular sourcing is coming. Key first tier suppliers vvith design and concurrent en- 
gineering expertise will increasingly take responsibility for cleveloping whole chunks of the 
car, organizing their production, and assuring their delivery to final assembly sites. 
Michigan can best defend its interests in this new environment through a deliberate 
policy of sponsoring relations among Michigan h s  that combine their talents for success-. 
ful development and production of modules. Maximizing the Michigan content of modules 
purchased for North American assembly operations, especially those in Michigan, should 
become an important State objective. 
Facilitating "Michigan module chains" logically begins with identifying those modules 
that are likely to be required by OEM assembly operations in the state. Learning which 
firms have been or probably will be selected for modular responsibility is the next step. (In 
subsequent years, the AIM Project can assist the State in this task.) These winners or 
strong candidates should be invited by the State to discus,ci ways in which State actions 
and targeted incentives can assist them in organizing cluster's of competent Michigan firms 
for producing the module. These discussions may well work. best when a Michigan opera- 
tion has the module contract, but i re  also appropriate for n.on-Micliigan firms considering 
modular production in the state. In the latter case, State technical assistance may be par- 
ticularly valuable. 
This strategy will be effective only to the extent that Michigan's potential subcontrac- 
tees in modular clusters are seen as attractive participants in the multi-year, highly- 
interactive, mutually-dependent interfirm relations required. The State should find ways to 
support effectively the technological modernity of Michigan's smaller suppliers. The State 
should provide industrial parks for modular production clusters where geographic 
proximity is desired. The State should do all it can to facilitate Michigan siting of OEM and 
k t - t i e r  supplier engineering and prototype operations, for these are where the informal 
vertical consortia of firms involved in modular cooperation will often be formed and nur- 
tured. In cases where the chain of relationships is being organized, the State should ad- 
dress the needs of the chain as a whole, and openly craft its labor training, development 
finance, technical assistance and other resources to maximize participation by Michigan 
firms. 
ALM RECOMMENDATION XI : SUPPORT THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND FLEXIBILITY OF MICHIGAN SUPPLIERS 
Only those iirms that stay in command of the new technologies relevant to their 
operations will remain the low-cost, high quality participarits demanded by the auto in- 
dustry. 
In this case, the State may already have developed a. plan of action. Assisting the 
broad base of Michigan manufacturing to adapt to the new environment through providing 
information, direct technical assistance, labor training resources, access to qualified in- 
dustrial consultants and occasional financial support for acquisition of new technology is a 
worthy if ambitious mission for the State's new Technology Deployment Service, Because 
that announced Service will oierate a t  the forward edge of the State's campaign to support 
Michigan's industrial competitiveness, it should be rigorously evaluated a t  the end of its 
1986 pilot year. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XIl  : PROVIDE ORXENTflTION ON JIT METHODS 
FOR SMALLER SUPPLIERS 
"Just-in-Time" objectives have become part of the vocabulary of the industry over 
the past three years. True acceptance of JIT methods as a potential source of cost- 
efficiency throughout the tiers of automotive supply is less developed, however, in 
because OEM implementation has proceded quite de1iber:itely. The pace of JIT is now 
quickening. Many more medium-sized and smaller suppliers will soon be required to adapt 
their operations or risk rejection in the automotive market, 
The State has a clear interest in building the JIT abilities of the supplier base in 
Michigan. For the OEMs, all other factors being equal, the closer supplier will be 
preferred. Given the huge demand generated by Michigan OEM facilities, Michigan can 
win, or lose, major shares of supplier business depending on how well most suppliers 
in the the state can perform to their JIT standards, Indeed, the "modular sourcing 
chain" strategy proposed above is compromised without JI'T capacity in the broad sup- 
plier base; the same may be said for the State's prospects in attracting major inves- 
tors that must depend on proximate suppliers who "get it right the first time and get it 
there a t  the time." 
The State has already shown it can make effective use of the Michigan community 
college system as a means to bring resources and training to the smaller manufacturing 
firms that do not have luge internal training staffs and cannot be a priority for the 
OEMs' supplier development efforts. The 1984-85 pilot project in training such firms in 
statistical process control is widely regarded as a success. The State should build on this 
base and launch a comparable program in JIT methods. The Automotive Industry 
Action Group has already piloted appropriate materials and is prepared to work with a 
State-sponsored program. 
AIM REXOMMENDA'MON XI11 : IDENTIFY PIUORITY TECHNOLOGY- 
TAKEBACK AND TECHNOLOGY-KEEP OPPORTUNITIES 
The promise of a CIM-Economy is premised on the prospect of technology-driven 
cost reductions large enough that their realization could reiturn to, or at  least retain in, 
the U.S. and Michigan work that has left or will otherwise leave. Unfortunately, 
some proponents of the "automate or die" thesis - correct as far as it goes - stop 
with the rhetoric and fail to note the products or product t,ypes in whose production the 
application of advanced manufacturing technologies may have the biggest payoff. 
The State needs to know which those are, so that its limited resources may 
be brought to bear where they will accomplish the most. Increased capacity to cast 
and machine alloys of aluminum and to design and mold plastic panels have emerged 
from the work herein summarized as among the opportunities to win for Michigan 
work increasingly being done in Europe, Mexico, Brazil, an.d in the U.S. but out of the 
state. Breakthroughs in multiplexing and fiber optics have! also been noted as possi- 
bly permitting retention of the finction now performed by copper wiring harnesses, 
more and more of which are being imported from Mexico and the Pacific. The possibility 
of more local production of manual transaxles as a result of simpler designs and the 
aluminum processing capabilities noted above is another such potential oppor- 
tunity. 
More such "technology takeback" and "technology keep" opportunities must be 
identified. The AIN Project should make such prospecting a priority in future work. 
Once opportunities have been identified, specific technology application programs can be 
explored with the producing companies, the Industrial Techn.ology Institute, the Techriol- 
ogy Deployment Service, and other Michigan resources. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XIV : ENCOURAGE AND1 ASSIST INVESTMENT - 
WORK PRACTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UNION AND COMPANY 
The State should be prepared to act as a catalyst for the negotiation of agree- 
ments between trade unions and Michigan manufacturers that embody explicit deals 
linking more flexible union work practices with managem.ent commitments to maintain 
and increase local production. The recent labor-management atmosphere of 
cooperation could be short-lived absent such contractual tradeoffs. While a particular 
company may have no strong preference for local versus distant production in a par- 
ticular product situation, and while a union may wish to maximize short-term employment 
through retention of certain work practices, the public's interest is clearly in attracting to, 
and anchoring in, Michigan work that might be performecl elsewhere in the absence of 
a more flexibly-deployable workforce. 
The key here is not the a priori virtue of greater work rule flexibility, but its 
potential synergy with the kind of "tip-point investments" described in the previous 
recommendation. Just as the State's efforts on the technology deployment front should 
be focused on product lines in which flexible automation could confer a location- 
dekrmining technological edge, so too its encouragement of investment-work practice 
deals should place emphasis on. situations in which work practice changes would be 
most likely to justify the flexible automation investments that can "tip" the location 
scales in Michigan's favor. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XV : PURSUE PARTICIPATION WITH G W A W  AND 
FORDIUAW BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT GRvOUP INVESTMENTS IN 
MICHIGAN 
The 1984 UAW contracts with General Motors and Ford featured promising in- 
novations enabling co-development of new business opportunities that will employ UAW- 
represented labor. Company-Union Groups are now meeting to develop the respective 
structures for decision-making and to seek worthy projects for investment, If appropriate 
opportunities are found, $ 100 million of General Motors arid $ 30 million of Ford capital 
is available during the next two years. 
These new departures are important to Michigan far beyond the welcome 
prospect of additional sector business development capital. Properly ap- 
proached, they can become "learning labs" in which the union, the companies, and the 
State can discover ways in which to support one mothers' interests while cooperating in 
job creation. 
The State must win the privilege of participation with the partners that have 
created the Groups and their funds. State  representative!^ who understand the industry 
and the union should meet with the Groups to inform them of State government's sub- 
stantial economic development resources and convey the State's strong interest in sup- 
porting projects brought forward by the Groups. Projects could take the form of planned 
conversions of existing capacity, or new product development, or combinations of 
both. The State has tools that can address any of the possibilities. 
If Michigan's future as a successful industrial community depends in part on the 
quality of the cooperation at the Development Bargaining Table we imagined in our 
Preface, then the State should make it a matter of pride that the initial projects funded 
under these 1984 contract innovations be sited in Michigan, home of the industry and 
birthplace of the union. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XVI : SPONSOR A MICHIGAN TRAINING ACCORD 
THAT CAN TARGET FUNDING TO SYSTEMATIC RETRAINING OF THE 
WORICFORCE * 
The U.S. automotive industry has now entered an era. in which systematic training 
and retraining of the workforce is an essential conditicln for continuing successful 
domestic operations. As the tools atid methods of the industry- are transformed, the 
. '  
skills of the auto workforce must keep pace. 
Unfortunately, neither the industry nor government has made sufficient progress 
in determining the best means to accomplish such a massive training effort, nor have the 
public and private sectors reached a satisfactory division of responsibility for funding 
and implementing the required programs. In the present environment, it is inevitable 
that training assistance - or, more precisely, promised funding for undefined "training 
programsn - become an additional, and extremely expensive, incentive offered by com- 
peting governments whipsawed in contests for automotive investment. 
This is no way to run a railroad. We believe the continued escalation of ad hoc bid- 
ding w a s  will subvert the opportunity for intelligent bargaining of development. Funding 
necessary (and unnecessary?) training through a series of project-specific programs jer- 
ryrigged by incentive-mongers will surely introduce "diseffici~encies" into this crucial work. 
To avoid this unwelcome future, the State should explore the possibility of a 
Michigan Training Accord between government, the industry, and the unions (in the case 
of auto, predominantly the UAW). Such an Accord might embody the participants' 
common definition of the magnitude of the traininglretraining task; the new institutions, 
programs, and arrangements that can best accomplish the task; and the proper divi- 
sion of fiscal and programmatic responsibility among the corporations, the Union, and 
the State. 
The first step toward a Michigan Training Accord might be a State-commissioned 
study that would deliver a detailed analysis of the magnitude and specificity of the train- 
ing needs of auto, in Michigan, during the next decade. Such a study should also 
provide working proposals for addressing those needs through cost-efficient means that 
allow all the parties to plan properly their contributions. Achieving long-range stability in 
the massive training effort necessary is certainly the best way to garner for the State lo 
a defensible comparative advantage in the inevitable contests for future automotive in- 
vestments. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XVII : INCREASE MICHIGA.N'S SUPPLY OF CWI 
ENGINEERS, TECHNICIANS, AND SKILLED TRADESPEOPLE 
Within the broad array of skills development effo:rts required for future U.S. 
automotive production, there is a particularly acute need for specialized talents at  the 
"top end." Michigan's future prospects in auto will be based on continuing technologi- 
cal development in the industry. Thus the State should have a strong interest in produc- 
ing. and renewing the the skills of the engineers, techr;icians, and skilled 
tradespeople essential to the emerging CIM-economy. 
The State-commissioned study and Michigan Training Accord envisioned in the 
previous Recommendation should focus special attention on the best ways to redress the 
continuing shortfall in what might be termed "CIM skills." The State is now sponsoring 
pilot projects a t  Michigan community colleges committed to modernizing their technical 
programs in CIM areas. With organized counsel from the ;auto industry and the UAW, 
these efforts might be matured into certificate programs tailored to the needs of auto. 
Producing and retaining in Michigan the advanced engineering abilities required in 
the auto industry of tomorrow poses a special challenge. Bold actions may be required. 
We propose for consideration a Michigan Manufacturing Sciences Scholarship Program 
that would combine features of the NSF scholarships, GMI's cooperative engineering 
education, and the ROTC's of .the U.S. military, The State-generated Fund would provide 
a full gl*aduate engineering degree program scholarship to :Michigan residents if the fol- 
lowing criteria are met: 
IS 
1) The candidate has been accepted into a post-baccalaureate engineering program at 
a Michigan institution of higher education; 
2) A Michigan manufacturer, on the basis of the candidate's record and proposed course 
of study, has made a conditional commitment to employ the candidate in an 
engineering capacity upon completion of (and perhaps during) the degree 
program; and 
3) The sponsored candidate agrees to work for the sponsoring Michigan firm in an en- 
. gineering capacity for not less than three years, contingent upon satisfactory 
performance. 
L Michigan Manufacturing Sciences Scholarships could be in the form of convertible 
loans provided a t  no interest. If the candidate succes:sfully completes the degree 
program and the three-year employment with the Michiga:n sponsor, the loan would be 
forgiven. Should the candidate deviate from this course, the loan would have to be 
repaid, in part or in full, unless otherwise determined by the Fund. As a matter of 
policy, the available scholarships might be divided between auto makers, auto sup- 
pliers, and other Michigan manufacturers with a demonstr.ated need for CIM-trained en- 
gineers. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XWII  : MARKET GREATER, DETROIT AS AMERICA'S 
UAUTOMATION ALLEY" 
Southeastern Michigan's credibility as a center of flexible automation comparable 
. to previous "high tech" agglomerations in Silicon Valley and along Boston's Routes 
128 and 495 will be based primarily on the interactions among firms in the area rather 
than on simple counts of establishments, jobs, and sales. The State can serve a 
legitimate purpose in marketing greater Detroit as the U.S. epicenter of industrial 
automation. That message will gain substance and specifi~it~y as the State works with the 
auto industry to intensify and enlarge our automation endowment. 
Superior market analysis will serve the State's ability to retain and attract 
desirable automation producers. State government shoultl seek the assistance of auto 
m&ers and f i s t  tier suppliers in projecting the potential future markets for industrial 
automation generated within the industry in achigan. - 
Michigan's best sell as America's "Automation Alley" will be the State's proven 
ability t;o support continuing development of those h, operations, and institutions that 
already constitute the infrastructure of our automation endowment. The well-launched In- 
dustrial Technology Institute and the proposed Michigan Materials and Processing In- 
stitute should remain priorities. 
The emergence of large, newly capital-intensive engineering service firms in 
Michigan is a highly desirable event worthy of State attention. Of equal importance are 
the several new corporate research and development, engineering sales, and 
production prototype facilities that have been or may soon be sited here. The en- 
gineering interactions that take place w i t h  and between these centers are the well- 
springs of innovation that can generate jobs and wealth in an automating Michigan. The 
power, and perhaps the legitimacy, of the "Automation Alley" metaphor may depend on 
how well the State links its substantial economic development capacities to the op- 
portunities emerging in these greenhouse centers of auto in Michigan. 
AIM RECOMMENDATION XIX : AID MARKET ADJUSTMENTS BY 
TRADITIONAL MICHIGAN TOOLING FIRMS 
'The mutually reinforcing development of Michigan's auto industry and the 
state's machine tool and tooling endowment is now a t  rislc. We discuss the origins and 
scale of this problem at some length in our chapter on Production Technologies. The 
move toward flexibility in auto now challenges machine tool builders whose historic 
competence has been in the dedicated, hard automation systems most appropriate to 
very high volume standardized production. At the same tirne, smaller tooling h s  face 
huge investments in order to integrate their operations i n i ~  the increasingly digital en- 
vironment of their historic automotive markets. 
On the Michigan machine tool builder front, we 'believe useful discussions are 
now proceeding between the leading h s  and the auto OEMS; particularly General 
Motors. The proper State role is to facilitate such discussions in any way requested and 
to consider modest forms of sponsorship that might quicken the repositio~~ing of
Michigan machine tool builders within the automotive market. One means might be a 
challenge grants fund targeted to applied research and cievelopment that adds to the 
flexibility of their products. For Michigan tool builders that are contending for or have 
been awarded major auto orders, the State might agree to fund a portion of carefully 
specified applied R&D projects relevant to the order. The State grant would be to the In- 
dustrial Technology Institute to underwrite part or all of its participation in the specific 
project. 
Given the impending turbulence in Michigan's large community of smaller tooling 
and tooling accessory h s ,  the State might take an expc!rimental approach in its ef- 
forts to facilitate adjustment. Michigan has much to lose if the talents resident in our 
smaller tooling h s  are lost because a technologically tr:msformed tooling market now 
requires capital investments that most smaller firms can not support. The State might 
consider partial sponsorship of small h consortia that would combine the complemen- 
tary abilities of several companies in larger operations that share expensive 
'computer-based equipment, key personnel, management services, business development 
efforts, and a common facility. There is r'eason to believe that such experiments 
might become sources of modest product innovation as well as preserving important 
talents within Michigan's rapidly changing tooling sector. 
AIR1 RECOMMENDATION XX : CONTINUE TEE AINA PROJECT, DEEPEN ITS 
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND INDUSTRY DWLOGUE ACTIVITUES 
Those responsible for the AIM Project have attempted an objective assessment of 
our capacities to make a continuing contribution to the S,tate's relations with auto, in 
Michigan. We conclude we can. We believe the Project has already delivered important 
senrices for its client, and for Michigan companies, trade unionists, and local development 
agencies. All participants in the Project are eager to pursue the work we have begun. 
Like any other supplier within the industry that we study and serve, the AIM Project 
must pledge continuous development of its products. We are gratified that as this is 
written the State has already funded the AIM Project for si second year. We recognize 
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50% of car and light 
truck engines redesigned 
'86-92; 80% '86-95 
o Aluminum suppliers 
o Producers of 
valves & hydraulic 
lifters 
o EFI makers 
o Quiprrrent ms. that 
get new orders 
o Old engine plants 
o Iron foundries 
0 Stampers 
o Carburetor makers 
o Equipment ms, that 
lose out to EXuropean 
and Japanese can- 
petitors 
If on-site stamping 
catches on, regionals 
muld be hurt after 
1992. Recent major OEM 
inves-ts suggest 
non-Michigan stamping - 
plants mre at risk. 
Electrogalvanizd steel 
for body panels may be a 
stage bet- unmated 
steels now and plastic 
panels in the 19908s, so 
large investments may 
have short lives, 
Most Michigan engine 
plants are secure 
through 1992, but if 
flexible autamtion 
reduces &ule size 
and/or if casting and 
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integrated, after '92 
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dedicated to assembly 
plants, spelling trouble 
for Michigan engine 
facilities. 
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Independent wheel 
manufacturers if OEM 
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wheels 
Magnesium diecasters Aluminum diecasters 
o Could begin to see 
union of casting and 
machining, bringing 
risks to existing foun 
dries and engine 
plants . 
o Excess iron casting 
capacity will endanger 
captive foundries. 
Trend to offshore 
sourcing could 
intensify, and include 
blocks as -11 as 
heads. 
o Unless steel wheel 
makers switch over, 
net Michigan losses 
expected . 
o Radiator materials 
depend on price of 
capper; big deter- 
mining investmnts 
will be m d e  soon. 
Main impetus for switch 
would be to avoid over- 
reliance on aluminum 
industry. Application 
candidates include 
transfer cases, valve 
covers, clutch housings, 
and steering oolumn 
Plastic body panels 
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Increasing use of 
plastics in bumpers, 
fuel tanks, 




rise, especially in 
controls for engines 
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in electronics; .sane spe- 
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assemblers 
o Large press makers 
o Molders 
o Patternmakers 
o OEM plastics plants 
o Resin-makers 
o Molibnakers close to 
assemblers 
o Injection nblding 
mchine firms 




o Semiconductor makers 
o Fuel injection 
equipment makers 
See Electronics, above 
o Steeimakers 
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o Die shops 
o Machine tool 
forming press m u -  
facturers 
o Small metal part 
stampers and 
machiners 




o Carburetor makers 
o Copper wire makers 
o Wire harness mkers 
Major impacts likely, 
esp. after 1990. Big 
Three stamping is cen- 
tered in Michigan, so ou 
steel and stamping faci- 
lities are in danger. 
H e a d l a m p  switch we11 
along, Slow change in 
springs, wheels, and 
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possible as redesign 
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non-integrated parts, 
Michigan's problem may 
be that electronics can- 
panies and QEM divisions 
(often non-Michigan) get 
wrk that replaces 
what's now done by 
Michigan producers of 
iwchanical oontrols and 
carburetion components, 
Impacts could be severe, 
as product is highly 
labor-intensive; but 
switch could also keep 
part £ran being per- 
mnently outsourced to 
Mexico and Pacific. 


SITING OF VEHICLE PROGRAMS 
Michigan is the core state of the U.S.-based asse~nbly companies, for the past 
several decades accounting for approximately one-third of North .America's annual produc- 
tion of 9 to 14 million cars and light trucks. Thus, while the future of a number of 
-Michigan assembly facilities is by no means assured beyond the end of this decade, there is 
considerable basis for optimism that the state can retain -a.nd perhaps increase - its his- 
torical share of domestic builds. At the same time, there is every reason to expect that 
sharp increases in imports' market share and heady gains in assembly efficiency will 
translate into a sharp decline in Michigan auto assembly jobs. Despite this conclusion, all 
of our interviewees stressed that the State needs to pursue aggressively the siting of new 
vehicle programs if it is to keep employment losses in both assembly and associated 
automotive manufacturing to an acceptable minimum. 
The Central Research Team (CRT) took 29 vehicle program siting questions to a 
small number of corporate- and division=level managers in GM, Ford, and Chrysler. In ad- 
dition, we retained the services of two consultants who have, between them, fully sixty 
years of immersion in the industry, virtually all of it in Michigan. 
The main issues we sought to illuminate in this area can be simply stated. What 
vehicle programs are currently produced in Michigan asserrtbly plants and how long will 
these programs continue? What new vehicle programs have been announced that wilI or 
might be sited a t  Michigan assembly plants? What new vehicle programs will require 
greenfield sites, and which of these might be sited in Michigan? What foreign-based auto 
makers may conduct North American assembly operations during 198&-92, and is 
Michigan a contender for hosting those operations? Which OEM older assembly facilities 
are most a t  risk? For those, are there innovative solutions that could extend their produc- 
tive lives? 
The answers to the first two questions be,h with the data summarized in Table V1 
at the end of this chapter. 
Key Findings: Pockets of Risk 
Five factors, in our view, constitute the main determinants of which of h1ichiganfs 
19.0EM assembly plants are'at risk in the 1986-92 period.. These are: 1) the age of the 
vehicle program itself; 2) the age, configuration, and labor relations history of the plants; 
3) the continuing trend, particilarly in passenger cars, to Front wheel drive (FWD); 4) the 
number and segment structure of the domestic light vehicles displaced by additional im- 
ports; and 5 )  the segment structure of consumer preferences based on fuel prices and 
federal fuel economy requirements. These factors, and the risks they pose for Michigan 
assembly operations, should be continuously monitored; their current implications are dis- 
cussed below and summarized in Table V2 below. 
Three Michigan car assembly facilities are at  risk due to the irreversible shift 
toward FWD cars: GM's ClarWFIeeCwood operation, its Pontiac Plant 8, and Ford's 
Dearborn Assembly plant. All three of these facilities tue old, muItistory structures; 
none has on-site dedicated major panel stamping capacity or a fully modern new-style 
paint shop. By today's new plant standards, all except Pontiac R8 are labor-intensive and 
at most lightly robotized. All produce rear wheel drive (R'N13) cars introduced more than a 
decade ago. Plans do exist to estend facility life through, but not beyond, 1990 at two of 
the three. Cl~k/Fleetwood apparently will be the North American plant that finishes out 
the decade-long run of B body CadilIacs and B body Oldsmobiles; the Chevrolet B body will 
be added in 1986 to keep the operations near capacity through at least 1989. Beyond 
1990 or 1991, however, the Clsk/Fleetwood complex appears to have little future, at least 
as a high-employment assembly operation. Age, coniiguralion, the $200 millionplus in- 
vestment required for an extensive overhaul, and the existence and output capacity of the 
nearby Poletown plant all point to a shutdown before 1992. There is talk of a Clark-based 
extension of a RWD car based on B and G body components, but no mention of such an in- 
tention on the planning schedules. 
Pontiac's Plant 8, a significant success story when it reopened in late 1984 after a 
two-year shutdown, will cease making G body Oldsmobiles in or before 1989. However, 
we are optimistic that a major renovation of several Pontiac area facilities to accommodate 
a) the GMT 300 light truck in 1987, b) the 1990 siting, either in Plant 8 or a nearby 
greenfield facility, of the GM80 successor to the current Camaroflirebird and the plastic 
body panel operation likely to accompany it, c) the possibility of redoing the current 
foundry building to house the 1991 high-volume all-alurninilm 4-cyiinder Manhattan en- 
gine, and d) consideration, perhaps for Plant 8 if GMSO is a greenfield project, of a new 
plastic-skinned Pontiac van will render the demise of G car output and the closing of the 
Complex's foundry defactn non-events. 
Dearboni Assembly, where the Mustang/Capri (program name: Fox) is produced, 
appears likely to close in the 1990-1992 period. The model line will be abridged to a res- 
kinned Mustang (renamed Mach 1) only in 1988, as half of the (Mazdaj Flat Rock plant's 
output replaces Capri. Despite reskinning and renaming, the Mustang will a t  that point be 
an old car line indeed, one whose sales volume seems unlikely to support a complete plant 
for long. The cost of investing in the faciIity to accommodate a FWD model would certain- 
ly be substantial, though Ford (like Chrysler) has shown more inclination than GM to 
retool RIND plants to FWD. 
Finally, Ford's Wayne Assembly Plant's Escort/Lynx/E4YP (program name: Erika) 
line is a t  mighty risk from increased imports. The threat to Erika volume has already 
begun with the 1985 non-extension of limits on Japanese imports, and will intensify with 
the 1988 importation of 130,000 of Ford's Mazda-designed filexican subcompacts. Despite 
this, the Wayne plant appears to be relatively safe through the late 1990's because of sig- 
nificant recent. investment, FWD status, high quality and labor relations ratings, and its 
secure truck line, which is scheduled for reskinning 1992. Even if continued fuel price 
moderation, fuel economy law loosening, and low incremental profitability of high-U.S. con- 
tent subcompacts lead to termination of the Erika nameplate in the 1990-92 time frame, 
Wayne is a likely site for a future Ford vehicle program. Moreover, unless Erika volumes 
fall over 60 % from 1985 levels, Wayne appears to be Ford's core plant for the model, and 
hence the last of the three North American Erika plants to close. 
Effective Policy Targets 
Opportunities exist for constructive state action in each of these probable model line 
terminations. In the case of ClarWFleetwood, public policy interventions could include 1) 
assistance in plant demolition to prepare a site for a future facility, assembly or com- 
 h he other two are Edison, NJ and St. Thomas, Ontario. 
ponent, b) incentives to induce conversion of either or both buildings to component produc- 
t i ~ n , ~  and c) marketing help in transferring ownership to a foreign-based vehicle or com- 
ponent manufacturer. b 
State efforts in focused training and other areas have played a major and continuing 
role in raising the probability that the Pontiac complex will continue to operate and even 
grow. The success of the P body (Fiero), the decision to sitme the GMT 400 light truck, the 
reported selection of Pontiac as the home of the high-volume (300,00O/year) GM 80 suc- 
cessor to Camaroflirebird, the possibility of the 1991/92 Manhat tb  engine in the place of 
some current iron casting operations, and even consideration of a new plastic body Pontiac 
van all suggest that the Pontiac Complex may well become GM's most ambitious exercise 
ever in "radical brownfielding." Continued state efiart to secure these programs is an ob- 
vious priority. 
Ford's Dearborn Assembly Plant poses a mightly challenge. Unless it becomes 
possible to site production of the find several years of a currently non-Michigan RWD 
vehicle line (perhaps a truck now assembled in one or more ouc-of-state facilities), any ef- 
fort to extend Dearborn's life may conflict with steps to site a new program at Wayne, 
should Erika be terminated (see below). One implication of this is that the state could 
begin to develop, working with Ford, a retention strategy that considers Wayne and Dear- 
born jointly. 
As for Wayne (car) Assembly, its future-and state efforts to ensure that future- 
rests on a complex web of factors. These include Ford's decision about how to allocate fu- 
ture output reductions among its three North American Erika plants, its potential role in 
the expected 1991 launch of additional (to Taurus/Sable) big car capacity to replace LTD/ 
Marquis, the siting of Ford's clean sheet Alpha program, th.e extent and timing of import 
competition threats to Erika line volumes and, as noted earlier, future plans for Dearborn 
Assembly. 
One approach would be to seek a state working agreement with Ford that it ~viU con- 
tinue to operate three high-volume Michigan car assembly f2,cilities (i.e., two in addition to 
Wixom); within such a framework, a variety of outcomes including: 1) continue Erika at  
Wayne, Alpha to Dearborn-brown- or greenfield; 2) Alpha at Wayne, new car or truck a t  
Dearborn; and 3) Erika at Wayne, a new greenfield plant elsewhere in the state) would be 
2 ~ f  pursued, this option-to be of net social benefit-should be exercised so as not to 
divert business from existing Michigan facilities, such as Chevy Gear and Axle or Saginaw 
Steering Gear. 
possible, all anchoring comparable wealth creation in Michigan. The rationale is 
straightforward: because both Erika (Wayne) and Fox (Dearborn) are a t  risk programs, 
' 
Michigan may need Alpha, some other new Ford car, or both just to stay even; this con- 
trasts with the quest for Saturn, which does not directly replace or compete with any 
programs currently assembled in Michigan. , 
None of Michigan's three Chrysler car and light truck assembly programs appears 
to be at  significant risk in the 1986-1992 time frame. Jefferson should get the A body 
replacement for K cars; Sterling Heights will add the P car to its current LancerLeBaron 
GTS (iY car) Iine in 1987; and Dodge City in Warren, despite the loss of utility vehicles to 
Mexico in 1985, will add the high volume compact pickup Dakota N truck in 1986. 
However, because of the effect that a recession, coupled with a sharply higher import 
share, could have on small car-dependent Chrysler's future capacity plans, the State 
should vigilantly monitor A car siting developments, and be prepared to act to assure a 
Jefferson home for the program. 
For short descriptions of likely futures for Michigan light vehicle assembly plants, 
see Table V3. 
Foreign Direct Assembly Investments 
~Michigan is made wealthier when vehicles that otherwise would be shipped from 
Japan are instead assembled in Michigan. The State is justly proud of having landed the 
Mazda assembly/stamping operation in Flat Rock, and there are grounds for optimism in 
the quest for the announced U.S. Toyota and Chrysler/Mitsubishi plants. 
That said, our work (see also this Report's chapters on input sourcing, OEM-supplier 
relations, and labor) suggests that primary emphasis must be placed on retaining or in- 
creasing the state's share of Big Three assemblies. Because of higher U.S. content (86- 
95% versus 20-50%) and greater propensity to purchase major inputs from existing 
Mic!higm suppliers, the typical Big Three Michigan assem.bly plant generates a t  least 
twice, and in some cases six times, as  much Michigan manufacturing wealth as the typical 
foreign-owned or joint venture ~Michigan assembly operation. Moreover, that estimate of 
dif'ferentiai wealth creation is probably on the low side: not counted are the Big Three and 
associa1;ed supplier output losses due to displacement by Flat Rock-W3liM-Smyrna- 
Marysville cars that add to, rather than merely replace, imports shipped from Japan. 
None of the aforegoing is to downplay the desirability of attracting foreign direct 
automotive investment. Rather, it is to suggest, first, that priority one should be on 
retaining Big Three assembly programs and, second, that State overtures to foreign- and 
domestic-based OEMs alike should condition at least part of State assistance on the 
achievement of relatively high Michigan content. 
Conclusions to Date 
Despite the best efforts of the CRT and its able consu.ltants, we have been unable to 
arrive a t  a simple yet reliable tool for predicting assembljr plant endangeredness in the 
context of multiplant vehicle programs. While older, multistory, RWD plants that have 
received little major recent investment of course face a higher risk of closing, the more 
detailed determination of facility futures seems to require a wealth of data, often unavail- 
able, about the internal politics and global strategies of particular companies and divisions 
within them. 
Because of the remarkable extent to which the indu.stry has opened its planning 
book to the CRT, we have some of the concrete data on which this chapter and others are 
based. As a result, we have concluded that landlocked assembly facilities are riskier, and 
that among current programs Wayne is the "core" plant of the Erika program, while 
Orion (behind Wentnille) and Willow Run (behind Flint's "Buick City") are number two 
plants for the C and H programs, respectively. 
Still, the overriding conclusion must be that there are few predictive shortcuts; ongo- 
ing expert state monitoring is therefore essential to developing and keeping up-to-date a 
useful public map of the State's automotive "path to prosperity." 
BIG TIBEZ CAR 
A FWD 
C FWD 
F or GM80 FWD 
G m 
H ar GI70 FWD 
J FWD 
K m 
L or 25 FWD 
N or @i 20 FWD 
P IWD 
T m 
T V X o r ~ 6 0  FWD 
Var a 3 5  FWD 
Celebrity, 600, Ciera, 
Century 
Caprice, Parisienne, 88, 
LeSabre 
F l e e b x d  Brougham 
M t e  Carlo, BoMeville, 
. Grand Prix, Supreme, 
Resal 
(New) M a b r e ,  Delta 
Cavalier, 2000 Sunbird, 
Firenza, Slqh&c, Cimrron 
Wetta, Corsica 








BIG THREE CAR LEGEND 
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Date of Program 










600 & LeBaron 
convertibles 
Caravelle, 600, E, 
LeEbron, New Yorker 
D a m ,  Laser 
Reliant, Aries 
Qnrxi, Horizon 
G r a m ,  Diplarat, 
F i f t h  Avenue 
Voyager, Caravan 
TABLE V1' 
LIm VEHICLE AssEmtY PRCGRAM SITIN(; IN MICHIGAN, 
aTRREejT P R m Y  FUlVRE PRcmAM 
FACILITY VEHICLES EUDS VMI- BEGINS 
General  motors 
Clark/FleeM B 89? 
D 90? 
Pontiac #1 P 
Pontiac West #5 , ,510 trudcs 
Pantiac East #6 GbQ400 87 
# 8 G 87 80 89 
Willcw Run 
Lansing N 
(Buiclr. City) Flint $4 
Orion C 
Chevy Flint Truck C/K truC! 
Poletown 
Ford -
WiXan LS, Panther 
Michigan (Wayne)' Truck Utilities 
Wayne (Car) Erika:Esmrt 90? ? 
LynX,E=' 87 





Sterling Heights H 
Warren (Dodge City) D/W Pickups N (added) 86t 
Utilities 85 
Flat Rcc!! 727 8 7 i  
OiT RISK RATINGS OF MICHIGAN 
CAR AND LIGHT DIUCK ASSENBLY PLARTS, 
(Scale: 0-0 r isk, .  . . , 99rave risk;  a plant r i sk  score over 10-absent 
firm future plans-indicates signficant danger. ) 
Risk Factor 
Attri- cat Imports Fuel - 
Current Age of butas of or  Prices Plant 
( 1985 1 Pro- of Change Out- ar Risk 









F l in t  Truck 
Ford Wixm LS ,Panther 4 1 6 0 3 1 4  
Wayne(Truck1 Bronco , F 3 0 0 0 4 7 
Wayne (Car) Erika 5 0 0 9 4 18 
Dearborn Fox 9 7 6 5 0 27 
Chrysler Jefferson K,E,CV 6* 3 0 2 0 U 
Sterli.ng H 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Warren D/w O** 2 0 2 3 7 
*Likely to decline to  0 due to s i t ing  of A ' s  in  88. 
**N truck (Dakota) d n g  i n  1986t. 
TABLE V3 
REFEmm GUIDE m MICHIGAN LIGHT m1CUE 
ASSElMBLY ACI'IVITIES, 1986-1992 
PLANT PRamJ!Y 
a: 
Clark/Fleetwxd 9 4  
Pontiac #5 
Pontiac t 6  
SlO pickup 
This 2-plant s i t e  w i l l  l ikely  be 
the plant a t  which a l l  r a i n i n g  
GY f ull-size IiWD (B  and D) pro- 
duction w i l l  be s i ted,  as 
Fairfax (HS. 1 # l  closes 
( r e p l a d  by W car a t  new 
Fairfax #2 plant i n  1988) and as 
Ste. Th~xese (Ont . I  loses B s i n  
1987. The 1987-88 addition of 
Chevy B ' s to  O l d s  and Cadillac 
gives Clar!k/FleetwPod l i f e  
through a t  l e a s t  1989, but not 
beyond 1.990 or  1991. 
Recent i.ntrcduction of the . 
space-fz:ame/plastic panel Fiero 
should sustain Plant 1 into  the 
early 1990's. However, 
burgeoni.ng Japanese canget it ion 
i n  the t m s e a t s r  niche makes 
v o l m ,  and hence employment, a 
source of concern. 
Successful recent product 
sustains Plant 5. ~ U t i p l a n t  
nature of S10 program, plus 
cycl ical i ty  of txuck demand, 
nrake temporary shutdown a 
possibil i ty.  
See Chapter text Successful medium tlvcks are 
being shifted t o  mke r m  fo r  
the high-volume, three-plant 
GbQ 400 pickup launch in  1987, 
Not known i f  Plant 6 is "coreN 
(;r"i111400 f ac i l t y  (versus new plant 
i n  Indianapolis ard newly- 
autcmatd Oshawa, Ont . plant) . 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO MICHIGAN LIGHT WIICLE 
(CONTINUED) 
Pcntiac 118 See Chapter text 
Lansing A,B 
Lansing (Delta -1 GM33 
Flint #4 
( "Euick City" ) 
Chevy (Fl int)  Truck C/K pickup 
While Plant 8 i t se l f  -my close 
in 1987 (any remaining G car 
output l ikely to be con- 
solidated to Mexico)  , current 
plans call for Pontiac t o  host 
the 300K/yrI plastic-skinned 
80 Wzo/Firebi rd  successor in  
'89 and perhaps, the new 
Manhattan engine in '91 and/or 
a future plastic M y  van 
progran* 
Closed in early 1985 after 
building W s  f ina l  X cars, 
Willow Run is to sb r t  up in l a t e  
1985 as one of the three ( w i t h  
Flint  and Wentzville) H car plants. 
Recent N car launch should 
sustairl th is  plant into the mid 
1990's ,, The canpact which 
shares many ,parts with the 
s-& JI could h ~ c ~ e v e r  
suffer f run heightening foreign 
comptition in its segmollt. 
A 1987 1/2 launch is expected 
for the upscale, low-volume 
Reatta, giving new l i f e  to the 
old W.ta Twp rear axle 
fac i l i ty .  
The fd .1  1985 launch of the new 
FWD full-sized H could s ~ ~ t a i n  
the JIT-exemplary Plant 4 to  the 
turn of  the century. 
Flint i,s truck town, USA, and 
l ikely to stay that way. A l l  
signs, hwever, p i n t  t o  Tmd! & 
Bus Division suprerracy i n  future 
fadl i tmiz ing.  
TABLE V3 
RDEREXX GUIDE TO MICHIGAN LIm VMI(LE 
ASSmL!i ACTIVITIES,  1986-1992 
( C O W T ~ I  









This re la t ively  new BCC plant 
is, despite ballyhooed robotiza- 
tion, labor-i.ntensive. But its 
upscale FWD cars are  l ikely  
t o  sustain it:, a t  least into  the 
middle 90's. Analysts say, 
however, that; i f  sales f d t e r ,  
Orion would 1.ose a s h i f t  before 
the other C car plant 
(Wentzville, which will also 
have the H car 1 . 
If FWD and new and expensive and 
luxury cars sean long-term 
safety, t h i s  is the safest 
f a c i l i t y  i n  W t h  Amrica. E/K 
launch i n  1986 t o  f o l l d  by 
GM35 (or  V) in 1988. 
Though the current Continental, 
Mark, and Tmn Car programs end 
i n  1987, 1989, and 1991, respec- 
tively,  Wixan is probably secure. 
Continental and ~Yark axe to be re- 
placed by new 3WD designs based on 
Taurus/Sable platform. Town Car 
mves to  St.  T h m s  (Ont.) i n  
1986 1/2 but is slated to return 
i n  1990 1/2 with FWD. Wixcm 
w u l d  then be a fu l ly  FAD luxury 
car plant, second in  long-term 
safety only to Poletown. 
Solid-selling full-size l igh t  
trucks anchor this plant against 
anything short of $3 gasoline. 
And they're slated for total 
reskinning in  1991 1/2. 
TABLE V3 
REzEma GUIDE TO MICHIGAN LIGHT VEHICLE 
ASSFMBLY ACTIVrrLFS, 1986-1992 
(CONTINUED) 
Wayne (Car)  Assembly Erika 
Chrysler : 
Jefferson 
Sterl ing Heights 
Fox 
Dodge City (Warren) Pickups 
Core prccjram plant of 3 i n  North 
m i c a ,  but threats abound: a 
higher innport share and relaxed 
CAFE rules, followed by a 
Ford/MazcIa captive £ran ~ W c o  
(gerhaps sold in  Lynx l ine  , 
follawed by Alpha which could be 
Erika's successor. High quality 
rating, however, suggests the 
plant would get  a new program 
even i f  EZika ends in 1990 o r  
1991. 
50% of ~%zda (Flat  Rcck) output 
w i l l  replace Capri in  1987 1/2 
or  1988. i%jor freshening of 
Mustang i.n 1987 secures Dearborn 
to, but not beyand, 1990. One 
hop:  A 90 termination would 
f i t  with the tentative 1991 1/2  
or  1992 launch of FWD Panther ' 
l ine.  
K's and C V f s  slated to end in  
1987 1/2 and to be replaced in  1988 
by At s . E1 s may continue, or  be dropped. 
There is a small danger that 
Chrysler could instead site A's 
a t  St. U u i s  (1%) or Wvide re  
(a). 
Recent H car launch, plus 1987 
addition 13f P l ine ,  secure 
th i s  eff ic ient ,  refurbished FWD 
plant. S.low sales and munting 
midsize foreign ctunpetition, 
however, are keeping v o l m  w e l l  
telw capncity, leading to P car 
s i t ing  decision. 
Full-sizai u t i l i t i e s  ?.ere mved t o  
Mexico in  1985, but cc~npact N pickup 
(Dakota) \ J i l l  be added to 
remining full-sized pickup 
l ine ,  searring the fac i l i t y  and 
anchoring the W g e  City 
complex. 
REFERENCE GUIDE M MICHIGAN LIGHT VMfCLE . 
ASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES, 1986-199;! 
(camNmD) 
PLANT PRCGRAM 
Mazda: Flat Rock 727 626-basell successor with on- 
site major stapings. Output 
starts 1987 1/2, split between 
Mazda and ~incoln-Mercury dedlers. 
A U. S. engine plant is -red 
for 1989. 
INPUT SOURCING 
For every U.S. job in the assembly of cars and light trucks (about half of SIC 3711), 
there are an additional 2..5 manufacturing jobs producing parts for those vehicles (the 
balance of SIC 371, plus SIC 3714). Moreover, for each auto job (SICS 3711 and 3714 
combined), there are about 1.25 other manufacturing jobs in industries such as steel, glass, 
textiles, and rubber. Thus the U.S. automotive manufacturing economy can be thought of 
as an inverted pyramid, in which some 200,000 light vehicle assembly jobs support about 
500,000 direct supplier jobs and those 700,000 together underpin a niillion more. Since 
Michigan is, if anything, more highly auto-agglomerated than average, our approximately 
70,000 light vehicle assembly (blue-collar) workers provide the underpinning for many of 
tho State's 200,000 supplier jobs and perhaps 280,000 of our other manufacturing jobs, 
for a total of 550,000. Add to that some 100,000 whik-collar jobs a t  corporate and 
divisional headquarters, technical centers, and proving grounds, and the figure rises to 
650,000. In fact, a 1981 MESC study found that fully 554'0 of Michigan's manufacturing 
employment is linked to auto production; in metro Detroit, the figure is 73%. 
Nurturing the prospects of the State's thousands of non-assembly auto-related es- 
tablishments is thus the single largest task facing Michigan's attempt to realize the wealth 
maximization goal set out in "The Path to Prosperity." Despite its obvious importance, 
retaining and attracting assembly plants cannot be the Sta1:e's only strategy for pursuing 
that goal. Rather, direct attention must be focused on maintaining the strong and identify- 
ing the weak links in the State's supplier base, and improvir~g the latter's competitiveness. 
Done successfully, this will sustain existing firms and jobs, improve the cost position of 
Michigan assembly plants and, perhaps most important, justify the State's efforts to assist 
assemblers to intensify their Michigan linkagedness. 
Key Findings 
In our work to date, the CRT has succeeded in describing the structure of supply for 
the major body panels, frames, engines, transmissions, and axles of all cars and light 
trucks assembled in Michigan. Table I1 presents that description for both 1986 models 
and, where known, for new programs announced for 1987-92. Even cursory inspection of 
Table I1 reveais the extremely high level of Michigan verticd integration of all of the Big 
Tnree in major body stampings, of GM and Chrysler in engines, and of GM in automatic 
transmissions as well. While many Michigan component makers, both captive OEM plants 
and independents, could survive on sales to non-Michigan assembly programs, many could 
not. The loss of any of our Big Three assembly plants would be a huge blow to the sup- 
plier base, 
Significant elements of that base seem headed for difficult sledding, even if the U.S. 
auto market can avoid a sharp cyclical downturn through the early 1990's and even if no 
major :usembly facilities are definitively closed. As we demonstrated in the previous chap- 
ter, a t  least four Michigan car assembly programs -BID at  Clark/Fleetwood, G a t  Pontiac 
#8, Fox at Dearborn, and Erika at Wayne - are kt risk. Absent similarly Michigan- 
linkaged replacement programs, loss of those plants' demands will endanger investment, 
employment, and derived input demand a t  [via BID and G:] Chevy Flint Met Fab, Grand 
Rapids #1, Chevy Flint Engine, Detroit Gear & Axle, and (perhaps to the point of closing) 
the Three Rivers Hydramatic plant; and [via Fox and Erika:] Woodhaven and especially 
Dearborn Stamping, the Utica and Chesterfield trim plants, Dearborn Engine, and 
- though to a lesser extent. - Sterling Axle. 
Beyond the BiD, G, Fox, and Eriha programs, risks face Michigan plants that 
produce parts for GM's T (Chevette) and J bodies [volume losses due to more imports] and 
Chrysler's Illinois-assembled OmniXorizon line. In fact, if State policy-makers had to ask 
themselves only one question about how td identify at-risk suppliers, that question should 
be: Which Michigan facilities currently supply at-risk vehicle programs and are not 
assured of supplying successor programs, if there are any? 
Many of the State's less at-risk assembly plants produce less Michigan-intensive 
vehicles than those whose production is imperiled. Indiana, New York, Ohio, Canadian, 
and offshore plants are significant suppliers for GM's Fiero, S.10, N cars, and CIK trucks; 
for Ford's Wayne-built light trucks; and for most of Chrysk:r vehicles' transmissions and 
engine cylinder heads. 
Other dangers threaten the all-important intrastate chains of automotive value 
added. Rising market penetration by foreign-assembled and low-US content smaU "domes- 
tic" cars will reduce traditional US. OEM parts demand by a.t least 14% by 1987 even if a 
recession is avoided, according to work done at IT1 by two AJM CRT members. Where in 
1978 the Big Three produced in the U.S. and Canada 14.3 million (or 86%) of the 16.6 mil- 
lion new cars and trucks sold in North America, in 1984 the Big Three proportion had 
declined to 74%; by 1987, it could weil be below 65%; and Chrysler has recently stated 
that by 1990 it will be just 51%. Increased outsourcing of the parts for those Big Three 
cars that continue to be made in North America makes that figure a conservative estimate 
of likely volume losses, though one OEM describes such increases as  temporary, "only un- 
til we get our U.S. production costs down through better technology." 
Identification among supplier companies of the probatlle winners and losers from all 
of these developments is inevitably risky; to the extent that changes in modular sourcing, 
materials, or technology are key factors in suppliers' prospects, the reader should consult 
the chapters on those topics. Here, we c o n h e  ourselves to broad aggregates and emerging 
trends. 
First among these trends is the continuing surge in imported auto parts, which have 
risen since 1978 at a 25% annual rate, reaching about $14 biUion in 1985, up from $3 bil- 
lion (nearly all of that Canada) in 1978. Canada and Japari top the list, but the dramatic 
recent increases belong (in order) to Meiico, Taiwan, Brazil, South Korea, and Singapore. 
Low labor costs, locd content and export requirements, and an. overvalued dollar tell only 
part of their success story; and a cheaper dollar alone won't change the trend. Growing 
scale economies and industrial infrastructure gains by marly Third World producers ex- 
plain why the new wave of exports to the U.S. is not restricted to labor-intensive and low- 
skill products, but included growing s hares in s m d  engines, aluminum cylinder heads, 
shock absorbers, pumps, wheels, and springs as well. iMol.eover, Japan - feeling itself 
barred by threats of protectionist action from taking more than about onequarter of the 
U.S. market with finished vehicles shipped from Japan - expects to increase its exports of 
parts and "knockdown sets" (essentially, kits of preassembled subsystems making up some 
80%-plus of the vehicle). by 13% a year between now and 19ElO. 
Suppliers' profits are even more a t  risk than their sales volumes. Imports are now 
taking some 23% of the lucrative U.S. aftermarket parts business, which for many sup- 
pliers constitutes 1 0 4 0 %  of sales but 30-50% of net earnings; a recent' .Arthur D. Little 
study forecasts aftermarket sales lost to imports a t  $3 billion a year by 1994. Shorter 
product cycles, more "niche" vehicles and the associated devaluation of economies of high 
volume, ma&rials changes, and their customers' technology and price demands ail add to 
the perilousness of most suppliers' environment. 
Suppliers a t  risk of losing work run the gamut from srnall independents to giant Big 
Three plants. Captive OEM component plants are no longer assured of the parent's busi- 
ness; this makes some Michigan plants less secure, while creating business opportunities 
for aggressive captives and non-captives alike - in Howell birt also in Hiroshima. For eu- 
ample, GM engine part outsourcing has meant gains for some Michigan h n s  that cast 
aluminum heads, cam carriers, water pumps, and intake manifolds, but also for Comau 
(Italy) and Cosworth (U.K.) castings. Chrysler purchasers reportedly have been told to get 
$1,150 out of each car in purchased parts by 1989 (versus 1984); one result has been in- 
tensified parts shopping in Korea and Taiwan. Some OEM interviewees told us that over 
_ $1,000 per car can be saved if Midwestern suppliers bec0m.e assemblers of modules made 
up pax-tially of subparts from the Sunbelt, Mexico, Brazil, md the Pacific. Firms benefit- 
ting from, or at  least able to prosper despite, increased offshore and modular sourcing in- 
clude those protected by technoiogy, hard-to-ship product type, or their own multinational 
character. Among these, inteniewees were bullish on plastics suppliers, assemblers of 
electronics-intensive modules, and diversified multinationals such as TRW, Eaton, and 
Rockwell. Predicted net losers include most RWD axle plants, many trim plants, non- 
galvanized steel plants, bearing makers, and smaller suppliers of castings, forgings, extru- 
sions, and powdered metal parts. 
Detailed Input Sourcing Factors 
In this section, we explore likely developments in the sourcing of frames; of major 
body panels, both steel and plastic; of engines and their major parts; of transmissions, 
transaxles, trailing axles, and their component castings; :md the major constituents of 
U.S.-assembled foreign-nameplate light vehicles. AM work in fiscal 1986 will continue 
the analysis of input sourcing, and extend the inquiry to include suspension, steering, 
brake, wheel, and other subsystems. 
Fewer and fewer passenger cars have frames as such; partial frames, front 
crossmember assemblies, and unibodies now predominate. The current Chevrolet Corvette 
and Pontiac Fiero, the 1990 GM 80, and perhaps an early 1990's GM van herald a pos- 
sible future of "bird cage" or space frames to which easily redesigned body panels are at- 
tached. Many light trucks, on the other hand, continue to be constructed on at least a par- 
tial welded steel frame. Michigan has already lost much of the remaining frame business, 
and what's left is at  considerable risk. A.O. Smith in Milwaukee, Wisconsin is the leading 
frame maker for GM B and G bodies, and its Granite City, IL. plant has landed the Dodge 
1V truck frame contract. The Ford Rouge frame plant remains, but is dangerously depend- 
ent on the large RWD'cars assembled at Wixom and in Canada; unless more truck frame 
work can be secured at Dearborn Frame, a 1988-1991 period closing cannot be ruled out 
as Continental, Mark, and Town Car are changed over to FWD. In space frames, Lobdell- 
Emery (Alma, MI) is a likely winner, especially if it lands the Gal 80 frame to go with its 
current Corvette work. 
Body Stampings and Plastic Panels 
Excess OEM large panel stamping capacity and the growing attractiveness of 
molded and ;tamped plastics place a number of captive Michigan stamping plants a t  risk 
in the 1986-92 period, while creating business opporturdties for certain independent 
stampers (see Table 11). GM stamping facilities a t  risk include Conner (tied to B, D), Wil- 
low Springs (Chicago), Mansfield (Ohio), Pittsburgh, ~ldsmobile Met Fab #l (tied to Olds 
B), Flint 2A (Chevy Pressed Metal), and Pontiac Met Fab. Either or both of the last two 
have some chance, based on demonstrated know-how, of being converted to plastic panel 
plants, particularly if (as seems likely) GM decides to make the panels for its 1990 GM80 
line in-house. While a number of GM Michigan stamping plants produce panels for vehicle 
programs facing declining volumes,l an emerging modular sourcing system2 makes 
forecasting perilous. 
Ford too has excess major panel stamping capacity; Dearborn but probably not 
Woodhaven is a t  significant risk. Ford is looking to outside! stampers more and more for 
both complex curvature outer skin stampings (e.g., to Budd [Detroit] for luxury car fender 
outers and deck lids) and for non-body surface stamped pzrts. Table I 1  lists some of its 
suppliers, all of which stand to gain work, barring major Ford volume losses to imports. 
Chrysler shed much of its excess captive supply capacity in its draconic 1979-82 
downsizing. Its remaining large panel stamping facilities - Sterling, Warren, and 
Twinsburg (Ohio) - appear secure. In fact, Chrysler is investing $120 million (mostly in 
foreign press equipment) between 1985 and 1987 to add modular subassembly capacity a t  
Warren and Twinsburg, after which it will pull in-house one-fourth of its now-outside 
major stampings. 
In plastic panels, our interviewees expect more Big Three in-house fabrication, 
either alone or jointly with plastics firms. If GM80 proves plastic skinning viable in non- 
niche volume applications, the need for 3,5004,000-ton presses and the efficient dedicated 
volume size of 200,000-plus vehicle sets both suggest that OEM insourcing predictions are 
 rand Blanc stamps B doors, G roofs, and T and J body panels, quarter panels, and 
roofs. 
' ~ e g i n n i n ~  with the 1986 L body, each new GM steel,-skinned vehicle program will 
have all hoods, fenders, and front doors (front module) stamged in the same plant, and so 
on for the rear module (roof, deck lid, quarter panel, rear doors), black metal module, floor 
pan module, and rear compartment module. 
accurate. In smaller panels and parts, however, plastics may mean net Michigan losses. 
Many of the steel parts displaced by plastic components - bumpers, small panels, cowls, 
etc. - are (or were) Michigan-made, while their plastic replsrcements are notS3 
Engines 
The 1986-92 period will be a tempestuous one in U.S. engine production. Most of 
today's engines embody incremental refinements of 30-year-old designs; by 2000, those - 
designs will have been radically changed, with many of GM's and some of Chrysler's en- 
gines transformed in the 1988-91 period. The light vehicle! engine changes predicted by 
CRT interviewees include smaller, lighter all-aluminum designs and even the appearance 
of "unicast" power plants with integral block-and-head. 
Michigan produces the majority of GM and Chrysler's domestic car and light truck . 
engines, and about one-fourth of Ford's. GM also casts a ma.jority of its engine blocks and 
cylinder heads in the state. However, while all these statements may still be true in 1992, 
. there is a significant chance that some will not. 
First, the blocks for the high-volume Buick 3.0- and 3.8-liter V6's will be moved to 
Defiance, Ohio in late 1986 when Pontiac's foundry closes. Many of the aluminum 
cylinder heads for GM's 60-degree V6's are made in Italy and Brazil by Fiat-Teksid, and 
will only be eligible for resourcing to GM Central Foundry Division plants if and when they 
master "lost foam" aluminum casting technology. Second, while the high-volume 3.2.liter 
V6 GM "3200" en,sine that will debut in the Fiero in late 1988 and in GMlO (W) cars in 
1989 and power GM80 in the 1990's may be sited in Elay City, it may also go to 
Tonawanda, New York; if so, Michigan will suffer a drop in its engine share and miss a 
major opportunity. 
On the plus side, Pontiac may get a large proportion of the 1991 Manhattan 
"unicast" Ccylinder that will replace its current Pontiac 2..5-liter engine. Chrysler's Tren- 
ton plant is adding a 2.5-liter version of itx current 2.2 that .will replace the imported Mit- 
subishi 2.6; Mound Road will soon add a 3.9-liter V6 tmck engine as well, and an all-new 
Chrysler 6 is being contemplated, though a vacant Chrysler plant in Widsor, Ontario 
would probably get that engine. Finally, Mazda is rumored to be considering a U.S. engine 
3 ~ i e r o  panels come from Ohio and Me&o in addition to Ionia, htichigan. Chrysler's 
plastic 120~1s come from Budd in Indiana, its plastic faciae O~umpers and associated trim] 
from Davison Rubber (Excello) in New Jersey and North Ca:rolina, and many of its other 
plastic parts from Modern Tool & Die in Cleveland. Only a t  :Ford, whose Saline and Milan 
plants are plastics specialists and many of whose outside plastic parts come from C&F in 
Grand Rapids, does growing less-than-full skin plastics use bode well for Michigan. 
plant to supply Flat Rock, with some volume left over for other customers. Obviously, the 
State should try to get the plant, though (see below) some of its~output could end up replac- 
ing other Michigan en,&es. 
Ford, finally, makes its only Michigan engines a t  Dearborn, and all but about 8% of 
them (which are exported to the U.K.) go into North American-assembled Erika vehicles, 
a t  risk from imports from Japan and Mexico. In addition, the avaiiability of small engines 
for Ford from a possible U.S. Mazda engine plant could make Dearborn Engine worrisome- 
ly expendable. 
A partial listing of independent suppliers of engine castings and forgings to ~Michigan 
engine plants appears in Table 12. 
Drive Trains 
Michigan is the nation's leading producer of passengerb car and light truck automatic 
transmissions and trulsaxles. Capacity is dominated by GM Hydramatic Division 
facilities in Ypsilanti (Wiilow Run), Warren, Three Rivers, Flint, and Bay City; Ford's 
Livonia plant supplies most of its large car transmissions. Only Chrysler, which gets dl 
its transmissions from its Kokomo, Indiana and Syracuse, New York plants, .lacks a 
Michigan facility. The State -and the U.S. ;is a whole - is much less involved in manual 
transaxles: GM gets its domestic manuals from its Muncie, Indiana line and from Borg] 
Warner Gear, also in Muncie, and buys some from Isuzu (Japan). Ford gets all its 
manuals from Borg Warner, Ford of Europe (Cologne), 'I'remec (Mexico), and Mazda 
(Japan). As of now, none of the Big Three plans any Michigan production of manual 
transaxles, though GM is expanding its Indiana Getrag lineup. 
Of the iMichigan plants producing automatic transmissions, only the Three Rivers 
GM Hydramatic facility is a t  obvious risk, owing to its dependence on large RWD cars 
slated for phaseout by 1990. However, major volume losses due to more mid-sized imports 
could imperil other Hydramatic plants. 
In transmission parts, a new U.S. plant that will cast aluminum parts is planned by 
the Ryobi-Sheller Globe joint venture; if the State can attract that facility, it could sig- 
nificantly increase the chances of future Michigan transaxle  investment^.^ 
4 ~ y o b i  plants in Japan already have contracts to supply the caseis of Erika's Ohio- 
made \3-speed automatic, the Taurus/Sable Cspeed automatic, and a new Hydramatic 
model. 
Sonle of the good news has a bad side. The shift to FWD has a meant new work at 
Saginaw and Hydramatic, but lost work at the ~ x l e  plants of all of the Big Three. Chevy 
' Gear :md kyle (Detroit) will lose half its B and G car RWlD axles in 1986, and C and H 
cars have independent control arms (made in Oshawa, Ontario) rather than trailing axles. 
Ford's Sterling axle plant depends heavily, though far from exclusively, on RtVD Ford 
models scheduled for phaseout by 1991. Chrysler's Detroit (Eldon) Axle plant may also be 
at  risk: of closing; current volume needs could probably be met by outside suppliers, and 
not necessarily in Michigan. 
Independent suppliers of transmission castings are listed in Table 12. 
Inouts for Foreign-Owned and JV Plants 
Great controversy surrounds major input sourcing for the new U.S. assembly 
programs launched or planned by Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, blitsubishi/Chrysler, 
and TuyotdGM. Most traditional suppliers report difficulty getting these plants' business, 
and fear that the Japanese-based suppliers clustering around the new assembly sites will 
compete away their Big Three work as well. 
.As of now, all of the new foreign-owned and joint venture assembly facilities import 
engines and drive trains; most import stampings or stamp ,major panels on-site using im- 
ported steel. Claims of North .American content as high as 50% are alleged; 35% is more 
typical and truthful, and even that lower figure may overvalue certain U.S.-assembled 
p m  that embody imported steel, castings, and forgings. On the plus side, Honda plans 
and M d a  is considering U.S. engine production by 1989. 
The pattern as well as the level of domestic supply to the new foreign-owned and JV 
assembly plants merits concern p d  on-going monitoring. ihalysis of input procurement 
for NUMMI in Fremont, CA. and for Nissan in Smyrna, TN,, reveals that low-value added, 
energy-intensive inputs such as paints, sealants, and cable typify what lW7hIMI and 
Smyrna buy from existing Michigan suppliers. To the extent that Michigan suppliers do 
get; contracts for more substantial inputs, these tend to be for non-complex subassemblies 
and often go to establishments set up by Japan-based suppliers,5 most of which purchase 
some or all of their own inputs from Japan. At MJiMMI, 1450 parts are shipped from 
Japan, including the engine, cransasle, emissions system, suspension, brakes, and steer- 
6 ~ a k a t a  Fisher in St. Clair Shores (seat belts), Nippondenso in Battle Creek 
(electronics, AC), Hitachi in Edrnore (magnetics), Musashi Seimitsu in Battle Creek (ball 
joints), Dai-Ichi in Madison Heights (electronics), and Yazdd in Livonia (wire harnesses) 
are some of these. 
ing. Of the 400 US.-sourced parts, none involves precision machining, casting, or forging, 
Mi.chigan's fortes; in fact, tires, seats, radiators, and air cortditioners are the only complex 
parts/subassemblies currently sourced from the U.S. As we noted in the previous chapter, 
this underscores the need for the State to encourage present and future small car assembly 
plants to move toward high Michigan content. 
Table 11. 
Major Input Sources for Michigan ,4ssemblies 
Unless otherwise labeled, all entries refer to 1986 
through 1992 or later models. 
Legend: FESM = front end sheet metal; BIW = body-in-white. 
Stamping plant names include: SM - Sheet Metal, 
bF - Metal Fabricating, PM - Pressed Metal. 
GM: 
DETROIT CADILLAC ASSEMBLY (1986-89) 
23% Cadillac (D), 12% EI8(B), 65% Caprice(B) 
Major body stampings FESM: CIark/Fltwd (Ca'd), Old$ Lansing 
MF (88), Chevy Flint &F(Caprice) 
BIW, Chassis: Clark/Fltwd 
Underbody: Grand Rapids #1 
Frame: A.O. Smith (Milwaukee) 
Engines 
Olds 5.0 V8 307 
Cadi 4.1 V8 249 
Chev 4.3 V6 
Chev 5.0 V8 
Chev 5.7 V8 
29% Olds (Lansing) 
8% Cadillac (Livonia.) 
10% Chev (Tonawanda, NY) 
50% Chev (Flint) 
3% Chev (Flint) 
Transmissions 
Chevys (65%) TH&i 700 R4 - Toledo (OH) HhID 
Others (35%) TH3I 2011 R4 - Three Rivers HblD 
Rear axles Chevy (Detroit) Gear St Axle (Gk.4) 
LAKE ORION ASSEMBLY 
Sedan DeVille, 98, Electra (a) 
Major body stampings FESM: Pontiac MI? (Cad), Chev Flint bfl? (Olds), 
Buick Flint &IF (Buick) 
BTCV: Mansfield, Oh (Cad), Grand Rapids #I (Olds, Buick) 
Underbody, Cradle: Chev Flint b1F 
Engines 
Buic 3.8 V6 231 
Cadi 1.1 V8 249 
24% Buick (Flint) 
76% Cad (Livonia) 
Transaxle THPvI 440 T4 +spd aut .. Warren HhID 
hdep  Control A m s  (instead of trailing axle) 
Oshawa (Ont.), but may be resourced to Warren HbID 
Major body scampings 
Engines 
Cadi 4.1 V8 
Buic 3.8 V6 
Xrmsaxle 
Trailing k l e  
Major body panels 
Engines 
Pont 2.5 14 151 
Chev 2.8 V6 173 
POLETOWN 
E/K (GM30) in '86,,V ((2b135) in '87- 
FESM: Hamilton (OH) 
BDV: Grand Blanc; Unclerbody: Gd Rapids #1 
Cradle: Chev Flint bF 
approx 50% Livonia 
approx 50% Flint 
Cspd aut THM 440 T4 Warren H3ID 
Buick (Flint) MI? 
PONTUC #1 
Fiero (P) 
Hoods, Fenders: Genl Tire, Ionia, MI 
Faciae: Fisher Guide (GM), Ramirez, Mex 
Deck Lid: Budd, Carey, OH 
Roof: Premix (div of Shell), Lancaster, OH 
Doors: Olds (Lansing); (Jtr Panels: Pontiac PM 
40% Pontiac 
60% Chev (Tonawanda, NY) 
Transmissions 
42% 3-spd aut THN 15!5C - Willow Run (Ypsi) 
27% 'aspd man Getrag - GM hfuncie (IN) 
31% 5-spd man MT2 - Isuzu (Japan) 
Trailing axle Pontiac MI? 
PONTXC #5 
S-10 Pickup Sc Utility 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Pont 2.5 I4 
Chev 2.8 V6 
FESM: Chev ~ i i n t  k1F 
Cab ShI, Box: Indianapolis (IN) 
Underbody: Parma (OH) SM; Bumpers: Livonia 
Frame: A.O. Smith (Milwaukee) 
15% Pontiac 
85% GM Canada 
71% 4spd aut THM 700 R4 - Toledo EvlD 
?9% 4 Sc 5-spd man T4:, T5 - Borg Warner (IN) 
Axles 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Cbev 4.3 V6, 7.4 V8 
Chev 5.0 & 5.7 V8 
Chev 6.2 V8 
Transmissions 
Rear axles 
Rear: GM Canada; Front: Olds (Lansing) 
PONTIAC (EAST) # 6  
GMT400 truck in '87 
FESM: Chev Flint hF 




bspd aut THhi1400 - Willow Run W 
4spd aut THh1700 R4 - Toledo IWD 
Manuals - Biuncie 
Detroit GStA (8.5" and 9.5") 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Chev 4.3 V6 262 
Chev 5.0 V8 305 
3200 V6 for GM80 & others 
PONTIAC # 8 
Cutlass Supreme (G) '86-,'88 or '89 
GM80 in '90 (unless greeofield) 
FESM: Olds (Lansing) MF 
BIW: Grand Rapids #l 
Frame: A.O. Smith (hfil~vaukee) 
Bumpers (RIM Faciae): (1M Canada 
(GM80: plastic body on space frame] 
65% Chev (Tonawanda, NY) 
35% Chev (Flint) 
?Bay City, Tonawanda, or Pontiac 
Transmissions 
74% 3-spd aut THM 2010 C - Willow Run (Ypsi) HMD 
26% 4spd  aut THM 2ClO 4R - Three Rivers H&iD 
Rear axles 
Control Arms 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Pont 3.5 I4 151 
Buic 3.0 V6 181 
65% 7.5" (with V6) - Buffalo G&A 
35% 8.5" (with V8) - Detroit G&A 
Warren HMD 
LANSING ASSEMBLY 
Somerset, Calais, GrancLh (N) 
FESM, BDV: Olds klF 
Underbody: Grand Rapids #I 
45% Pontiac 
55% Buick (Flint) 
Transaxles 
70% 3-spd aut THM 135 C - Willow Run H3fD 
30% 5-spd man MT% - Isuzu (Japan) 
Trailing axle Pontiac IvF; Control Arms: Oshawa (Ont) 
BUICK CITY (FLINT) 
H (GM70) in '86 
Major body stampings FESM, BlSV: Buick lLlF 
Underbody: Grand Rapids #1; Cradle: Chev Flint ?vIF 
Engines 
Buic 3.0 V6 
Buic 3.8 V6 
33% Flint 
67% Flint 
Transaxle 4-spd aut THM 440 T4 Warren HiMD 
lndep Control Arms (instead of trailing axle) 
Oshawa (Ont) 
WILLOW RUN ASSEMBLY 
H (GkI70) 
Major body stampings same as Buick City above . 
Engines 
Buic 3.0 V6 
Buic 3.8 V6 
4% Flint 
96% Flint 
Transaxle, Indep Control Arms same as Buick City above 
CHEVY FLINT TRU'CK 
C/K, K trucks 





6.2 V8 diesel 
7.4 V8 
Transmissions 
FESM: Chev Flint MJ? 
Cab SM, Box: Indianapolis Ski 
Underbody: Parma PM; Bumpers: Livonia 
Frame: A.O. Smith '(Mhaaukee) 
11% Chev (Tonawantla, NY) 
51% Chev (Flint) 
23% Chev (Flint) 
7% Moraine (OH) 
8% Chev (Tonawanda, NY) 
52% 4spd aut THM 700 R4 - Toledo HhfD 
23% 4spd aut THM 4010 - Willow Run 
3% 3-spd aut THM 350 - CPC Parma (OH) 
22% 33- & 4spd manuals - GM Muncie (IN) 
Rear: Detroit G&A 
Front: 80% Detroit G&A 
20% Dana (Toledo, OH) - to Detroit G&A in '87 
FORD: 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Ford 2.3 I4 140 
Ford 2.3 I4 turbo 
Ford 3.8 V6 ?32 
Ford 5.0 V8 302 
Transmissions 
Axles 
Major body stampings 
Enginea 
Ford 1.6 I4 98 
Ford 1.9 I4 
DEARBORN ASSEMBLY 
Mustang (1986-90)/Capri (1986-87) [Fox] 
Qtr panels, fenders, floor pans, doors: 
Woodhaven 
Bumpers, Trim Moldings: Utica Trim 
Valance panels, fender liners: Maumee (OH) 
46% Lima (OH) 
2% Ford do Brazil 
25% Windsor 
27% Windsor & Cleveland 
56% automatics - 3-spd: Ford (Bordeaux, Fr) 
- 4spd: Livonia 
14% manuals - Ford (C:ologne, Ger), Borg Warner (IN) 
Sterling 
WAYNE (CAR) ASSEMBLY 
Escort ('86-'go?), Lynx, EXP ('86-'88?) [Erika] 
same as Dearborn above 
Dearborn Engine 
Dearborn Engine (incl some exported to UK) 
Transmissions 
45% 3-spd aut ATX - Batavia, OH 
55% manuals - Mazda (Japan) 
Trailing M e  
CV Joints 
Sterling 
GILY (Sanford, NC) - could come to Sterling 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
4.9 L6 300 
5.0 V8 302, 5.8 V8 351 
MICHIGAN (WAYNE) TRUCK 
Utilities, F pickups 
Doors, hoods, fenders: Woodhaven 
Interior moldings: Saline . 
46% Cleveland 
54% Cleveland, Windsor 
Transmissions 
58% bspd aut - Sharonville, OH 
42% 4spd manuals - T'remec (Mexico) 
Rear axles, U-joints 
4WD transfer housings 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Ford 5.0 V8 302 
Transmission 
Sterling 
Global Die Casting (Buchanan, MI) 
WMOM ASSEMBLY 
Mark, Continental (LS now, then Panther) 
Town Car to St. Thomas, Ont. '88+, but returns '91 (FN9) 
Budd (Detroit): Mark qtr panels & fenders, 
Cont deck lids, Town Car doors 
Hoods, roofs, doors (exc Town Car): Woodhaven 
Trim/moldings: Utica (exterior), Saline (interior) 
Cleveland & Windsor 
4-spd aut AOD - Livonia 
Sterling 
Independent Ford Suppliers of Automotive Stampings 
include Budd (Detroit), Active Tool (Roseville), Allied Products (Hillsdale), Creative Industries (Detroit), 
C & F S1;amping (Grand Rapids), Checker Motors (Kalamazoo), Lobdell-Emery (Alma), Aetna Industries 
(Centerline), Logghe Stamping (Fraser), Hawthorne Metal Products (Royal Oak), Lake Odessa Machine 
Products (Lake Odessa), and Ivleans Stamping (Saginaw). 
CHRYSLER: 
Major body stampings 
Engines 
Chry 2.2 I4 135 
hiib 2.6 I4 156 
Chry 2.5 I4 
JEFFERSON ASSEMBLY 
I< Cars (incl CV), E Cars ('36-'88) 
A Cars in '88 
Plastic cowls: Budd (Indiana) 
Hoods, fuel tanks, front frame x-members: Sterling Stmpg 
Fenders, doors: Warren Stmpg 
Floor pans: Twinsburg (OH) 
Other (many): Active Tool (Roseville), Allied Products 
(Hillsdale) 
83% Trenton 
17% Mitsubishi (Japan), replaced by 
Trenton, in mid-'86 
Transaxles 
62% bspd aut - Kokomo (IN) 
38% 4 & 'ospd man - New Process Gear (Syracuse, NY) 
Trailing Axle 
CV Joints 
Major body stampings 
Engine 
Chry 2.2 I4 135 
Detroit Axle 
GKN (Sanford, NC) St Citroen (France) 
STERLING HTS ASSEMBLY 
Lancer/LeBaronGTS 
same as Jefferson above 
100% (about 113 turbo) Trenton 
Transaxles 
90% 3-spd aut I<ok:omo 
10% 'ospd man New Process 
Axles, CV Joints same as Jefferson above 
DODGE CITY (WARREN TRUCK) 
D/W Pickups, N (Dakota) '86 
Major body stampings Cargo box, fuel tanks, front frame 
crossmembers: Sterling 
Doors, fenders, hoods: Warren 
N truck frames: A.O. Smith (Granite City, IL) 
Engines (D/W only) 
3.7 I6 225 60% Chrysler (blexica) 
5.2 V8 318 31% Mound Rd (Detroit) 
5.9 V8 9% Chrysler (Mexico) 
3.9 V6 (new in late '86 for N) Mound Rd 
Transmissions 
76% 3-spd aut Kokorno 
24% 4spd  man New Process 
new 5-spd man New Process (in '87 for N trucks) 
Rear axles, U-joints, etc. Detroit Axle 
Independent Chrysler Suppliers of Automotive Stampings 
include all of the stampers listed above that supply Ford, except for Creative and Lake Odessa. 
MAZDA: 
M D A  (FLAT ROCK) 
727 series car in '88 
Major body stampings 
Engine 
Transaxle 
70% from onsite stamping plant 
Mazda (Japan), but a U.3. plant possible after '88 
Mazda (Japan) 
Table 12. INPUTS INTO MAJOR SUBSYSTEMS 
OF MICHIGAN-ASSEMBLED mHICLES 
GM Engines and Transmissions/Transaxles 
Engines 
Chev 2.8 V6 173 
Chev 4.3 V6 282 
Chev 5.0 V8 305 
Chev 5.7 V8 
Chev 6.2 V8 diesel 
Chev 7.4 V8 
Pont 2.5 I4 151 
Buic 3.0 V6 181 
Buic 3.8 V6 231 





Sag, Defiance Saginaw 







Planned new engines: 3200 V6 Bay City or Tonawanda, NY 




THM 440 T4 
THbl700 R4 




CASE DIFFERENTIAL ASSY 
Muncie Muncie 
Three Riv HMD Three Riv HMD 
Warren HMD St. C4ath. (for now) 
Toledo HMD Toledo HhlD 
Willow Run H&lD Buick (Flint) 
Willow Run EMD Willow Run IliWD 
Parma Parma 
Willow Run HblD Willow Run Hh/lD 
Blocks and heads cast in Central Foundry-Div. (CFD) plants. 
Nh.ID= (GM) Hydramatic Division 
* = To Saginaw in '87 when Pontiac foundry closes. 
** = To Defiance in '87 when P ontiac foundry closes. 
Ford Engines and Drivetrains 
Blocks and heads for Ford engines are cast in foundries associated with Ford engine plants in Cleveland 
and Windsor. Except for some work done in Windsor, virtually all aluminum castings are purchased 
outside, mainly in Ohio and Michigan. Engine connecting rods are a specialty of Ford's Dearborn Vulcan 
Forge. Some Ford Livonia transmission cases are purchased from GM Central Foundry Division in 
Saginaw. Some Ford V8 engine intake manifolds are cast and machined at Metalloy in Hudson, hfl. 
Independents that supply some engine and transmission castings and forgings include CXvLt, Metalloy, and 
Ryobi (Japan). Ryobi has a casting joint venture with Toledo-based Sheller-Globe, and the JV is scouting 
for a site for a transmission component casting plant (see text for details). 4iVD transfer housings are 
purchased from Global Die Casting in Buchanan, MI. 
Chrysler Engines and Drivetrains 
Chrysler's main engine and transmission castings come from its facilities in Indianapolis, Kokomo, and 
Etobicoke, Canada. A number of New York independents supply ca;stings and forgings to New Process 
Gear in Syracuse. Unfortunately, all of the cylinder heads (aluminum) for Trenton-assembled engines are 
supplied by Fiat plants in Italy and Mexico. Ryobi (Japan) supplies additional transmission castings (see 
note on Ryobi and Sheller Globe under Ford, above). Trenton's hydrsulic vaIve lifters come from Sealed 
Power in Muskegon. Turbochargers for Trenton's engines currently come from Garett (California), but 
reportedly will be outsourced to hlitsubishi in 1986 or 1987, where they will be produced in a highly- 
automated new plant. 
Capital Goods Suppliers to the Big Three in Michigan 
A1 of the Big Three purchase the bulk of their steel sheet from the Great Lakes division of National 
Steel, U.S. Steel, Republic, Armco, and Inland; Ford also relies heavily on Rouge Steel. A good deal of 
the OEMs' weld-assembly equipment is supplied by Progressive Tool of Southfield, Key Welder of 
Roseville, and Newcor of Bay City. Lamb-Technicon of Warren is the dominant supplier of cylinder 
head, transmission case, and differential case machining lines. Ingersoll-Rand's Rockford, IL. plant and 
Cross St Trecker (Fraser) dominate engine block transfer machinery. Al l  of the Big Three have been 
looking worldwide for new capital equipment, with Italy, Brazil, and Japan all scoring gains in recent 
equipment orders. For additional detail, see this Report's chapter on production technology, 
MANUFACTURERSUPPLIER RELATIONS 
The internatibnalization of production for the U, S. automotive market has per- 
manently changed the domestic industry. Increased import penetration, domestic produc- 
tion of foreign nameplate vehicles, nondomestic sourcing options for traditional U.S. 
manufacturers, and changed bases of competition are all. facets of this trend. Inter- 
nationalization is clearly the key factor influencing the prospects of manufacturers (i.e., 
OEMsIassemblers) and their suppliers in the 1980s. 
If we examine the impacts of internationalization on the structure of the domestic 
automotive industry - the patterned ways that business tritnsactions and less formal ex- 
changes between companies occur - the dominant theme is the way in which widened 
sourcing options shakes up the traditional relationship between manufacturers and sup- 
pliers. Internationalization has forced the industry to recognize that its time-worn ways of 
doing business have in many instances led to increased coskj and lower quality, whatever 
short-term advantages they may have provided a particular company. Both manufacturers 
and suppliers are reexamining a wide range of sourcing criteria and arrangements, and 
some changes are occurring, however slowly and unevenly, There is movement towards 
longer term contracts and some sole sourcing, for example, and it is clear that piece-price 
is not as dominant a criterion as it has traditiondy been. At  the same time, the manufac- 
turers are involving suppliers earlier in the design process, and placing greater demands 
on the suppliers for engineering and quality assistance. In general, the manufacturers are 
trying to reduce their number of direct suppliers, and approximate the tier system more 
typical of Japan. How effective all these measures will be and, in some cases, whether 
they are simply efforts to transfer costs to suppliers, remains to be seen. 
If it is internationalization that sets the new rules of the game, it is the nature of 
the manufacturer-supplier relationship that arises in response to internationaiization that 
will go a long way toward determining how well the traditionid U.S. industry competes. In 
many instances, that relationship will have to change for the industry to be competitive. If 
the cost and quality benefits of Just-In-Time or ocher reduced-inventory manufacturing 
systems are to be fully realized, for example, a much closer coordination between manufac- 
turer and supplier will have to develop. So, too, if the product-development cycle is to be 
substantially shortened, then suppliers will have to be identified and involved in that 
process a t  an earlier stage than is currently the practice, This requires a group of core 
supplierms with competitive manufacturing and engineering skills that can work cooperative- 
ly with the manufacturers, rather than ones that either simply make-to-print or fully 
develop and market a proprietary design. 
The emphasis of this chapter will be on the impact of these emerging relationships 
upon the Michigan-based, traditional automotive supplier. The importance of these com- 
panies to wealth-creation in Pvlichigan, and the advantages they offer in this effort com- 
pared to newer entrants from abroad, have both been discussed in this Report's chapters 
on vehicle program siting and major input sourcing. The i:nitiatives in this area that will 
have broad impact by 1992 are most likely to be those that; come from the manufacturers 
(or a few of the very largest supplier companies) because they have the economic power to 
make demands and enforce compliance upon large numbers of suppliers; most supplier in- 
itiatives, per contm, will only gradually diffuse throughout the rest of the supplier com- 
munity. Consequently, our questidns are formed around the actions of the manufacturers 
and the responses of the suppliers though, to be sure, we do not totally ignore supplier in- 
itiatives. 
The CRT immediately faced two probleins in addressing the issue of changing 
manufacturer relationships. The topic is clearly too broad to be treated in toto; some nar- 
rowing is required if we are to identify specific and practical implications either for the 
State of Michigan or for supplier companies located here. We have attempted to resolve 
these problems by drawing upon the results of the Joint U.S..Japan Automotive Study 
suppiier survey to focus on some specific dimensions of the overail issue; this strategy is 
reflected in the questions that we took to both manufacturers and suppliers. 
'The &st dimension reflects likely developments in the sourcing strategies of the 
manufacturers. This includes the manufacturers' decisions to make a part themselves or 
to buy it from an outside supplier and, if the latter, whether the supplier will be domestic 
and, if so, located in Michigan. The second dimension covers the technical competence of 
suppliers, including their overall engineering capabilities, their response to specific techni- 
cal capacities demanded by the manufacturers, and their views of the importance of techni- 
cal competence as a competitive strategy. The third dimension addresses general changes 
within the industry, including both manufacturer actions, such as the establishment of 
Mazda a t  Flat Rock and the move towards modular sourcing, and supplier actions such as 
diversification efforts and investments in Michigan. 
Key Findings 
The complementary efforts of the OEMs to increase the sourcing of modules rather 
than constituent discrete elements such as  parts and components and to reduce their num- 
ber of direct suppliers present both n opportunity and risk for Michigan suppliers. The 
Michigan supplier industry includes large numbers of small suppliers that will no longer be 
able to supply the OEMs directly. To the extent that Michigan suppliers are successfuI in 
establishing themselves as the central source for a module, then these small suppliers may 
well be able to convert their proximity to a competitive advantage. If these core suppliers 
are not located in Michigan, then it is likely that many, if not most, small Michigan sup- 
pliers will lose much of their current automotive business. 
The emphasis on Just-In-Time systems of inventory reduction should eventually con- 
vert to an advantage for Michigan suppliers, if we are successfui in retaining vehicle as- 
sembly programs and in securing core supplier roles for mc~dular sourcing. On the other 
hand, J-I-T may mean construction of J-I-T warehouses; to the estent that this approach 
offers some of the short-term cost savings that the OEMs are seeking to garner from J-I-T, 
it secures those savings by shifting inventory carrying costs to suppliers. Moreover, it 
undercuts the proximity advantage of Michigan suppliers. In theory, J-I-T warehouses 
interfere with the attainment of the complete cost and quality benefits such systems offer. 
Therefore, suppliers whose locations permit low in-transit inventory and no warehousing 
should eventually gain competitive edges in both cost and qurfity. 
The development of electronic communication, especi~lily in the design area (linked 
CAD systems, for example), may well undercut Michigan's current role as the engineering 
center for the traditional domestic OEMs, as  it lessens the need for frequent face-to-face 
communication. The increased sourcing of engineering to E:urope symbolizes this threat. 
On the other hand, it also allows the continuation of engineering in Michigan even when 
other activities are sited elsewhere. The location of the Seturn engineering activities in 
Southeastern Michigan represents this opportunity. 
There is no question that most suppliers will need to develop distinctive technological 
competence, either product- or process-anchored, to remain major direct suppliers to the 
OEMs. Beyond this, they will have to develop sophisticatiorl in the new control and com- 
munication technologies. Low technology and high labor content parts and components are 
likely candidates for offshore sourcing, and even to the extent they remain here, unlikely 
to be core to emerging modules sourced by the OEMs. Suppliers that do not develop these 
technological capabilities are likely to fall into the lower tiers of the new supply structure, 
and some of them will simply cease to be automotive suppliers. For larger suppliers, then, 
broad technological and engineering competence are critical, while for smaller suppliers, 
narrower process technology capability may be key. Michigan suppliers appear to be no 
different from non-Michigan suppliers in the adoption of advanced aanufacturing tech- 
nologies, but s m d  Michigan suppliers report larger allocations of their R&D efforts to 
automotive than do small non-Michigan suppliers. Michigan suppliers feel that product 
and process innovation, as well as engineering and manufacturing competence, are more 
important to the OEMs than do non-Michigan suppliers. If these beliefs convert to actions, 
then Michigan suppliers are positioned to develop competitive advantages. 
The restructuring of the supplier industry and the emphasis on reduced total costs 
will result in the disappearance of some Michigan suppliers, and significant changes in cur- 
rent business practices and relationships for most. New responsibilities, new customers, 
arid new roles in the chain of value-added will be commonplace. Those suppliers that can 
most readily identify their best niche, and adapt to it or encourage its development, will 
have maximum chance for survival. Under the logic of J-I-T, and the advantage it confers 
on proximate location, the siting of assembly facilities and the selection of core modular 
suppliers are likely to be the primary determinants of how many Michigan suppliers will 
survive in the 1992 time frame. 
Beyond the standard forms of State assistance and continued attention to the details 
of Michigan business costs, there are two areas that the State might fruitfully pursue from 
the perspective of these changing relationships. First and f~remost would be those broad- 
based efforts to contribute to the technological competence of the entire supplier base, to in- 
crease the chances that survivors on this criterion are Michigan based. A critical com- 
ponent of this effort would be the development of a t~chnologically sophisticated labor 
force, at both the hourly and salaried levels. In tandem with this, efforts could be made to 
assist small and medium suppliers that lack necessary resources, either through direct aid 
or indirect aid, such as helping them pool their resources in design or even production con- 
sortia. The aborning ~Michigan Technology Deployment Service speaks to this piece of the 
solution. Second, the State may usefulIy play the role of "honest broker" in encouraging 
cooperative development of modular strategies among Michigan suppliers. Part of this ac- 
tivity would involve identifying suppliers with various prodilct and process capabilities to 
potential core suppliers. Many likely core suppliers have f:~cilities both in Michigan and 
elsewhere, and such assistance might tilt the location of modular programs to Michigan. 
Product and Process Developments 
The AIM interviews on the relationship between ~nanufacturers and suppliers 
provided some interesting views on product and process changes, as well as on the role of 
the State in assisting the automotive industry. The themes that appeared most often were 
the increasing reliance on modular or system sourcing, the continuing push to full im- 
plementation of Just-In-Time, and the increasing utilization of computer-based technologies 
throughout the industry. 
The push for modular sourcing by the OEMs is c1eai:ly related to their attempts to 
rationalize their own costs and the costs of the entire set of manufacturing operations re- 
quired to produce a vehicle. I t  allows the OEMs to extern~llize some of their engineering, 
manuf'acturing, and quality assurance costs, but also permits the reduction of costs as- 
sociated with effort duplication throughout the manufacturing chain. At the same time, it 
fosters the tiering of the supplier chain in much the fashion of the Japanese industry, 
reducing transaction and coordination costs and avoiding duplication of purchasing and in- 
spection efforts. 
To the extent possible, suppliers that provide the OEM with a module such as an in- 
strument panel, rear suspension, a front "corner" (wheel and brake), or a door will become 
the first-tier suppliers; their need to be close to assembly customers will benefit Michigan, 
but it is far from automatic that the parts that compose the modular subassembly will be 
locally sourced. Xodule suppliers wili be expected to have a high degree of technical 
sophistication, including good design and manufacturing engineering capability, and 
electronic communication facility. They will need to meet rigorous quality and productivity 
demands, and will in turn have to manage their own suppliers for the module to assure 
their performance. The lower tier suppliers will be allowed to have correlatively lower 
technical capacities, but will be held to similar productivity and, quality criteria. The 
higher the tier, the higher the value-added for the supplier, and the more critical the sup- 
plier's own sourcing decisions become throughout the manufacturing chain. It is clearly of 
great importance to the State that as many emerging first tier suppliers as possible be lo- 
cated here, and that they be induced to source heavily in the :state. 
The basic change involved in Just-In-Time production systems is the Rushing of in- 
ventory out of the system. While there are benefits in terns  of reduced inventory costs, 
the long-term cost reductions promised by this approach are more those resulting from 
"stripping the system clean" so that process problems are r~avealed and corrected quickly. 
Hence J-I-T should result in more efficient use of capital equipment, better process design, 
more eiTective deplopent  of labor, reduced scrap and rework, and better product quality. 
To a certain extent, as we've noted, J-I-T has so far resultred in a transfer of inventory 
carrying costs to suppliers, partially reflecting the OEMs' rnore rapid implementation of 
these systems, but also reflecting the OEMs' reluctance to rely on their suppliers for the 
re,darized, high quality production J-I-T requires. The auhmotive industry has been ap- 
proaching J-I-T as a system whose pieces can be gradually implemented, rather than as 
one that needs full and systematic application if it is to force improvements throughout the 
process. 
The different OEMs appear to have somewhat differing views on J-I-T, and there is 
disparity within each OEM on what J-I-T is and what its ultimate benefits may be, Thus 
one OEM interviewee stressed the advantages that J-I-T would provide Michigan suppliers 
if assembly facilities continue to be located here. Another stressed that because of lessen- 
ing transportation costs, proximity is not worth much, espechlly if quality, technology, and 
productivity are lacking, except for those few elements of the vehicle that do not travel 
well because of damageability. One supplier pointed out that state lines are permeable, 
and that northeast Indiana is a major competitor that shares in whatever advantage 
proximity confers. 
One development associated with J-I-T is the possibility that suppliers will locate 
dedicated satellite facilities close to assembly plants. Hoover has set up a number of such 
seat plants, for example. Some of the suppliers raised questions about whether this prac- 
tice will be as major a development as some expect. One lirnitation is the economy of scale 
associated with different products, and the balance of capital and transportation costs, 
Another issue is the possibiiity that such plants will come to be simply extensions of the 
assembly facility; for suppliers that compete on low labor costs or different management- 
worker relationships, a nearby location might undercut their advantages. Other suppliers 
have noted that the assembly plant itself becomes a major competitor for the available- 
workforce, and not only drives up wages, but also attracts the better workers. 
If Michigan suppliers can compete on an even hasis along other dimensions, 
proximity should provide a natural comparative advantage, assuming that assembly ac- 
tivity remains here. To be sure, this edge will be shared with Indiana and Ohio. Whether 
more distant suppliers implement J-I-T over longer distances, or pursue the option of 
warehousing close to their customers, there will be increased costs of higher inventory, as 
well as more of the quality problems that full J-I-T should reduce or eliminate. These 
costs are ultimately reflected in the final vehicle, however they may be apportioned in the 
short run. 
The increasing implementation of computer technoloky in the automotive industry 
ranges from rather straight-forward cornrnunicadon, such as billing and order-release, to 
the integration of technical functions, to the exchange of engineering data and designs, to 
the control of the manufacturing process, with the implementation of control technologies 
from CNC machines to CIM. $Suppliers that will have any chance of remaining first-tier 
into the 1990s will have to make broad advances on all three of these fronts, and suppliers 
in any tier will have to make advances on the &st and, quite possibly, the third. These 
advances will require management and labor skilled in both the hardware and software 
aspects of computer-based technologies. 
If proximity confers an advantage in the delivery of physical goods to the OEM, it is 
unclear what computerization might do the the traditional advantage of proximity in en- 
gineering and design development. ~Wchigan historically has been the center of research 
and development activity in the automotive industry and this, as one supplier noted, tends 
to keep the manufacture of new products and the introduction of new processes here too. 
It is clear that the OEMs see in the computerization of teck~nicd functions the opportunity 
to outsource, and even offshore source, much of this effort. One OEM respondent especial- 
ly highlighted the need for Michigan supplier to become technologically sophisticated, be- 
cause the OEMs now can go to Japan or Italy for their engineering; another identified 
small engineering "job shops" as high-risk facilities. 
The extent to which on-line communication and exchange of data can replace face-to- 
face meetings is very much an open question, and i'vlichigan probably will retain some ad- 
vantage in the concentration of OEM research and development activities here. One sup- 
plier noted that proximity is important in design and engineering. However, it appears 
quite likeIy that Michigan suppliers would lose this advantage if they fall behind their out- 
of-state counterparts in their efforts to computerize: the OEMs are likely to opt for tech- 
nological over face-to-face communication, if forced to choose. 
The US.-Japan Joint Automotive Study conducted a :survey of automotive suppliers 
in late 1983. Fewer ~ i c h i ~ a n  than non-Michigan suppliers reported that they were likely . 
.to malce investments in programmable controllers and in CADICAM over the next five 
years. Both these differences, however, reflect the disproportionate number of smaller 
suppliers in Michigan. It turns out that Michigan and nor{-Michigan large and medium- 
sized suppliers did - not differ in their reports, but that fe'wer Michigan small suppliers 
reported likely investments in these technologies than small suppliers located elsewhere. 
If, as we believe, the supplier industry comes to approximate the pyramid structure sug- 
gested by the development of tiers, and if the necessity for engineering capabilities is lower 
in the Iower tiers, then the results for CmICAM are not likely to be important in the long 
run, though without CA.DICAN fewer Michigan suppliers may be able to move up the 
pyramid in the years ahead. However, the results for programmable controllers are more 
immediately wonisome. To the extent that these devices contribute to productivity and 
quality, these small Michigan manufacturers may h d  themselves a t  a disadvantage, and 
may in fact not survive. 
Increased modular sourcing (and the associated tiering of the industry) and the in- 
creasing computerization of manufacturing and its associated functions place a premium 
on State efforts to upgrade the technical capacities of the supplier base. There is little 
reason to think that we face a disadvantage here, but neither is there m y  reason to sup- 
pose that we enjoy an advantage. Just  as proximity confers an advantage in J-I-T only 
after more fundamental competitive requirements are met, electronic communication may 
seriously undercut the historic advantage of pro.uimity in developmental activities. 
Sourcing 
We asked our respondents to comment on the OEMs' patterns of making parts and 
components themselves versus purchasing them outside, and how this balance might vary 
from now through the early 1990s. We further asked them to identify patterns of OEM 
offshore sourcing for purchased parts, and to comment on how free the OEMs are to vary 
their patterns in the light of the constraints they face. 
There was unusual unanimity across supplier and OE'M respondents with regard to 
how free the OEMs are to alter their sourcing patterns. Long-term contracts are not seen 
as  serious impediments by either group, because (suppliers complain) they contain clauses 
. that allow the OEMs to escape. The UAW is not seen as an effective constraint, because 
the! economic reality is that "they lose some jobs now or more later." Some suppiiers did 
say that the internal political clout of the OEM captive supplier divisions might constrain 
the OEMs a bit. 
The OEMs see increased purchasing from outside sources, and not many 
components as candidates for pulling in-house. The suppliers see a somewhat 
smaller increase in outside purchasing, and express more apprehension that some 
current  purchases might move inside. The OEMs strerss high labor content and the 
need to impose coherence on their own activities as drivers fbr outsourcing, while the sup- 
pliers see low labor content and mature products (with no further development costs) as at- 
tractive for the OEMs to bring back in-house. 
One supplier noted an interesting development in the pattern of OEM outsourcing. 
He felt that the OEMs are relying on high capability suppliers to perform the most 
demanding work, in terms of development, precision, technical content, and skill content. 
The less demanding work, on the other hand, is sourced to less capable but lower cost sup- 
pliers or moved back in-house. This creates problems for the high capability supplier, be- 
cause it denies it the opportunity to cover the costs of the more difficult work with the 
easier work. This pa t t en  of "tier-jumping" has been noted in Japan as productivity im- 
provements have resulted in reallocation of work within the manufacturing chain. (There, 
the OEMs' need to keep busy a permanently employed labor force, while protecting the 
technically capable suppliers, has led the OEMs to pull back in-house some work from 
lower tier suppliers). Here in the U.S., it appears to be more a matter of allocating 
rewards and costs between companies, and may in fact pose some danger to the technical. 
ly capable supplier. 
There was divergence among the OEMs in expectations about future levels of off- 
shore sourcing. One respondent felt that, in the long-term, the trend is definitely toward 
increased offshore sourcing to remain cost competitive, while the others felt that there 
would be a tempormy increase, and not an especially s h a p  one. Our respondents noted 
that labor savings can be illusory and temporary, and that many parts from offshore are 
not in fact cheaper. Moreover, technology may reduce the labor content of some subsys- 
tems, lessening the incentive to offshore source them. Wire harnesses, for example, have 
been increasingly sourced from Mexico and offshore, but could soon be obsoleted by multi- 
plexing or even fiber optics (see chapter on emerging product developments). 
The suppliers expect and fear a much sharper incrense in offshore sourcing by the 
OEMs. The lack of familiarity with potential sources of supply on the part of OEM pur- 
chasing people may be the biggest obstacle to a surge in offshore sourcing; some suppliers 
also feel that the OEMs' need for control may limit the rate at which they can move work 
to distant supply sources. 
Our interviewees generally had difficulty specifying items for which sourc- 
ing patterns are likely to change. By and large, they were comfortable identifying the 
attributes of parts and the considerations that would factnr in the decision, but either 
would not or could not commit themselves to specific cases. This probably reflects the ex- 
tent to which this whole issue is new territory: the old rules for these decisions may no 
longer hold, and the old patterns may not be good guides to the future. For the most part, 
respondents mentioned factors such as value (and value-to-weight ratios), labor content, 
technology content, system integrity considerations, elements of modules as they develop 
and, iri the case of offshore sourcing, transportability. The following list reflects the com- 
ments the small subset of our respondents that were willing to hazard specific predictions. 
Parts likely to be outsourced: soft trim, interior fa.brics, plastics, smaller stamp- 
ings, wiring, wheels, brakes. 
Parts likely to be pulled in-house: electronics, machined cast parts, larger stamp- 
ings. 
@ Parts likely to go offshore: drum brakes, interior fabrics, anything involving smail 
parts assembly, and tooling. 
Womsomely, our interviewees had similar trouble identifjring areas of opportunity for 
Michigan suppliers due to increased olctsourcing, and viewed the threat of offshore sourcing 
to the current business of these suppliers as more immediate. The same supptiers were of- 
ten mentioned as the ones facing the greatest threat - and as having the greatest oppor- 
tunity. Budd, Kelsey-Hayes, and Allied Automotive's Michigan facilities were all seen as 
faxing threats from offshore; yet all three were also seen a.s the type of supplier with the 
potential to become responsible for various modules. The feeling that Michigan suppliers 
need ,to emphasize their technical capacities - both in terms of product and process in- 
novation and execution - came through frequently. The other possible opportunity area 
might be in those lower technology, high labor content item; that lend themselves especial- 
ly well to J-I-T, although this would apply equally (and perhaps better) to areas of Ohio 
and Indiana, and is not a realistic - and perhaps not a desirable - option for many 
traditional Michigan suppliers. 
On balance, then, our interviewees expect more net outsourcing of OEM work. 
However, much of this work is likely to go offshore, and there is the added risk that work , 
cwrentiy domestically outsourced will also go offshore. The changing patterns of make- 
buy decisions appear to present more threat than opportunit;y for Michigan suppliers. The 
importance of Michigan suppliers playing the central role in supplying modules to the 
OEMs emerges again, as does the necessity of developing the technical capability required 
for that role. 
Supplier Technical Competence 
The frequent mentions of and references to supplier technical capacides in the prim 
sections of this chapter highlight a basic characteristic of the automotive industry in the 
United States today: it is a very technology-conscious industry. Most manufacturers and 
suppliers view technology as a basic competitive dimension, one that offers them the hope 
of regaining an edge over their foreign competition. 
Ail our OEM respondents stressed the critical importance of supplier engineering 
. competence in the 1986 to 1992 period. One suggested that technical competence would be 
more important than cost, and all agreed that it would only become more important over 
time. The suppliers certainly feel that product and process innovation are important to 
their survival, and will in fact protect their business with the OENs. 
The respondents were not able to distinguish part icui:~ strengths or weaknesses of 
Michigan suppliers in technical areas. In some cases, they just were not sure about the 
comparison; in others, they were reluctant to make specific comparisons. Because of that, 
this section will draw heavily upon two parts of the U.S. supplier survey mentioned ear- 
lier. The first part provides an assessment of the level of engineering service provided by 
Michigan suppliers, and the second suggests how they compare with non-Michigan sup- 
pliers in their view of the importance of technical competence. 
The supplier survey asked respondents to identify whether or not they "black-box" 
their major OEM product, Black-boxing describes designing a part or component to 
functional specifications, rather than relying on drawings from the OEMs; so it involves a 
higher degree of engineering or technical resources. Anlong Michigan suppliers, 36% 
report black-boxing, compared to 46% of non-Michigan suppliers. While this difference is 
not statistically sigmficant by research standards, it is cause for concern that Michigan 
suppliers may indeed lag in this area. Since black-boxing does require more resources, it is 
not surprising that it is related to size: larger suppliers are more likely to black-box than 
are small. Since we know the Michigan supplier base contains a larger proportion of small 
suppliers, it is worth asking whether the possible difference in black-boxing is due to dif- 
ferences in the size of Michigan and non-Michigan suppliers. When we look within the 
groups of small, medium, and large suppliers, a troublesonle pattern emerges. Reassur- 
ingly, there are no differences a t  all between Michigan and non-Michigan suppliers that 
are smalI or large. However, among medium-sized suppliers, those located in Michigan are 
much less likely to black-box than those located elsewhere (16% compared to 46%). 
This is disturbing because these are the very types of suppliers that may most re- 
quire technical competence in order to survive, and the type whose level in the developing 
tier structure of the industry will be influenced most by their technical competence. Small 
suppliers are likely to lose their direct supplier business, and become indirect suppliers. 
They will compete on their process capabilities, cost, quaIity, and perhaps location. Large 
suppliers will compete for first-tier or second-tier status, and their technical compeknce 
will clearly be important. The medium-sized supplier is thus the one with the most uncer- 
tain future: some will become fist-tier or second-tier, continuing to function a t  a relatively 
high level in the chain of value-added; others will fall into tihe lower tiers, and find their 
economic role diminished. Moreover, these medium-sized suppliers may play a critical role 
in influencing the OEMs' selection of core modular supplier:;, because they represent the 
supplier base available to that modular supplier. Certainly hlfichigan does not want to find 
its medium-sized suppliers slipping into the lower tiers, especially if that drags large 
Michigan suppliers out of the critical first-tier. 
The U.S. automotive supplier survey collected information on suppliers' views of the 
importance of different criteria in the OEM vendor selection process. Specifically, it asked 
the suppliers how important a variety of supplier characteristics are to the OEhb as they 
decide where to place their business. These ratings were asked with regard to the past 
(the mid-seventies); the then present (1983); and the near future (1984-1987). Charac- 
teristics included engineering competence, manufacturing competence, product innovation, 
and process innovation. These supplier perceptions, whether accurate or not, are impor- 
tant: they represent the suppliers' view of the importance !;heir OEM customers assign to 
a variety of supplier capabilities, performances, and attributes. These supplier views 
represent the action premises of the suppliers as they formulate business strategies and 
make associated investment, diversification, and research and development investments, 
and as they decide how to balance efforts in the areas of quality, productivity, and cost 
reduction. 
On engineering and manufacturing competence, Michigan suppliers do not differ 
from their non-Michigan counterparts for the past or present, but do anticipate a greater 
importance for this supplier characteristic in the future. Similarly, while there are no 
Michiganinon-~Michigan differences in the ratings for the past importance of either product 
or process innovation, Michigan suppliers rate product innovation higher than non- 
Michigan suppliers for the future. On process innovation, Michigan suppliers ratings are 
higher for both the present and the future. 
These supplier ratings suggest that Michigan-based suppliers may well undertake 
broader initiatives andtor put more effort into their initiatives than suppliers elsewhere. 
The higher importance assig.ed.to the combination of engineering competence and product 
innovation implies that Michigan suppliers may well make greater efforts to contribute to 
product development efforts. The higher ratings given to nlanufacturing competence and 
process innovation suggest greater attention to the details of the manufacturing process, 
with likely payoff to themselves and their customers across a variety of dimensions: 
, quality, productivity, cost-reduction, and dependability. On balance, these data suggest 
that Michigan suppliers have responded and are responding somewhat more rapidly than 
their out-of-state competitors to changing OEM concerns and priorities. They certainly put 
more emphasis on technical strength than their non-Michigan c0mpetitors.E This should 
convert to a variety of activities and efforts which will increase their value as suppliers to 
the automotive industry. Whether these efforts will be enough to overcome what appears 
to be a debit in current technical contribution among TvIichigan suppliers of medium size 
remains to be seen - and will matter. 
Michigan suppliers, then, are aware of the importance of technical competence both 
for their survival and in shaping the roIe they will play in the changing automotive in- 
dustry; they are more aware of this than non-mchigan suppliers. At the same time, the 
low rate of black-boxing among medium-sized Michigan suppliers may represent a critical 
potential weakness in the Michigan supplier chain, one that may disadvantage the 
Michigan supplier base in retaining or expanding its current level of activity in the in- 
dustry. 
Investing in Michigan 
Our respondents see the effect of the on-going reorganization of General Motors 
much a s  they see the development of Saturn: more OEM outsourcing, but not necessarily 
tca local suppliers. Rather, the purchasing philosophy will be to secure the best quality at  
the lowest price, whether inside or outside of the corporation, here or abroad. The result- 
ing need for captive suppliers to become more entrepreneurial is not expected to have 
a 
much effect on their ability to compete with independent suppliers, since most suppliers 
feel that they are lower cost than the OEMs and can respond more rapidly and flexibly to 
changes in customer demand.' On the other hand, these captives may lose some of their 
current influence on the sourcing of smaller subcontracted parts, a prospect that worries 
many Michigan suppliers of OEM component plants. 
The implications of the Mazda decision to assemble vehicles a t  Flat Rock, and of the 
more general profusion of foreign-nameplate assembly and stamping operations in the 
state, are less clear to our respondents. By and large, they appear to be taking a wait and 
see attitude. Some commented that they suspect that Flat Rock/NUMMUHonda sourcing 
patterns have already been set (with no role for them), while others are more hopeful that 
such foreign investment will provide them new business opportunities. 
While staying power is uncertain for small and medium-sized suppliers, and while 
large suppliers have the option of being footloose, our suppl.ier respondents are committed 
automotive suppliers. Despite the experience of the early 19SOs, they are not actively 
seeking to diversify away from the automotive industry. Those respondent that did expect 
to increase the nonautomotive component of their business made it clear that this would 
result from faster growth in their nonauto sales rather than from active disinvestment 
from automotive operations. 
Furthermore, most of our supplier respondents report, continuing capital investment 
in the state. Whether this is a sign of copmitment, however., is less clear: many suppliers 
stressed the pressures they felt to move out-of-state, reflecting the feeling that wages and 
other costs of doing business here are high. A distressing comment, but one with ace 
tionable policy implications, is that many suppliers want to rnaincain their Michigan opera- 
tions, but see greenfield investments and an outsf-state move as closely linked if not 
synonymous. While this does not provide grounds for optimism about new Michigan plants 
of traditional suppliers, it does highlight the critical importance to the state of retaining 
' ~ 0 t h  of these perceived independent supplier advantages could evaporate if captive 
parts plants "fall out ofn the Big Three wagelbenefit pattern - see our chapter on labor 
relations - andlor if their superior access to capital allows them to leap ahead in flexible 
automation. 
m d  upgrading existing facilities. Those upgraded facilities can become, or supply, first-tier 
modular suppliers to the OEMs. If that occurs, many suppliers will come to enjoy suffi- 
cient stability and cash flow to consider further investments, including greenfield ones. To 
the extent that - their second- and third-tier suppliers are here, and to the degree that the 
OEMs fully implement J-I-T, many of those greenfield investments will be made in 
Michigan as well. The bottom line, then, is the need to nurture each level of supplier in or- 
der to ensure that the advantages of proximity to assembly is not more than offset by 
other factors, According to this analysis, an effective retention strategy will yield gains in 
facility attraction, while an attraction-focused approach alone is unlikely to bear fruit. 
LABOR RELATIONS 
Introduction 
Contending forces are buffeting labor relations in Michigan's automotive economy. 
Cooperative efforts and union-busting are both at a peak. Traditional wage, benefit, and 
work rule patterns are under attack, and crumbIing. With the end of import restraints, 
the OEMs face a shrinking market; the resulting excess production capacity means that 
plants and local unions are pitted against each other for survival. In the supplier sector, 
increased offshore sourcing and burgeoning competition from newer Sunbelt plants and 
new Japanese-based entrants threaten many Michigan establishments. 
At base, the driving force is the increased competition at every level. Every plant 
siting decision, every sourcing change is a response to heightened competitive pressure. 
The result, whether welcomed as "dynamism" or disparaged as "turbulence," is a higher 
level of capital mobility. The deployment of competitive capital has become automotive 
management's primary strategic activity. 
Since there is no uniquely correct strategy, a variety of approaches to dealing with 
workers and unions has appeared since the mid-1970s. Even within a particular company, 
a bewildering array of practices may be seen: one diversified supplier we interviewed had, 
since 1.975, closed a unionized Michigm plant and put all its major new investments in a 
non-union southern plant - and added its newest, most innovative product line to an old 
Michigan plant in which it had no Q\VL-type program and a history of labor militancy. 
We talked to OEM and UAW representatives committed to industrial democracy, 
others who dismissed QLVL as a fad that can't last, and still others who hoped - or feared 
- it would help shift bargaining from a company-wide to .a plant-by-plant activity. We 
heard pay-for-knowledge alternately described as the key to competitiveness, the end of 
the union contract, and a dangerous inducement to foremen letting untrained workers ad. 
vance to top pay rates. The OEM executives we intervieweti accepted the U.4W as a fact 
of life, though most hoped that plant-by-plant bargaining would come to replace a common 
patter% Most also thought that the UAW had grown weaker and less militant, and were 
grateful. Supplier management was more likely b cite high union labor costs as the basis 
for decisions - past and prospective -to make any significant capacity additions else- 
where and non-union. 
Everywhere, contradictions are encountered in the labor-management field. GM and 
the UAW - from the 1952 agreement through the Saturn understanding - seem to have 
agreed implicitly to trade large pay hikes for job security; yet outsourcing grows, and a 
leaked 1984 GM Labor Relations memo lists the discontinuation of pilot employment 
guarantee efforts as a priority. Suppliers launch QWL groups in plants doomed by years 
of conscious underinvestment. 
Why this confusion? German industrial relations expert Wolfgang Streeck has noted 
that enlightened auto managers would Iike to join with 1.abor in a "productivity coali- 
tion."' This would involve "an undertaking by trade unions to cooperate in industrial 
restructuring and modernization in return for institutionalized influence on the process." 
Deals of this kind have been struck in Europe under the labels "social partnership," "in- 
dustrial democracy," and "codetermination." These arrangments, however, have proved 
stable only with the help of some "external facilitationn by government, mainly in the form 
of enough protectionist elements to prevent sudden shocks to the deal. A productivity 
coalition in the auto industry would mean that unions would have to ensure the acceptance 
of structural change by their members, while management .would have to cede some of its 
prerogatives to the unions. Management also would sometimes have to accept economical- 
ly suboptimal solutions; e.g., reduced flexibility to outsouree or lay off, In exchange, it 
would be guaranteed relative tranquility in production, and lower costs through reduced 
restrictions on the assignment of work. 
'We believe such an arrangement is what the UAW leadership seeks a t  the present 
time, and that the job losses since 1979 have put most of the rank and file in the same 
mood. Unions are prepared to sacrifice a significant proport;ion of the jobs in the auto in- 
dustry in order to save others; to go along with technical rationalization and higher produc- 
tivity; and to accept lower wage increases if they get a re,al say in how the industry is 
managed. Such "say," however, would have to go beyond input at the plant (EUQIVL) or 
even the vehicle program (Saturn) level to include company-wide joint determination of 
production siting and component sourcing.2 
l~resentation to MIT Future of the Automobile Project, Philadelphia, 6130181. 
2 ~ b s e n t  such an* arrangement, critics of current cooperative programs have a valid 
point when they contend that such programs can be used lie play locals off against one 
another, though of course such competition did not originate with EI/QWL. 
However, in the U.S. case a t  least, and particularly at the supplier company level, it 
is not a t  dl clear that unions will be offered an opportunity to make this deal. As Streeck 
notes, "employers may lose interest in a cooperative solutiorl and may instead prefer to lec 
the market do the job. It may be that the bargaining powerb of organized labor in the U.S. 
auto industry has been eroded m such an extent that capital. no longer depends upon union 
cooperation, and that it feels no need to offer unions a productivity coalition on acceptable 
terms.". One would have to be blind to ignore, despite the spreading talk of cooperation, a 
simultaneous and rising call to roll back trade unionism, the welfare state, and the rest of 
the New ~ e a k r a  social contract. The increasing weakness of unions in the U.S. today no 
doubt heightens the temptation on the part of management to go for an outright win. At 
the least, it can be expected to lead employers to drive harder bargains. ,The reluctance of 
employers to pay a visible price for union cooperation may add to the problems union 
leaders have with their members when taking part in coope1:ative solutions to problems of 
industrial change. 
Based on our AIM work, we cannot yet predict whether the tension between 
cooperation and conflict will be functionally resolved in the next half-decade, and in favor 
of which set(s) of interests. We are convinced that more constructive labor relations can 
create competitive advantages for the industry in the U.S. 3~1d in Michigan. Like Streeck, 
we find "the exclusion of labor from industrial governance so costly in terms of motivation 
and quality that real cooperation, although it carries its olm costs, is on balance more 
economicaI." Auto manufacturers, their suppliers, unions, and workers will in the near fu- 
ture have to make up their mind - and be prepared to act on -whether they agree with 
that assessment. 
, 
It matters how this decision comes out. Without sharply higher productivity and 
lower costs, we see greatly reduced output from Michigan's auto industry; the work will 
leave. Moreover, because developments in the automobile industry set the pattern for the 
industrial relations system as a whole, events in this industry will tell us much about 
whether, and how, we will cope with the fundamental problerns of structural change in the 
world economy, and whether the historical compromise between labor and capital upon 
which liberal democracy depends can be preserved in a period of crisis and transition. 
Sources of Indecision 
We see in the present period parallels to the 1910's movement for scientific manage- 
ment. 'The early Taylorists were antagonistic to old style management, but not able to ac- 
cept a thorough-going alternative that diluted prerogatives over the size, nature, and siting 
of investment. Then as now, a labor movement weakened by 'job loss was ripe for new 
wage-moderating deais. Taylorists cited cases in which unions tried to "require owners 
. , ; to install new and modern devices" in order to stay in bu~iness .~  It  took more than 
ten years for Taylorist ideas on work organization to take hold in US,  industry. By the 
time this occurred, those ideas had been shorn of their cooperationist content and, ironical- 
ly, have become the basis for narrow and contentious work organization that inhibits in- 
vestment and productivity gains. 
The period between now and the early 1990's seems sure to provide a turbulent b r -  
rain for the development of new forms of labor-management interaction. On the one hand, 
an unprecedented opportunity exists: common interests in maintaining and reclaiming 
market share lost to imported vehicles and parts will be a powerful motivator of deals in 
which labor "trades" wage moderation and fewer work rules for management comrnit- 
ments to invest, and keep work, in their plants. 
On the other hand, most of the forces likely to impact the U.S. auto market seem 
destined to increase labor-management strife, Increased international competition will 
tend to engender more outsourcing. That, in turn, will produce pressures to pay parts 
workers4 and small car workers less than large car workers; that will be perceived by 
many as an attack on hard-won contractual patterns. Resistance will tend to drive invest- 
ment to lower-cost, often non-union sites, with .the resulting displacement heightening 
reluctance tu modify job-preserving work rules. Deals will be harder to cut to the extent 
that the need for them is traceable to Big Three outsourcing rather than to more thorough- 
ly foreign factors. 
. The State Interest 
Despite the contradictory signals, the uncomposed class forces, and the obstacles to 
constructive, investment-anchoring deals the State's interest is clear, albeit dficult to 
pursue. In a period of footloose capital, coIlapsing and multiplying wage and benefit pat- 
terns, and burgeoning competition, the public interest is in maximizing wealth creation in 
the State. As explained in the chapters on vehicle progr:un siting and input sourcing, 
31912 ASME Transactions, quoted in Donald Stabile, Prophets of Order (Boston: 
South End Press, 1985). 
4 ~ o r  parts sector workers, new Japan-based entrants also exert downward pressure 
on contract settlements. 
retaining and replacing existing opei'ations anchors more Michigan activity than does the 
attraction of new entrants. Thus, the State earns a high return on its effort when it is 
successful in keeping in Michigan work that is at risk of moving elsewhere. 
To earn the highest available return, however, requires more. I t  requires attention 
to the net cost of turbulence, and policies to minimize it. New labor contracts that under- 
mine long-established patterns may keep some firms in business, but may also spell the 
end for others that depend on manufacturing workers' discretionary spending. Lower 
labor costs may move the State up a notch in the Aleximder Grant business climate 
sweepstakes, but may also invite underinvestment in labor-saving technologies. Two- 
tiered pay or benefit structures may save some establishments money, but may also in- 
crease the militancy (and the resistance to deal-making) of lower-tier employees. 
The State interest, then, is neither in "zapping" labor o r  in freezing existing 
arrangements, but in promoting as smooth as possible a transition to an automo- 
tive economy based on explicit labor-management deals covering investment, pay, 
and work organization. As an increasingly active investor in the industry, the State al- 
ready brings to the table many of the "chips" needed to incentivize such wealth-anchoring 
deals. In the pages ,that follow, we present the results of ow preliminary efforts to secure 
the information on skill requirements, work rules, and pay patterns the State will need if it 
is lo facilitate, and serve the public's interest in, these new constructive agreements. In 
the near-term, the State may also have to play an educati.ve role: our interviews make 
. . 
clear that few in labor or management have as yet thought beyond the rhetoric of coopera- 
tion to the complex relationships among investment, technology, cost and work organiza- 
tion on whose full articulation we believe the new labor relations will have to be based. 
In the sections that follow, we report on and analyze responses to the labor relations 
questions we took to management and labor representatives during the first eight months 
of 1985. These address, in order, issues of skill requirements, work rules and lines of job 
demarcation, multiple-tier wage and benefit agreements, ancl the impacts on pattern bar- 
gaining of new small car  programs. 
Emerging Skill Structures 
The conventional wisdom holds that, while productivity gains and market share los- 
ses will mean fewer U.S. auto jobs in the future, the jobs that remain will require far 
higher average skill levels. This prediction provides the rationale for heightened training 
efforts5 among disemployedG and active workers alike. New product launches are now 
typically preceded by about a year of skilled trades and several months of production 
worker training and orientation. 
Blanket predictions of across-the-board upskilIing fell away before specific CRT ques- 
tions. Management interviewees stated that skilled trades workers were and would con- 
tinue to be fast-rising proportion of the remaining workforce, yet surprisingly head counts 
and hiring plans for programs launched or set to debut between 1983 and 1990 showed 
roughly the same 18% skilled trades proportion that the industry exhibits today. Union 
and management respondents agreed that programmable automation is reducing 
diemakers' skill needs, but not having much effect on skill requirements for the machine 
repair trades or for millwrights and pipefitters. In both hydraulics and the electrical 
trades, however, skill requirements and the need for new, specialized electronics training 
have increa~ed.~ Our labor respondents, however, see this as perhaps temporary, "only - 
until the debugging phase is complete." At Rouge Steel, for example, the continuous caster 
will eliminate nearly 250 production jobs and require 90 new skilled jobs-but "about 40 of 
those 80 (skilled trades) slots ~ ~ v i l l  be downgraded to production once the bugs are out." 
What is seen as coming after that point may explain why new technologies may not 
expand the trades' share of jobs. Umpire decisions have consistently backed manage- 
ment's right to have production workers perform routine diagnostic work. As repair and 
maintenance of electronically-controlled equipment becomcas a matter of checking and 
replacing easily removable circuit boards or chips, diagnosis requires less specialized skilI. 
The argument that the function of the circuit board is identical to the function of the wiring 
it replaces is, trades representatives admit, an apparent loser. 
5 ~ i n c e  mid-1982, company contributions to negoti~~ted union-company training 
programs have totaled in excess of $250 million; information on expenditures, in total or 
by type of training, is not easily available. 
 rainin in^ for displaced workers is a subject of some controversy. Once Big Three 
workers lose rehire rights by being laid off too long, they also lose eligibility for "nickel 
fund" training opportunities. Equally imponant, for obvious reasons, the automakers 
main interest is in their active workforces. A reorientation of training efforts away from 
displaced employees was listed as a goal in the leaked 1984 (;M bargaining memo. 
7 ~ h e r e  will, of course, be continuing bargaining a t  the national, but particularly the 
local, level over the extent to which construction, repair and maintenance, and program- 
ming tasks connected to new technologies will be performed (a) in-house by the OEMs, and 
(b) by TJAW members. 
Among production workers, the future skill outlook is likewise miued. Job setters 
will see skill needs rise, but many other will find machine operation skills obsoleted by 
technologies that make it possible for many types of equipment to run unattended. As in 
the trades, near-term average upskilling may reflect the newness of most programmable 
equipment. To the extent that the new, more computerized production process becomes 
more mature and r~ut inized,~ a more mixed skilling picture seems likely. 
The overall picture, then, is not unambiguously one of long-lived general upskilling 
or of deskilling, but of a continuing change in the distribution of skill needs. Other develop- 
ments that will be considered in our discussion of work rtdes - including trends toward 
pay-for-knowledge, work teams, and classification depopulation - will all tend to increase 
the number of different - tasks and responsibilities expected of the average worker, yet the 
substance of those tasks will not necessarily or uniformly embody increased skill. 
Rules and Lines 
A great deal of discussion about work rules has occurred since 1980. Impressed 
with Japanese assembly companies' productivity advantage, top U.S. auto executives have 
sought to modify and loosen certain work rules and to combine certain job classifications 
across lines of 'demarcation. In some cases, changes in work rules - including limitations 
on how seniority can be exercised, in order to reduce bumpirtg of experienced workers from 
a job - and classifications have been amicably achieved. :[n small car assembly and en- 
gine plants, the obvious import threat has greased the skids for such loosening of union 
work practices. In other cases, notably in stamping plants, management has used plant 
closing threats to achieve the same result, but with correspondingly greater ill feeling. 
Based on o w  discussions, local bargaining over work rules and job classifications has 
produced more flexible organization in the majority of OE2d facilities; as one respondent 
put it, "Most of the horror stories have been cleaned up." Such increased Aexibiiity is the 
rule in small car plants, stamping plants, and some older plants whose workers saw clear 
benefits in acceding to management demands as the quid pro quo for extending faciiity life. 
As a nlie, the least change has occumed in large car assembly plants and in captive parts 
plants producing parts for large cars and for trucks. In suppliers, the picture is even more 
mixed. Some s m d -  and medium-sized suppliers had never evolved the complex set of 
should be noted that many analysts dispute whether such technological maturity 
will occur, and they point to the increasingly short period between automation purchases 
and their competitive obsolescence. 
restrictions that took hold in OEM plants.g In larger first-tier suppliers, however, our 
interviews reveal even split between those in which closing threats have produced 
major loosening, and others in which work structure is now more rigid than in most OEM 
plants. There is also a large body of anecdotal evidence that suggests that in 1981-53 
OEM workers made small concessions (often "merely" foregoing increases) in pay but of- 
ten large ones in local work practices, while in many suppliers larger cuts in pay and 
benefits rather than rollbacks in job rules were the rule.1° 
How much do restrictions on how management deploys employees matter? How 
costly are they? How much has been "conceded1' in this area so far? Which changes in 
work rules, which combinations of classifications save the most money? How much could 
further changes save? Enough to change any significant component or vehicIe sourcing 
decisions? For which components, which vehicles? Are there "disjustified" investments, 
particularly in programmable automation, that would be justified if changes in negotiated 
work rules ceased to inhibit the realization of flexibility (if indeed they do inhibit it)? 
We took these and related questions to respondents in the OEMs, independent sup- 
pliers, and the UAJV. Conclusion number one must be that the level of rhetoric on this set 
of questions exceeds the level of precision by a stunning mi=&. Even in our "literature 
search," we tuned up but a single quantification of work rule costs: a GM spokesman told 
Business Week in mid-1982 that changes in local agreements had, "at some locations," cut 
hourly labor costs "as much as $4.50." At one assembly plant interview, we were told 
that having operators clean their own work areas had allowed a reduction in sanitation 
workers from 140 to 60, saving about $15 per vehicle. Beyond that now-three-year-old 
quote and the sanitation anecdote above, we got few hard answers. We did get one OEM 
statement that "continued progress" in local work rule loosening was "a big factor" in 
whether some upcoming investments were or weren't made -- but no further details. 
' ~ h e s e  restrictions, it must be noted, are the joint creation of management and 
unions. Rules governing task division and the application of seniority were, and are, a 
predictable response to Taylorized work and a lack of job and income security. In West 
Germany and Sweden, fewer work rules and classifications are permitted by greater job 
protections and by "codetermination," while in Japan '"lifetime employment" makes 
restrictive rules unnecessary. h fact, the US., Canada, and the United Kingdom are 
unique in this feature of industrid organization - and are now apparently paying the 
price. 
' O A ~  least half of all 1979-1983 U14W agreements were reopened in mid-contract for 
"concession bargaining," and in the small supplier sector the trend toward giveback 
demands reportedly continues unabated. 
Union respondents were extremely skeptical that work could be won or retained by 
agreeing to ease work practices. While work rule changes (and, to impurify the matter, 
new programmable controllers) had halved employment in one engine plant's crankshaft 
operation, cutting 125 jobs (or about $10 per engine), "they can build (the engine) in 
Mexico with the same technology, no work rules, and slave wages." (One exception was 
noted: SPC was seen as able to cut U.S. costs by eliminating the need for most inspectors; 
Mexico was seen as continuing to need an army of inspectors to achieve required levels of 
quality). As for the cost of particular work practices, unionists we interviewed didn't know 
but were sure management did. We wish we could agree. 
Surprisingly, we found no cases in which management demands for relaxed work 
rules .and for classiiication combination were supported by arguments connecting flexible 
work organization with flexible technology, Even more striking, we found only a few cases 
in which management had explicitly traded a guarantee of keeping or returning work in 
return for changes in local agreements, and none in which such a deal was struck after a 
union-company study of particular work practices' effect; on product costs. Instead, 
unionists complained, management justified its demands with either blunt threats of 
"change the agreement or we'll close the plant" (stamping, mainly) or "the same old tune 
that we have.to be competitive."11 We believe, but cannot prove, that sharing of data on 
which steps can influence competitiveness, and how much, is a precondition to more 
trusted "tunes." 
To return to an earlier theme, we suspect that the state of affairs just described 
owes to the unequal strength of management and labor in a context of globalized competi- 
tion. To oversimplify, management needs to be competitive or it will move production else- 
where; ,while logistics and politics are forces tending to keep work here, the fact that the 
option of moving it exists reduces the pressure on management to trade significant 
unilateral prerogatives in return for labor cooperation. We hope, but cannot predict with 
"several respondents hear the same "tune" in EL1QW.L-type programs, and worry 
that becoming more competitive may simply increase "whipsawingn of local against local. 
"Solidarity House shouldn't allow such local bargainingn wit'hout coordinating among the 
locals. This raises an important issue to which we shall return: are the appropriate 
"deals" properly a plant-, component- or vehicle-, division-, or company-level matter? Our 
view is that the component or vehicle level (often multiplantj is the relevant one, because 
that is the level on which sourcing decisions are based. On the other hand, subsystem 
interdependencies complicate the matter. For example, we were told that Ford's Batavia 
plant lost potential manual transaxle work to Japan (Mazda) not because of its own costs, 
but because it was saddled by high-cost casings from the cor~pany's (now closed) Sheffield 
foundry. 
confidence, that technoiogy and JIT may, along with politics, heighten the industry's 
resolve to solve cost problems in domestic - and especially Michigan - operations even if 
doing so means, in some cases, ceding the outsourcing alter~lative. 
Though we lack the hard numbers, we have compelling evidence of helpful trends. 
The 1984 and 1985 UAW-Big Three agreements embody, in the Job Opportunity Bank 
(JOB) program, a significant symbolic first step toward a commitment to the current OEM 
workforce.12 That emerging, not-yet-stable commitment, .we think, has begun to reduce 
fear of work rule changes, though continued fear of share loss to imports plays a major 
role as well. In the next few paragraphs, we describe some of the emerging models of 
- and points of resistance to - new, more flexible work organization. 
First, pay-for-knowledge (PFK) schemes, in which production workers can be as- 
signed to any of a number of jobs in return for being paid for the highest-paid job for which 
they are trained, trade 20-70 cents an hour for flexibility while also creating incentives for 
workers to learn new skills. While this approach has generally worked well where it has 
been tried, there are dissenters and skeptics. GM's Wentmille assembly plant voted down 
PFK by a 4-1 margin. And some executives see PFK leading to foreman being "nice 
guys" by promoting less-than-competent workers into eligibility for high-paying jobs. Ac- 
cording to this view, PFK (and perhaps other job-widening ]?rograms as well) provides the 
employment rductions of flexibility, but a t  a cost in quality. 
Second, in some plants such as Pontiac Plant 8 (G car) ,  narrow classifications have 
been dealt with through "depopuiation": the classifications remain but where in 1982 
there was a t  least one worker in 80 out of the roughly 100 skilled trades classifications 
defined by the UAW (See Exhibit Ll) ,  today only 15 are populated. (At Fiero, also in Pon- 
tiac, only seven are filled). Obviously, workers do a wider range of tasks now; but basic 
trade lines are not crossed. This distihction between basic and non-basic trades is essen- 
tial to understand. The UAW Skilled Trades Department has no official objection to corn- 
birsing or consolidating class~cations within a basic trade:'GQg., machinists, toolmakers, 
and diemakers of all kinds may be grouped into a single, consolidated classification. The 
trouble starts when attempts are made to combine across such basic trades as electricd, 
millwright, machining/tool- and diemaking, and machine repair. Such attempt- 3, we were 
1 2 ~ h e  JOB programs is only a fast step in this direction. Job loss due to recession and 
vehicle outsourcing is not covered, nor is displacement in one plant due to new technology 
in another, 
1 3 ~ h e r e  are  only about ten basic trades. The 37 listed under that designation in Ex- 
hibit L1 are not "basic" in this same sense. 
told, are under dispute a t  the Chrysler plant in Sterling Heights and at the (not-yet-open) 
St. Louis minivan plant. .4t Sterling Heights, workers are assignable broadly within nine 
production and seven skilled trades classifications; some of the latter are, the UAW says, 
the wrong seven, i.e., basic lines are traversed. 
.4n earlier case in which rules and lines were relaxed, but that did not violate basic 
lines, is the Pilot Employment Guarantee (PEG) program at  Ford's Rawsonville parts 
plant. There, the labor agreement - whose first words are "Faced with ever-growing 
competitive pressures* - tradespeople are now in 14 classifications, many of which have 
overlapping duties, with the result that a good deal of work, especially in machine main- 
tenance and rebuild, occurs in teams. In production, the "operator andlor set-up personnel 
may perfoim nonskilled maintenance and repair...". That reduces labor requirements, and 
that in turn necessitates the most radical and controversi:d aspect of PEG: unassigned 
"extra" production workers go into one of two flexiblydeployable groups, members of 
which may be assigned a t  management discretion, in soml? cases out of seniority order, 
That same sort of discretionary assignability appiies to JOB-banked workers in the Big 
Three, thus making explicit (albeit little understood) the link between greater jobhncome 
security and less restrictive work rules. 
Even more radical, of course, are the new streamlined classiiication systems being 
negotiated a t  new and future small car plants. At NUMMI (and, reportedly, Mazda), 
there is (will be) one production and three (plus one "leader*) skilled clusifieations, formed 
in teams by department. Under the UAW-Saturn "memorandum of agreement," clas- 
sifications apparently give way entirely to "work units" with a working "c~unselor.~ 
Eighty percent of the workforce is secure against non-'catastrophic events," and seniority 
is relegated to being a "tie-breaker" in assignment conflicts. 
All of these developments represent evidence of maria-gement's belief that less rigid 
work organization will reduce costs by allowing lower emp1o:yment levels and, perhaps, by 
justifying new automation investments. While the savings remain to be quantified, there 
is an emerging consensus on what flexible work organization can do in an assembly opera- 
tion. Head counts tell an oversimplified but instructive story: Chrysler Sterling Heights 
produces nearly twice as many cars per worker as GM Orion or Ford Wixom; a t  full 
capacity, NU3IMI and Mazda will produce three times as many; and Saturn, it is planned, 
four.14 The keys, our OEM assembly respondents told us, ,are stability and machine up- 
14~ord's  Wayne [car] plant and Pontiac #8 both have impressive cars-per-worker 
figures, higher than Sterling Heights though still well below NUMMIJMazda. 
t h e .  "Stability" encompasses managerial turnover, job bumping, and consistency of plant 
throughput. The last of these, clearly, depends importantly on uptime and plant layout. 
Uptime depends on investment, equipment choice, repair, and maintenance, but also on 
plant layout. In a proprietary analysis of one OEMs company-wide downtime, 46% was 
traced to machine failure (60% of that 46 was traced to production workers not doing set- 
ups and & delays in repair and maintenance due to skilled trades demarcation lines; 40% 
was traced to underinvestment in new machinery and underbudgeting for routine main- 
tenance.) The remaining 55% was composed of 18% abseateeism, tag rather than mass 
relief, and "other," while the other 37% was traced to "inefficient arrangement of lines and 
excess buffering," including overly long lines, mismanagement of stock between stations, 
too many spindles a t  stations, and too many extraljust-in-csse stations. This allows us to 
infer that up to, but not more than, about 35% of downtimt! may be related in one way or 
another to work practices. Based on the kind of calculation (Exhibit L2) we will use below 
in a different context, that 35% would cost about $180 per vehicle. We have, as of now, 
little data on other costs of work rules and lines of demarcation. Those will have to be 
known and brought to light if constructive deals are to be struck. 
We do, however, want to report an observation about the politics of work rules. We 
observe a split between top executives on the one hand and plant managers, foreman, and 
the UAW on the other. The former wa i t  to eliminate as many rules and to combine as 
many classifications as possible, as fast as possible. The latter see this as an overreaction 
to past; rigidities: "They don't see all the downtime that will get them when non-specialists 
screw up repair and maintenance jobs," one respondent told us. Several interviewees 
recounted that GM, in its "southern strategyn of the 1960s, tried to go with three trades 
classifications (electrical, maintenance, and tooling), only to have to add more to avoid high 
downtime, even in new plants; we have no idea whether the story is apocryphal. Automa- 
tion increases the number of formerly specialist jobs that can be done by "a good han- 
dyman'," but "there's no substitute for a plumber when your pipes burst," one unionist 
noted. 
150ne interesting cost-related anecdote: the new contract between UAW Local 600 
and Rouge Steel ends alI formal job descriptions in favor of teams of tradespeople working 
on the new continuous casting Iine. How much does that save? Enough that management 
granted a 75 cent raise plus about SO cents in increased average incentive yield. 
hterviewees from both sides of the collective bargaining table agreed that many, if 
not most, of the work rules that create instability on the hourly side have been eliminated 
since 1980. '~ Several stamping plants in which every seventh worker was a non-working 
group leader in 1979 have no such rules today. Most plants that had daily output quotas, 
after whose attainment workers could go home, have given those up - though, surprising- 
ly, the practice remains in some independent suppliers' skilled trades agreements. The 
L 
mai? cause of loosening, of course, has been competition: until about 1973, OEM captive 
and large independent parts plants alike felt secure, understood their power over assembly 
plant schedules, and negotiated accordingly. Restrictive rules, to the extent they remain, 
are therefore centered in less competitive parts, such as major starnpings, trailing axles, 
and automatic transmissions, though in the first two of ever1 these cases plastic panels and 
the trend to front-wheel drive may now be competing away remaining restrictions. One in- 
dependent stamper complained that "The UAW (local) hiu gotten off some work rules 
(break time, overtime, and bumping rules), but still won't budge on combining classiiica- 
tions. We're over a barrel on that because we can't get enough good tradesmen, especially 
diemakers." 
We end the discussion with two clear conclusions. First, as noted, hard data on the 
cost of work practices are needed, but lacking. Second, for id the talk of combining trades 
classification, the biggest cost reductions will probably come from having production 
workers maintain and set up their own equipment. Automation should hasten this trend, 
simultaneously broadening the jobs of many production workers and reducing the need for 
what really costs in the trades: extra repair and maintenance personnel idjust in case."17 
Patterns and Tiers 
If heightened competition is undermining traditional work practices, it is also wreak- 
ing havoc with long-established patterns of wages and benefits. Since the middle of World 
War II, with few exceptions the wages and fringes received by workers a t  the U.S. OEMs 
have been the same. By the eariy 1950's most elements of OEM pattern had become the 
16we encountered several cases in which no one could even remember how restrictive 
practices had evolved. One assembly plant found itself with six classifications involved in 
moving parts from the truck to the line: ",God only knows how that ever happened. It must 
have been late a t  night ... anything to put an agreement to bed!" Today, one worker does 
the job; the other five classifications are unpopulated. 
 his conclusion poses a dilemma. How will the emerging shortage of skilled workers 
be add:ressed if there is a simultaneous devaluing of many skilled workers' privileges and 
(narrow) "craft"? 
norm a t  major first tier independent suppliers as well, though pension benefit levels have 
often been an exception. Beginning in about 1981, however, these norms, these predic. 
table relationships have come under increasingly fierce attack.18 Citing the unequal cost of 
providing a given package (due mainly to different retiree-to-active ratios), and 
demonstrating markedly different competitive positions, suppliers have won contracts in- 
creasingly different from each other and from the OEMs, Often, this has been accom- 
panied and/or accomplished through splitting particular plants off from master agree- 
ments. Finally, the announced contracts and memoranda covering NUMMI, Mazda, and 
Saturn appear to some as a harbinger of a different pattern - or even none at all - for 
plants assembling small cars, or a t  least new small cars, Paralleling this has been new 
(1982 and 1984) UAW-Big Three contract language permitting terms of National agree- 
ments to be waived in certain cases in which "major outsourcing decisions" are con- 
templated; as of this time, we know of no application of this newly-allowable waiver. 
One would have to be blind, however, not to see signs of pattern breakdown. X 
Mach,  1985 article in Automotive News sees the end of pattern bargaining, and quotes a 
GM vice-president as saying that future national agreements will be limited to 
"philosophies and those kinds of things," and also notes the waiver provision just dis- 
cussed. The 1984 JOB program, the New Venture fund, anti the waiver language together 
suggest that lower labor costs in at-risk captive component plants are on the way as the 
price fir continuing high (though falling) levels of OEM vertical integration. 
.At the same time, new competition from Mexico ancl offshore, and from new U.S. 
plants of Japanese-based suppliers," spells major trouble ahead for many traditional 
UAW-organized suppliers, trouble that many aim to address by negotiating radically new 
and cheaper labor agreements. Pointing to the movement in certain other industries to 
"two-tiered wages", some supplier executives told us bluntly that only the knowledge that, 
five and ten years hence, labor costs will be $10 rather than f 20 an hour will lead them to 
make !substantial new investments in their existing Michigan facilities. These suppliers 
express dismay over State and UAW "breaks" for new entrants; their point seems to us to 
18prior breaks in pattern had been limited to such minor differences as the size of 
quarterly COLA diversions. 
l g ~ h e s e  new plants - and, to some extent, all new p1:mt.s - have a labor .cost ad- 
vantage over more mature facilities. Few are unionized, but even those that are and 
whose workers receive UAW-auto style pay save from $3 to $5 per hour worked thorough 
lower pension, UI, and other benefit costs associated with older operations whose active 
workers support more laid-off and retired personnel. 
have some validity, and it suggests the State should consider tilting such breaks toward . 
entrants not in direct competition, or those joint venturin.g, with existing Michigan es- 
tablishments. 
Are multiple wage and benefit tiers in the offig? We are convinced that in some 
form they are, and found no disagreement - though some dismay at the prospect - on 
the past of our interviewees. Pure two-tier schemes are not predicted, but "We're going to 
see a lot of cases where it takes ten or fifteen years to get to maximum rate" in wages and 
fringe benefits. Supplier executives talk of future start rates a t  50% of maximums with a t  
least 10 years to the top; UAW respondents hope for 80% and five-year "grow-in" (com- 
pared to the 85% and 18 months typical today). OEM, supplier, and union respondents 
alike had taken close note of the Chrysler-NE agreement trading two-tier wages for 
greater security for high-seniority workers; unionists were worried. 
A big part of the attraction of abandoning the current Big ThreeJBig SupplieriUAW 
pattern lies in the widespread perception that labor costs in Japan's auto sector are steeply 
tiered. There, some 25% of the workers involved in manufacturing get the "OEM rate" 
(basically final assembly, major stamping, and engine and transaxle assembly), while 75% 
get a rate 20 to 70% lower. In the U.S., about 50% of the value of a car is produced in 
firms with Iabor costs exceeding $20 an hour. How, one respondent asked, could Ford's 
Batavia transmission plant compete with Mazda when the company's Sheffield casting 
plant had to pay upper-tier OEM Iabor costs (today, about $24 an hour) when Mazda's 
casting supplier pays $5? The answer he supplied was the "Either workers in plants sup- 
plying parts for small cars get paid less than the guys a t  Orion and Wixom, or you can 
kiss (domestic Big Three) srnail cars goodbye." 
How will a greater spread in rates occur, if it does? The consensus was the NUMIMI 
and Mazda herald a new s m d  car pattern of full pay and benefits but with sharply fewer ' 
work rules. Some felt that, in addition, union acceptance of a Saturn-style pay system in 
which some 20% of pay is tied to productivity, quality, and profitability, might become the 
quid pro quo for new domestic small car programs, probably including the successors (if 
any) to Escort/Lynx, OmniXorizon, Alliance/Encore, and even the J bodies. 
In parts, competition will force one or more additional tiers for many OEIvI corn- 
ponent plants, whose new pay levels will set the new, lower ceiling for fist-tier independ- 
ent suppliers. Types of captive component facilities slated for lower-tier futures (as the 
cost of the OEMs, especially GM, staying far more vertically integrated than Japanese 
OEMs) are those making small hardware, batteries, bearing:;, and die castings, and many 
kinds of foundries. Anything that has to be sold outside as well as inside, that's done out- 
side much cheaper, or that's labor-intensive (e.g., copper wire harnesses) is seen as a can- 
didate for one or more lower tiers, "Many patterns are coming," one union interviewee 
*told us, "We won't let it happen randomly, a plant at a t h e .  If bearings are a competi- 
tive problem, we'll take all the bearing plants down a notch together," he continued. An 
OEM respondent agreed: beyond (final) assembly znd large car engines and drivetrains, 
'only proprietary technology protects against failing out of the big  car) master." Again, a 
tier cut was described as the price of high vertical integration. "Either we get $1,000 out 
of each (small and rnidsized) car in the parts plants, or we don't get the $2,000 (total) we 
need to catch the competition. Parts plants (workers) are going to have to understand," he 
concluded, "that the coptract isn't really with GM or Ford; it has to fit the plant." 
So What's the  Deal? 
The last few pages provide ample grounds for expecting that the 1980-92 period 
portends a chaotic labor-management playing field; we expect management to get much, 
but not all, of what it seeks in the way of breakouts from pattern agreements. We expect 
sizeable rank and file disgruntlement, and a resulting split between "cooperationists" and 
"resistors" in the labor leadership. 
What we don't know is whether the automotive economy that ivill emerge from the 
fray in the mid-1990's will be one that continues to hold its own in the marketplace while 
providing high living standards for many Michiganians. The reason for this agnosticism is 
that we don't know whether the labor-management engagements we foresee 'cvill result in 
bargains that anchor and nurture wealth-creating automotivle activity here. Will labor see 
greater job security as worth a cut in living standards and, if so, will increased intra-labor 
inequities be tolerated as the means to the latter? Will management make the offer, or 
use resistance to justify plant closings and increased outsourcing? Will heretofore purely 
management prerogatives over sourcing be shared? Will backers of greater participation 
insist that the the level of participation go beyond Saturn's 'work unitsn to include codeter- 
rnination of investment? Will the skilled trades - who may feel that technoiogical change 
makes their employability and living standards secure - stand in the way of deals linking , 
work rule changes and job security? 
And perhaps most important, does it make much dif'ference how these questions are 
answered? Can deals such as the ones at which this chapter has hinted, combined with 
new and well-applied technology, cut costs enough to keep most of the industry's produc- 
tion here,20 or are successes quickly imitable in low-labor cost nations and non-union 
states? 
The clear imperative is to find out in practice. The State can play a role in educat- 
ing, in cajoling, in providing forums for OEMs, suppliers, labor, and itself in which the pos- 
sibilities for new and better deals - some involving State resources - might be struck. To 
be sure, skeptics abound. Many managers prefer a purely market-driven restructuring, 
with the only State role in paying the losers' transition cost;s. Many unionists at  all levels 
will resist any changes in work practices, Many on both sides of the table won't want the 
State involved. 
We noted earlier that, even were labor composed on the question,21 constructive 
trades might not be offered. Our interviews with all but the top level of UAW reptesenta- 
tives made clear how distrustful many in labor are of recent deals. They cite AMC's 
promise to restore 1982 cuts as an example of "a good deal that wasn't worth the paper it 
was written on," though in the same breath they agree that the 1985 cuts were inevitable 
and saved the Kenosha plant. Despite all the obstacles to deal:makinp, we see no attrac-. 
tive alternatives. More important, there are emerging signs of good bargains; it is with 
them that we close. 
The IUE-Chrysler two-tier settlement included an agreement that new, viable work 
would be sought as unknably labor-intensive wire harness work was gradually - at 
a controIled rate - let go. 
A UAW agreement with Budd's rdcar  operation in Pennsylvania allows the plant to 
shed the terms of the master agreement, but only if and when Budd secures for the 
plant new work sufficient to occupy 60% of UAW hours. ' 
At International Harvester, the company got much-relaxed work mles in return for 
;I guarantee not to reduce the UAW's share of total hours worked. 
20~.xhibit L2 presents an illustrative exercise in which, a plausible deal results in a 
12% cut in engine production costs. 
2 1 ~ e .  take as evidence the fact that in no case of wlich we are aware has labor 
proposed an arrangement in which EUQWL programs, work rules changes, and pay for 
knowledge are part of a package that includes management commitments to make specific 
major investments. 
At Rockwell, relaxed work practices and a longer progression to top rates was traded 
for a provision that makes layoffs more costly through triggered hikes in severance 
pay obligations. 
Finally, a t  one large Michigan independent supplier, our respondent flatly backed a 
deal linking fewer skilled trades classifications and longer wage and benefit proses. 
sion to plant-saving investments - and promised not to make those investments 
without those contract changes. 
The next step is for new deals to become part of wider debate and discourse. The 
fuller articulation of these themes holds unique promise for a constructive automotive cul- 
ture in the years ahead. F d u r e  to proceed along these lines seems a periious non-decision 
indeed. We have nothing to lose but our greatest industry. 
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,.. BUT WHAT IF A DEAL COULI) BE CUT 
... in which management and labor agree to take steps to reduce costs in 
an effort to retain work in, or return it to, t h e  U.S.? For example ... 
Labor agrees to modify work practices in return for 
Management promises to 
- invest in existing unionized U.S. facilities; 
- co-redesign line balancing & buffering; and 
- commit to CAEC/DEbI to reduce subpart 
and assembly complexity, 
resulting in: 
- 15% higher direct labor productivity; 
- An indirect: direct ratio of 0.7:l; 
- 80% machine uti1izatio.n; and 
- A 2% scrap rate. 
AFTER-DEAL RELATIVE PRODUCTION COSTS 
U.S. Japan France Korea 
Direct & indirect labor $63.00 $34.67 $6(,1.33 $21.60 
Direct material 145.71 145.71 172.86 162.86 
Equip't amortization 62.50 54.81 89.12 74.60 
Transp'n & tariff -- 30.00 25.00 35.00 
$276.21 $265.19 $356.31 294.06 
As Pct of US Cost 100 96 129 106 
Relatively More, but Absolutely Fewler, US Jobs 
Direct 
Indirect 
Initial Mt er-D eal 
425 361 , 
425 2453 
850 614 
EMESGIiiG PRODUCT DEVELOPMENTS 
Introduction 
The automotive industry is changing at an increasingly fast pace, with a fundamen- 
tal reordering of the entire business. This is certainly true of product technology. During 
the next ten-year period, we will witness unprecedented major technical changes 
throughout the industry. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a perspective on those 
product changes. The scope is necessarily limited, particularly with regard to impacts on 
particular firms in U.S. and Michigan industry. Future work will remedy that limitation. 
Technology must today be viewed on a worldwide rather than a domestic basis. The 
competitive environment requires that technology become a more important factor in es- 
tablishing a competitive advantage in the industry. In fact, many of the traditional con- 
sumer value factors that have been used to discriminate or differentiate between products 
on an international scale are losing their value as parity is achievec! in many of the 
quality areas. U.S. cars are rapidly approaching the level of' the Japanese in fit and finish 
quality, and the Japanese are quickly attaining the levels of corrosion protection found in 
U.S. products. This growing parity is increasing the emphasis on new technology as a 
product differentiation feature. 
Consistent with rapid technological change is a shift in the basic structure of the 
U.S. market. The emerging automotive market can be characterized as having a com- 
modity, or high-volume, vehicle se,gnent and a specialty vehicle segment consisting of 
higher-priced but lower-volume vehicles. The latter market segment is a particularly im- 
portant technological driving force because of the "high tech" expectations and even 
demands of many upper scde buyers, and it provides a real world laboratory for features 
that will later be embodied in commodity segment vehicles. 
For this phase of the .4IM study, our approach was to contact executive engineers at 
the various OEMs and a t  one integrated suppiier. The OEMs surveyed included the C-PbC 
and B-(3-C divisions a t  General Motors, the Ford Motor Cornpany and Chrysler Corpora- 
tion. The Hydra-Matic division a t  General Motors was also irlcluded in the study. A series 
of questionnaires was prepared which included the universal questions and a more detailed 
set of questions pertinent to the individual technical areas. With each group, a 
"roundtable" discussion was convened to address the universal questions in an interactive 
manner. Overall, more than 40 executives participated in these meetings. Following 
these roundtable sessions, CRT representatives met with ,the individual technical area 
groups. 
The following areas were addressed: 
Drivetrain 
@ FrameIS tructure/Body 
* Spark-Ignited Engines 
* Electronics 
0 Engineering Process 
They were selected because of their importance to the competitiveness of U.S. and 
Michigan industry, the high rate of change in each area, and because each is a leading in- 
dicator of other technological change. 
In the following pages, we present in the main the dominant respondent view, and 
generally refrain from attribution of trends to specific individuals or manufacturers. We 
found the roundtable participants to be candid, direct, and almost uniformly concerned 
with future challenges as well as eager to assist the State to better understand the in- 
dustry. We also observed a sense of urgency: several key panelists expressed greatcon- 
cern of a coming crisis because of the growing intensity of international competition. 
There was general agreement that we are in an incredibly complex international environ- 
ment that demands prompt, aggressive, and forceful moves toward greatly enhanced 
quality and productivity. 
World class quality is now viewed as a fundamental condition of participation in the 
industry; anything less is viewed as unacceptable. This places enormous pressure on both 
the manufacturers and their suppliers to improve product cluality to the best available in 
the world. The panelists agreed that unless supplier qualicy goals can be met, they will 
aggressively seek offshore sources and, in fact, this process is already occurring a t  an in- 
creasing rate. Concerns with productivity are consistent wi,th the consensus view that .the 
U.S car is $2,000-$2,500 more expensive to produce than a comparable Japanese car, 
partly because of tax, exchange rate, and capital cost disadvantages for US, producers. 
Anything less than cost parity is seen as unacceptable. 
The urgency expressed is also associated with some noteworthy new ideas. 
Traditionally, engineers have focused on objects, things, and processes in discussions of 
this type. We were impressed with the panelists' sense of the growing importance of 
people and of improving human relationships. Participative management is viewed by 
most not as an option, but as fundamental to long term success. Those who have recently 
observed a U.S.-based plant organized and managed by Japanese were particularly em- 
phatic about the importance of a dedicated, flexible, and turned-on workforce. Further- 
more, the reIatively "low tech" nature of the plant, together' with the high quality and low 
cost of its products, have dramatically altered the view that the key to success is simply a 
"high tech" production environment. 
Panelists emphasized the importance of systems engineering, which includes the 
interrelationship between various parts of the product and between the design and produc- 
tion functions. Systems should be viewed in an even broader contest, one in which 
management, social and economic considerations, and technological factors are considered 
in total to ensure the production of a truly competitive vehicle. Our technical educational 
system was criticized for lack of emphasis on systems. There was also consensus that 
skills need to be improved through training and advanced schooling. Manufacturing en- 
gineers,' designers, applied electronic engineers, and service personnel were viewed as 
being in short supply. Problems have been exacerbated by the early retirements of the last 
few years, and by the fast pace of recent technologicai change. 
We dso observed a strong sense of optimism dong with the sense of concern and ur- 
gency. There was consensus that the industry had awakened from a deep sleep and would 
forego future "snoozes." The change within the industry is viewed as deep, fundamental, 
and all-encompassing. We found an almost consuming. concern with the challenges of 
manufacturability and the aligning of product design and manufacturing people a t  the ear- 
liest stages in the product life cycle. Such phrases as "design for automation" and "simul- 
taneous engineering" were used liberally. Much traditional. manufacturing technology is 
increasingly viewed as obsolete, including the synchronous a.ssembly line, which will more 
and more be replaced by a modular construction, parallel processing system. 
Universal Questions 
In this section, we summarize the product development panels' response to the 
Universal Questions. 
A range of views was expressed as to what would be the three most important chan- 
ges in cars and light trucks between now and 1992. Respondents grouped predicted chan- 
ges into four categories: customer requirements, product technology, manufacturing con- 
siderations, and governmental concerns. Based on customer requirements, increased 
model proliferation and increased demand for high quality products were expected to be 
key factors prompting change in passenger cars and light trucks. 
The two most prominent product changes mentioned were the increased application 
of advanced electronics, and the development of new materials. Changes such as improved 
engine performance, new engine requirements for fuel economy, aerodynamic improve- 
ments, reduced mass, and the trend to front drive were also mentioned. 
In terms of manufacturing, integration of design and processing, design for automa- 
tion, the rapid expansion of modular construction technology, parts integration into single 
components or subsystems, and the application of new joining technology were were 
viewed as critical. 
Government regulations on passive restraints were viewed as prompting product 
change, already accelerated due shorter product life cycles. 
Views on the most important changes between now and 1992 from a manufacturing 
standpoint closely parallel those on product changes. 
Much higher 'levels of automation are e.qected, and the resulting alteration in 
manufacturing operations will be extensive. Entire plants will be obsoleted by competitive 
pressure; retooling will be a massive undertaking. Computer-Integrated Manufacturing 
(0 and its relationship to overall improvements in productivity and quality was 
repeatedly noted. 
FIexible manufacturing systems (FMS) are viewed as very important, prompted by 
disaggregation of the future market and the need to meet rapidly changing consumer ex- 
pectations. This dictates a quick change (at modest cost) manufacturing system. .4 
reasonable cost premium for FMS systems is expected. 
Modular construction is coming on very quickly, and eventually could almost tatally 
replace the synchronous line concept. This suggest that convc~ntional assembly will be vul- 
nerable, lending pressure toward greenfield siting of future programs, 
Quality was observed as being a major factor in the revision. of the production sys- 
tem, as was the need for major improvements in productivi.ty. Design for automation was 
emphasized, indicating again the importance of bringing design and manufacturing more 
closely together. 
Another factor receiving considerable mention was the role of outsourcing; manufac- 
turers believe it is likely to expand, particularly on a complete subsystem or module basis. 
Suppliers are increasingly expected to be close to the production operation to better accom- 
modate "just-in-time" requirements, which may prompt moves of remote plants to a satel- 
lite location in major production complexes. Absent on-location plants, local warehousing is 
likely. Supplier-manufacturer relationships are viewed as improving. 
I t  appears that any major change within the manufacturing environment will be 
evaluated on the basis of long term return on investment, so automation for automation's 
sake is not likely to be a major independent force. The recent qualitylproductivity ex- 
perience of the comparatively unautomated NUMMI operation is often cited on this point, 
a t  least for h a l  assembly operations. 
Management and personnel changes were viewed a:; tremendously important. A 
more skilled workforce will be required in order to operate the more productive and sophis- 
ticated plants of the future. Effective implementation of pa-ticipatory management is es- 
sential. Jobs will on average be broader, as minimum efficient scaIe is decreased with 
flexible automation, in some cases leading to smaller plants rather than large complexes. 
It is also clear that the growing materials revolution must be considered in the con- 
text of the processing steps required for those materials. Future materials considerations 
will be increasingly integrated with manufacturing considerations. 
Detailed areas of change in the manufacturing system include application of ad- 
vanced optical measurement systems to improve process ciipability and quality, reduced 
inventories, and less space devoted to rework. 
In almost every instance, panelists viewed advances in CIhI, which in many cases 
have already led to si@cant productivity improvements, as enhancing the potential of 
the manufacturing base being retained in the United States in general and in Michigan in 
particular. However, the point was strongly made that this result is not automatic. Paral- 
lel advances are required in the development of designs for automated manufacturing; in 
the skill of the workforce; in the proximity of key suppliers to the point of assembly; in ef- 
fective cooperation between manufacturers, suppliers, labor, and governmental units; and 
in labor cost moderation. I t  was emphasized that one mu.st look at the total system of 
costs to arrive a t  a final decision on competitiveness, although in general improved com- 
puter .technology is expected to redound to the advantage of U.S.-based operations. 
A wide range of plant types were viewed as being in the strongest positions through 
1992. Modern plants and those recently receiving heavy investment are reasonably 
secure. Facilities that have demonstrated excellent cost and quality competitiveness are .. 
likewise not likely to be closed unless, of course, a fundamental change in the product oc- 
curs. Strong operations include Ford Livonia Transmission, new luxury car operations, 
plastic-composite materials operations, Ford Climate Control., Saginaw Steering Gear, C-P- 
C Bay City, (GM) Rochester Products Division in Western Michigan, Buick City, newer en- 
gine plants, and plants devoted to the manufacture of advanced electronics. In addition, 
manufacturing equipment facilities, especially those producing FMS equipment, appear to 
our respondents to be safe. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, heavy forging and casting operations and those 
with labor intensive operations such as cut-and-sew were viewed as particularIy vul- 
nerable. .41so seen as at risk are facilities manuf'acturing a mechanical component likely to 
be replaced by electronics, and plants dominated by a militant third generation labor force 
. and unenlightened management, through recent experiences have demonstrated that some 
fundamental changes can be made even with a well-entrenched, militant labor force, lead- 
ing to a much more productive situation. 
T i d y ,  the extensive basic redesign of engines expected in the next few years 
means that many if not most engine production facilities are being thoroughly re- 
evaluated. And, of course, the trend to rear-drive and independent control arms spells 
trouble for many axle operations. 
The engineering executives asked to consider what the State of Michigan can do to 
help the changing automotive industry offered a range of answers, including the expected 
ones: t k  incentives (especiaIly for automation) and reductio~ls in workmen's compensation 
and unemployment insurance costs. Retraining and overall training efforts also received 
prominent mention. There was support for assisting educational institutions to meet the 
need for people with design and rnanufscturing experience. In fact, concern was expressed 
that there is a mismatch between future job requirements and the educational system. A 
highly skilled workforce, from the plant floor to the engineering laboratory to top manage- 
ment, is vitally important to future competitiveness, and the State is being asked to play a 
prominent role. 
The State is also viewed as being important a s  an encourager of new business, by 
making Michigan a more attractive location for entrepreneurial and creative businesses. 
Note was made of the State as a venture capital source and of how important this could be 
as we shift to a more entrepreneurial way of thinking. This is viewed as closely related to 
to dev'eloping an even stronger technological base in the State, one on which the auto in- 
dustry can build. The auto industry feels it should be treated as an investment, in which 
the goal is preserve the health and strength of the strongest and most aggressive com- 
panies. The potential role of the State in helping marshal the support of rank and file 
labor was also noted. 
From a political point of view, it was observed that the State should be increasingly 
aggressive in helping firms meet foreign competition through support of federal initiatives 
to improve the yen/dollar relationship and reimpose impor?; restraints, though there was 
not unanimous support on these points. 
'The Department of Natural Resources' (Dm) interpretation of environmental 
regulations was also noted as a problem Respondents suggested that less interpretive 
strictness could be very helpful in ensuring Michigan siting for new plants, as would swift 
resolution of waste stream issues raised by the increasing use of plastics. 
In the aforegoing Uiiversal Question responses, we have not esplored the issues in 
great depth. However, we have attempted to capture the overall trend of thought. The 
views were diverse from one panelist to the next, but there were some consistent threads 
throughout. 
Technical Survey Overview 
We found reasonable consensus among the manufacturers in the various topic areas 
surveyed, with more differences in view beyond the 1992 time frame. Basically, the 
product of 1992 is reasonably well known and not widely subject to speculation, whereas 
forecasts for 1992-2000 elicited greater variance among the panelists. 
'There is consensus that the move to front drive will continue, although some 
manufacturers indicated that rear drive will remain a significant configuration in their 
product Iines for a number of years b come. The results of the cunent .&i forecast is 
shown in the table below. We believe the variation between manufacturers that led to the 
AIM ranges below reflects product strategy differences in the 1988-92 period, but not 
beyond. By the year 2000, front drive should reach a penetration of about 90%. 
1992 AIM Drivetrain Forecast; 
Compared to Actual 1954 Shares and 1992 Ilelphi Forecast 
Front Enginemar Drive 48% 15% 
Front Engineflront Drive 5 1 8 1 
Mid-Enginemar Drive 1 4 
1984 Delphi 
Actual 1992 Forecast 
It should be noted that light trucks (induding most vans) will largely continue to use 
front enginekear drive, particularly those intended for heavier loads. Four wheel drive 
systems could become increasingly popular, and one forecasistA2r suggested that fully 25% of 
light duty vehicles could be four wheel drive in the late 90s. 
AIM 
1992 Forecast 
Parts that will be eliminated with the continued shift to front drive include the con- 
ventional rear axle assembly with its differential, prop shaft, .and universal joints, and 
peripheral parts. Major modifications are necessary to the floor pan and rear suspension. 
Front drive demands more careful integration of the engine and transmission. 
Areas of opportunity associated with front drive are the overall front engine transaxle 
unit, which contains numerous similar (from a functional st,andpoint) components to rear 
drive transmission and d e s ,  plus additional elements such. as the constant velocity (Cli) 
universal joints. Electronics will play a more prominent role as hydraulic control elements 
are replaced with electronic components. Considerable modification of the front suspension 
is also necessary. The transverse front engine/front drive design, in fact, has been the 
major stimulus behind the switch to h1cPherson strut front suspension. 
Plants producing drivetrain parts thus face either a threat or an opportunity, 
depending on whether they serve the front or rear drive market. The possible expansion 
of four wheel drive is a very significant point, because of the considerable value added in 
the overall drivetrain. This would create new opportunities for volume in prop shafts, U- 
joints, and a sophisticated transfer case. 
Specific facilities and producers that would be affected, either positively or negative- 
ly, include Ford Livonia Transmission, Chrysler Eldon Axle, Dana, GKN, Saginaw Gear 
and Hydra-Matic as well as facilities makiig engines that need to be modified to accom- 
modate front engineifront drive. Several panelists observed that with a greater emphasis 
on aerodynamics there will be increasing attempts to reduce the hood line, which in turn 
could lead to rather dramatic changes in the front suspension. 
Overall, panelists did not foresee major dislocations among those faciIities presently 
involved in drivetrain production, particularly the in-house supplier operations. However, 
each old and new supplier, inside or independent, must meet increasingly rigid quality re- 
quirements to be considered a viable supplier. 
A broad range of transmission forecasts was suggested. The range is dictated in 
part by the model mix forecast by the various manufacturers. Panelists generally 
responded in terms of their own product line rather than in Genns of the industry. Also, it 
was noted that transmission manufacturing flexibility is desirable to address a fast- 
changing market. The following table demonstrates the broad range of transmission 
forecasts. 
Manual transmissions are expected to be used more; five speeds will dominate, 
though it was suggested that, with new broad torque range engines, there may be little 
performance advantage for the five speed. In the automatic transmission, we found very 
mixed ,views as to the potential for the Continuously Variable Transmission (CVT). Some 
are opt.imistic, others quite pessimistic. This gives rise to the broad range of the forecast. 
When the forecast was extended to 'the year 2000, we fimnd that the range of CVT 
forecast was still a very broad 5% - 30%. 
1992 AD1 Transmission Forecast 
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**No breakdowns available. 
Because of the mystery and corresponding "hypen !surrounding the CVT and the 
potential threat to conventional transmission facilities, we chose to investigate CVT 
feasibility in modest detail. Most current designs are based on the Van Doorn principle, 
which involves two variable diameter pulleys connected by EL very special belt, It was ack- 
nowledged that there have been significant belt manufacturing problems with the CVT, al- 
though most expressed optimism that this problem will be solved. However, even with a 
solution, there are a number of areas of concern, including poor initial vehicle acceleration, 
lack of crisp off-the-line feel, and excessive engine noise. CVT cost projections were also 
very mixed, Some felt that it would be more expensive t'han a conventional automatic 
transnlission; others expected a lower cost. Rather significant concern was also voiced 
over CVT consumer acceptance. Our conclusion is that the fiture of the CVT is too close 
to call a t  this time, although with the solution to its present problems, it will likely begin to 
maderateIy penetrate the small vehicle market by 1992. 
:Panelists expressed a range of opinion as to the maximum engine displacement and 
weight for a CVT-equipped vehicle. Some suggested 2.2 liters maximum; others extended 
the limit to 2.8 to 3.0 liters. The key is not so much disp1ac:ement as torque output of the 
engine. PvIaximum vehicle weight for a CVT vehicie is expected to be in the area of 3,000 
lbs. In general, the CVT is viewed as a competitor to the automatic transmission, and 
would probably not have much effect on manual transmission designs, although there is a 
strong minority view, particularly when one considers the :European market as the likely 
first area of application. It was also observed that a t  this point there is relatively little 
fuel economy advantage of the CVT over the manual transnlission. 
There are several key unique elements or component,s in the CVT that make some 
conventional transmission components vulnerable. The belt and its special elements are 
the primary unique features of this transmission, and present significant opportunity for 
suppliers., Many conventional automatic transmission components, such as gears, various 
friction surfaces, and clutches would still be used, but in lesser numbers. It was em- 
phasized that the components in many respects are similar, but there would be far fewer 
than in current designs. Various hydraulic control elements' presently used would in large 
measure be replaced by electronic components. Spring o:r viscous dampers could also 
present opportunities. 
,411 agreed that the transmission is a vital vehicle subsystem to retain in-house a t  
the manufacturers. Therefore, GM, Ford, and Chrysler all expect to produce CVTs- 
eventually. However, special components suppliers are likely to play a prominent role. 
Borg-Warner, in particular, was mentioned as a likely supplier of key cut components. 
Because of changing market trends, the growing use of flexible manufacturing sys- 
tems, and our large .existing transmission facilities, we explored the outlook look for 
production scaling. The following table shows the range of standard volume for a produc- 
tion module (including a forecast for the CVT). 
-- - 
Range of Standard Volume for a Production Module 
- -- - - - . - - 
Idodule Volume 
Transmission Class (Thc~usands Per Year) 
Automatics 400 - 600 
CVTs 500 - 600 
CVe found a considerable variation in the production volume of a module among the 
various companies, leading to the broad ranges above. Flexible automation is expected to 
make considerable inroads in the transmission area, and perhaps reduce the minimum 
production volume of a module by a factor of two. It may even mean that in some cases 
engine and transmission operations will be brought together in a single plant. 
Some key changes are likely in both product and process technology with respect to 
existing transmissionsldrivetrains. Clearly, quality improvement and cost reduction are 
two aims of every transmission group. It was suggested that the most important technical 
changes, those that ensure the high quality of every transmission produced, require that 
,'the existing process be brought under better control through a combination of improved 
management and process and product technology: "A greater level of science must be ap- 
plied to the manufacturing system," suggested one paneiist. Such technical features as the 
use of groundgears, pre-formed gear teeth, and aluminum or composite shafts were men- 
tioned as possible changes in existing designs. The transition from mechanicaYhydramatic 
tb electronic control is just beginning, and is expected to accelerate rapidly. 
During the past decade, there has been a basic shift in the construction techniques , 
for U.S. vehicles, particularly passenger cars. The separate body frame design is being 
replaced by the integral body frame (ormibody), and we have also begun to see the emer- 
gence of a "bird-cage* or space frame concept. By 1992, the separate body frame is ex- 
pected to disappear in cars and the integral or unibody to dominate. There is mixed 
opinion within the car companies as to the potential for the space frame, Some think it 
will be used in as many as 10 - 20% of 1992 vehicles, vrhile others see no role in the 
product mix forecast of their company. With extension of the forecast period beyond 1992, 
however, there is some indication that space frame usage could expand well beyond 10% a t  
some companies. 
Vans and trucks designed for heavier load-carrying capability are likely to continue 
using the separate body frame design. Thus there will still be the need, albeit reduced, for 
some rather heavy frame stampings. Suppliers of heavy frame stnicturd members will 
be further impacted by the reduction in separate body-frame use, 
Major body and structural components will also be impacted by the change forecast 
above. With the bird cage or driveable chassis design, changes are particularly dramatic. 
These range from the steel, and possibiy aluminum or composites, in the support structure 
to the use of polymer-based composite panels on the exterior. In addition, a truly unique 
frame manufacturing process is required. 
Even in the integral body-frame, which is essentiall,~ the standard today, plastics 
are likely to play a more prominent role in various structural components. From a con- 
struction standpoint, the basic design of the vehicle will be such that it must accommodate 
the growing trend to modular construction. 
One of the true areas of automotive revolution is in the basic materials sector. Per- 
haps the most interesting part of this revolution is the competition between steel and plas- 
tic for body panels. The technology panel forecasts were ~:easonably consistent. Steel is 
expected to remain the dominant material, but with plastics coming on strong, particularly 
beyond 1992. 
DI 1992 Materials Forecast 
of Body Panels 
Reinforced 
Steel Plastic Total 
Hood outer 80 - 95 % 5-20% 100% 
Door exterior 70 - 100 0 - 30 100 
Roof exterior 97 - 100 0 -  3 100 
Fender outer 70 - 95 5 - 30 100 
Fender inner 0 - 99 1 - 100 100 
There was major disagreement between panelists in 21 few key areas. For example, 
one manufacturer's engineer forecast all plastic inner fenders, while another forecast es- 
sentially zero plastics penetration for of the component. Clearly, reinforced plastic will be 
more heavily used in the future, but mainly after 1990: a common remark was that many 
post-1990 vehicles may be designed with essentially 100% p1,astic exterior panels. The key 
to the future of polymer-based materials lies in  development;^ yet to be made, particularly 
in the processing area (see this Report's chapter on materials for details). Manufacturing 
considerations have improved, and there has been significant part integration with plastic 
components. While there is not universal enthusiasm for reinforced plastic panels, the list 
of supporters is growing and, clearly, plastics in all their forms must be viewed as a 
material on the move. 
Another important material competition is in the frame and structural member 
area. Steel will remain the primary structural material in the integral body frame 
through 1992, although polyrner-based composites could be used for 5% of the structural 
requirements. In the space-frame, on the other hand, a much more prominent role was 
envisioned for composites, and potentially for aluminum. In this design,' rather easily 
fabricated basic shapes can be brought together in an autorr~ated facility to form the basic 
space-frame. By the year 2000, a fa r  greater use of polymer-based composites is envi- 
sioned, although there is considerably uncertainty as to how far this technology will 
proceed in the next ten years. The processing, quality, and cost issues are critical with 
any competitive material. Selection wiIl be based on a total systems analysis. 
One of the key dichotomies observed in our interviews was the indication that on-site 
stamping would be used increasingly in new plants, yet that centralized stamping facilities 
still make a great deal of sense. Modern, dedicated ma.ior stamping facilities of the 
manufacturers are viewed as being secure a t  the present time, perhaps because, as one 
interviewee suggested, ,studies of on-site stamping operative do not show a cost advantage 
over centralized stamping facilities. On-site stamping can oi~ly be effective with rapid die 
changes to enable multiple parts production on a few press lines. I t  is still too close to call 
as to the ultimate impact on Michigan facilities. Gbl is pr-esently heavily integrated in 
stamping and therefore little outside impact is envisioned. On-site stamping, led by the 
Fairfax, KS GMlO plant, is coming. At Chrysler, the view was expressed that assembly 
could be moved to the site of stamping operations. At Ford, on-site stamping is envisioned 
as a more common requirement; still, the Woodhaven plant is viewed as secure and well- 
equipped for the future. All respondents felt that independelnt stamping suppliers will be 
highly vulnerable to lost business. 
Spark=Egnited Engines 
One of the most important areas of technical change foreseen in the next ten year 
period is the powerplant, generally a spark-ignited or gasoline! engine. While moderation in 
energy cost expectations has reduced considerably the demand for diesel engines and public 
clamor for fuel economy gains, there is still emphasis on improving efficiency and perform- 
ance of the gasoline engine. Certainly the federal Corpo:rate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) requirements are a factor in this. 
Engine Cylinder Distribution Forecast 
Compared to Actual 1984 Distribution and 1992 Delphi Forecast 
4 Cylinders 47% 58% 
6 Cylinders (V-6) 26 3 2 
8 Cylinders (V-8) 27 10 
1992 Ilelphi 
1984 Actual Forecast 
1992 AIlLI 
Forecast 
h general, the trends forecast in the past Delphi study yre holding up for engine 
configuration. Obviously, however, if there is a major dislocation in energy supply, there 
could be a more rapid shift to smaller engines, and with significant energy price cuts the 
demand for larger engines could expand. The V-8 is expected to be an important future . 
powerplant, and remains under a i y  future energy scenario a viable truck engine; 4- and 6- 
cylinder engines will dominate. 
Total 100% 100% 
We found the industry in the midst of a major effort to update and improve its en- 
gines. The majority of U. S. light duty engines will be a1mo:st totally redesigned by 1992- 
95, in the opinion of our panelists. One major manufacturer suggested that 100% of its 
engine lines would be redesigned completely by 1992; another, 80%; and another, that 40 
- 50% would be completely redone. The present typical powerplant design, which is 20- 
30 years old, is viewed as outdated. New engines will be "high tech," with micro precision 
arid repeatably made components, lower weight, and sipficantly improved specific power 
and efficiency. As several panelists stated rather emphatically, engine component sup- 
pliers must be at worId class quality and cost levels to even be considered for future 
products. 
100% 
Present light duty vehicle engines have several major deficiencies, including exces- 
sive noise, vibration and harshness, high cost, greater weight and size per horsepower, and 
lower feature content per dollar than the Japanese competition. There is an unacceptable 
balance between power and thermal efficiency or fuel economy, and a general need to im- 
prove quality through manufacturing precision. Decreased package size and a higher level 
of customer satisfaction are also required. 
New materials are expected to play a prominent role in new engines, particularly 
aluminum in cylinder heads and blocks. We observed a relatively wide range of expect* 
tions for duminum in heads and blocks. The 1992 forecast for aluminum in heads ranged 
from 45 to 90% and for blocks, from 5 to 15%. And, there was almost a consensus that, if 
the experience is good by 1992, there wouId be a much more extensive conversion to 
aluminum shortly thereafter. Weight savings with aluminum heads are expected to be 20 
to 30 Ibs, one major motivator for the material change. 
Another possible future material mentioned was map~esiurn. Weight savings would 
be even greater than with aluminum. With a complete vehicle redesign, this weight 
savings could be propagated throughout the vehicle as a secondary weight savings. 
However, where a direct substitution is rxiade in an existing vehicle, the secondary weight 
savings are more difficult to achieve. In our judgment, based on the trends developing, we 
should prepare for rapid and almost complete conversion of major cast engine components 
to aluminum. 
Numerous detailed technical changes are expected in future engines. Features 
foreseen by 1992 are shown in the following table, with expected market penetration. 
While this is not a definitive list, it is representative of the growing climate of change. 
Feature Penetration rate 
Lean burn combustion 
3J4 valve and twin cam designs 
Superchargers 




Fast burn combustion chambers 
Port fuel injection 
Electronic fuel injection 
Roller valve lifters 
In generd, engines are in the process of being "high-teched*; the extent of advanced 
technology employed will be dependent on the market. With the increasing evidence that 
we are entering a two-tier market of commodity and specirllty vehicles, it is evident that 
many of these advanced technology items will be focused on the specialty vehicle engine. 
Recently there has been speculation about the role of' a new "wonder material" for 
engines, namely ceramics. Since a major new material could cause dislocations in engine 
production centers, we explored ceramic materials' potential for causing change. Some in- 
roads are expected from ceramic materials, although it is evident from panel comments 
that there are still many uncertainties. Such application:; as a ceramic-faced cam fol- 
lowers are forecast in 10% of future engines. Other potentid ceramic applications, includ- 
ing turbocharger hot wheels, piston crowns, and exhaust port liners, were forecast for a 
small percentage of engines by 1992. Another area in which ceramics are viewed as 
having potential is in reciprocating components such as pi,stons and valves. In general, ' 
components subjected to high heat loading and wear are can.didates for ceramic materials, 
although often only as a thin coating. Ceramic materials are more critical to low-heat 
rejection or adiabatic diesel engines which, for the foreseeable future, are not likely as light 
duty vehicle powerplants. 
Ceramic manuf'acturing technology is not yet sac ien t ly  advanced to provide any 
basis for a significant forecast. It must also be noted that ceramics in the inner combus- 
tion area are not likely in gasoline engines because of problems with high temperatures 
and consequently high fuel octane requirements. 
A large number of engine technology factors were suggested by the expert panelists, 
ranging from broad and aggressive application of statistical process control to flexible 
manufacturing systems. FMS was viewed as necessary to reduce the minimum efficient 
scale for a given engine model, as well as to reducb the investment when model changes 
are made. Other areas noted were increased use of autometed assembly and inspection, 
self-diagnosis of equipment to reduce downtime, improvement in precision casting techni- 
ques, use of adaptive tools, and the appearance of some new machine tool concepts such as 
super-fast machining. Reduced and distributed inspection (in process inspection) will be 
used. Consisknt with present trends, inventory will be reduced to even lower levels. 
Quality and cost demands are key in prompting change. 
Many Michigan engine-related facilities are vulnerable to these changes. Any cast 
iron foundry making engine parts is viewed as being in potential trouble. In addition, 
plants more than about 25 years old, including foundries and old engine plants with quality 
problems, &re seen as skating on thin ice in the present environment. Component sup- 
pliers must seek early involvement.with new engines if they are not to sink with the old 
designs. 
To wsess the risks, we looked a t  the minimum efficient production volume of an en- 
gine module for two shifts today and in 1992. As observed ,with transmissions, we found a 
range of answers. Today the annual standard volume of an (engine module appears to be in 
the area of 400,000 - 550,000 units. There is some indication that flexible manufactur- 
ing could reduce this figure, in some cases considerably. One manufacturer suggested that 
economic producdon volumes may already be achievable in a range from 15,000 to 
550,000 units a year! Another suggested that it may be possible to think of one module 
broken up into three submodules, each with approximately equal volume, because of the 
potential of flexible manufacturing. If so, flexible manufzicturing would be earning its 
somewhat more expensive keep by providing a more fiexible product mix. 
Electronics 
The automotive electronics revolution is well underway and accelerating. There is a 
fundamental shift from mechanical control systems to an electronic control strategy. In 
addtion, electronics are critical in entertainment and com~nunication systems, and even 
the clock. In the most recent Delphi (III), more than 12% of 1992 vehicle cost was forecast 
to be in electronic components. The AIM panelists from the U.S. manufacturers generally 
support this forecast. Moreover, they have added an important increment of detail. As 
noted earlier, there is an expectation that the future auto market will be increasingly seg- 
mented into a "low tech," high volume and a low volume, "high techn market. The former 
is expected to employ electronics to the extent of about 6 - 10% of total cost, while 
electronics use in specialty vehicles may attain a level of 15 - 25% of total cost. For both 
vehicle classes, this represents a continued significant expansion. 
The unit cost of electronic componentry will be reduced considerably. Therefore, the 
number and complexity of electronic functions will not be directly proportional to cost, but 
much higher. This is all the more impressive because as more electronic components and 
I 
systems are incorporated in the vehicle, functions and components are increasingly likely 
to be integrated, with a consequent reduction in redundant components. Technology such 
as multiplexing could expand feature content at relatively low cost, and cause the obsoles- 
cence of current components. Where electronics are competing against mechanical control 
components, electronics are likely to win rather convincingly. 
Panelists were also queried as to which rnajor.components and controls will be fun- 
damentally altered or changed by electronic technology in the next 8 - 10 years. 
Viewed from a systems standpoint, electric power steering, suspension control, 
transmission control, sophisticated diagnostics, and onboard communication systems will 
be broadly used and have a major impact. There will be extensive emphasis on all comfort 
and convenience features. Additional systems that will make heavy use of electronics in- 
clude electrical distribution (implying the likely application of multiplexing), brake systems 
(in particular, anti-lock features), and passive restraints. 
On a component basis, there will be increased us;e of various surf'ace-mounted 
devices, more powerful and faster microcomputers, and specially designed custom circuits. 
One key feature of such new technology will be a significant increase in part life; and, 
wi.th a failure or even pending failure, diagnosis down to the electronic module within the 
overall system will be easily accomplished. 
Again, it must be observed that wherever the standard today is a mechanicall 
hydraulic control element, by the mid- to late-1990s electroxlics will probably prevail. It is 
imperative for those engaged in the manufacture of most of' these mechanical components 
to plot an alternative business strategy. 
'The electronics experts also spoke of factors that could limit the thrust to electronic 
technology. As with any new and rapidly expanding technology, there are certain limita- 
tions: reliability, cost effectiveness, and customer acceptance. Perhaps more than in any 
other current fast-paced area of technology, the personnel problems w e  acute: there is a 
lack of' adequately trained electronic design and service people. One of the electronics ex- 
perts stated with some conviction that in his field only 204'0 of the people do 80% of the 
work. 
With multiplexing, either with electrical wiring or fiber optics, there is a substantial 
interface problem, i.e., in converting electrical to optical signals and vice versa. This is a 
signdicant issue, and a t  this point it is not resolved to the extent necessary to allow broad 
automative multiplexing application. 
Other key points noted were the remaining and still fairly major problem associated 
with the development of low cost and highly reliable serlsors and actuators, and the 
lengthy time required to prove out and develop electronic technology in the very hostile 
automotive environment. 
Several of the manufacturers stated that even with the growing importance of 
electricaUelectronic systems, there will be only limited opportunity for additional outsourc- 
ing; a fundamental base will be maintained within the assembly companies. 
Another major limiting factor in electronic applications is cost in relation to 
reliability: any electronic system must be substantially bett,er than the system it replaces, 
due to the complexity and cost of repair and to the debilitating nature of some system 
failures. More system integration tends to reduce failure points, but a singular failure can 
be catastrophic in nature, e.g., a singular failure in the m~rltiplex wiring control could in- 
capacitate lighting and windshield wiper function. 
From a competitive standpoint, in terms of the basic fundamentals of electronics and 
electronic application, the U.S. is in a strong position vis a vis Japan. But electronic tech. 
nology has sped up time for the industry: many parts of'the product and manufacturing 
system that are today viewed as state-of-the-art will become part of history very quickly. 
Any organization, either independent or within the OEMs, will have to possess sophisti- 
cated electronic capability in both the process and product areas to ensure future success. 
Engineering Process 
One measure of how quickly the auto industry can adapt and change to meet the 
international challenge in the years ahead can be glekned from examining trends in en- 
gineering technology. In the present study, the major mariufacturers were queried on a 
few significant factors related to progress in computer-aided design (CAD), engineering 
materials assessment capability, and forecast change in lead time. A recurring theme was 
evident: despite the rapid development and deployment of technological aids, there is a 
major shortage of trained, experienced, systems-oriented people in the design and 
manufacturing areas. Shortages of these criticd skiIls may rather fundamentally limit the 
capacity of the industry to change and become competitive on an international scale. 
One measure of how aggressively the various organizations are moving toward the 
electronic-aided engineering function is the availability of n~icrocomputers, personal com- 
puters, and design terminals at  the engineer's workstation. While the trend is to rapidly 
expand deployment of CAD-related systems, their application is not uniform even within a 
given organization. Some engineering departments use these devices extensively, others 
only modestly. However, the general god is to provide every engineer with a basic com- 
puter workstation by 1992. Presently, work station deployment range from about 5 to 
70% of the engineers, depending on the company and department. In some specialized 
staffs, such as electrical groups, all technical employees already have workstations. Few 
indicated that capital was a limiting factor. 
Another measure of the application of advanced engineering technology is the 
amount of design work done using CAD. Again, a range w;w evident, with a low in some 
technical areas of about 30% to a high of 100% in electrical systems design. In the next 
10 years, the god generally is to achieve a much higher average percentage design with 
CAD, in the range of 85 - 100%. Still, it must be noted that the availability of computer 
technology does not replace the need for trained and skilled d.esigners. 
To further refine our assessment of computer technol.ogy, we chose to examine one 
detailed technique, finite element analysis, which is used to improve component structural 
efficiency. We found widening application of this technology, with a strong capability at alI 
of the Big Three. Furthermore, it was suggested that there are a number of very com- 
petent suppliers contributing significantly to the design process. Some of these specialize 
in advanced computer-based design technologies such as finite element analysis, 
:Despite improving competence in this area, a shortage of trained personnel does not 
permit inhouse facilities td be used to the extent of their capability. By 1992, those 
facilities will need more and larger, high speed number-crunching computers, allowing 
much more computepbased anaiysis to be performed. Also, it was noted that much of the 
current computer-based effort is being used in the deve!opment process, which is really at 
a final stage of design. I t  will be increasingly important to e::pand the use of some of these 
advanced techniques to - earlier stages in the design process to ensure the faster design of 
more optimal systems. 
Lead time is a very critical issue in dealing with international competitors. Present 
product lead time ranges from 3' to 5 years, depending on t:he extent of the design effort 
anti the definition of beginning and end of the interval, and they vary by manufacturer. 
We believe the greater part of observed Merence across the OEMs is due to definitions of 
when planning ends. Substantial lead time reductions were forecast for the next 7 - 10 
years. These range from over a year (relative to a 5-year current lead time), to 6 months 
(from a 3-year current lead time). One manufacturer made particular note of its concept of 
"Phase Zero," a part of the design process that occupies considerable time and involves 
some very basic planning, but is relatively inexpensive. A number of Phase Zero 
programs wilI be placed on the shelf and, if the market suggests a particular program is 
needed, the remaining (and far more expensive) parts of the design development and tool- 
ing process can proceed from an intermediate point. 
Since materials technology is viewed as becoming an increasingly important part of 
the transformation of the auto industry, we asked a rather general question with respect 
to knowledge of competitive materials and their processing. In all~cases, we found con- 
siderable inhouse expertise on materials: departments and staffs were specifically review- 
ing and investigating various materials and their processing requirements. St3ffs are 
reviewing the technical literature; doing bardowns of competitive vehicles and products 
(including non-automotive products); and seeking and getting major assistance from sup. 
pliers that are aggressively developing and promoting new materials. Inhouse technology 
forums are useful, particularly for companies in a number of of engineering materials 
businesses. 
Also, it was noted by several experts that in most of the basic materials, and par- 
ticularly plastics, the U.S. is generally well-positioned. One exception: the Japanese were 
viewed as very strong in the basic ceramics and ceramics processing areas. It was also ob- 
served that the industry needs to look a t  materials technology in other industries, e.g., 
aerospace, in such basic areas as epoxies and sealants. 
It is evident that the engineering process is undergoing a basic and fundamental 
transformation. Serious shortages of skilled and experienced people exist, but engineering 
technology is expected to provide U.S. manufacturers with an important competitive ad- 




Triggered by the oil embargoes and the resulting ~.ush to downsize and lighten 
American cars, automotive designers have been and are making radical shifts in the use of 
automotive materials. The direct development impacts of these early shifts have been sub- 
stantial for many Michigan companies, and for certain communities in Michigan's lower 
and upper peninsulas. In a normal automotive sales year during the 1970's) the industry 
consumed about 114 of the nation's steel, 116 of the aluminum, about 112 of the malleable 
iron, 118 of the copper, and 1/3 of the zinc. Hence, drastic usage reductions by the auto in- 
dustry in any of these materials create serious economic consequences in diverse parts of 
the country, especially Michigan. 
The average weight of American cars has been reduced from about 3500 pounds ten 
years ago to about 2800 pounds in 1985. We would expect that this trend will continue a t  
a somewhat slower pace until in 1992 the average car might weigh 2500 pounds. T'ne 
combined impact of downsizing and material substitution hsis removed almost half of the 
iron in cars, 114 of the steel, and 113 of the copper. With respect to Michigan's economy, 
the need for metal stamping plants and iron foundries has been reduced apace. 
Most of our study in the materials area will, for.reasons to be explained shortly, con- 
centrate on specific materials alternatives in given applications. Nevertheless, it is worth 
looking first a t  the overall materials usage picture. Exhibit 1A shows the overall trend in 
materials usage by percentage of the car's dry weight in the years 1977, 1985, 1993 and 
2000. (Obviously our forecasts have high degrees of uncertainty and are presented to 
provide a general context. The forecast for 2000 is a t  best a guess.) Exhibit 1B shows the 
same information expressed in pounds. 
From a given materids (industry) point of view, one might think of the percentage 
chart as being useful for measuring the market penetration capability of the companies in 
that particular field. However, for purposes of planning capacitv in a given industrial sec- 
tor, the chart relating to pounds is important. For example, while steel's share is forecast 
to decline 11% from.1977 to 2000, its poundslvehicle declines 49%. Employment in the in- 
dustry is obviously more directly related to the latter number., 
Materials decisions are not made for a car as  a whole and certainly not on a 
material-by-material basis. Typically, specific decisions are made for specific components 
and subsystems on a specific vehicle. Thus we must look at  each of these components and 
subsystems (by vehicle entry, if practical) and at how the materials decisions will be made .- 
in those. Then we can try to generalize the relative competition which will result between 
alternatives. Exhibit 1C is an attempt to do this between unprotected steels, galvanized 
steels, and plastics and composites for body panels and structural components of a unibody 
vehicle. 
Despite tile fact that material substitution takes place on a component or subsystem 
basis, there - is a general frame of reference in which all these decisions are made. In the 
auto industry, generally speaking we are interested in minimum weight at approximately 
constant effective cost in place. This battle for weight savings a t  constant cost is described 
conceptually in Exhibit ID. The ability to reduce weight by design is saturable, and even- 
tually one pays an increasing cost penalty per pound saved (conceivably reaching infinite 
cost per pound saved, as we reach the limits of design technoIogy within one material). 
We then try to find an alternative material for which we are in a more favorable part of 
the savings curve and switch from one to the other, as shown in the double line segment. 
This substitution concept vastly oversimplifies the real situat'ion, since almost in- 
variably there is a fixed cost (often better expressed as a risk, due to lack of experience), or 
investment, in switching from material X to material Y. It is balancing all these factors, 
which are of necessity a great deal vaguer than this precise model ~ ~ o u l d  imply, that is the 
task of those involved in materials substitution decision-making. 
Although materials substitution is an extremely complex process, the main con- 
siderations may be summarized into three variables: market pressures, technical develop- 
ments, and supply base considerations. Often these three categories tend to be appraised 
by different specialists within the auto companies and their materials and components sup- 
pliers. The separate appraisals must then be integrated in order to come up with the 
strategy for a particular subsystem or vehicle. Thus in order for decision makers in in- 
dustry or government to prepare well in advance for future changes, each of these three 
families of considerations (and their interactions and implications) must be tracked. 
As will be seen in the discussions of specific materials alternatives, one of the pri- 
mary market drivers common to most materials changes is the perception that consumer 
demands will require more market segmentation in order to compete effectively. This 
changes the competitive (cost) balance of various materials. 
Obviously the technical issues with regard to the use of specific materials alterna- 
tives vary from application to application. However, several seem to be common to most. 
Weight reduction in the vehicle for increased fuel efficiency is a common driving force. 
There is also a desire for parts integration, for modular assembly possibilities, for the 
whole concept of productlprocess integration and design for automation, and for new 
strategy of plant construction, be it for plant reintegration or small plant modules. 
In our discussions with bot,h the materials suppliers and the automotive companies, 
it was generally agreed that there was rather considerable in-house expertise within the 
auto companies on materials and that there are specialized departments looking at  various 
materials and their processing. (The one exception to this may be in the area of "En- 
gineered Plastics." These materials are so different from the experience base of automo- 
tive engineers - even their "line" materials specialists - that a critical knowledge gap ap- 
pears to exist in this area.) However, although materials specialists act as a very impor- 
tant internal resource to the decision makers, the materials specialists themselves are not 
the decision makers. The decisions are generally made by product management functions 
in the general case (e.g., a plastic vs. steel body) and by product and process engineers on 
a specific application basis. 
This makes marketing materials to the automotive industry (and other industries as 
well) a particularly sophisticated task. Generally speaking, materials promotion falls into 
the category of "pus'n/pull" marketing, where the people who make the decisions are not 
the ones who eventually consume the materials in question. An example of this 'is a 
vehicle engineering function which specifies a certain plastic panel, whereas the actual 
plastic resin material is bought by an independent or captive :fabricating plant. 
We were fortunate to be able to study in somewhat more detail (in a related study 
described below) the decision-making process leading up to the implementation of gal- 
vanized steel in auto bodies. Even after the fact, it was extremely difficult to understand 
the dynamics of this complex decision. The use of protected steel for body panels is a 
multi-billion-dollar decision for 'the parties involved, and was taken in an environment 
where the technical and market future was particularly uncertain, typical of many major 
decisions in the automotive industry. 
We have tried to stylize the galvanized steel decision process in Exhibit 1E. The 
decision process fell into three major stages: the market response decision (indicated by A 
in the flow chart), detailed strategy development and testing (B), and sourcing decisions 
(C). In addition, there is the post-decision-making phase of implementation, both with 
regard to the steel mill galvanizing line construction and to the implementation on a major 
scale in the stamping and downstream automotive plants. Exhibit 1E attempts to define 
the time frames in which the various decisions' "mileposts" were met. For given com- 
panies a given mile post might have been reached six to nine months earlier or later. The 
overall decision-making and implementation process took over ten years, and the interval ,- 
between the conceptual market response decision and the implementation of that decision 
for vehicies was five to six years. 
In the context of our looking a t  other ongoing decisions in the materials area, it thus 
is clear that we must look now for decisions that will be implemented in the late 1990's or 
about the year 2000. In fact, the majority of our interviewees felt that, with regard to 
materials decisions, virtually all the substantive decisions had been made through 1992, 
that many decisions are semi-firm through 1995 or '96, and that we really are looking a t  
the end of the century in terms of being able to influence any major materials decisions. 
2. Steels for Automotive Bodies 
In the early 1970's the average U.S.-produced passenger car contained ap- 
proximately 2400 pounds of steel. With North America.n cars being downsized and 
lightened, steel usage is expected to drop to about 1425 pounds by 1992. The major 
decline in steel will take place in carbon steel, which is forecast to drop to about 1050 
pounds by 1992. High strength low alloy (HSLA) steel is expected to grow to about 300 
pounds in 1992. Ford's usage trend is illustrative: HSL.A usage increased from 115 
pounds in 1975 to 169 pounds ten years later, to a published projection of 341 pounds in 
1992 - an overall gain of 200%. 
An even greater change in steel usage is expected by 1990 in the form of sharply in- 
creased usage of zinc-coated steel. The Office of Business Community Development of the 
Michigan Department of Commerce, under Grant 84-30AG, sponsored a study in depth of 
the "automotive demand for galvanized steel and its impact on steel galvanizing capacity" 
and its implications for the State of Michigan. This forms the core of these remarks, up- 
dated to the extent necessary by later AIM interviews. 
By 1987, there are expected to be approximately 2.6-3.0 million tons per year of 
electrogalvanized steel capacity in this country. However, it strongly appears that there 
will be demand in excess of 5 million tons of the material by the 1985 mode1 year in that 
sector alone. In the short term, it is expected that the excess demand will be picked up by 
foreign, primarily Japanese, steel producers (witness the recent decision to use Japanese 
steel for the 1986-87 Cadillac products), which have presently an excess of capacity. Our 
analysis suggests that domestic automotive steel demand will grow by the late 1980's to 
such a level that a t  least two additional hot dip mills and three or four electrogalvanizing 
mills will be required over and above those currently planned, assuming that present steel 
import levels are not expanded. 
Whether or not (from the firms' viewpoints) these mills can and should be built in 
the U.S., let alone in Michigan, remains to be seen. The retu.rn on investment of these in- 
cremental mills may not be compatible with domestic steel companies' limited capital 
resources, However, many of the firms involved now have major foreign (mainly 
Japanese) partners; perhaps this.will change the equation. 
Xn order to obtain a satisfactory level (five years) of rust-through protection, car 
manufacturers have had to utilize more rust-resistant materials. Because substitute 
materials for steel (such as aluminum, fiberglass, reinforced plastics, etc.) are still relative- 
ly experimental and are not expected to be used in large scale in the near future, some -- 
form of coated steel appeared to be the likely choice (see Exhibit 2A), Zinc or zinc alloy 
coatings have been found to be the most effective, as they offer: 
a physical barrier preventing the corrosive agents from reaching the underlying 
steel; and 
e a sacrificial action, preferentially oxidizing, to protect the steel substrate. 
There are two primary processes for the manufacture of galvanized steel. The first 
and oldest is the hot dip method, in which the sheet steel is introduced into' a bath of mol- 
ten zinc. The zinc then cools when the sheet is removed from the bath and hardens into a 
discrete layer. Various mechanical devices may be utilized during the process to help 
make the coating more uniform, spangle reduced, and/or with differential thickness on the 
respective sides of the sheet. However, despite its cost advantage for thicker coatings, hot 
dipped steel has a number of handicaps: the spangle (which may show through paint), lack 
of ductility, lack of formability (mostly due to the annealing which occurs during the high 
temperature dipping), flaking of the zinc in dies and presses, and non-uniformity of the 
deposition of the zinc on the steel. 
A second method involves the electrodeposition of zinc onto the steel. Although this 
process is energy-intensive, resulting in ,significantly higher (7-15% on the average) 
production costs, it avoids virtually all the disadvantages associated with hot dipping. Be- 
cause it is a "cold" process, the mechanical properties of the base steel remain unaltered; 
the coating is also uniform in thickness. These properties make it an ideal material for 
automotive body stampings. The car makers have come to recognize this fact, and have 
signaled (by long-term contracts) steel companies, both in the U.S. and abroad, of their up- 
coming high level of demand for electrogalvanized steel. 
For their part, steel makers have responded vigorously. Until this year, there was 
only one major electrogalvanizing line operating in the United States capable of producing 
automotive quality electrogalvanized steel. However in 1985, National Steel, U.S. Steel, 
and Bethlehem are expected to start up electrodeposition lines serving the demands of the 
automotive industry. By early 1986, there should be no fewer than five major new lines. 
All but one of these lines now under construction are joint projects. The four combined ef- 
forts are by Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and Prefinished Metals Inc.; LTV Steel and 
Sumitomo Metals; National Steel and Nippon Kokan KK; and U.S. Steel and Rouge Steel. 
ARMCO Steel is the only compar~y building its facility alone (although details of that 
facility are still hard to obtain). 
Each of the North American automotive manufacturers has its own set of factors to 
determine the types and applications of coated steel it will use. Various areas of the 
vehicle suffer corrosion more quickly than others, depending upon exposure to salt spray, 
etc. The most vulnerable areas are the insides of doors, hood areas, especially inner hood 
sections, quarter panels, deck lids, and floor pans. These obviously are large material con- 
tent items, and the ultimate selection of hot dipped, electrogalvanized, or Zincrometal will 
have major impacts on the fortunes of affected inateiials suppliers and processors. For ex- 
ample, Chrysler's 1985 front-wheel-drive cars each contain about 1000 pounds of coated 
steel. Some 750 pounds are two-sided galvanized, while the remaining 250 pounds are 
either 1 112 sided or Zincrometal. Roof panels are uncoated. Chrysler's 1985 Lancer 
model contains 88% coated steel. The TI15 Minivan conta.ins similar amounts. Of the 
1155 pounds of steel in the van, 752 pounds are two-sided ,galvanized, 260 pounds 1 112 
sitled galvanized, and the remaining 143 pounds uncoated. By the 1988 model year, Ford 
plans to employ close to 1 million tons of coated steel, or almost 75% of all the steel it uses. 
Most of this will be in the form of electrogalvanized (1, 1 1/2, and 2 sided) and Zincrome- 
tal. 
In late 1983, General Motors announced its decision to make a wholesale shift to 
galvanized steel, with two-sided coated steel on all external panels, as well as underbody, 
with a heavy reliance on electrogalvanized for outer body components. The decision led to 
the long-term galvanized steel contracts that triggered three of the installations cited 
above. 
Traditionally, General Motors has bought virtually no ;steel abroad. Ford bought no 
more than 5 percent of its needs abroad. Chrysler, on the other hand, often bought sig- 
nificant parts of its needs abroad, often under quite advantageous conditions. Because of 
a t  least a short-term shortage of domestic capacity for e1ect;rogalvanized body steel (and 
the potential for medium~long-term capacity problems), both Ford and GM appear to be 
reevaluating their positions (informally, a t  least). GM has a.nnounced its first-ever major 
body steel procurement contract abroad in agreeing to source the electrogalvanized steel 
for. the 1986 Cadillacs with Nippon Steel. This followed a year-long steel survey of Japan 
and Korea. The GM purchasing community is currently performing an analogous in-depth 
study of potential European sources, again focussing on electsogalvanized mills. Whether 
this is a portent of a fundamental change in supply strategy or just a necessary, tempo- 
rary tactic remains to be seen. ' 
A review of the information gathered thus far suggests that there are only two cars ., .. 
definitely expected in the 1985-1990 time period for which serious consideration is being 
given to replacing steel with plastic composites on body panels: GM's new Firebird/Camaro 
and perhaps Chrysler's Liberty - - if Chrysler decides to produce it. (There is also a recent 
rumor that there may be a 1988 Ford Taurus derivative and a 1992 GM van with plastic 
skins. We have yet to check this out.) All the other cars to be introduced between 1985 
and 1990 are expected to be designed with steel (unibody) frame and body panels. 
Once a model is tooled for steel, a fundamental change to plastics is not likely until 
major redesign requiring new tooling is implemented. Thus, models introduced in the late 
1980's with steel are not likely to be redesigned before the late 1990's, and therefore will 
continue to use the material chosen for the initial design. Obviously, significant shifts in 
relative material fuel prices could cause an earlier switch. Likewise, specialty derivatives 
of core vehicles could use a different material system. 
In the longer term, there is a significant possibility for competition for steel bodies 
from plastic composites and, to a much lesser extent, from aluminum. Even in the ab- 
sence of serious fuel price escalations, persons surveyed in the AIM interviews foresee an 
ongoing emphasis to lessen vehicle weight, and when this is combined with the determina- 
tion 'to improve body structure inte,grity and skin corrosion defenses, reinforced plastics are 
expected by those surveyed to be the major competitor of steel. It is obvious that a suc- 
cessful assimilation of galvanized steel technology by the industry will set the stage for 
pitched material battles when plastics technology matures. 
The basic application decision process for galvanized steel was discussed in Section 
1.6. In our in-depth study of galvanized steel implementation, we also looked a t  the basic 
decision variables regarding production of this material and site selection. Direct and in- 
direct labor is a relatively small cost in the entire equation for production of electrogal- 
vanized steel, about equal to electricity and the zinc raw material. The single most impor- 
tant variable in the product cost is the amortization of the relatively expensive, limited use 
installation. To this end, the motivation obviously exists to make that installation flexible, 
so that the investment can be recovered as quickly as possible, especially given uncertain 
futures. 
An example of the relative cost impact of the several variables is shown in Exhibit 
2B. Hypothetical costs are shown under two sets of conditions; they give a fair indication 
of the relative cost importance of capacity versus labor. Case 1 might be thought of as 
representing the best information we have been able to gather (mainly by inference) from 
our interviews. Case 2 should be thought of as a "worst case" consideration, where, for 
example, there is a cost overrun in an installation and because of inappropriate specifica- 
tions and steel-making production technology, effective capacity is reduced. 
Furthermore, the financial markets andlor potential technological obsolescence imply 
the need for a shorter payoff period, and finally, the effective capacity utilization during 
this payoff period is reduced, potentially owing to overcapacilty (either a t  a constant rate of 
auto production or conceivably a t  a time of reduced autfimotive production in North 
America). The basic concept of facilities amortization being a major cost factor is a vital 
one. 'The impact of this in the case of the galvanized steel irr~plementation implied delaying 
the investment until production guarantees could be secured. This might very well also 
happen should the auto makers decide they want to make major shifts towards, for ex- 
ample, plastic body components. We would strongly suggest continuing attention to the 
potent;ial investment and operating cost factors as determining t,he ability of our industry 
to compete for these new materials requirements. 
The capability and competitiveness of Michigan's body steel suppliers currently 
focuses on two establishments: the Great Lakes facility in Ecorse and the Rouge Steel 
facility in Dearborn. Both have been granted new leases on life by major core investments 
by their shareholders (NationaUNippon Kokan in the case of' Great Lakes and Ford in the 
case of Rouge). At h u g e ,  the RougeAJSS joint electrogalvarlizing venture is an important 
step, but still has several technical and commercial hurdles to overcome. 
National is proportionately more dependent on Chrysler's fortunes than on GM or 
Ford, although it sells significant amounts to those firms as well. National has long been 
considered a creative marketer, particularly with regard to the markets on which it has 
chosen to concentrate, among which automotive is nurnber 1. Its new Japanese 
shareholder should provide complementary capital and technological resources. 
Rouge is obviously heavily dependent on Ford demand. Traditionally it has not been 
very effective in marketing outside of the circle of Ford ant1 its direct suppliers. Lately, 
however, it has shown signs of getting better a t  this. Its management in all functions has 
been supplemented in the past few years with experts chosen from both within Ford and 
outside the mother company. Thus the prognosis of this fm is far better than a few 
years ago. Undoubtedly its future has been enhanced by the concessions made by its 
U14W local as a prerequisite to Ford's continued investment. 
F Michigan seems to have come through the restructuring of the U.S. steel infrastruc- 
ture in general and the switch to galvanized steel in particular as well as possible. We 
must assure that its endowment is as modern and as competitive as practical if it is to sur- 
vive the ongoing lean times of the domestic industry. So far, so good. 
If, as our analysis implies, there is demand for one or more galvanized (hot-dip or 
electro) U.S. facilities, it would be in Michigan's interest to attract such a facility. (The 
ideal location, from a market point of view, would probably be in the southwestern part of 
the state.) As of now, the fastest and cheapest way to build such a facility would be to add 
it to an existing cold-strip mill. Unfortunately, Michigan does not have any more such 
mills on which to piggy-back, although one could conceive of adding additional galvanizing 
capacity a t  either Great Lakes or Rouge. 
One could consider a cold strip 'Lmarket mill" with galvanizing facilities which would 
buy hot band from an integrated mill elsewhere in the country or the world. Other new 
continuous casting techniques (e.g., the split horizontal techpiques being implemented in 
the Soviet Union) might be in order. The point is if we want to compete for automotive 
steel facilities, we will have to learn much more - and soon - about the technologies and 
markets. In year two of the AIM project, we will seek continued contact with automotive 
steel buyers (especially, but not exclusively, purchasing departments) and with steel com- 
pany specialists, to appraise the supply/demand picture in galvanized steel. 
We will begin looking at shifting specification, supply, and demand patterns in what 
is called "Special Bar Qualityn carbon and alloy steels, such as those used in automotive 
suspension, steering and transmission applications. European and Japanese specification 
patterns are quite a bit more sophisticated than traditional North American tendencies. 
Michigan has a t  least two excellent "mini-mills" (Quanex in Jackson and Northstar in 
Monroe) which might be able to benefit from these technological changes if they prepare 
properly - and which might miss opportunities if they don't. In addition, there are 
rumors that LTV might bail out of bar products (centered in Cleveland and Chicago) in its 
struggle for survival, creating space for Michigan entrants. 
3. Automotive Usage of Aluminum 
Since World War 11 there has been a continual, albeit uneven, growth in aluminum 
in passenger cars. Exterior trim, transmission cases, pistons, and air conditioning com- 
ponents were early and steady aluminum applications. By 1970, the typical car manufac- 
tured in North America contained 75 pounds of aluminum, about 2% of the average car's 
weight. By 1981, although some 500 pounds of total weight had been eliminated, 
aluminum had grown to about 130 pounds, and its propo:rtionate content in the car to 
about 4% (see Exhibit 3A). 
Usage of aluminum in cars has been heavily concentrtzted in castings rather than in 
wrought parts. Castings probably account for approximately 60 of the total 75 pounds of 
aluminum used in the 1970 car. By the 1984 model year, aluminum castings grew to 110 
pounds of the total 130 pounds in the composite car. These castings include the primary 
engine castings plus a wide variety of aluminum die castings. 
There have been short-term surges in wrought alunlinum applications, especially 
during the 1970's when such usage turned out to be a temporary expedient in response to 
the Arab oil embargo and resulting quickly escalating fuel prices. Car designers switched 
certain body panels from steel to aluminum so that weight could be quickly eliminated and 
fuel economy increased. Such a switch was often a means fclr helping the manufacturer to 
mjeet both emission and fuel economy needs. Especially popular components in such a 
switch were hoods and deck lids. Because significant manufacturing and tooling changes 
were not required to process in aluminum a part originally designed for steel, it also was 
relatively simple to switch the part back to steel when cheaper methods were found to cut 
comparable weight elsewhere in the vehicle. Ford's use of' aluminum grew by 56% be- 
tween 1976 and 1980 but only 5% between 1980 and 1984. 
In the United States, the Chevrolet Corvette is often cited as the vehicle to illustrate 
advanced materials concepts, especially with regard to aluminum. Exhibit 3C summarizes 
aluminum usage in the Corvette, showing some clearly innovative (at least for North 
America) applications representing approximately 12% of total weight. Exhibit 3D shows 
an analogous breakdown for aluminum components in the Porsche 928. In this vehicle, 
aluminum represents close to 19% of weight. The aluminum manufacturers would, of 
course, like this type of concept usage of aluminum to be extended to broader-based models 
as well. If this happened, the usage of aluminum as a proportion of total materials in a 
car would multiply by a factor of between 3 and 5. 
- 
Aluminum usage in light trucks generally has paralleled that in cars. Because 
vehicle materials directly affect gross truck weight, which especially limits the payload of 
commercial, heavy duty trucks, this different set of economic tradeoffs has encouraged 
more wrought aluminum in medium and heavy duty trucks. I t  is not unusual for most of 
the cab of a large commercial vehicle to be almost entirely wrought aluminum. 
In the University of Michigan's most recent Automotive Delphi Forecast, a stable 
price of fuel (in real terms) was projected, and on that basis, aluminum usage was also 
forecast to remain flat over the balance of this decade a t  about 135 pounds per car. 
Material use trends published more recently by Ford are only a little more optimistic. 
Their designers forecast that Ford's typical 1990 car will contain 148 pounds of aluminum, 
barely 10% more than the 1984 level of 135 pounds. 
By contrast, a recent study by the Aluminum Association forecasts the 1990 usage 
in the 200 pound range. For this to occur, t,he traditional parts listed above must continue 
to be made of aluminum, and most of the parts now under consideration for conversion to 
aluminum will have to make that switch; of these, the engine block and head are very im- 
portant. A review of potential vehicle manufacturers' plans for new or increased 
aluminum parts production follows, with the exception of engine parts which are discussed 
elsewhere. 
Wheels and Bumpers 
Aluminum wheels are now offered by all North American car companies, for weight 
savings and styling appeal. In the case of passenger cars, these are quite often cast. In 
light trucks, other techniques are often used, e.g., Ford uses impact extrusion to make 
Aerostar aluminum wheels. Aluminum wheels have become the centerpiece of the market- 
ing strategy of one casting company, and such wheels comprise 30% of its sales. 
There is considerable manufacturing research being conducted to find the aluminum 
wheel production method most competitive with steel wheel processing. A set of aluminum 
wheels can represent a 50-60 pound net weight savings. Present aluminum wheel usage 
has grown quickly from about 5% to 11 112% of the North American market. With ade- 
quate refinements in aluminum wheel production methods, many engineers surveyed ex- 
pect a significant increase from this level by 1990, causing some erosion of business for 
traditional steel wheel manufacturing companies. 
One such Michigan-based company has already positioned itself in this regard, 
having bought and constructed "high styled" aluminum wheel production facilities. In ad- .- 
dition, it has built in its main steel wheel facility an aluminum line with flexible 
capabilities both within the range of aluminum wheels and for conversion back to steel 
wheels. On this line, they will be producing all the 1986 C:adillac wheels, which will be 
spun formed out of heavy gauge aluminum plate. Apparently the aluminum usage in this 
program alone represents some 8 million pounds per year, one of the largest orders ever 
for aluminum usage in passenger cars. 
Largely because of weight, steel bumpers are being replaced with plastics and 
aluminum. However, the transition to a lighter material has lately favored plastics, and 
this is expected to continue, unless consumers show a preference for bright bumpers. 
Radiators 
Starting in the early 1980's, Ford began introducing aluminum radiators and has 
gradually increased its usage to the point that about one third of its 1985 cars will have 
aluminum radiators. (Nissan's published estimate of Ford's aluminum usage is closer to 
60 percent.) By the end of the decade, almost all of Ford's car radiators will be made of 
aluminum. The level in light trucks is not far behind. 
General Mobrs has had a growth pattern similar to Ford's in the use of aluminum 
radiators. A recent article estimated its usage a t  35 percent. The same article estimated 
European penetration of aluminum radiators a t  SO percent (up from about 30 percent just 
a few years ago), while Japanese usage of aluminum radiators is of the order of 3-4 per- 
cent. One Nissan official has estimated, nevertheless, that that firm will be moving 
towards 90 percent aluminum radiators (undefined timeframe). 
On the other hand, a recent Metalworking News article points out that Chrysler is 
using another approach to weight reduction in the heat exchanger area, sticking with cop- 
per and brass but redesigning the radiator to eliminate weight. Nevertheless, aluminum 
radiator usage is expected to spread unless some field problems should develop during 
widened customer usage. 
Two key technologies had to coalesce to allow the practical widespread use of 
aluminum radiators: the development of aluminum-compatible antifreeze material and 
vacuum aluminum brazing techniques. In addition, automotive designers have had to take - 
into account the different heat transfer characteristics of alum.inum as compared to copper. 
Drive Shafts, Other Chassis Components, and Engine Parts 
Aluminum drive shafts were introduced on the Corvette several years ago and are 
being introduced on Ford's new Aerostar minivan (at least for partial production). If the 
latter application is technically and economically successful, we can expect to see expanded 
usage for (RWD) minivan production. However, there are no public indications as yet that - 
aluminum drive shafts will be included in passenger cars, other than specialty vehicles 
such as the Corvette, though GM is looking a t  aluminum drive shafts for another rear- 
wheel-drive vehicle. 
The motivation behind the minivan applications is to permit as large a vehicle as 
practical while still enjoying good fuel economy. The 1990 market for minivans could be 
significant if they continue to receive the consumer acceptance shown so far. Some 
forecasters see a 1990 market of close to 1 million minivans in North America, an ap- 
parent significant potential for aluminum and a threat to operations of companies tied only 
to steel drive shaft technology. Economically joining aluminum or composite driveshafts to 
the end yokes is only one of the production problems. (Another approach is being inves- 
tigated by the automakers, a composite plastic drive shaft with aluminum end yokes. This 
might be an interesting application combination as well.) 
Another class of chassis component conversion to aluminum shown in the Corvette 
progratn is that of control arms and similar structural parts previously cast or forged in 
steel. There is a cost penalty in converting this to aluminum, but we have seen renewed 
interest in this type of part in recent months. 
/- 
' 
Experiments have been performed in reinforced forged aluminum connecting rods. 
They are similar to chassis components from a process viewpoint, sometimes being made 
in the same plant. In a related engine part development, Honda announced that it has 
developed a pressure cast, stainless steel-reinforced connecting rod which reduces weight 
by 304, particularly important in a reciprocating part. 
General Motors announced recently it will switch this fd l  from 332 alloy to 390 al- 
loy in die-cast pistons for some high performance versions of the Pontiac 2.5-liter engine 
supplied from GM's Bedford, IN facility. Apparently the switch is being made to increase 
durability in the piston ring and pin bore alloys. In some cases, a weight reduction may 
Also result. GM indicated that this switch of alloy could become more general. Die casting 
and machining process changes were almost certainly required, although they were 
probably not major. 
Body Components 
The Corvette is the only North American production car that makes any appreciable 
usage of aluminum in the supporting body structure. However, interviews indicated that 
studies are being conducted to determine the feasibility of switching space frame material 
from steel to aluminum (or, for that matter, to plastics and composites). Persons inter- 
viewed speculated that the decision to use aluminum will depend on necessary advance- 
ments such as welding aluminum chassis components (some of which will undoubtedly be 
tubular) and the projected price of aluminum relative to steel. While the joining problems 
of aluminum have limited its use in body panels, this is esse~itially a cosmetic problem and 
one which is not significant with regard to substructure stampings and tubular parts. 
With, regard to body panels themselves, the main surge of aluminum use to gain 
short-term CAFE and emissions improvements seems to have run its course. However, 
there is still continuing interest in using aluminum body panels (essentially in competition 
with plastic panels) in short-run vehicle body panels. This might depend on the develop- 
ment of two unrelated technologies, namely epoxy die techniques for low cost tooling and 
adhesive bonding to eliminate some of the cosmetic problems :referred to above. 
, In Germany, ALCOA and Audi have presented docurnentation on a high-intensity 
use of aluminum for a unibody vehicle, an entire midsize 'body which weighs only 149 
kilograms. At the moment, this is still a concept car, but there are rumors that it might 
be put out as a limited production vehicle in the coming several years. In any case, we 
know that the aluminum manufacturers and car manufacturers in Europe are working 
very closely on increased use of aluminum in specialty vehicles.. 
The Impact on Michigan 
Michigan has many plants producing wheels for cars a.nd light trucks. Ford's "cap- 
tive" wheel facility is part of their Monroe plant; GM's is'in Warren. Chrysler does not 
have a captive wheel plant. 
Among independent suppliers, Kelsey-Hayes' Romulus plant employs about 900 in 
passenger car and (mainly) light truck wheel production while (Goodyear) Motor Wheel's 
facility in Lansing employs about 800; Budd has a plant that makes heavy truck wheels. 
In addition, there are plants, such as Kelsey Hayes' Cast Forge operation in Howell that 
have peripheral wheel activities. As yet, we have only relatively limited knowledge about 
these captive and independent plants'. activities and how changes in wheel materials 
specification might impact them. 
Michigan has one major captive bumper plant, General Motors CPC-Livonia Plant, 
employing about 2,000 in bumper-related production. [Years ago, we also had Ford's cap- 
bive bumper plant in Monroe and Houdaille's independent bumper plant on the east side of 
Detroit.] We should look further into the future of the CPC-Livonia bumper plant. That 
plant's spring product line, supplemented by a sister plant within the Buick complex in 
Flint, probably merit further study regarding risks of materials and process substitutions. .. 
Michigan is not particularly dependent on radiator production. GM's radiators are 
mainly made in Lockport, NY and Ford's in Connersville, IN. Likewise, Michigan is much 
less dependent on RWD drive shaft production since GM's Saginaw Steering Gear Division 
has elected to concentrate on FWD component manufacture, ceding its former RWD drive 
shaft production to the CPC Parma (Ohio) parts plant. On the other hand, Ford's RWD 
drive shafts are still made a t  its Sterling Plant. To our knowledge, Chrysler's drive shafts 
are supplied from Kokomo, IN. 
Michigan has several major captive forges which could be impacted by the substitu- 
tion of aluminum for steel in certain forged applications. These include Ford's Vulcan 
Forge in Dearborn (producing almost exclusively connecting rods), chrysler9s Detroit Forge 
(employing about 400 and producing mainly chassis and transmission parts), and CiM's 
New Departure-Hyatt Detroit Forge (Hamtramck, employing around 1200 and producing 
connecting rods, chassis parts and some transmission parts). In addition to potential com- 
petition (or opportunity, if they properly adapt) from aluminum substitution, castings and 
stampings always pose substitutional problems for forges. 
While Michigan has many stamping plants, it is difficult as yet to single out those 
which might be affected positively or negatively if aluminum sub-skin body components are 
specified widely. However, logically, they might be those specializing in complex stamped 
and welded subassemblies. We will continue to monitor automakers' intentions of 
aluminum applications. In addition, we will interview Alcoa, Reynolds, Alcan and Martin 
Marietta, all of which have sales/application engineering offices in the ' ~ r e a t e r  Detroit - 
area. 
A high priority should be set on understanding the potential impact of aluminum 
(and plastic) specification for wheels. Here, we must interview the wheel specialists within 
the automotive companies,. as well as  the management of the several wheel-making 
facilities within Michigan. A somewhat lower, but still significant, effort should be made 
tracking the aluminum impact on drive shaft, bumper and forge plants within the state. 
4. Aluminum Engine Castings 
Although aluminum engine (main) castings have been quite commonly used in 
Europe and Japan for many years, they have only come into reasonably frequent use in 
North America in the past 5 or 6 years. Earlier than that, their use had been limited 
primarily to specialty and high performance vehicles. 
The principal driving force toward the use of aluminurn in the principal engine cast- 
ings (intake manifolds, cylinder heads, and blocks) is weight reduction. Quite aside from 
the gross mass reduction possibilities, there is a particular importance in reducing weight 
in front-wheel-drive vehicles, which tend to be "front heavy."In terms of both direct and 
distributional weight reduction, the effect of a pound less in the engine (or transaxle) tends 
to be larger than a pound in the support structure. A rule of thumb is that one pound 
reduced from the engine can yield 1-2 additional pounds of ,weight reduction in the struc- 
ture. 
Thus many current engines are being retrofitted to aluminum castings as their 
designs are updated. In addition, it appears that almost all engines currently being 
designed (for example, a t  GM, the Saturn and Manhattan enb4nes) are being designed with 
as much aluminum usage as possible. A good application example is GM's (CPC) 3200 V- 
6 engine, which by 1989 could become the highest aluminum content mass production en- 
gine made by GM. Reported aluminum usage includes the cylinder block, head, two intake 
manifolds, oil pan, water pump, and pistons. The block design is thought to be of the 
sleeveless type, made from 390 alloy. Quite a few of the p:zrts would be cast by outside 
suppliers with sand, permanent mold and die-casting facilitic!~. In all, each engine might 
use 100 pounds of aluminum. 
In addition to weight reduction, there are a variety of secondary motivators for the 
use of aluminum. One is that aluminum substitution provides a convenient excuse for 
resourcing castings. In some cases these resourced parts go to independent domestic firms, 
but frequently foreign firms are involved as well. However, a fair amount of the volume 
stays captive within the automotive companies, although quite often in different plants. 
Another motivator is that it is easier to automate the manufacture of aluminum 
castings than of their iron counterparts. In part this comes from the lower temperature 
environments in an aluminum foundry but also from a variety of other process alterna- 
tives (e.g., permanent mold or, as yet, lost foam) available in aluminum but not in iron. A 
final secondary motivator is that aluminum has more rerr~eltable scrap and less total 
scrap, so less total material is used. 
Why, then, is aluminum not used universally? The primary demotivator to its more ..- 
widespread use appears to be a combination of direct cost penalty for the aluminum 
material and a reinvestment requirement both in terms of the redesign of the component 
and, of course, the fixed invesbment for manufacture both in the casting plant and in 
machining. In addition, traditionally aluminum casting prices have been more volatile 
than scrap prices used for iron casting, although steps are being taken to damp that 
volatility. 
The results of all these countervailing forces are shown in Exhibit 4A, which shows 
a dramatically increasing use of aluminum in all three of the major engine castings, ap- 
proaching saturation by the year 2000. 
Intake Manifolds 
Intake manifolds were the first principal engine castings to be converted from iron to 
aluminum and will probably approach saturation the quickest. Generally speaking, these 
parts are sand cast or semi-permanent mold cast, although there were some efforts to use 
two piece electron-beam welded die castings (at Chrysler). 
Traditionally, the vast majority of iron intake manifolds were cast in captive 
foundries. Some aluminum intake manifolds are now manufactured in captive foundries. 
However, many of these have been outsourced, particularly by GM and Chrysler, mainly 
to U.S. suppliers, including quite a few in Michigan. Ford has elected to make these 
manifolds using the lost foam process in their Windsor, Ontario plant. Generally speaking, 
these are cast from secondary alloys of either 319 or 356 aluminum. 
Cylinder Heads 
In the U.S., cylinder heads have been transformed to aluminum part,icularly in the 
case of selected four cylinder engines. In Europe, most cylinder heads have been made 
from aluminum for many years. These are typically semi-permanent mold cast and, to 
date, that has been the primary methodology for North American clonversions as well. 
However, it is well known that General Motors is working on the lost foam process 
for cylinder heads and in fact used it for the V-6 diesel engine which Oldsmobile produced 
for a while. Whether lost foam will turn out to be a truly cost and technologically competi- 
tive process for cylinder heads remains to be seen. GM is officially convinced that i t  will; 
competitors are generally skeptical of lost foam for this particular application. Generally 
cylinder heads are 319 or 356 alloy, quite often the latter. The process Chrysler went 
through in converting to an aluminum cylinder head from iron for their 2.2-liter engine six 
years ago is a case worth studying. At the time, Chrysler's engineers and buyers per- 
formed a worldwide survey of foundries competent in casti:ng aluminum cylinder heads. 
They found none available in the United States with any breadth of experience and felt 
that, even with its relatively limited volume, Chrysler would have had to split production 
among various smaller foundries, with attendant logistical and quality concerns. On the 
other hand, in Europe Chrysler found several foundries which seemed competent in this 
field. As was mentioned above, the Europeans have used semi-permanent mold cylinder 
heads for some time. They finally settled on TEKSID, a Fiat subsidiary, which had 30-35 
years of semi-permanent mold cylinder head experience. The Chrysler design is a relative- 
ly simple one, and had a particularly smooth launch with TEKSID., They have ex- 
perienced less than .2 of 1% scrap over the years from TEKSID. They have since qualified 
TEKSID's plant in Brazil, which is apparently a smaller carbon copy of the Italian and 
which came onstream with virtually no problems. In addition, they have bought some 
cylinder heads from Nemak in Mexico, though there were some launch problems. 
The Chrysler personnel with whom we talked about this were quite disappointed 
that they were unable to find a North American source. As they look on to other possible 
aluminum applications, they would prefer if possible to buy them domestically, but have a t  
the moment relatively little hope of doing so. 
Cylinder Blocks 
Cylinder blocks will be the last of the major engine parts to be generally transformed 
to aluminum. American production experience with "production" aluminum blocks has 
been almost all by G.M., and can hardly be described as an extraordinary success. GM 
used a sleeved aluminum block on a V-6 engine used in smaller cars in the early 1960s. 
Later, in the early 1970s, it used an unsleeved design in the Vega. 
Europeans have used aluminum cylinder blocks for some years, generally of the wet 
sleeve permanent mold design. Such American use as has been made of aluminum blocks 
in production has most recently been of ,the unsleeved type, using a hypereutectic silicon 
(generally alloy 390) approach. Originally, these were permanent mold cast or die cast, 
but GM in particular is looking at  making aluminum blocks by the lost foam process, for 
example for the Saturn project. 
Europeans to whom we have talked on this subject si:mply do not understand the 
avoidance of cylinder liners in American practice. They admit that there is an in-principle 
cost penalty to casting in the sleeves, but feel that sleeves so simplify other aspects of the 
process and add so much to engine durability that they prefer to use this approach. Ap- 
parently this feeling is not shared among their American engineering counterparts. The 
situation on cylinder blocks, therefore, is probably the least clear of all of the major engine 
castings. 
The Impact on Michigan 
Exhibit 4B shows the current sourcing of the major engine castings for General 
Motors, Ford and chrr;ler, from which one can deduce the plants that are likely to be af- 
fected positively or negatively. We see several plants (especially in the Saginaw area) 
which could suffer significant business losses, and hence employment shrinkage, if the 
trend toward aluminum finds them unprepared technologically and from a cost viewpoint 
to compete effectively in this new medium. 
The transition, in principle, offers an opportunity for independent foundries capable 
of casting aluminum and willing and able to learn the intricacies of casting cylinder heads 
and blocks, both of which are more difficult than intake manifolds. I t  is not clear, 
however, that Michigan's independent foundries have the human and capital resources to 
develop the necessary technology quickly enough and then to invest in the capital equip- 
ment to implement what they learn in time for the application schedule of the customer 
base. Second, several of them have shown a tendency to locate capacity expansions out- 
side of Michigan. 
Many of these aluminum castings will hopefully be machined in the major engine 
facilities located in Michigan. These would include GM's engine plants in Flint, Pontiac, 
and Livonia; Ford's engine plant in Dearborn; and Chrysler's Trenton Engine plant. 
To machine aluminum engine castings, changes in speeds and feeds are required, 
and different coolant and chip removal systems are in order. Although this may not seem 
like much, they can require some investment time to implement. An example of the dif- 
ficulty of changing to machining aluminum is illustrated by the following case. GM in- 
tended to introduce aluminum cylinder heads on their V-S engines installed on certain Cor- 
vettes a t  the beginning of the 1986 model year. Since, from a machining viewpoint, these 
heads are nearly identical to their cast iron counterparts, it was decided to machine these 
40,000-80,000 heads per year on the long-standing transfer line a t  the CPC plant in Flint. 
However, quality problems were encountered (perhaps due to speedlfeed differences be- 
tween aluminum and iron). It was decided to delay introduction of the aluminum head by 
a t  least six months and to outsource the machining which, of course, required the construc- 
tion of new tooling more suitable for the lower volume and the special needs of aluminum. 
There are often advantages of integrating the casting and machining processes for 
aluminum .castings. Integration can assist in controlling leakage by faster feedback of 
problem areas. In addition, machining of aluminum is somewhat of a specialized field, and 
the traditional breakdown between the foundry and the machine shop may not make much 
sense. It is worth while noting that this appears to be the a:pproach in the Saturn engine 
program and, perhaps, for the Manhattan engine as well. 
Cast Metal Industries is a good example of a Michigan firm which has seized on this 
opportunity in the intake manifold area. Another (earlier) out-of-state example is Winters 
Industries in Canton, Ohio. If this integration of casting ancl machining of aluminum (or, 
for that matter, other materials) becomes widespread, however, significant dislocation may 
take place even if the net -job effect for Michigan is neutral or even positive. 
In year two work, we will focus on the impact the increased use of aluminum 
cylinder heads and blocks would have on the Michigan foundries currently making their 
iron counterparts. High level contacts should be made to see what, if anything, state 
government could do to maximize the potential for such facilities as the Saginaw Central 
Foundry to transform themselves in time. We will investigate what can be done to allow 
our independent foundries to acquire appropriate technology and to invest in the equipment 
necessary to produce competitively major aluminum castings in Michigan. 
The strategy of integrated aluminum castinglmachining plants should be inves- 
tigated in detail. If i t  is found desirable and/or likely, we must develop mechanisms to 
maximize Michigan's share of this type of faciIity, and to ascertain the direct and indirect 
effects of this change in industrial structure. 
Finally, we must continue 'to monitor engine design and technology trends with 
respect to aluminum casting usage. From this we can update our transformation 
timetables. Another technological trend worth tracking is porosity control, preferably in 
the casting itself but conceivably by more sophisticated impregnation techniques. 
5. Plastics and Composites 
We are entering an, era in which entirely new plastics are being used in entirely new 
types of automotive applications, providing the basis for a materials revolution. Because 
of the overall importance of this revolution and the complexities of the "battlegrounds" and 
the "rules of war" (which are unfamiliar to many of the protagonists), we divide our dis- 
. cussion into two portions. In section 5, we discuss plastics and composites in general, ex- 
cluding the area of substitution of plastics for the major "sheet metal" of automobile 
bodies; that will be discussed in section 6. 
Because of the unfamiliarity of most automotive engineers (excepting, of course, the 
plastics specialists) with these materials, we begin with the vocabulary describing the 
myriad plastic materials and processes. In Exhibit 5A we have tried to define some of the 
terms more frequently used in plastics technology without getting into the details of 
specific plastic formulations. 
Much confusion arises from the term "composite." Apparently the plastics industry, 
in order to put a better image on "plastic," has started using the term "composite" for high 
performance plastics when, in fact, these plastics may not necessarily have a filler 
material in addition to the resin base, We try to use the term composite in the stricter 
sense of its definition, although we advise. readers to be careful in reading this and other 
articles; this discipline is not always applied. 
The most important categorization of plastic materials is into major families of ther- 
moplastic and thermoset materials. Our emphasis on the distinction between thermosets 
and thermoplastics is because, in many respects, the infrastructures for making and effec- 
tively using these two families of materials are quite different. For this reason, the deci- 
sion by the automobile companies of which of the two families to use in which application 
will be extremely important: no raw materials company has meaningful product lines in 
both families. - 
Exhibit 5A-1 shows the relative situation of plastics and several other materials 
with respect to fracture toughness and stiffness. Exhibit 5A.2 characterizes these same 
materials with respect to fracture toughness versus material cost per pound. Note, 
however, that material cost per pound is not necessarily indicative of the final cost of the 
part in use. For example, although the material cost per pound of a thermoplastic com- 
posite may be the highest, efficiencies in processing and in the amount of material which 
must be used to serve a given function are such that it may be the lowest cost choice 
for the automotive. designer. 
Plastics have beeri used for many years in various forms in the automobile (Exhibit 
5B). In addition to obvious uses of plastics there are many materials which one does not 
normally think of as plastics which are in that family. For example, many of the "rubber" 
hoses under the hood are synthetic rubbers which are, in fact, plastics. Likewise, "rubbern 
tires have for many years been synthetic petrochemicals. Furthermore, most of the 
fabrics in a car are synthetics, plastic (petrochemical) fiber. Rigid or semi-rigid plastics 
have generally been used in non- or 1ow.load-carrying situat,ions. Where higher stresses 
were found, the plastic was quite often supported by some sort of metallic backing. In 
fact, one of the more important trends today is the substitution of different grades of plas- 
tics for "traditional" plastics, so that these applications becorne more load carrying or im- 
pact resistant. 
One of the principal areas in which plastics have been used is in the interior of a 
vehicle, and it illustrates a key aspect of the general application trend in this material. 
The original use was simply to substitute a plastic molded part (for example) for the equiv- 
alent metal part. Very rarely was the shape changed to take into account some of the in- 
herent desirable shaping capabilities of plastics. More recently, as cars and their interiors 
are redesigned, the designers are taking into account the contouring capabilities of plastics 
in specifying their use. This is a much more cost-effective technique and is particularly 
space effective in a shrinking interior of a car. Bucket seats are a good example of the 
changing role of plastics in the interior of cars. Plastic bucket seat back shells serve only a 
secondary structural purpose; there is still a significant interior metal frame which 
provides most of the strength of the overall seat structure and to which all of the 
mechanism and linkage to the vehicle is attached. In coming years (certainly by 1990, ac- 
cording to the,thermoset manufacturers), we will, have a truly structural plastic (blow 
molded) seat with an injection-molded shell. 
It is difficult to pick up a trade journal related to the automotive industry without 
finding a dramatic headline regarding the use of plastics in the automotive industry. Ex- 
hibit 5C presents an Owens-Corning forecast taken form the Predicast computer file. 
Those materials and applications forecast to increase a t  the highest rate seem to be the 
load carrying and impact sensitive ones. The implied growth rates in different materials 
are so different as to imply a selective strategy on the parts of the automotive firms. In 
turn, the whole infrastructure of the plastics production and processing industry will 
depend on which of these different materials and applications :ue selected. 
In our interviews with the automobile companies, we asked a variety of questions 
regarding general categories of applications and the plastic intensity in those applications. 
The people with whom we talked expected a relative increase in exterior uses of plastics. 
Exhibit 5D shows the percentages of selected components our interviewees expect to be 
made from plastics in 1990 and 2000. In some of these examples, there is a fairly narrow 
spread in opinion, whereas in others there is a much wider spread. Where the spread is 
narrower, this is a more likely forecast. The feeling was that between 275-280 pounds of 
plastic would be used in a car by 1990 and 300-350 pounds by 2000. Although this over- 
all increase may not seem dramatic, it must be taken in the context of a considerably 
lightened car by the year 2000. Ford has publicly predicted that the plastic content of 
their 1992 average car will be about 260 pounds, barely 40 pounds more than their cur- 
rent level. While GM seldom publishes material usage projections, it would appear that 
their plans are more optimistic. GM uses plastic composite panels for two cars already, 
and is working on another with such panels. 
Plastic Bumpers 
Plastic bumpers have been in use in American automobiles for some time. Their use 
began in part due to the front and rear impact requirements of NHTSA and have since be- 
come more integrally designed into vehicles. Originally, bumpers were made with plastic 
fascias over steel supports, with the advantage that the fascias would come back to their 
original shape after low-speed impacts. More recently the trend is toward more completely 
plastic bumpers with less or no metallic support inside. In 1954, the Federal Government 
reduced the impact resistance standard for bumpers from a five-mile-per-hour impact to 
2.5 miles per hour. Many expect that this will lead to still more use of plastic bumpers. 
Some new plastic b,umpers have reinforced, reaction injected molded fascias covering a 
honeycomb polyurethane, impact-absorbing cushion that replaces conventional hydraulic 
energy absorbers. The honeycomb section may or may not be backed by a steel reinforce- 
ment beam. 
Oldsmobile uses a three-part bumper system which includes a steel reinforcement 
beam, saving about 20 pounds per car as compared to an all-steel unit. Chrysler's 
LeBaron GTS model also uses the soft fascia bumpers on the front of its car, with 
aluminum reinforcements, but has retained steel-reinforced soft bumpers on the rear. 
Recent Ford Escort and Mercury Lynx models use bumpers made completely of plastic. 
These first all-plastic bumpers in production in the United States meet the five-mile-per- 
hour impact resistance standard. Ford is also using this type of bumper on TaurusISable 
and on Ford's new Aerostar van as an optional item. These bumpers, including the 10-12 
pound valance panels, will weigh approximately 40 pounds when made of plastics. Ford's 
bumpers are produced in its Milan plant. It is publicly estimated that during the 1986 
model year this plant will produce 1.4 million plastic bumper parts. Ford officials estimate 
that the 1986 bumpers will be approximately 35 pounds lighter than the comparable steel 
units and should be less expensive and easier to paint as well. The material used for the 
bumpers is a polycarbonate crystal - polycarbonate polyester alloy thermoplastic. (This 
approach was introduced by Ford in North America after extensive experience in Europe.) 
The Milan plant uses injection molding linear and sonic welders and a computer-controlled 
automatic material handling operation. Part manipulation is almost totally by robots, and 
the station-to-station movement is by guided vehicles or automated overhead monorail sys- 
tems. The robots also paint the bumpers. 
The 1985 AMC Alliance and Encore have a plastic burnper system as well, using in- 
jection molding honeycomb techniques. Recently this molding was moved in-house and 
replaces a urethane foam design previously supplied by an independent supplier; much of 
the design was done by a small, independent analytical firm in Plymouth, Michigan with 
heavy emphasis on CADICAM modeling. 
Wonda, too, is planning to make plastic bumpers, adjacent to their Marysville, OH 
assemblyfplant. I t  has recently purchased six 3000-ton highly automated injection mold- 
ing machines for these and other large parts. The machines will be equipped with closed 
loop pressure and speed controls and an interfacing system for centralized control by a 
host computer (with processing information up- or down-loaded) and will be able to operate 
unattended. 
Plastic Fuel Tanks 
Plastic fuel tanks have a great potential for net weight reduction a t  an increased to- 
tal fuel capacity. This comes not only from the light weight of the material itself but from 
the ability to mold unusual shapes which can conform to the surrounding environment. 
Plastic fuel tanks have been used fairly widely in Europe a.nd in US.-built recreational 
vehicles for some time. There is a slow movement toward plastic fuel tank use in North 
American passenger cars, but a variety of (largely non-technical) concerns seem to be 
retarding its growth. The first passenger car use of plastic fuel tanks in the U.S. was 
Volkswagen's 1985 Golf. Two minicar manufacturers will be introducing plastic fuel tanks 
in the coming months. The upcoming Aerostar minivan features a plastic gas tank, and a 
plastic tank is highly probable for the forthcoming N-body trucks be built by Chrysler in 
its Dodge City complex. 
Plastic fuel tanks are manufactured by blow molding high density polyethylene. Al- .- 
though most objective tests seem to show that these fuel tanks are as safe as gasoline 
tanks, if not more so, the litigious U.S. environment makes many firms hesitant. In terms 
of process engineering, there are still some variables. The high-density polyethylene tanks 
are normally treated to eliminate permeation of fuel vapors. There is a variety of ap- 
proaches to doing this and some debate as to which is the most efficient. The conventional 
approach uses fluorine, which has some environmental impacts that have yet to be con- 
sidered. 
It is now thought that blow-molded tanks are cheaper overall to manufacture than 
gasoline tanks. Tooling for metal stamping tanks costs approximately 4 times as  much as 
for blow-molded fuel tanks. The cost-equal crossover volume between the two approaches 
might normally be of the order of 500,600 units per year. However, the increasing use of 
alcohol in fuel has caused certain corrosion problems in metal tanks, which have required 
specialized steels and treatments, increasing the crossover volume. Thus a t  worst, plastic 
fuel tanks seem to be a even-up in terms of cost and, under low volume conditions, sig- 
nificantly less expensive. 
If the United States follows the European experience, blow-molded fuel tanks should 
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become major market factors. In 1983, one out of four West German cars was equipped 
with a blow-molded plastic tank. In that same year in France, one out of three cars also 
had a plastic tank. By 1988 it is expected that 4/5 of West German cars and 314 of 
French cars will have plastic fuel tanks. 
Plastic Headlamps, Wheels, and Springs 
Another new application of plastics is in all-plastic front lighting systems. Front 
turn signals and rear turn signaYstop lamp assemblies have been plastic for a number of 
years. The use of plastic headlight assemblies provides several advantages, including a 
savings in weight. These all-plastic assemblies provide styling flexibility unavailable in the 
former sealed-beam approach, and are particularly good in terms of sculpturing the front 
end of the car for favorable aerodynamics. Furthermore, this approach to front lighting 
can be integrated into a whole front module, which goes along with the general design 
trends in the industry. 
We now turn to several miscellaneous applications of plastics which are difficult to 
categorize. Plastic wheels are beginning to be applied in selected cases. General Motors 
apparently has a major interest in this, Motor Wheel of Lansing is among the leaders in 
developing these wheels, which it feels have the potential for redoing the entire competitive - 
structure of the wheel industry, particularly as this development comes in parallel with 
aluminum wheels. A recent Motor Wheel advertisement describes their "Polycast 11" 
wheel as being urethane molded on a core of steel. They cite styling advantages, including 
color choices. An earlier press report cited a "one-piece composite-fiberglass wheel in- 
tended for 1987 model Pontiac sporty cars." 
It is estimated that plastic wheels produce the same weight savings as aluminum 
wheels, but (in production volume) it is hoped that plastic wheels will be less expensive to 
manufacture. 
Plastics are also beginning to be used selectively in wheel covers. Apparently a 
nylon resin is used in this, and one application cited to date (the Pontiac Grand Am) is 
molded by Lacks Industries in Grand Rapids. The press report indicates that this plastic 
approach was chosen because of its resistance to high temperature (in painting, one as- 
sumes) and to impact damage in use. 
Traditionally vehicle suspensions in North America have .either been leaf or coil 
spring. Composite springs may take an increasing portion of' the suspension market in the 
future. Composite springs are interesting insofar as they are the first major use of "ad- 
vanced composites" in structural use in an automobile. Th.e first use in North Aperica 
was in the restyled 1981 Corvette. This was succeeded more recently by the use in the 
General Motors M van. In the 1986 model year, a composite rear suspension spring will 
be used in the. GM 30 (Toronado, Riviera, El Dorado, Seville) to be assembled a t  the 
DetroitIHamtramck plant. 
In the Corvette application, it is estimated that the rear spring application saved 33 
pounds. An additional ll'pounds were saved when the front end of the Corvette used com- 
posite springs beginning in 1984. In the ht van application, these springs are used only in 
the rear and save about 32 pounds. It is worth noting that this is the first use by General 
Motors of the longitudinal composite spring design, the Corvette having been a transverse 
design. An additional advantage of the composite spring usage is the ability to use smaller 
stabilizer bars and, in some cases, to eliminate their use. GM production composite 
springs have been made by the Inland Division, located in D:yton, Ohio. Inland forecasts 
that use could double by 1990, and has recently entered into a joint venture with NHK 
Spring of Japan in the composite area. (NHK and Nissan, it has been reported, are work- 
ing together on a fiberglass-reinforced plastic spring for 1igh.t trucks.) Thus we foresee a 
significant amount of usage in selected vehicles of these composite springs over the coming 
years. Ford intends to use a composite spring in its 1988 Ranger pickup. In that applica- .-. 
tion it is estimated that there will be a 40 pound weight savings. Plastic springs could also 
be used in the Aerostar, it is speculated, if a 4-wheel-drive version of that is used. 
Advanced Composites 
The distinction between composites and advanced composites is a t  best an arbitrary 
one. One publication defines "advanced composites" as those that contain a fiber-to-resin 
ratio of greater than 50% fiber, with the fibers having a modulus of elasticity greater than 
16 million psi. A more functional definition, used by engineers in the field, is that ad- 
vanced composites denote a resin matrix material that is reinforced with high strength, 
high modulus fibers of carbon, aramid, or boron and usually fabricated in layers to form an 
engineering component. 
One of the important factors in the development of advanced composites will be the 
selective use of the filler material in highly stressed areas to limit the cost penalty of using 
these advanced fibers. One of the principal fibers being used in these high tech composites 
is carbon. Mitsubishi Chemical Industries has announced an "industrial grade" carbon 
fiber called Dialead for automotive and similar applications. They intend to begin produc- 
ing a t  the rate of approximately 250 metric tons in 1986, increasing to 1000 metric tons 
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by 1990. Mitsubishi Chemical is a partner of Fiberite Corporation of Winona, Minnesota. 
These firms have formed a joint venture in Japan called Kasei Fiberite Company, which is 
exploring the possibility of production of these new fibers in Japan. 
Nippon Steel is also working in the area of more cost-effective carbon fibers. Their 
product development, like Mitsubishi's, is coal pitch-based. Nippon admits that the specific 
properties of its fibers are inferior to the best available, but not on a property per cost 
basis ($4 per kilogram versus about $15 for polyacrylonitrile-based counterparts.) These 
polymer fibers are also important candidates for use in advanced composites. Perhaps the 
best known is DuPont's Kevlar material (best known for its use in football helmets and 
flak jackets). An alternative has recently been announced by Allied Corporation called 
Spectra 900, an extended chain polyethylene fiber, which Allied says is pound for pound 
ten times stronger than steel and 30-50% stronger than Kevlar. Allied has estimated that 
the total market for these aramid and graphite fibers might be of the order of $300 million 
per year. Whether or not this can be produced a t  a cost compatible with automotive in- 
dustry needs remains to be seen. Japanese producers in this area include Toray Industries 
and Toho Rayon. 
Several examples of a t  least relatively advanced composites (drive shafts, leaf 
springs) were mentioned above. In addition, advanced composites have been used in the 
automotive industry for selected high performance vehicles. Since 1957, Lotus in the U.K. 
has been using advanced composites in the Lotus VARI (vacuum assisted resin injection) 
process to form their vehicle structures. In a recent article discussing potential applica- 
tions of these advanced composites, the Lucas Research Center emphasizes engine parts. 
Inlet manifolds were mentioned as a technical possibility, but with prohibitive costs a t  the 
moment. The all-plastic "Poiimotor" engine designed by Matthew Holsberg is also cited as 
a technical and yet not economical situation as  yet. Composite piston skirts are perhaps a 
nearer-term application possibility. 
The most interesting possibilities would be when certain parts of a spaceframe struc- 
ture (particularly the complex corner sections) could be macle from advanced composites. 
Here the great advantage would come from the ability to optimize the design and to reduce 
the number of components in what is now a complex subassembly into a single-piece 
molded structure. A similar situation 'would exist in such applications as  steering arms, 
independent suspension arms, etc. In principle, coil springs made of composites are also 
possible, although we have yet to see a practical methodology for manufacturing them. 
There is also discussion of fiber-reinforced plastic connecting rods, with a major research 
program sponsored by the West German Ministry for Research and Technology. 
Plastics Implementation Issues 
'Most automotive engineers have as  their principal background mechanical engineer- 
ing and were educated a t  a time when, a t  best, they were exposed to the rudiments of 
metallic materials. Even today, mechanical engineering university students normally get 
very little exposure to plastics and composites. Although each of the automotive com- 
panies has sections of specialists in materials, they are relatively less well endowed with ' 
experts in plastics and composites. Thus, automotive application and process engineers 
tend to have to rely unusually heavily on potential suppliers of materials and parts (par- 
ticularly the former) for their technical information. I t  would be unrealistic to assume that 
these potential suppliers are fully objective as  to the pros and cons of alternative materials 
when their product or products are among the candidates to bme appraised. 
Another major problem area cited by those interviewed is that of characterizing the 
properties of the materials being considered, particularly with respect to specific applica- 
tions. Many of the mechanical testing systems that have been used in industry are not en- 
tirely suitable to plastic and composite materials. The plastics industry, of course, has 
also developed its test methods, but it is difficult to compare results with those in the 
metallic materials fields. In addition, quite aside from bulk property characterization, one 
must look a t  a characterization in a particular use or application, the 'testing methods for 
which may not optimize the potential use of plastics with respect to redesign. 
Even assuming that properties can be properly characterized, there are so many 
varieties of plastic resins, fillers, and structures that the practicing engineer has trouble 
constructing an organized base of information. There is no uniform numbering system 
such as is used in steel alloys, and the automotive engineers obviously do not want to be- 
come chemical engineers or have to understand the implications of all the proprietary trade 
names used. Some sort of a structure of computerized or non-computerized database could 
be extremely helpful to diffusing the use of plastics in the industry. Both General Electric 
("ERIS") and Borg Warner ("P1astivision") have databases available on a time sharing net- 
work. They are structured to help plastics designers make the primary materials selection 
and manufacturing decisions involved in new product development. Since these are 
developed by suppliers (one of thermoplastics, the other of thermosets), however, one must 
wonder about objectivity. Other systems include "PlastiServ" and "Plaspec." 
Finite element analysis and similar modeling and simulation techniques have an im- 
portant role in helping to refine and quicken the pace of component and system design in 
vehicles. There are several prerequisites to the effective implementation of these analyti- 
cal techniques. One is a good characterization of the materials. Another is an understand- 
ing of boundary conditions and localized effects in the use of materials. While localization 
effects can often be ignored in metallic materials, this is generally not the case in many 
plastics and composites, as was discussed above. Therefore, there may be a need for some 
further development of practical, analytical models in order to better refine the design of 
plastic components. 
A final, but absolutely crucial, area of implementation concern is that of environ- 
mental issues. There are, of course, certain fumes produced in the production of plastic 
parts (quite aside from the plastic material formulation itself). A more intractable problem 
(at least on the firm level) is the issue of how to dispose of non-recyclable (usually ther- 
moset) plastic byproducts of broadened use of plastics. Several of our interviewees cited 
the need for an early policy in this area so as to provide the automotive planners with 
ground rules. Depending on the disposal infrastructure developed, decisions may be tilted 
towards thermosets or thermoplastics. 
The Impact on Michigan' 
Much of Michigan's industrial infrastructure and direct capacity may be dramatical- 
ly impacted by the increasing use of plastics. I t  is difficult to specify with any accuracy all 
the Michigan establishments currently employing plastics processing to some extent or 
another. Often, this activity is ancillary to the main line of business and does not show up 
in SIC-based surveys. 
Michigan has several captive plants and numerous independent firms. which 
specialize in "traditional" plastics for interior use. For example, GM's Adrian and Ford's 
Milan and Saline plants come to mind. 
GM's CPC-Livonia Plant is a t  risk in bumpers, and also faces technological competi- 
tion with regard to composite springs. Ford's Milan Plant seems to have a growing role in 
plastic bumpers for its company. 
Almost d of GM's fuel tanks are made in Michigan, about half in Lansing a t  
Oldsmobile and the rest a t  Flint Pressed Metal. Should the decision be taken to make the 
switch to plastic, major dislocations are possible for these two plants. This is also true for 
Ford and Chrysler plants in Michigan. 
The net effect for Michigan may not be all bad, however, as one of the major 
manufacturers of plastic fuel tanks is in Michigan, the .Bronson Plastics Division of 
Kuhlman Corporation in Bronson, Michigan. However, fuel tanks are not convenient to 
ship and, given the more modular capacity of plastic tank production, the question remains 
whether the production will be as Michigan-centralized as that of metal tanks. 
The net effect of switching to plastic headlamp assemblies may be positive to 
Michigan, as most of the conventional capacity is outside the state, while Michigan has sig- 
nificant optical plastics capabilities (Ford Saline and AhlC's Evert Products subsidiary.) 
The current Ford plastic headlamp assemblies are made in Saline. 
hfichigan has several spring plants which have been and might be impacted adverse- 
ly by increased use of composite leaf springs. Most of GM's leaf and coil spring needs are 
served by the CPC Plant in Livonia (employing about 2,000 in spring production) and one 
of the BOC plants in Flint. Livonia had a somewhat later "pultrusion" composite alterna- 
tive to Inland's composite approach, but GM decided not to fund parallel programs beyond 
a certain stage. Ford manufactures most of its spring needs a t  its Monroe plant. Chrysler 
makes some of its springs at its Detroit Forge location; torsion bars are also made in that 
plant. 
With respect to structural uses of advanced composites, these would generally be - 
used to replace small stamped assemblies which are either made by independent specialists 
or (more in the past than currently) "off-line" in captive plants using offal material. The 
Flint Pressed Metal plant has specialized in engine cradles, which could logically be a can- 
didate for advanced composite implementation. However, the engine cradle as we now 
know it may disappear from some or all future models. Of course, its functions must be 
redistributed to other structural members, which may be plastic or composite rather than 
metal. 
6,  Plastic Body Panels 
The most difficult area to describe and analyze, let alone forecast, is the long-term 
use of materials on the outer "skin" of the passenger car, t$e principal "battle" between 
steel and plastic. The situation is relatively clear between now and 1992. As was dis- 
cussed, the vast majority of the product plans for this time frame call for steel bodies; but 
the possibilities beyond 1992 multiply significantly. .. 
The first use of a plastic body panel in North America mass-produced vehicles was 
the Chevrolet Chevette. Ever since its first appearance in thle 1953 model year, it has had 
a "fiberglass" body - a relatively conventional unibody structure with a fiberglass skin, 
but not a driveable chassis. Corvette volume is relatively small, varying between 25,000 
and 40,000 units per year. 
The next major plastic vehicle skin implementation is the well-known Pontiac Fiero, 
which appeared in the 1984 model year. Much less expensive than the Corvette, it has a 
production volume of 100,000 units per year. It uses a "space frame" or "birdcage" drive- 
able chassis with bolt-on panels. Exhibit 6A shows the 1984 body panel material and ven- 
dor selection for the Fiero. It is worth noting that all of thlese materials are thermosets 
and, significantly, that more of the parts are made by outside vendors than in any General 
Motors steel-bodied car. The Fiero has demonstrated that higher-volume vehicles can be 
economically made using a creative body structure, including large-scale use of plastics. 
It has been rumored in the press that both Ford and GM are looking at a similar ap- 
proach for plastic-bodied minivans based on passenger car chassis. Ford is rumored to be 
considering a minivan based on the new TaurusISable chassis for around 1990. It would 
be front wheel drive, as opposed to the Aerostar, and somewhat smaller. Likewise, 
General Motors has been reported in the press to be working (within CPC) on a plastic 
"personal van." 
In addition to all-plastic or largely-plastic vehicles, we are starting to see the selec- - 
tive use of plastic panels in essentially steel cars. For exa:mple, the Cadillac Fleetwood 
Limousine produced a t  Clark Street uses glass-fiber-reinforced plastic rear doors, hoods, 
and roof spacers. In addition to having provided an economical mechanism for stretching 
the Fleetwood into a limousine version, this is an important test of whether certain classes 
of customers will accept plastic body panels and whether these can be intermixed under 
critical customer scrutiny with steel panels. Another current use of plastics in North 
America is the hood and lift gate of the passenger version of ,the just-issued Ford Aerostar 
minivan (Exhibit 6B). Chrysler is planning to use plastic double doors on some special 
cargo-type service versions of minivans. This is a relatively low volume application, and ,_-_ 
undoubtedly low tooling cost plays an important role in the decision. These 1986 plastic 
doors are a conversion product built by Creative Industries of Detroit from panels produced 
by Budd of sheet molded compound (SMC) with steel hardware and door frames. 
We now turn to future plastic-skinned cars. The 1990 GM80 replacement for the 
Camaromirebird will be a space frame plastic car along the structural lines of the Fiero, 
but with the more traditional front engine front wheel drive configuration. Volume for the 
GM80 could be close to 400,000 units per year, making it by far the largest volume plastic 
car in production. It is anticipated that the core plant for this production will be in Pon- 
tiac;with sourcing of body panels split among captive and outside suppliers. 
GM80 volume will be made up of four differentiable models. There will be some 
very low volume models and some medium volume models, not the high volume body 
panels that the total platform volume implies. This probably had a significant effect in the 
selection uf the plastic strategy for this vehicle. 
Saturn will be a largely metal vehicle, but may have plastic fenders. Much less is 
known about the Chrysler Liberty car, although it appears that plastics are being con- 
sidered. In addition, apparently Chrysler has a parallel program for a completely plastic 
fl 
or composite vehicle. We know relatively little as yet about the Alpha; however, we would 
not exclude the possibility of major plastic body sections on this vehicle (or, as  Ford prefers 
to describe it, vehicle concept), although we doubt that it will be an all-plastic vehicle along 
the lines of the GM80. 
Product Planning 
As we have seen, there are different ways to apply plastics in body panels. To over- 
simplify the situation, it is useful to distinguish among three major categories: 
1. Hang-on panels;' 
2. All-plasticlnon-driveable space frame construction (e.g., the Corvette); and 
3. Driveable space frame all-plastic vehicles, (e.g, the Fiero). In the rest of this section, 
we will focus on the driveable space frame, boltable plastic panel approach, and on 
the hang-on panel approach where this is a conscious part of the original product 
strategy. 
'1n addition, it is important to make a distinction in hang-on panels between situa- 
tions where the selective plastic use is conceived in the original design and production 
processing of the vehicle and those where it is an afterthought to lighten the vehicle. 
The most important driving force is cost-effective market differentiation. Market 
volatility and the need for relatively short-term flexibility imply that single model annual 
volumes will be significantly lower than they were ten years ago, and this favors plastic 
body panels. Product planners are starting to look a t  the total life cycle cost of the 
platform/model during its life. Thus, if we have a vehicle that, to maintain consumer 
interest, must be restyled or "freshened" regularly, one must look a t  the capital and tool- 
L 
ing investment over this whole cycle versus the total operating cost over that same time 
frame. 
Product planners must have some feel for the crossover cost competitiveness of plas- 
tic versus steel. (The use of a selective plastic panel in a steel vehicle family would be 
analyzed somewhat differently, though crossover volume is still critical.) The crossover 
volume will depend on a variety of factors, including the base cost of the materials, 
processing costs,' and relative tooling costs. Exhibit 6C summarizes our general feel as  
to the historical, current and. possible future crossover volunles between plastic and steel. 
At the moment we have assumed that the Fiero volume represents approximately a break- 
even choice between the two from a process cost point of view. In the past, we assume 
that the Corvette volume was the crossover point. The future, of course, is much less 
precise, but if we assume that the GM80 represents a target for 1990, we can speculate 
from this point out. 
Design and Materials 
Product differentiation possibilities become particular1;ly impressive as space frames 
are designed and used with common mounting points to allow for different types of panels 
on the same frame. (There are, however, constraints on the degree of difference in the 
panels if they have to meet the frame a t  a given point.) Evlen more exciting from a cost- 
reduction standpoint is the fact that significant parts consolidation can take place if a 
properly designed plastic unit replaces several heretofore welded subassemblies. Par- 
ticularly good examples of parts consolidation include one-piece fender assemblies and one- 
piece floor pans. 
20ne estimate is that a t  the current molding cycle time of 1.5-3 minutes, the plat- 
form crossover volume might be of the order of 100,000 units per year. At 1 minute, the 
crossaver volume might jump to somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 units per year, 
and a t  40 seconds to 500,000 annual units. James Best of PI4arket Search, Inc. is quoted 
as commenting that today 28 models are produced in annual ,volumes less than 75,000 per 
year. 
We now turn to the consideration of the different classes of materials for plastic I -  
body panels. Thermosets used in automotive body panels include sheet molded compound 
(SMC), reaction injection molding (RIM), and reinforced reaction injection molding (RRIM). 
Thermosets have been used in virtually all exterior body panel applications to date. Ther- 
mosets have the advantage of relatively easy resistance to high temperature paint baking. 
On the other hand, they can have entrapped monomers which then "pop" in the painting 
process, causing surface blemishes, In addition, RIM and RRIM materials tend to be 
hygroscopic, which can result in thermal expansion problems unless appropriate measures 
are taken both in design and manufacture to account for this. 
Thermoplastics are just beginning to be used in automotive body panel appfications. 
Even the more optimistic thermoplastic manufacturers do not feel it is likely they will gain 
more than a ten percent penetration by 1990. Between 1990 and 1995 they expect some- 
what of a shift, so that after that point they hope to have perhaps a 50 percent market 
share of plastic body materials. The first major application of a thermoplastic body panel 
in North America production is probably a DuPont "Bexloy" spoiler in the 1985 Fiero GT. 
The General Motors H Car may have a thermoplastic header painted in line with steel 
panels. The two main manufacturers of thermoplastic resins are General Electric (whose 
plastics operation is headquartered in Pittsfield, MA) and DuPont (based in Wilmington, - 
DE). Both of these firms have for many years had major plastics application centers in 
the greater Detroit area, and both of them have significantly expanded their facilities in 
recent months. Each of them has gained recent publicity for product announcements of 
new thermoplastic materials for body panels. 
DuPont's Bexloy material is based on thermoplastic amorphous nylon. Bexloy is ac- 
tually a family of different but related materials whose chemical composition, molecular 
weight, and toughness can be manipulated over a wide range for different uses. Bexloy 
parts can be fabricated either by injection or blow molding, with various grades more 
suitable for fenders and quarter panels, for bumpers and backup beams, for spoilers, etc., 
depending on product performance requirements. General Electric has two categories of 
material of interest in automotive body panel use. "Lomod" (low modulus) is a cornbina- 
tion of an amorphous segment to provide dimensional stability and flexibility and a crystal- 
line segment for heat and chemical resistance. By varying the ratios of these two phases, 
the modulus can be changed, for example, from 20 to 200,000 psi. This type of material 
seems particularly applicable for the lower body applications (filler panels, valance panels, 
air dams, wheel flairs,, side panels), where damage resistance is a primary consideration. 
GE's other body material is called "GTX." Developed to fill the high temperature gap -. 
which has traditionally kept thermoplastics from body panel use despite appropriate physi- 
cal properties a t  room temperature, GTX combines polypropylene oxide (PPO) intermit- 
tently dispersed in a continuous matrix of nylon. This requi.res the use of compatibilizers 
and a process proprietary to General Electric. The result is heat resistance up to about 
350 degrees Fahrenheit, very similar to the range which Bexloy claims (and that achieved 
by most thermosets). GTX Gso appears to have a very stable modulus over a wide range 
of operating temperatures. General Electric suggests the following applications: fenders, 
bills, header panels, rockers, rear quarters, and lift gates. 
Machinery and Tooling 
Machinery and tooling variables will be important fact,ors in determining the rate of 
plastic body panel applications. Plastics equipment is quite different from stamping pres- 
ses (their functional equivalents when metal body panels are used), Different manufac- 
turers are involved in making them, and the design and process control requirements are 
different. The basic output rate of the two types of equipment has traditionally been quite 
different for a given size and shape of piece. Current injection molding presses tend to be 
more suitable for smaller vertical panels than for larger horizontal panels. The largest in- 
jection molding press manufactured in the United States is 5,000 tons. Horizontal panels 
such as  hoods would require a t  least a 6,000 ton press. European presses are made up to 
10,000 tons, but there are so few of them available that horizontal panel development 
seems to be hampered (in North America, a t  least) by the lack of tryout equipment large 
enough to properly make these parts. 
We do not have any specific details as  to the capacity for making plastic molding 
machines suitable for body panels. One planning engineer involved in plastic vehicle 
production told us that the lead times for molding equipment would describe the critical 
path for implementing plastic cars. -4t the moment, these lead times appear to be consis- 
tent with the normal product planning cycle of the auto companies. However, if several of 
the auto companies decide to go into significhtly higher uses of plastic body panels at  the 
same time, it is not clear whether the capacity and lead time of both American and foreign 
industry would suffice. 
Just  as machinery for plastic molding differs from stamping presses, so does tooling. 
Perhaps the most dramatic difference is in the better surface fmish required in molds as 
opposed to in stamping. (On the other hand, the structural requirements in molds are con- 
siderably - less demanding than for stamping dies.) The economics of the two types of tool- 
ing differ greatly as well. The cost of injection molding tooling for a given shape is con- 
siderably below that of stamping dies. On the other hand, output capacity and life of the 
tool may be lower in the case of plastics tooling than for stamping dies. But since more 
frequent design changes in automotive exterior panels seem likely, mold life may not be a 
substantive problem.3 
The mold-making industry for plastics (very closely related to pattern making in the 
foundry, in many regards) is, at  best, a fragmented one. There is a fair amount of mold 
making capacity, but it is broken up into so many small and relatively unsophisticated 
companies as to raise concern by auto makers. This concern would be particularly valid if 
several auto makers decided to get into major programs a t  the same time. Thus moId 
making is viewed as a potentially constraining factor in the development of plastic automo- 
tive panels. Moreover, significant mold-making learning curve is required regarding large 
body panel molds, both on the part of mold designers and mold makers. CAD/CAM 
programs do exist for injection molding and other types of plastic mold development, but 
many mold shops do not have this type of equipment. In fact, mold and pattern shops are 
somewhat less advanced than their stamping die counterparts in the CAD/CAM area. 
Mold design software does exist and can be "site licensed" or used on a service bureau 
basis. If one wants to use this in house, however, close to $200,000 in interactive graphics 
terminals is required. The software license itself costs about $20,000 a year.4 
From the auto makers' point of view, there is an obvious strategic issue posed by 
the structure of the mold-making industry. On the one hand, they would like to use the 
flexibility and originality of independent mold makers. On the other hand, they see these 
under-capitalized and relatively low-sophistication management firms as risky partners in 
the evolution of plastic-bodied vehicles; joint ventures might be a possibility, The mold 
designlmaking strategies selected by the auto makers will have a significant effect on both 
the rate and the direction of plastic body implementation. 
3~owever ,  there is a concern as to whether one needs backup molds in case of a 
manufacturing accident. Due to long experience, quick die repair techniques have been 
developed in the stamping area. At least as  yet, these techniques do not exist in the plas- 
tics area, and it can often be six weeks before one is back in business with a new plastic 
mold. In part, this comes from the very delicate surface finish requirements in plastic 
molds, an area which is absolutely crucial to the eventual competitive position of plastic 
panels in cars. 
*plastic body panel production would be as  easy if not easier to automate than the 
metal counterpart, if for no other reason than the slower cycle times involved. In addition, 
everyone seems to be taking effective automation into account in the design of facilities for 
plastic panel manufacture and assembly. 
Production Variables 
The largest single production variable influencing plastics versus steel is the molding 
time for plastic panels. Molding time is dependent both on the material itself and on 
processlequipment optimization and die design. Generally speaking, molding time is a 
function of the cross section of the part and not its surface area. Thus, a large, thin panel 
may have a shorter molding time (in a much larger machine) than a thicker, smaller part. 
Depending on the shape of the part and the specific material from which it is being made, 
today's molding time is between 90 seconds and 3 minutes. In the laboratory, analogous 
molding times have been reduced to 60 to 90 seconds; in all probability, certain types of 
parts will be made a t  that rate in a plant environment by 1990. 
Painting is the process area of most concern, other than molding. In a n ,  all-plastic 
car, one has the option of painting the panels in place (Corvette) or off-line on racks, after 
which the panels are mounted on the space frame (~iero).' However, both cars are 
painted at  significantly lower temperatures than if they were steel: 250 degrees Fahren- 
heit maximum. 
Supplier and Locational Implications 
The widening use of plastic body panels will have huge impacts on the structure of 
the industry, both with regard to winners and losers and with regard to geographical loca- 
tion. The first obvious impact would be on manufacturers of the steel which would other- 
wise be used in bodies. Steel companies may find a more cost-effective way of attaining 
the same type of durability as  a plastic body might provide, but it is much less likely steel 
cornpanies will be able to slash tooling costs. On the other hand, if they could work with 
tool development experts on reducing the cost of stamping dies (and the lead time required 
to develop them), the crossover volume for plastic and steel would once again be raised. 
Pricing reactions are also a potential tactic for the steel companies. However, cur- 
rent margins on steel and the current financial condition of the domestic steel makers are 
such that this could hardly be used as a long-term strategy. In fact, even selective use of 
plastics for auto bodies may put into jeopardy the plans the steel makers have to upgrade 
their technological capabilities. 
' ~ n  fact, the Fiero body panels are pre-primed by th.e molders themselves, then 
reprimed with a constant material (the primer used by each molder sometimes being dif- 
ferent) to avoid problems of color match. 
Stamping plants are also dramatically affected by increased use of plastics. We sur- - 
mise that the captive large body panel plants are proportionately much more affected than 
smaller independent plants, which tend to make smaller, often non-visible stampings. In 
addition, the ability to respond to this threat by diversification may be less available in the 
regional stamping plants than to smaller independents. One should point out, however, 
that all three of the major auto companies have been investing heavily in upgrading the 
stamping facilities in many of these regional plants, and so apparently still expect this in- 
vestment to pay off in the time frame for implementation of plastic body panels. 
As was discussed above, stamping press companies and plastic molding press com- 
panies are not, in most cases, the same firms. Thus to the extent that the plastic panels 
are increasingly used, the market for large body stamping presses wili diminish dramati- 
cally. Similarly, a t  the moment a t  least, tooling firms for stamping dies and plastic molds 
are not the same; hence, dislocation in this industry is also possible. In this latter case, 
however, there is a t  least the possibility of mutating die plants into mold plants. 
The switch from steel to plastics, to the extent that it happens, has significant 
locational considerations as well. There is an advantage to being closer to the sources of 
resins, although we think that is a second order consideration. On the other hand, there is 
a significant need, at least during the transition phase, to be close to the knowledge base 
- 
for molding plastics. Perhaps most important, there seems to be a significant bias toward 
having the plastic panel molding plants close to the assembly plants they serve. It is very 
likely that, whether captive or independent, there will be a cluster of molding companies 
built up in the approximate vicinity of assembly plants. This also is compatible with the 
needs for damage control in plastic panels, the now-apparent advantages of JIT, and the 
probable lack of nestability of plastic panels as parts are consolidated to make more com- 
plex shapes. Thus the principal determinant of the location of plastic body panel plants 
may, in fact, be the selection of assembly plant sites. 
A "Fearless Forecast" 
In order to look into the future, we have chosen to divide the period between now 
and the year 2000 into three time frames. The first is 1985-1992, for which decisions 
must be .made by 1986. The second is 1992-1995, with decisions made between 1987 and 
1990. Finally, there is the 1996+ time frame, for which the decisions will be made after 
1990. By the time the "gut" decision must be made between a plastic versus a steel 
bodied car, the decision makers must be confident that the requisite technologies and 
market conditions are extremely likely (go+% confidence level) to be right. One cannot af- 
ford parallel programs once a vehicle has a definite time frame for rollout. This may have 
been one of the reasons for limiting the use of plastics in Saturn. 
We have also decided that it is necessary to provide a low, medium and high 
forecast. The "Low" forecast might represent a forecast wlere problems encountered, for 
example, on the GM80 vehicle. The "MediumJ' forecast should be thought of as an ex- 
trapolation of our current view of the situation. The "High" forecast might be though of as 
one where there is either a technological or a market breakthrough in the late 1980's. 
- -  - - - 
Percent Plastic Body Panels 
Low Medium High 
Probability 10% 70% 20% 
7. Magnesium Castings 
For several years, automotive designers have looked a t  many parts being made of 
(die-)cast aluminum and considered the possibility of using magnesium instead. Mag- 
nesium alloys are some of the lowest specific gravity materials economically available to 
automotive designers. They do, however, suffer from potential corrosion and flammability 
(in manufacturing) problems. Furthermore, they have certain mechanical properties in- 
ferior to those of steel or aluminum. However, magnesium is stronger per pound than any 
current automotive material alternative except, for example, nylon glass filled plastic. Be- 
cause magnesium is only 213 aluminum's weight, it has much promise for the future as a 
weight saver. 
During the late 1970's, experts in automotive materials usage predicted as  much a s  
10-15 pounds of magnesium per typical car within five to ten years. In actuality, current 
usage remains restricted a t  less than a pound, but growing use was again foreseen by 
some of the persons surveyed by the AIM project team. 
If the North American automotive industry makes a wholesale switch to aluminum 
engines in the 1990 decade, it is very likely that magnesium will be tried as an alternative 
material for some components that are now aluminum. There would be a variety of tech- 
nical motivations for this, but one of the primary business motivations would be to lessen 
the a u b  industry's dependence on primary aluminum manufacturers and to oppose the 
potential price dictates of the aluminum industry. 
Such a switch from aluminum to magnesium would impact material suppliers, of 
course, but particularly die casting companies now supplying aluminum die castings. 
Manual and automatic transmission cases are examples of components, now containing 
10-20 pounds of aluminum, that might be switched to magnesium. 
Automotive materials economists suggest that magnesium's price premium must be 
less than 50% above aluminum's per pound price for magnesium to grow in automotive 
use. Because of magnesium's 113 lighter weight, a t  a price ratio of 131, magnesium in- 
got and aluminum ingot are roughly equal in terms of material effective volume cost. 
Recently, magnesium's price has been about twice the price of aluminum, the same a s  
during 1982. 
Exhibit: 7A represents a start at  cataloguing parts that have the highest probability 
of being converted to magnesium. Examples of past magnesium applications in the North 
American automotive industry include alternator and air conditioning brackets, engine 
valve covers, die cast steering lock mechanisms, wheels, clutch housings for light duty 
trucks, brake and clutch pedal supports. 
European manufacturers also use some magnesium components. The Alpha-Romeo 
GXV612.5 Sport Coupe contains about 100 pounds of magnesi,um, including cast wheels, oil 
sumps, engine covers, and a few power train components. Probably the most widely 
known magnesium automotive application is Volkswagen's transmission case, which VW 
has produced for 35 million of its cars. The current VW Golf model has a 40-pound mag- 
nesium transmission case. 
Recently there have been several public announcements of magnesium components 
for future models. For example, the 1987 Ford F Series pickup and full size Bronco utility 
vehicles will use a magnesium transfer case housing. The two piece housing will weigh 
about 14 pounds, 113 less than the 21 pound aluminum predecessor. The lighter housing 
reduces overall weight of the assembled transfer case nearly 10%. Apparently ap- 
proximately 150,000-200,000 units yearly will be produced, thereby representing 2-2 1/2 
million pounds of additional magnesium usage. 
The next major application of magnesium in a production North American vehicle 
will probably be in the GM 10 or W car. Webster Manufacturing, a division of Canada's 
CAE Industries Limited, will be the primary supplier of a magnesium steering column 
bracket for this vehicle. Webster management was quoted as citing a $70 million single 
source long-term contract beginning in 1988; the plant is located in London, Ontario. Ap- 
parently the one piece magnesium bracket weighing 354 grarns replaces two conventional 
zinc die castings which would have weighed 1.4 kilograms. This is an application in which 
magnesium means lighter weight - and superior parts integration. 
There are, quite properly, some technical concerns in rrloving to die castings. There 
is the susceptibility of molten magnesium or magnesium chips to ignite and burn. Second, 
in automotive applications, magnesium has been found to be susceptible to four types of 
corrosion: salt, galvanic, alcohol, and other chemical. Ford introduced three magnesium 
exterior castings in 1980 which they later withdrew, possibly because of corrosion 
problems, although the official reason was cost. Such experiences have, however, helped 
pave the way to solutions, such as better coating techniques. 
On the plus side, efficiency during magnesium part manufacture is an advantage .,- 
that interests automotive planners. The most common method for casting aluminum has 
been cold chamber die casting. The process is similar to aluminum die casting, where mol- 
ten metal is shot under high pressure through a cold shot cylinder into the mold. En- 
gineers we surveyed indicated that automotive companies are particularly interested in a 
hot chamber method, which has about a 213 cost saving over the cold process. The com- 
parative savings result from lower porosity, thinner-walled castings, increased production 
speeds, better surface finish, and reduced scrap breaks. The hot chamber magnesium 
process, which has thus far not been universally perfected for automotive aluminum parts, 
gives magnesium an added advantage but only for parts under about four pounds. 
Magnesium also offers superior machining characteristics relative to aluminum, cast 
iron, and mild steel. Volkswagen has reported that it machines magnesium transmission 
cases in a little over half the time required for aluminum. Excellent finishes are achieved 
with heavier cuts and without coolants. 
The principal suppliers of magnesium materials to the automotive industry are Dow 
Chemical and Amax. There are several cost-competitive magnesium die casting suppliers, 
including Webster in London, Ontario, and Global Die Casting and Die Makers in 
St. Louis. To the best of our knowledge, there are no Michigan facilities significantly in- ,-- 
volved in die casting magnesium. 
Dow Chemical is working to develop strong, lightweight composites of magnesium 
filled with alumina for the automotive market. They are beginning testing of prototype 
parts, from oil pump covers to chain saw engine cylinders. The purpose of this effort is to 
improve the structural strength and wear resistance of magnesium. The main ingredients 
in Dow's composites are molten AZ 91 magnesium alloy and alumina added with a 
proprietary mixing technique. 1-10% alumina by weight is added and dispersed evenly. 
The alumina provides the strength and wear resistance, while the light weight of mag- 
nesium is not increased significantly. While an optimum amount of alumina in the mag- 
nesium composites has not yet been determined, 1% appears to be a workable level. 
Such composites could someday provide a useful cylinder block material. One of the 
problems in cylinder blocks always has been the cylinder wear problem, and it is for this 
reason that in sleeveless cylinder blocks 390 aluminum alloy is used. Would this mag- 
nesium composite casting material provide an even lighter block material with suitable 
wear characteristics? This is an early stage development which should be tracked closely. 
Michigan is home to a whole host of die casting plants, More general adoption of 
magnesium as an automotive die casting material could put our firms a t  a relative disad- 
vantage since they appear to be unprepared for manufacturing magnesium parts. With so 
many Michiganians employed in diecasting automotive and other parts in Michigan, the 
State has an interest in seeing to it that its die casters are capable of converting to mag- 
nesium, as this might provide them a competitive advantage. 
In future work, we will seek out more specific application opportunities and trends 
by interviewing the magnesium manufacturers and specifiers in the automotive firms. 
Based on what we learn from this, we can assist the Tech~lology Deployment Service in 
identifying which of Michigan's die casters might be most suitable for magnesium im- 
plementation. (Sealed Power in Muskegon, Kelsey Hayes' Cast Forge Division in Howell, 
and Nelson Metal Products in Grand Rapids come to mind. 7Ve will also check for suitable 
latent capabilities in captive die casting departments in the state, if any.) TDS might then 
consider informing them on application possibilities and operating cost parameters relative 
to magnesium casting production, and assisting them in deciding whether technological 
cooperation or a joint venture with magnesium capable diecasters (e.g., VW's transmission 
case supplier) would be desirable and, if so, starting them off in that direction. 
8. Ceramics and Other Materials 
In this section we will discuss a variety of miscellaneous materials matters to which 
relatively little time has been devoted during the current AIM term. These were deem- 
phasized a priori because of a lack of resources compared to what we assumed to be the 
Michigan impact. What follows thus comes more from published reports and general 
knowledge tlian from specific interviews. It is meant to provide a base from which to build 
in later AIM work. 
Ceramics 
The use of so-called "fine ceramics" in industry is going to be a major field in the ' 
coming decade, and even more so around the year 2000. Charles River Associates recent- 
ly concluded a study for the National Science Foundation which has been widely quoted. 
They estimate that the market for U.S. engine parts in ceramics should be of the order of 
$800-900 million by 1996 and $1.2 billion by the year 2000. 
One can divide the logic for applying ceramics into "systemic" applications where 
ceramics are used systematically throughout a system (generally a diesel engine), and 
"selective" applications where they are used to improve certain subsystem and component 
functions. In the first case, virtually all the effort is directed toward increasing thermal ef- 
ficiency in diesel engines. Increased thermal ei3ciency results in better fuel economy, both 
directly and indirectly. By reducing the heat rejection, one can minimize (or in principle 
eliminate) the heat exchanger (radiator), which yields a major weight reduction. 
While the systemic use of ceramics is largely limited to diesel engines, in more selec- 
tive uses ceramics can be used to advantage in gasoiine engines. In the one AIM field 
interview where the application intensity of ceramics was discussed, interviewees felt that 
by 1992 one might see a ceramic faced cam follower in 10% of North American vehicles, 
turbocharger hot wheels in 1%, piston crowns in 25%, and exhaust port liners in 2%. 
At least one Michigan company, Bohn Engine and Foundry Division of Gulf and 
Western in South Haven, has been cited in the press for its application of ceramics. Bohn 
supplies pistons to such companies as International Harvester, White Motor, and Ford. 
They are most enthusiastic about a ceramic fiber-reinforced aluminum piston. They say 
that silicon carbide, alumina, and alumina/silica whiskers will strengthen the aluminum 
casting while reducing its thermal expansion rates. This will in turn make feasible the ad- 
dition of ceramic coatings over the solid piston caps. 
Some ceramics research work is being done in Michigan today a t  the Big Three. We 
assume that Detroit Diesel is also doing some work because of their dependence on heavy- 
duty diesel engines, but that still has to be ascertained. [If they are not, they could be a t  a 
competitive disadvantage eventually to firms such as Cummins, which are investing in this 
technology.] It is not known to us what, if any, research in ceramics is being done in 
Michigan's universities. 
Soft Trim 
Without a doubt, the soft trim sector is one of the most labor-intensive part of the 
automotive industry. Although as recently as two or three years ago, it was thought that 
because of the color and damage sensitivity of the products there was relatively little risk 
of foreign sourcing, this is now less evident. 
In fact, the soft trim industry is an excellent example of how it is impossible to 
segregate different forces driving change. For example, in soft trim there is a significant 
element of industry restructuring. The reorganization of General Motors has broken down 
the former dominant role of part of the Fisher Division (now part of the Inland Division) in 
soft trim management (and production) for GM. This combines with new sourcing 
strategies on the part of all the automakers, which emphasiize the need for just-in-time, 
fully modularized manufacturing in the soft trim area and opens this up to independent 
function managers. Perhaps the most dramatic examples of that are Hoover Universal 
and Lear Siegler's advances in selling modular, just-in-time seating systems to the 
automakers, first just for specialized applications and, more recently, for general produc- 
tion at certain plants, such as Chrysler's Sterling Heights assembly plant. 
Coincident with the new sourcing trends is an increased openness to new materials 
and processes in soft trim. In fact, many of the soft trim areas are elaborate forms of 
chemical engineering where materials and proc!ess development are closely integrated. 
Another important coincident factor is the increased interest in developing soft trim 
packages that then can be automated in the "final trim" a.ssembly of the vehicle. The 
"final trim" line in an assembly plant has traditionally been the one thought hardest to 
automate. However, it is also the most labor-intensive and, especially with the movement 
toward modular construction of vehicles, it is now time to attack the automation of the 
final trim line. This requires different design, process, and materials in the soft trim area. 
The final factor impacting the soft trim area is the recognition that there is low labor 
cost competition available. Experimental "cut-and-sew" programs have taken place in 
Mexico, particularly in the border area, providing evidence that they can produce parts 
which are properly color coordinated and undamaged over long distances. 
As for specific materials and technology changes in soft trim, molded carpets, head- 
liners, and seats are particularly interesting. Both Ford and GM have discussed "foam-in- 
place" seats for some number of years now, and there now seems to be a significant move- 
ment in that direction. Finally, there seems to be - both within the automotive companies 
and among several independent suppliers (Allen Industries is cited in this regard) - an ef- 
fort to look at  some other way than cut-and-sew for bonding parts of ;eats, door pads, etc. 
One general trend in the design area is that there is a return toward contourability 
with more upscale plushness in this area. This is contrary to a trend that was observed 
earlier, where the more functional (in effect "German") styling seemed preferable (at least 
to the engineers, if not. to the American buying public). Apparently the automotive desig- 
ners and marketing specialists find that the American public is willing to pay for the ad- 
ditional cost of the plusher look. 
Although a relatively small amount of year one AIM time was spent on this area, 
this is not due to its lack of impact on the Michigan economy. Michigan has several sig- 
nificant captive soft trim plants: GM in Grand Rapids, Livonia, and Tecumseh; Ford in 
Utica; and Chrysler in Detroit. All can be thought of as being a t  risk (to a greater or 
lesser extent) over the next three to ten years. 
Surrounding these plants, both literally and figuratively, is a whole support in- 
dustry. This includes materials and parts fabricators and specialized tooling and equip- 
ment manufacturers. Most of these are relatively small; many are privately held. To 
some extent, these supporting plants have already migrated to lower labor cost areas to 
protect their competitiveness; this may continue as cost pressures upstream increase. 
Miscellaneous 
What follows is a series of extremely brief comments on miscellaneous materials 
which have at  best second order impacts on the Michigan economy as a whole, though they 
are in some cases significant to particular communities. 
Copper: Until recently the use of copper in the typical U.S.-built car was fairly 
stable a t  about 40 pounds. With downsizing and material substitution of key components, 
average copper usage was expected to have declined to 30-33 pounds by 1985. The 
University of Michigan's 1984 Delphi Forecast predicted that by 1990 the average car will 
contain only about 22 pounds of copper. The vast majority of copper usage in automotive 
components has traditionally focused on radiators and wiring harnesses. As was men- 
tioned above, copper radiators are being increasingly supplanted by aluminum. In wiring 
harnesses there may also be a significant trend away from copper, assuming that fiber op- 
tics technologies can be substituted. Signal multiplexing techniques are going to be ab- 
solutely essential in the electronic-based car of the future, smd it appears that the band- 
width and EMF insensitivity advantages of fiber optics will push us in that direction, 
Michigan has several copper wiring harness facilities, although far fewer than in former 
years. In principle, these could convert to fiber optics, although there is some question as  
to whether this utould be done in Michigan or not. 
Asbestos: There is a decreasing use of asbestos in friction materials such as clutch 
and brake linings. The EPA is considering banning this material as  injurious to workers' 
health; there is even consideration of danger in terms of ail: pollution by normal braking 
activity. Commercially available substitutes include zinc and brass chips or aramid fiber 
products and, for heavy duty use, ceramics. To the best of' our knowledge, there are no 
friction material plants of significant size in Michigan, so impacts are not likely to be sig- 
nificant here. 
Powdered Metallurgy is changing of late, both in terms of process and materials. 
Although Michigan is a heavy user of powdered metal parts, it is not a particularly heavy 
manufacturer of those parts. The powder producers are exclusively outside the state, with 
the exception of a new firm founded recently by two Ford executives. While the direct ef- 
fect on Michigan of powdered metals materials development is probably quite limited, the 
intensity of use of powdered metal parts can be an important competitive advantage or dis- 
advantage in other industries such as  transmission and axle manufacturing. 
Developments in adhesives are going to be extremely important in the ability to ap- 
ply certain other -materials such as  plastic body panels, and may result in greatly 
decreased use of weldments and hence in Michigan dislocations. 
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Exhib i t  2 B  
A Capital Investment 
C ~ S ! ~ - A  ------ Case 2
$80 million $120 million 
B. Annual Capacity 400,000 tons 300,000 tons 
C. Investment/Annual Ton ( W E )  $200 $400 
D. Required Payoff Period 10 years b years 
E. Effective Capacity Utilization During 
Payoff Per i od 80% &OX 
F. Amortization Charge/Ton Sold (C/ (D x E l  ) $25 $111 
G. Annbal Labor Charge (Assumed Fixed at 
75 people x 925/hr. loaded rate x 
2000 hr s/yr. $3.75 million $3.75 million 
H. Labor Cost/Ton Sold (G/(D x E l )  $12 920 
Exhib i t  3A 
Aver age A1 umi num 
Passenger Car Application Percent of 
Mod_e_L-Ygac WeFqht,-Lbs,---- (1) LbslLCac-121 A_Luminu,rn 
(1) Light Duty Fuel Economy Trends through 1982. 
SAE Paper 82-0300. 
( 2 )  'Auto & Truck Committee, A1 uminum Association and industry 
sources (Model Years 1972 - Present) 
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PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES 
Anyone who attempts to chart potential developments in the production technologies 
of the automotive industry and their specific impact on Michigan's future role in the in- 
dustry faces a formidable array of interacting factors. Cars and light trucks are, arguab- 
ly, the most complex high voIume goods produced in modenn economies. The technologies 
used to design, engineer, manufacture, assemble, and test light vehicles have constantly 
evolved during the auto age, but never more intensely than now. Future technological 
changes in the production systems of the industry may alter powerfkly the location and 
size of new facilities, the materials used to build vehicles, th.e relations among firms in the 
tiers of the industry, the demand for labor skills, and perhaps even the flows of trade 
among the world's auto-producing countries. 
AIM has been required to pursue selectively those aspects of change in the in- 
dustry's production systems that we sensed were of most import to Michigan. We were 
guided in our focus by early roundtable discussions with some engineering leaders and 
staffs from the auto companies. Based on these discussions and several subsequent inter- 
views with leaders from the auto firms, parts suppliers, capital equipment producers, en- 
gineering service firms, the UAW, and industry consultants, we c m  provide an initial sum- 
mary report on eleven topics within our subject. 
1. Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
2. Just-in-time Methods and Flexible Automation 
3. Ferrous and Aluminum Castings 
4. Adhesive Bonding to Replace Weldments 
5. Training in New Technologies 
6. Machine Tool Technology and Future Productivity 
7. Tooling 
8. Toolmaking Opportunities in Plastic Composite Parts 
9. Manufacture of Plastic Body Panels and Space Frames 
10. Centralized vs. Decentralized Production 
11. "Simple" vs. Complex Automation 
These brief summary reports should be regarded as descriptions of pieces in a ' 
puzzle. The puzzle is constantly being redesigned. Without question, the strongest force 
disrupting and reshaping the puzzle of automotive production is the widening application of 
computer technology to the design, engineering, fabrication, and assembly of the product, 
and to the tiers of managerial activity that control the flow of materials and information 
within the great chains of automotive production. Because computer technology will form 
the future, some initial reflections .on its importance are in order before we offer our 
provisional findings. 
Programmable Automation, Computer-Integrated Manufacturing, and Auto in 
Michigan 
I t  is now possible to envision the power of a truly computer-integrated manufactur- 
ing economy. Indeed, visions of a "CII11-economy" abound in our industrial press. The vis- 
ta encompasses very large scale substitution of microproce~~sors for living Iabor. Efficient 
hierarchies of control swiftly aggregate and.analyze millions of data elements from discrete 
engineering, fabrication, transport, and assembly operations, from factory departments, 
and from entire facilities, while simultaneously dispatching appropriate instructions 
downstream to several levels of automated decision-making imd execution. 
In the envisioned CIM-economy, communications within and among enterprises flow 
on an electronic pathway so broad that no matter is too complex to transmit instan- 
taneously. Firms cooperate on joint development projects across great distances, the tirne- 
span from conception to production is much shorter, and nimble adjustments to meet the 
demands of volatile, highly differentiated markets are a com:monplace. 
Such a CIl\I-economy would be a mightly engine of wealth creation, could bring relief 
from many forms of toil that are unwanted and dangerous, and would provide powerful 
tools for constant innovation and invention. I t  is thus a compelling vision. Some argue 
that rapid progress toward a CIM-economy is the i'y basis on which the equities of most 
current stakeholders in the U.S. manufacturing economy car1 be preserved in a future that 
promises more intense international competition. 
At present, this vision of a CIM-economy remains, an  elegant abstraction. Its 
realization through socially rationai means is a challenge to private initiative and public 
policy. 
Progress toward a CIM-economy will be disruptive, risk-laden, and expensive. It 
will be fueled by basic and applied research (a clear oppo~tunity for government coopera- 
tion with industry, as in Michigan's Industrial Technology Institute) and by the bold real- 
world experiments now being conducted by all auto makers and several major suppliers. 
These efforts will yield larger islands of flexible automation and build a growing network of 
bridges between them. This incremental integration will depend on the continuing develop- 
ment of IGES, KAP, and subsequent industry standards for digital communication. 
Initial projects in inter-firm cooperation, such as the ALAG, must expand their man- 
date to include more of the issues involved in CIiLI implementation. Consortia of firms con- 
tributing to all elements of a new production process must be formed, as prefigured, per- 
haps, in GM's objective of bringing together machine tool builders, materials suppliers, 
parts producers, and their own engineering staffs. 
How fast will a CIM-economy emerge in the United States automotive industry? 
The most recent (1985) Arthur Anderson & Co. Delphi study tells us that the current in- 
dustry consensus answer is by the mid-1990s, aithough without knowing the precise form . 
of the Anderson question it is difficult to know if the stage of C h i  impIied is as substantial 
as what we term here &e "CIM-economy." 
The pace of progress toward a CIM-economy will be determined by political and 
economic factors as well as technological advances. The industry believes that vigorous 
development and deployment of computer kchnolo~es  throughout the production system 
constitutes the best single source of cost reductions to meet; the Japanese challenge in the 
North American market. If true, the push toward a CIM-economy in the U.S. auto in- 
dustry becomes a drama involving the interests (and perhaps even the economic fate) of 
hundreds of firms, hundreds of thousands of workers, and entire auto-intensive regions 
such as Michigan. 
Michigan's prospects for a stable share of future automotive value added and 
employment, and the world's perceptions of our maturity as an industrial culture, will be 
shaped in no small part by how well the key stakeholders in industrial modernization learn 
to bargain progress. 
Imagine a four-sided Conference Table at which progress toward the benefits of a 
CIM-economy in Michigan's automotive industry is discussed (and, in a sense, "bar- 
gained*) by the four parties with most a t  stake: auto makers, Michigan automotive sup- 
pliers, organized labor (principally the UAW7, and state government. 
What interests are brougllt to this imagined Table? 
For the auto makers, the prime consideration is driving down the relative production 
costs of competitive products in order to meet the challenge of the still-substantial 
Japanese landed cost advantage in light vehicles. They are driven to seek cost reductions 
on all fronts, and believe that flexible automation offers the richest source. Auto makers 
will push toward CIM, constrained internally only by technical possibility and their capital 
resources. The unacceptable alternative is further erosion of market share to lower cost, 
higher quality competibrs. 
The OEM commitment to accelerated development and deployment of programmable 
automation in all forms establishes a new technological environment for their suppliers. 
Indeed, the pressures to accommodate the technologically tl-ansforming OEMs promise to 
restructure the U.S. automotive supplier sector. Suppliers are challenged to adopt new 
tools and methods that can integrate their capabilities with those of their major customers, 
and to help deliver some of the cost reductions expected of them by the OE&Is, The capital 
and skills development costs dictated by supplier commitment to increased CbM are for- 
midable. For many suppliers a t  our Table, continued participation in the automotive in- 
dustry is a t  issue. 
For labor, the choice is clear, and difficult. The UAW has always been supportive of 
technological progress, provided that the anticipated benefits of increased productivity are 
shared. Increasingly, the choice is between significant job . losses through increased 
automation versus perhaps even greater employment declines through loss of market 
share to technically superior and thus highly competitive foreign producers. While this 
general choice is starkly apparent, how the union services its membership in each instance 
of modernization, and how work and the institutions governing work should be recon- 
figured, is no simple matter. 
State government sits a t  the Table to represent the "general interest," a limited but 
potentially crucial role. Each of the other parties at  the Table has a number of market 
relations with one another in the rough and tumble of the competitive private economy. 
OEMs compete (and cooperate) and contract with suppliers and 'with the union; suppliers 
compete intensely for OEM business, and with OEM captive suppliers, but they also 
cooperate (e.g., AIAG); the UAW bargains labor power and -work organization with OEMs 
and suppliers, but knows security is tied to productivity, imd to' the skills required for 
tomorrow. 
Each of the private sector participants will pursue their primary objective, but they 
share, in varying degrees at different times, an interest in Michigan's economic health. 
For the State, that objective is paramount. In the inevitable'turbulence of future progress 
toward a CLN1-economy, State govenment's interest is in maximizing Michigan's share of 
the vdue added embodied in the U.S.-produced automotive fleet. Uniquely, we have an 
interest in successful cooperation (and negotiation) among aU participants a t  the Table. 
Michigan wins when we build the ability of each of the parties to serve one another's 
needs. 
If Michigan is properly to facilitate technological modernization within the full range 
of automotive operations in the state, government must be more than a passive tender of 
t l ~ e  "business climate." It must understand what is occurrillg within the industry, it must 
become an advocate of change, and it must invest talent and treasure in the modernization 
process. 
Given the charge of the AIM Project, our role is to suggest to state government the 
events it must anticipate if the state is to become a more resourceful facilitator in the high 
stakes movement toward a CIM-economy. 
'We identify five areas that will require priority attention. Michigan must try to an. 
ticipate: 
r How auto OEM adoption of programmable automation and computer-integrated 
manufacturing practices will place new requirements on Michigan automotive sup- 
pliers; 
D How progress toward larger-scale computer-integrateti manufacturing will influence 
the location of future investment; 
1~ How the widening deployment of programmable automation will change the struc- 
ture of the auto industry in the state through a shakeout of smaller firms; 
@ How Michigan will fare as a site for the research and development, engineering and 
sales, and production operations of producers of programmable automation and corn- 
puter integration technologies; and 
How the spread of flexible automation will impact the interests and needs of labor. 
In the several sections that follow, we can only begin tr) address these areas. 
Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
Exactly how much flexible automation will be used in future U.S. auto manufacture 
is an issue that provoked considerable discussion, but little agreement during the inter- 
views. There are two general aspects to defining flesible manufacturing systems (FMS): 
adaptability and convertibility. In general terms, adaptability is the ability of manufactur- 
ing systems, for example, machining lines, to serially sequence different designs of the 
same family of parts without adjusting the flexible manufacturing system. 
Convertibility refers to the ability to switch a manufacturing system from one 
product or model to another version, e.g., to convert an engine block machining line from 
producing 6-cylinder blocks to 8-cylinder blocks. IvIany executives were more optimistic 
about the economic justification prospects of using FMS for convertability advantages than 
they were about the prospects of gaining adaptability advantages. 
Largely because of the accelerating use of robotics in body assembly operations, 
C 
recent progress toward flexible operations was judged to be somewhat ahead of other 
developments. However, both machining and stamping operations are lagging. One ex- 
ecutive commented, "We still cannot adjust production in our stamping plants to meet 
shifting schedules because of o w  inability to change dies qtuckly." As will be noted later, 
nearly everyone agreed that considerably more use of modules will occur in vehicle ha1 
assembly, which along with other methods will radically increase flexibility. A concern is 
that more flexibility might be achieved a t  the cost of assembling 15 - 20% fewer vehicles 
per hour. 
Most executives agreed that substantially more flexibility was essential in machin- 
ing of drive-line components, such as engine heads, blocks, manifolds, transmissions, etc. 
One manufacturing executive commented, "Our traditional engine machining equipment is 
designed to.'machine approximately 1,600 to 2,000 engines per day. We feel that in the 
future we will need the flexibility to be able to efficiently produce en,@ne blocks or other 
drive-train components on the same equipment a t  rates as low as 50 per day and as high 
as 2,000." The need for less dedicated and more flexiblt? automation is supported by 
another drive-train trend. Typical minimum production volumes for a "high-productionn 
transmission facility will drop from the present 2.000 automatic transmissions a day to 
1,000 by 1992; and from 1,600 manual transmissions today down to 500 in 1992. These 
lower volumes are driven by needs to reduce inventories, to reorganize the assembly of 
major components among smaller decentralized plants contipous to vehicle final assembly 
plants, etc. Here too, the challenge is to achieve greater flexibility without losing the high 
productivity enjoyed with conventional transfer machining systems. A partial list of tech- 
niques follows which the executives believe will be used to increase machining flexibility: 
Performing variable operations off-line, for example pre- or post-machining opera. 
tions of a specialized nature. 
ID Equipping machining heads with sensors signalling operation or non-operation of 
each head as the workpiece is transported past that station, depending upon a 
preprogramrned code. 
@ Using indexing heads in place of fixed-position spindles. 
@ Integrating flexible numerically controlled (NC) machines into the serid transfer line 
to take advantage of the NC machine's flexibility. 
@ Supplementing the fixed serial transfer line with spur lines; common operations 
would be performed on a transfer line of conventional design, and the variable opera- 
tions would be routed over spur lines. 
o Flexible timing schemes for varying the pace of work:piece transfers to more readily 
accommodate the variability of work-station spacing. 
0 Manufacturing ceils for relatively lower volume requirements. 
o Adaptive control of metal cutting operations. 
There was a general concern about the wisdom of abandoning conventional automa- 
tion for high-volume machining systems, or about modifying them to gain flexibility a t  the 
cost of lower hourly output. Still, everyone envied the ahility to convert manufacturing 
systems quickly to accommodate shifts between different types of related production, e.g., 
shifting from a 8-cylinder engine block to a 6-cylinder block with as little delay as possible. 
Some of the techniques being considered to speed changeover times follow: 
@ Automatically changing index heads via computer command. 
@ Reprogramming machines' electronic controllers 
Designing universal clamping techniques, and designing parts according to the part 
family concept, which will more readily accommodate universal clamping. 
Advanced controls incorporating simpler reprogramma.ble servo mechanisms. 
Fast-change l i i t  switches, or devices serving the same function, but which are 
easier to reprogram. 
Using solid-state controls in place of electromechanical devices, and integrating solid. 
state controllers with computer networks. 
In .the Saturn, Liberty, and Alpha projects of the Big Three, considerable attention 
has been devoted to increasing the flexibility of final vehic1.e assembly operations. While 
the actual implementation is expected to differ between companies, the techniques are all 







Front-End, with bumper, grille, lamps, radiator, etc. 
Rear-End, with bumper, lamps, etc. 
Most of these modules rviviil be fully assembled a t  sites in or adjacent to the vehicle 
assembly plant. Thus, companies formerly producing any of these modules or components 
going into these modules, likely will be forced to relocate their production facilities near as- 
sembly plant sites. 
By using modules in tandem with robotics, automated guided vehicles (AGV), and 
related flexible automation, the executives interviewed believe they will substantially in- 
crease the ability to assemble a wider array of related body styles over the same vehicle 
final assembly line. They also expect to be able to convert a flexible assembly plant to a 
new model in much shorter time. 
With the old continuously moving ass&nbly line having a semi-fued number of work 
stations and workers, it has been troublesome to add even minor vehicle trim variations to 
selected vehicles for new developing market niches without d.isrupting work assignments or 
the balanced timing of assembly line processes. When the change was substantial, another 
worker was added to the assembly line. Sometimes, the new worker had little to do when 
standard vehicles came past the added station. Now .with the flexible approach, differences 
in the time required to build up "standardn and "non-standard* modules will be more 
flexibly accommodated in the off-line "stationary" work stations. 
A priority goal of these new, more ffexible assembiy concepts is to reduce mobile as- 
signments on the final line. Some, but not all, of the plans for the future call for the use of 
automated guided vehicles (AGV), which will carry module:s/subsystems, and, eventually, 
the car itself as it is being progressively built up. As the AGV stops at  each work station 
along the final assembly line, each team of workers will be able to perform its tasks, in- ' 
ciuding installation of the modules, while the car and AGV are stationary. Enthusiasts 
promoting such systems believe that eliminating mobile work assignments and handling 
the fabrication time differences between modules off-line iniprove both the quality of the 
module and the vehicle on the final assembly line. 
The approaches to increase flexibility diier  from company to company. Depending 
upon specific application requirements, e.g., a vehicle h a l  assembly plant, a body in white 
fabrication operation, an engine or a transmission plant., etc., the requirements for 
economically useful technologies to achieve flexibility also vary substantially. And, be- 
cause each of the Big Three operates many of its plants a t  different volume levels, and has 
variations in the outsourcing of component parts, different implementation approaches to 
automation (both dedicated and flexible) are dictated. 
Still, some generdizations are possible. One of the vehicle manufacturers cited the 
following four criteria for deciding upon the level of flexible manufacturing technology it 
selected for a plant producing drive-line components. 
Market Flexibility: the ability to introduce new products quickly or to change product 
mix a t  the factory level a t  a minimal cost. 
Capital Flexibility: the ability to utilize flexible equipment purchased for one product 
for other products, should the initial product requirement disappear. 
Production Flexibility: the ability to produce a family of products across the same 
equipment, 
Operation Flexibility: the ability to continue operating the flexible system, often on a 
reduced capacity basis, should one of the stations in the flexible machining system 
breakdown. 
Another criterion for increased flexibility in a final vehicle assembly plant was sug- 
gested: 
@ The assembly plant should be able tu receive an incoming order from a dealer and 
have that vehicle built to the special order within one ,week, compared to the several- 
week lead time presently necessary. 
A11 companies are at various stages of planning for implementation of flexible 
automation. Most companies consider flexible installations made thus far to be real-world 
production facilities, and also laboratories in which they are leaning more about flexible 
automation. 
A major challenge to broader implementation of flexibility is learning how to 
economically justify this new manufactwing technology in the U.S. vehicle market, which 
historically has been characterized by very large volumes of relatively stable production. 
Prior to the energy crises, the U.S. market conditions strongly encouraged the use of the 
most productive, but dedicated, vehicle production technology in the world. Flexible 
automation systems that have been installed thus far init idy cost more than dedicated 
equipment, and yet they typically produce fewer workpieces per hour or day than the lat- 
ter. They are therefore much more dficult to justify economically by traditional economic 
evaluation methods used for dedicated equipment. 
Better measures of the indirect costs/savings factors will help answer the following 
generic questions as part of the audit of an economic payoff of flesible manufacturing sys- 
tems: 
@ What are the quantitative direct expense benefits of flexibility? 
AD What are the quantitative indirect expense benefits of flexibility? 
How much of original investment in a flexible mariufacturing system is reusable 
when a new product is introduced? In the past, because product change often meant 
that dedicated automation was obsoleted, little of the original investment was 
reusable. 
How can these direct and indirect expense measures be utilized in today's economic 
justification methods for capital equipment? 
Suppliers of automation and vehicle parts are also seeking answers to these ques- 
tions. In the case of automation suppliers, positive answer-s will open flexible automation 
markets worth billions of dollars, but at  the expense of possiible sales of dedicated automa- 
tion systems. Companies finding the right answers first obviously stand to gain a strategic 
edge, while others will suffer lost sales and employment. 
Michigan automation suppliers appear to be at quite different stages of readiness to 
meet the market for increased flexibility. The state's traditional strength, the builders of 
sophisticated dedicated automation systems, are now challenged to adapt their competence 
to incorporate much more rnicroprocessor-based flexibility. At the same time, they are 
being pressed by aggressive Japanese and European producers. 
How well Michigan's machine tool firms will adjust to position their abilities in the 
new environment is not clear. One positive sign is the obvious desire of General Motors to 
transform its past relations with these firms in the interest of deviloping and maintaining 
a base of U.S. machine tool builders that can deliver more flexible systems. The state has 
already made an important potential contribution on this front in sponsoring the Industrial 
Technology Institute. One mission of I'M is to be a source of contract research and 
development that can supply some of the focused expertise now reguired by blichigan's 
traditional automation vendors. 
Michigan's prospects in other segments of the growing flexible automation 
marketplace are brighter. Southeastern ~Michigan is already a center of machine vision 
technology, with firms that have shown the way in automotj,ve applications. Based largely 
(but hy no means exclusively) on industry-leading GMF. Michigan remains the lead state 
in robotics development. The huge automotive market .continues to attract the research1 
engineeringsales arms of automation firms with headquarters and production operations 
elsewhere. The vision of a southeastern Michigan "Automation Alleyn to rival the 
economic weight of Silicon Valley or Route 128 is plausible. Nurturing its evolution should 
be a high priority for state government. 
The Just-in-Time System and FIexible Automation 
As the vehicle manufacturers increase the use of just-in-time (JIT) delivery methods, 
parts suppliers know they will see even more pressure on t'heir manufacturing systems to 
be adaptive and responsive on shorter and shorter lead times. Their manufacturing en- 
,&eers are closely following the experiences gained by the vehicle manufacturers so they 
can determine where flexibility works best before they make their investments. 
For parts suppliers to win Iong-term contracts from U.S. car companies, they un- 
doubtedly will have to agree to a base price, followed by annual cost reductions. To make 
a profit under such requirements, parts suppliers need to invest in more productive 
automation. However, with the new JIT requirements, conventional automation will no 
longer be the only approach. 
Although the net value of the JIT system as applied in the American automotive 
' 
mmufacturing environment received mixed reviews, its gro-wing use is inevitable. For the 
parts suppliers to meet the increased variability of delivery schedules, everyone agreed 
that the greater use of flexible automation will be necessary. Important questions for 
managers in parts supplier companies are: how much? and what type? 
While most pans  suppliers indicate a willingness to step up their investment in 
automation, including the flexible type where justified, they also believe that vehicle 
manufacturers could do a better job of controlling schedules which might somewhat lessen 
the need for flexibiiity. Vehicle manufacturers commonly change schedules for several 
reasons, e.g., abrupt shifts in consumer preferences, engineering change orders, component 
part shortages, etc. Various approaches are being tried to reduce schedule modifications. 
For example, one manufacturer is trying to establish a prod.uct mix with fewer sets of op- 
tions; others are buying rather than making lower volume components and vehicles to 
reduce the range of part types their manufacturing systems must produce. 
A more predictable schedule for vehicle assembly ir; Fundamental to gaining the 
benefits of the just-in-time manufacturing concept. One manufacturing executive com- 
mented, "For JIT to work the way we would like in reducing inventories we must establish 
a production schedule and adhere to it." .4 recent scheduling system introduced in one 
truck plant, which now operates on a 20-day "firm-buiIdV schedule (allowing for minor dab 
ly adjustments), could represent a model for the future. The 20-day schedule is updated 
daily so that all of the part and material suppliers have a better chance to optimize their 
plans. 
Other executives talked about l o d a y  schedules for car assembly operations, with 
daily updates as required. However, most of the persons interviewed admitted that the 
"firmness" of present 10- and 20-day schedules was a relative concept. 
All vehicle manufacturers are studying the extent to which the frequent adjustments 
that assembly plant schedulers seem to implement daily :ue actually necessary. Ddly 
modifications to the 10- and 20-day vehicle build schedules not only undermine production 
plans in the vehicle assembly plant, but also those of dl the component part and material 
suppliers. In the long run the frequency of the changes will have a major influence on the 
degree of required flexibility. 
One parts supplier, observing the instability of scht?dules relative to the level of 
necessary flexible automation, suggested that the vehicle manufacturers might more care- 
fully audit engineering change orders from product engineering groups in order to evaluate 
the actual tradeoffs between product performance, manufitcturing quality, productivity, 
and delivery times. 
Despite the understandable interest in schedule stability, greater variability in the 
future marketplace seems to be an irreversible trend. Buick City and Oldsmobile were 
cited as facilities that were initiating daily and even hourly delivery schedules. Suppliers 
to one vehicle manufacturer were cited as being contractually obligated to have a computer 
CRT tenninal in their plants over which &e customer could issue daily, hourly, or even 
narrower updates of production schedules. The suppliers iue contractually obligated to 
have a module delivered just-in-time no later than severr hours after any change in 
delivery schedules. 
Despite the currency of the concept, the OEMs and major suppliers are only now 
quickening the pace of XJ! implementation. As they do, there are many hundreds of 
smaller auto-related firms in the Michigan economy that could benefit from some direct 
education and consultation. In Michigan, the number of such firms is so great that the 
responsibility cannot be fully addressed by the OEMs or even by the excellent educadonal 
efforts of the AIAG. 
The State should explore ways in which it can sponsor provision of initial orientation 
and some consultation on JIT methods to the hundreds of firms now confronted with the. 
need to acquire new equipment and skills. The successful use of the community college 
network to provide training in SPC methods might serve as a model. 
While JIT requirements ,increase the need for flexibility by independent parts sup- 
pliers, it is even more of a shock for some captive plants owned by the vehicle manufac- 
turers. Some executives questioned whether captive plants would be able to adjust to JIT 
which is predicated on the quick reaction capabilities normally afforded only by "job shop" 
automation-which contrasts sharply with the continuous processing technology commonly 
used. 
Lack of universal agreement on the value of JIT bysterns suggest that they will not 
be implemented universally over-night. JIT was alleged to have caused General Motors to 
cut back too far on its engine production capacity, contributing to a recent loss of two or 
three percentage points of market share, presumably because they had been unable to 
manufacture the exact engine mix desired by consumers. 
However, the new GWToyota joint venture in Fremont, California, apparently 
operates effectively with the JIT system. Because productbn has been undexway for only 
six months, it may be too early to make meaningful comparisons. Nevertheless, some JIT 
skeptics commented that the Fremont piant may find i t  easier to follow JIT because it 
produces a relatively non-complex product with few option variables, allowing for more 
stable production schedules. Clearly, the optimal equipment investment decision for JXT 
will be influenced by the cross currents of equipment adaptability and stable schedules- 
conditions which are still in flux. 
Ferrous/Aluminurn Castings 
Up until the energy crisis in the mid-1970's, the vast majority of all the castings in 
U.S. cars and trucks were made of iron, often mined in northern Michigan. By 1985, with 
ve.hicles being downsized, and lighter materids being subst.ituted for iron, the amount of 
iron castings has declined by half to about 250 pounds. Not only has Michigan's employ- 
ment in iron mining and ore shipping declined, but sever,d foundries have also closed. 
Over the past few years, the decline in iron castings usage has stabilized. However, AD1 
interviews indicate that considerabiy more aluminum substitution for iron castings could be 
on the horizon, threatening more iWchigan jobs in iron mining, shipping and ferrous 
foundries. 
Currently, about three-fourths of the engine heads &e cast in iron. By 1990, 
another fourth will be converted to aluminum. As noted in the materials chapter, some of 
the vehicle manufacturers are also interested in converting engine blocks from ferrous to 
aluminum materials. Engine m d o l d s  have been heavily cast of iron, but intake 
manifolds are now being switched to aluminum or steel. 
Most of the aluminum heads substituted thus far for iron heads previously produced 
in Nichigan and elsewhere in the U.S. have been imported, largely from Italy. Foundries 
there have developed a leadership role in the difficult task of casting aluminum heads. 
U.S. companies in certain instances have designed aluminum heads, and put them into 
production in their own aluminum foundries using their own casting technology, with dis- 
appointing results. However, some captive and a few independent casting companies in 
the U.S. are beginning to master the technology, and onct of these has an operation in 
Michigan. However, if Michigan is to avoid a net job loss, foundries, competitive 
aluminum casting technology must be acquired by more state foundries and casters. 
A very large proportion of the aluminum engine corrnponents produced thus far has 
been cast using permanent mold technology. While this technology has important benefits, 
they are probably not significant enough in themselves to encourage a sharp acceleration 
in the switch to aluminum. However, General Motors and Ford in particular have been 
working intensively on a new casting process called the lost-foam method, which so far is 
not attractive for iron. 
A major foundry advantage of the lost foam process is that it avoids several 
problems inherent in sand molds and cores because a coated polystyrene perishable 
pattendcore is ased. ,Polystyrene patterns "mass produced" by injection molding permit 
engine and manufacturing engineers to design more comple:~ castings-for example, allow- 
ing such details as oil drain and through bolt-holes to be camst rather than machined later. 
Other machining economies also result because the lost-foam casting creates a smoother 
and more consistently repeatable surface. All told, this technology, with advances in 
machining, can reduce the aluminum head and block machining time by about a third. 
If manufacturing tests currently underway prove out, the lost-foam process could be 
the key that persuades GM to produce blocks and heads of aluminum. And it is likely at 
least that intake manifolds would be aluminum as well. Ford is readying an aluminum 
manifold for lost-foam production at its Windsor, Ontario foundry. If GM's experiences 
are positive, it is speculated that Saturn b d  another new engine design, the Manhattan, 
could also be made of aluminum. Similarly, success at  Ford on the manifolds is expected 
to encourage more applications. 
The Saturn engine will be produced adjacent to its new vehicle assembly plant. Be- 
cause there has been no announcement yet from GM as to .which four cylinder engine will 
be tak'en out of production when Saturn begins manufactu~i~ng, it is not yet known where 
the associated job loss will occur. More of this information should become available during 
the next several months. 
Adhesive Bonding to Replace Weldments 
Several manufacturing engineers commented that among the keys to greater 
flexibility, particularly in assembly activities, are advancements permitting the use of ad- 
hesive bonding to reduce welding operations. Despite the productivity and quality gains 
experienced recently from the development of robotic and other flexibly automated welding 
processes, manufacturing engineers continue their search for- ways to reduce the number of 
welds in a car. One vehicle manufacturer described an ex.perimenta1 vehicle which was 
fabricated with adhesives to replace 900 welds. Besides saving as much as 40 dollars per 
car, test data suggest that the integrity of the vehicle may actually be improved. 
Welding has been a source of quality and produccivit;y problems for several years; 
these have become even greater with the increasing use of' galvanized steel. Zinc multi- 
plies the usual problems with the welding tips, requiring frequent equipment changes and 
higher consumption. Welding operations that have used lead. also raise occupational health 
questions; the entire welding operation often involves an unpleasant work environment, 
causing worker turnover, It  is also an occupation that requires considerable skill for high 
quality standards. Thus, a high turnover r a k  brings espenisive training costs and quality 
problems. 
The increasing use of plastic composites will also encourage more adhesive bonding. 
Plastic's inherent ability to integrate what would have been several discrete components if 
made of steel, into a one piece molding will in itself reduce the need for both bonding and 
welding operations. AIM 11 should explore the extent to which Michigan equipment 
manufacturers are involved with welding equipment and supplies, and evaluate the impact 
of the possible eliminatiodreduction of welding operations. 
Training Problems 
Flexible automation, especially the various forms of computer-assisted manufactur- 
ing, were viewed by many of the executives interviewed as being important potential sour- 
ces of productivity and quality improvements. Yet it was their opinion that where these 
technologies have not been utilized effectively, the lack of worker training was a principal 
cause. The need for retraining at various Ievels, includins technicians, engineers, and 
managers, throughout the industry, was cited again and again. 
Several executives mentioned the lack of properly trained personnel as the reason 
that certain plants (both captive and independent parts suppliers) were having trouble 
achieving the flexibility necessary for JIT. A typical problem, was characterized as follows: 
too often the highest level of management fails to understand what computer:assisted and 
ot,her flexible manufacturing technologies can do. .4nd the younger managers, while they 
understand the technologies, lack the authority or the experience to promote and integrate 
these systems within the existing formaViforma1 networks in the plant. 
And even when a pIant management has aggressively installed computer-integrated 
manufacturing equipment, too often it has painfully learned that inadequate preparations 
had been made for training operations people. During interviews about flexible automa- 
tion, CAD, CAIY m d  computer integrated manufacturing, several executives mentioned 
repeatedly that people are the key and that for the foresees.ble future they will continue to 
be the key to successful implementation. 
The training problem is viewed as being so serious that mmy executives interviewed 
cautioned that flexible automation and related technologies such as CAM would never 
achieve anything near their full potential in U.S. plants because with prevailing training 
programs, the work force may not be able to cope with these technologies. 
Some vehicle manufacturers reportedly have sent CAM-involved workers to special- 
ized training schools where they achieve a level of proficiency adequate to program, 
operate, or maintain a flexible system. Frequently, these newly trained workers were 
soon transferred to jobs with other responsibiIities. Untrained personnel were commonly 
assigned to replace the transferred persons. Not surprisingly, the performance of the 
automated equipment deteriorated. A. work force with superior 'training was one of the 
reasons cited to explain why the Japanese have purchasttd automation from American 
companies and achieved an operating level of 80-85 percent, compared to an approximate 
operating level of 50 percent achieved by U.S. vehicle manufacturers having the very 
same machinery. 
Two parallel, but related, trends are also bringing to the surface other dimensions of 
the training problem. The vehicle manufacturers want to involve both product design and 
manufacturing engineering personnel early in the design phase. At the same time they 
are increasing the outsourcing of component parts, which often includes more responsibility 
for the detail design of both the part and the manufacturing process. The vehicle manufac- 
turers are requesting that the parts suppliers design with CAD'equipment. This requires 
product people who understand how to design with CAD for CAM, and CAM people who -
understand the use of CAD. There is a serious shortage of these specialists in Michigan. 
Because the shortage is serious, some OEM's are considering sourcing complete 
vehicle modules to Europe because these suppliers have the necessary engineering staff 
with CAD/CAM skills. One OEM indicated that without a proficiency in computer-aided 
design and computer-aided manufacturing skills, future parts suppliers will not be con- 
sidered. 
The problem was described by another executive somewhat differently a t  another 
interview. He said, "Our problem is to figure out how to get manufacturability considera- 
tion into the product design which is done on on CAD, when the manufacturing people do 
not understand how to use CAD." This problem is present not only in the independent 
part supplier companies, but also in the parts supplier divisions of the OEM plants as well. 
The vehicle manufacturers are finding it difficult enough to build a new culture which more 
closely links product designers in the vehicle manufacturing companies with the manufac- 
turing engineers in their own operations and in the parts supplier companies using conven- 
tional design processes, but dimculties are compounded when they also trp to do the en- 
gineering using new CAD processes. 
I t  is a common practice in the U.S. auto industry to subcontract detailed vehicle and 
component-parts design to a specialized group of design companies. *These "job shops" 
work out the design details and make thousands of individual drawings, once a preliminary . 
design, at least, has been formulated by the vehicle designers in the OEMs. The vehicle 
manufacturers would like the design shops to do all of this d,etailed product and process en- 
gineering by CAD. However, the OEMs are also finding <a shortage in design shops of 
designers who are skilled in CAD. Moreover, there are not enough product design shops 
around Michigan which have their own CAD equipment. 
We asked several interviewees about the prospect of increased sourcing of engineer- 
ing and design services from elsewhere in the U.S. and abroad as the development of CAD- > 
CAE and teIecommunications lays the technical foundation for this option. Tvlost ack- 
nowledged the possibility, and several could offer examples, but the prevailing sentiment 
was that the value of continuous, intimate, even "subjectiven interactions between en- 
,&eering and (especially) design teams would continue to support a preference for contrac- 
tors close a t  hand. In their judgment, there will continue to be a circle of engineering and 
'design excellence in southeastern Michigan, even as global. communications link the in- 
dustry internationally. This continued strength depends, of course, on the ability of the 
state and the industry to atiract and develop superior talent in CAD-CAE. 
One OEM is near the point of going 06shore for these types of semices. A group of 
executives commented that too few schools in the United States still teach drafting. They 
argued that there was a shortage of perhaps as many as 1000 designers in the Detroit 
area. They also commented that it was puzzling that Electronic Data Systems (a new GIvl 
subsidiary), which provides data processing services, could recruit thousands of program- 
mers, but the product design and manufacturing' engineering groups within the auto in- 
dustry cannot find qualified designers. 
One of the executives interviewed summarized the at,titudes voiced at several inter- 
views where the training problem was discussed: "The rapid introduction of computer aids 
to engineering and manufacturing results in a dearth of trained personnel." Perhaps the 
state can put its weight behind a training program that would yield engineers, model 
makers, etc., schooled in the use of computer techniques. 
Machine Tool Technology and Future Gductivity 
Executives at  the vehicle manufacturers cited the critical role that advanced 
machine tool technology must play in essential productivity and quality improvements. 
Nearly everyone interviewed expressed serious concern about the health of the Michigan 
and U.S. machine tool industry. Not only will the technological competitiveness of these 
automation suppliers directly impact the auto industry, but they are also important 
employers of thousands of highly paid Michigan workers. 
One high-level official from a vehicle manufacturing company commented that 
during the period from about 1979 to 1954 he! seriously doubted that the U.S. machine tool 
industry would be able to develop and supply technologically competitive equipment. Now, 
he has modified his opinion somewhat, and believes that U.S. machine tool companies are 
improving their technological capabilities relative to their international competitors. 
However, he and others are.stii1 concerned. 
Most of the concern focuses on the machine tool industry's ability to deliver equip- 
ment with integrated computer technology. In response to the question, "What do the 
machine tool manufacturers have to do to become more technologically competitive," one 
official summarized the concerns as follows: 
@ Develop more reach in their product 
Increase their research and development investments. 
@ Improve the educational capability of their staffs. 
Assimilate available technology from all over the world and extend it. 
r Increase their competitive ability to compete with leading industries and technologies 
around the world. ' 
Do more with computer networks besides stopping a t  the programmable controllers, 
leaving the balance of the engineering for the computer controUmanagement infor- 
mation network to the vehicle manufacturer or another contractor. 
A major t h t  of the auto industry's drive to increase flexible manufacturing sys- 
tems will be powered by linking management information computers and machine controls 
through a hierarchical data communication network. At present, one of the Big Three has 
approldmateIy 45,000 programmable machine control devices in its plants, but expects a 
four- to fivefold increase over the next few years. Today, only about 10 to 20 percent of 
these devices can communicate with computers or networks outside the island of automa- 
tion that the machine connollers manage. 
In the future, one-fourth to one-third of the costs for ;automotive industry's automa- 
tion is expected to be targeted for data communications, i.e., transmitting control data and 
management information around and between factories. The concern of the automotive in- 
dustry is that there does not exist a systems engineering capability in the conventional 
suppliers of factory automation, especially machine tool companies. This concern is 
strengthened by the information that the two largest machine tool companies employ only 
2 1  and 14' p r o g r b e r s ,  respecti;ely. Executives interviewed commented that the miss- 
ing link in the machine tool companies' systems capability is software skills. 
The increasing requirement for automation companies; to become systems suppliers 
is summarized by the following statement, taken from a '1984 speech given by Donald 
J. Atwood, Executive Vice President of the General Mocors Corporation: "We will increase 
our emphasis on creating total systems of machine tools and related material handling 
devices. Thus, simply buying pieces of this and partials of that will be far less common." 
I t  is clear that some Michigan automation companies face both a challenge and an oppor- 
tunity if they are to develop a systems capability, 
It also looks as though the machine tool industry may be moving toward a structural 
realignment in which some companies will act as systems packagers, while others will sup- 
ply speciality products to the systems-oriented companies. Without a proficiency in 
software, equipment suppliers will by default be relegated to specialty products, and be in- 
creasingly vulnerable to foreign competition. 
Most of Michigan's machine tool builders began as small tool, fixture, or die builders. 
They expanded to include more of the "system"-an entire machine. As they grew, they 
tended to specialize in a single-purpose machine like a lathe, a mill, or a boring machine. 
The first transfer machines, which Michigan machine tool companies can proudly 
point to as one of "their" key developments, were collections of several of these single- 
purpose machines connected together with mechanical handling devices. 
-4 handful of the Michigan special-purpose transfer-line machine tool builders dedi- 
cated themselves to the needs of the automobile industry. Most of these companies were 
closely held, i.e., family-owned. Manufacturing officials thought that over the past several 
years there was not enough "risk-taking" or research and de!velopment performed by these 
previous technological leaders. 
However, vehicle manufacturing company officials were quick to assign a good share 
of the blame for the machine tool industry's condition to both the machine tool companies 
and the purchasing policies of their own companies. Especially during the past 25 years, 
the automobile OEMs did much of their own process engineering, in-house. They wrote 
complete sets of process specifications. They turned these over to the machine tool in- 
dustry through a purchasing group which, in turn, solicited low bids and the shortest 
delivery times. Conversation between the OEM's manufacturing engineering department 
and the machine tool builder normally was overtly discouraged by the purchasing corn- 
munity; it seemed to interfere with the analysis process. 
While this process may have had the nearsighted result of forcing the lowest initial 
price for the equipment, it restricted opportunities for fruitful technological interchange be- 
tween the OEM technical staff and the machine builder. Equipment price and delivery 
quotations frequently were requested on a "piecemeal" basis. When there was a need for 
more than one machine, transfer machines might have been ordered from more than one 
builder. The vehicle manufacturer ordered ancillary equipment, such as washers, induc- 
tion hardeners, etc., separately. 
Reportedly, up until recently, there was a low pr i~r i t~y placed on innovation. -4 low 
priority was also placed on flexibility. The machine tool supplier was not involved with 
process until it was nearly time for the vehicle or component; part production to start. 
The machine tool industry became a customer-satisfying industry whose philosophy 
was, "Tell us what you want and we will build it." Their primary task was to satisfy the 
purchasing department's low-bid and fastdelivery requirements, with little emphasis on 
supplying to the industry "leading-edge" technology. 
I t  was surprising to find in the AIM survey phase that so many manufacturing 0%- 
cials employed by the vehicle manufacturers recounted reasonably similar historical 
scenarios-a series of developments which helped creak! a machine tool industry in 
Michigan that became a world leader in certain technologies, and then helped accelerate its 
deterioration. The scenario places a significant portion of the blame for the delayed use of 
advanced manufacturing technology on the vehicle manufacturer's purchasing policies. 
One executive, now approaching retirement, commented: "Looking back, it was foolish that 
we were forced to save $50,000 to $75,000 by selecting the low bidder on a multi-million 
dollar system and ended up with technologically inferior equipment that ultim'ately 
resulted in lower productivity/quality on billions of dollars worth of engine blocks produced 
by that equipment." 
Similar interviews can be summarized by the comment of one manufacturing official 
when he stated, "In a very real sense we (the automobile OEMs) made the U.S. manufac- 
turing equipment building industry what it is." These policies, when combined with the al- 
legedly historicd conservativism (fostered by boom or bust business cycles) of the Michigan 
machine tool companies have created a questionable outlook for the vehicle manufacturers' 
ability to acquire technologically advanced automation from the Michigan companies. This 
dilemma likewise places in jeopardy the jobs of thousands of workers employed in the 
Michigan tool building industry. 
A machine tool company executive emphasized other barriers a t  the vehicle 
manufacturers that dissuaded the acquisition of new product;ion technology with the follow- 
ing rhetorical question. "How many manufacturing engineers a t  the car companies have 
been fired for proposing or selecting proven but outdated technology, compared to the num- 
ber who were released because they selected new technology which required more time 
than planned to make it operational?" 
When the criticism regarding 'a lack of technologica.1 advancement was discussed 
with a representative of a machine tool company, he conceded that the conservatism of the 
machine tool industry was a factor. He also elaborated on the short delivery requirements 
as another serious problem. .4s noted earlier, the machine tool company proposing the 
shortest delivery time commonly received the contract, assuming price compatibility. 
Short delivery requirements often meant that machine tool suppliers were discouraged 
from proposing new technology which was not completely proven out. Thus, the automo- 
tive industry commonly bought proven, but old technology. 
Jn this type of competitive environment, Michigan machine tool companies seldom 
enjoyed the opportunity to test out their research in a real-,world production environment. 
This barrier can be contrasted with some European and Japanese competitors, where the 
machine tool company is a subsidiary of, for example, for example, Fiat, Renault, or 
Toyota. These companies find it easier to take new technologies directly to a noncritical 
application on the production floor of the parent vehicle maxlufacturers for tryout-free of 
the pressures of needing to deliver workable systems to contractual specifications within a 
specific delivery period. 
A partial solution of this type of problem was suggested to be inherent in the new 
approach General Motors announced in late 1984 that it intends to use in buying equip- 
ment. However, American machine tool companies contacted in the interviews said that 
while they had heard about GM's policy change, they had not as yet been asked to become 
involved in a contract that would incorporate these new policies. Further, it was noted 
that the "business-as-usual" purchasing policies of the other two vehicle manufacturers ap- 
peared intact. Manufacturing executives in vehicle manufacture and machinery companies 
believe that the continuation of these purchasing policies will greatly lessen the car com- 
panies' prospects for acquiring advanced manufacturing equipment, and eventually Iead 
them to become dependent upon foreign machine tool technology. 
As noted earlier, the Big Three are asking parts suppliers and automation builders 
to join their design teams early in the vehicle! development ,programs to "simultaneously" 
engineer the product and "optimal" manufacturing process. Although the automation sup- 
pliers interviewed view such invitations as encouraging signs for changing procurement 
policies, they are reluctant to share their expertise and proprietary technology unless they 
are assured that they will receive subsequent orders for th.e equipment. Their mistrust 
grows out of past automotive purchasing tactics for both parts and equipment wherein a 
supplier funded the basic development on its own, and submitted the design to the vehicle 
manufacturers for evaluation. Often when the technology was accepted, the new business 
opportunity was then opened to competition and awarded to the lowest bidder. Additional- 
ly, automation supplier companies often incurred si&cant, unreimbursed engineering 
costs to prepare preliminary designs for new automation proposals. The vehicle manufac- 
turers were accused of picking concepts from higher priced proposals and asking the low 
bidder to incorporate them in its design. 
Despite these misgivings, automation companies believe that "simultaneous* en- 
gineering with appropriate safeguards will be an important step forward in developing 
technologically advanced equipment for automotive manuf'acture. Some people speculate 
that the Saturn program will procure at least some of its equipment on the basis of a firm 
commitment to companies participating in "simultaneous" engineering. Stamping press 
manufacturers report that GM plans to design and purchase the major stamping presses 
for Saturn by these methods. Saturn engineers and personnel from one or two stamping 
press builders will jointly and simultaleoudqr work out the design of the stamped parts, 
the presses, and associated material-handling equipment. Once the equipment specifica- 
tions have been jointly determined, the participating equipment supplierts) will be paid for. 
their design services; Saturn and the equipment supplier(s) will then negotiate price and 
delivery. 
This new method of automation procurement contrasts sharply with the conven- 
tional approaches which grew out of the separation of product design, manufacturing en- 
gineering, and purchasing. I t  also promises to create a new atmosphere which should 
result in products designed for sharply accelerating the introduction of advanced manufac- 
turing technology. 
Tooling 
Despite the progress made in the U.S. auto industry to tighten tolerances 
throughout vehicle bodies, considerable progress is still required in improving body panel 
fits. The following comment summarizes the present situation and the hopes for the fu- 
ture: "Compared to where we expect to be in a few years, the fit-quality of sheet metal 
parts and subassemblies is in chaos. We will eliminate the build-up of tolerances that 
result through the manual methods used for vehicle design and toolmaking by accelerating 
the use of CAD, CAE, and CAM, in conjunction with NC machining of tool components," 
While the compounding of tolerances occurs throughout the entire system of going from the 
product designer's sketches through to the fabrication of the production tools and checking 
fixtures, considerably more emphasis will be focused on the computer-aided design and 
production of stamping dies and plastic molds. 
An essential element to extending the! implementation of these CADICAE and NC 
systems is wide-scale implementation of NC in both the captive and independent design 
and toolmaking operations. Machining equipment for body tools, however, is very expen- 
sive, costing as much as $2 million for a single NC milling machine. TooImaking opera- 
tions committing to such techniques would require several NC machines, in addition to the 
CADICAE equipment. Both independent toolmaking compa.nies and the auto industry are 
co.ncerned that the small tooling firms cannot raise the capital to buy all this new equip- 
ment. 
One of the vehicle manufacturing executives summarized the concern: "The objec- 
tives of higher quality and shorter lead time will drive the use of computer technology in 
the engineering, manufacturing, and assembly of automotive tools. This will result in 
h e a w  investments in computer-aided engineering and manufacturing equipment to replace 
the present system of drawings, die models, and prototype tooling, leading up to hard steel 
tools. The investment required will doubtless weed out the smaller, weaker supplier or- 
ganizations. 
It was noteworthy during AIM interviews that while the vehicle manufacturers 
place the responsibility for the needed improvement in body quality on the manual tool- 
making methods, the independent tool and die shops argue that tooling which they have 
produced with the manual methods is superior to tooling produced by NC within the cap- 
tive shops. I t  is apparent, however, that significantly improved quality tooling has been 
produced on NC by equally skilled toolmaking operations, regardless of whether they are 
captive or independent. 
It is clear that there will be a dec1inin.g (probably gradual) automotive demand for 
tooling manufactured by manual methods. The requirements for the use of CADICAE for 
designing and producing automotive tooling are clear. Yet, because the capital needs are 
- so large compared to the resources of a small toolmaking company, it is not a t  all clear 
how these companies, which are vital to the vehicle manufiacturers actually being able to 
use such technology to improve their body-fit quality, will be able to afford it. 
Additionally, once the equipment is acquired, either by captive or independent tool- 
making facilities, it is obvious that a considerable number of years will be required before 
all the managers and skilled trades can be retrainedltrained in a suficiently large number 
of toolmaking facilities to provide enough increase in capacity to make a difference in the 
huge tooling programs of the auto industry. The state can heip fill this trainingJadvisory 
need until new programs by trade associations and colleges can be implementxd. 
If the U.S. auto industry must wait until CAD1C.G and numerical toolmaking 
methods are fully assimilated by the captive and independent tool design and production 
operations without outside support on equipment financing and training-before the fit- 
quality of vehicle bodies is fully optimized, it is possible that this process will require 1.5 to 
20 years. 
As noted above, one of the persons interviewed indicated that it was his private ex- 
pectation that only about one-third of the independent companies now building body tooling 
for the auto industry will find the resources ta be able to buy the CAD/CAE, and NC equip- 
ment; the other two-thirds that are not able to afford it will need to shift markets. Should 
that forecast be accurate, it is doubtful that there will be a sufficient number of CAD/CAM 
NC operations to build the required tools during peak tooling programs. 
Independent companies were urged by auto industry executives surveyed to work 
out cooperative arrangements were they can share CAI)/CAE and the expensive NC 
\ 
machines. It was suggested that the state might create an industrial park where in- 
dependent toolmaking companies could cluster. Within the park one company could con- 
centrate on providing CAD/CAE services, another company on prototype tooling, and 
another might concentrate on NC machining of large tooling components; still others 
might specialize in construction and tryout, or other specia1t:y services. 
Apparently, there have been somewhat similar approaches to related problems in 
Japan requiring large amounts of capital investments by s~aal l  businesses. A centralized 
effluent treatment system reportedly was installed by a unit of the Japanese government 
in a new industrial park specially designed for plating companies. 
Independent toolmaking companies that have acquired an "entry-level" capability 
with CAD-numerical control reported in the interviews that'software differences crop up 
even among the individual divisions of General Motors, as well as between the Big Three. 
Tooling companies have been further fmstrated because they have purchased specially 
designed equipment/software that was advertised as making data from generally similar, 
but slightly different CAD systems compatible. 
While GM divisions may have similar CAD equipment for tooling design, these sys- 
tems often produce slight variations in software formats by the time the data reach tooling 
companies. Independent tooling companies that have acquired CAD systems are therefore 
unable to use a single CAD system which can accommodate all the different data formats 
coming from the several GM divisions. The problem is conipounded by the still different 
data formats from Ford and Chrysler. A few years ago, it .was thought that an emerging 
software system would be able to accept minor variations in data formats from different 
CAD systems and make them compatible for a range of CAD/CAM systems. The results 
have been disappointing for both the vehicle manufacturers :md their tooling suppliers, and 
tho software incompatibility problem is still holding back the pace of CAD/CAM toolmak- 
ing. 
Some executives speculated that General Motors through its new subsidiary, 
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) is considering the establishment of a chain of CAD/CAE 
equipment centers around the country which suppliers to the auto industry, including in- 
dependent tooling companies, might be able to utilize. This possibility could have a special 
tooling appeal, because General Motors, like Ford and Chrysler, has developed special 
CADICAE, and NC software for computer-sided design and toolmaking which might be 
marketed by EDS, or other similar commercial ventures. 
GM has made other proprietary software available ta EDS for its commercial pur- 
poses. Having GM's proprietary CADICAEICAM software available for tooling design and 
manufacture, with appropriate computer equipment and ,advisory expertise on an as- 
needed commercial basis, would not only be of great assistance to the small independent 
tool and die shops, but be of great help to General Motors, and probably the other U.S. 
vehicle manufacturers in achieving their principal goal of im.proving the fitquality of their 
body components as soon as possible. It is also possible that because of EDS's 
entrepreneurial interest, it would be willing to offer CADICAM advisory services exploiting 
this apparent gap in today's toolmaking marketplace. 
It wouid be of definite value if the state government could provide the leadership for 
"EDS-typen organizations to establish Michigan operations concentrating on the develop- 
ment of CADtCAE centers having the computer equipment and expertise necessary to 
bridge the gap between the CAD/CAE/CAJ toolmaking systems of the vehicle manufac- 
turers and the independent tool and die companies. In the interim, however, state- 
sponsored CADlCAE/CAM toolmaking training and advisory programs may be needed. 
The use of CAD for moldmaking activities is further advanced than it is in the com- 
panies making stamping dies for body panels. On many molded parts, it is customary to 
make more than a single mold. It is, therefore, easier to uaortize costs of CAD and NC 
programming across multiple sets of molds. In some automotive applications it is not un- 
common to build six to eight molds for the same plastic part, compared to one die for a 
steel part. 
To summarize what appears to be a very volatile situation, the capital costs and 
new technical abiIities required for continued (or new) participation in the independent tool- 
ing and prototype seapent serving auto dictate that larger organizations will be required. 
The segment will be very turbulent during the rest of the 1.980s. What kind of organiza- 
tions will emerge from the turbulence is less clear. Several forms, not necessarily mutual- 
ly exclusive, seem possible. 
Some of the larger and now rapidly-eqandiig engineering service firms in the area 
will certainly extend their capabilities to embrace tooling and prototype development. 
Major first tier suppliers are expanding their engineering and design capacities to conduct 
concurrent development with their OEM customers, and may acquire some of the talent, or 
actual firms, from Michigan's historic tooling and prototype endowment. OEM-sponsored 
regional centers (as with the EDS idea) that might provide training and pooled equipment 
for trusted smaller tooling firms is an attractive prospect for those with an interest in en- 
couraging an orderly, socially efficient transition to the new technologies. The same can be 
said for the bold concept of a consortia of sn~aller firms that, with public support, might 
reorganize to share a common facility in which expensive equipment is commonly owned or 
leased and firms are encouraged to share skills, jobs, and work on innovations that require 
the gifts of many "golden hands." 
The state has a clear inkrest in renewing its historic leadership in the tooling seg- 
ment. In the environment of the late 1980s, it may be appropriate for government to ex- 
periment openly, to share some of the risks with the private sector. 
Toolmaking Opportunities in Plastic Composite Parts 
The GM replacement for the Camaroflirebird cars i:s expecgd to have composite 
pIastic body panels. Toolmaking and molding capacities for plastic parts of the ap- 
proximate size of body panels is in short supply in the United States, and could limit the 
ability of the car companies to make the switch from steel to composite plastics. 
Executives outside GM speculated. that the production moIding requirements for the 
Camaroflirebird would probably require a new General Motors plastics plant to produce 
plastic body panels-which would be similar in function h u t  smaller) to a stamping plant 
for a car with steel bodies. Because the Camaroflirebird replacement is expected to be' as- 
sembled a t  Pontiac, it is logical that GM, or its suppiier of these panels, could be interested 
in a "just-in-time" site near Pontiac. 
One study of plastic composite body tooling capacity concluded that there is a total 
capability in the U.S. for making about 150 body panel molds per year. The car com- 
panies estimak that this will accommodate production up to about 400,000 cars per year, 
at  today's production rate for plastic composite panels. 
Fiero production a t  100,000 units and the Corvette at; about 50,000 units is still well 
below the 400,000 units per year ceiling. However, by 1989, the CarnaroFirebird should 
be in full production at  300,000 to 400,000 units per year, pushing the total to about a 
half miIIion units from just those three cars. In addition, other specialty cars Eire planned 
to have some plastic composite panels as well, creating more of a tooling opportunity for 
Michigan moldmaking companies. Because the increased plastic use will be a t  the expense 
of steel panels, there will bg little if any net gain in overall tooling business. And because 
most of the body stamping dies are made in Michigan, any new body molds that are not 
built in Michigan will result in a net loss of tooling jobs in the state. 
Beyond the toolmaking bottleneck, production capacity problems for molding body 
components are also expected. The extent of the capacity shortage is directly related to 
production molding and painting cycle times-affected by technological advances. It is es- 
timated that for plastic composites to be used for body panels significantly beyond the 
400,000-500,000 vehicles per year, the production molding cycle time will have ta fall 
under one part per minute, compared to today's three to four minutes. Should that hap- 
pen, it likely would create a "Catch-22" situation; wherein faster production times will en- 
courage even more plastic composite applications, which in turn will stretch the capacities 
of moldmaking and plastic body panel producing companies. However, being able to iden- 
tify these capacity shortfails two to three yews in advance should be adequate motivation 
for suppliers to expand their facilities-perhaps in Michigan. 
One force driving the increased use of plastic composite body panels, and certain 
other types of components as well, is the attraction of achieving a 40 to 60 percent tooling 
savings compared tu tooling for steel parts. ~ o w e v k ,  some companies are working on a 
stamping die production method based on casting rather than machining to obtain the 
desired contour in stamping die. If this technology should prove out, and some of those we 
interviewed are optimistic about the prospects, the cast technology could reduce die costs 
for steel parts by as much as 30 to 40 percent-thus narrowing the cost gap between tool- 
ing for plastic composites and steel panels. While there are! other motivations for switch- 
ing to plastic composite body panels, (weight and corrosion protection, for example), suc- 
cessful implementation of casting technology for stamping dies would nevertheless be a 
mild depressant on the future prospects for plastic composit;e body panels, and help main- 
td.n employment opportunities in stamping dies and steel panel production. 
Manufacture of Plastic Composite Body Panels and Space Frames 
The possible switch from steel to plastic panels is expected by several executives to 
be the most significant manufacturing change over the next, decade. Beyond the next few 
years, an acceleration in the use if composite body panels is expected because of projected 
solutions to the following problems which have slowed past applications: 
relatively slow production cycle times; 
painting or coating problems/penalties relative to steel; and 
surface quality problems on body panels. 
TIjl%.de steel components are produced a t  very high rates, sometimes as high as one 
part e v e 6  ten seconds, plastic body panels may require three to four minutes. However, 
improvements in resins, molding machinery and controis, and the technological advance- 
ments in materials, especially non-reinforced composites, will reduce the production cycle 
time to one or two minutes. Some engineers believe that ultimately, cycle times for body 
panels will be reduced to around 40 seconds per panel. Recently, there has been sig- 
nificant progress on reducing cycle times with non-reinforced materials, drop-ping them 
about 25 percent in the last five years. 
Differences in cycle times as affected by part thickness is largely due to differing 
cure times, especially for non-reinforced materials. On fenders, about l/lOth of an inch 
thick, the processing time is 60 to 80 seconds. On bumpers which are about 114th inch 
thick, the processing time varies between 90 and 100 seconds. 
Virtually all materials and manufacturing executives agreed that a 60-second 
production cycle time will make plastic composite body panel technology extremely com- 
petitive with pressed steel panels, especially on lower'volume cars. However, considerable 
development is required before the new non-reinforced plascics technology is suitable for 
horizontal panels, such as the hood, deck lid, or roof. To manufacture such panels with 
non-reinforced plastic composites, it is still necessary to design the component with a 
heavy thickness-about 100 thousandths of an inch-to prevent sagging. The comparable 
thickness in steel would be about 30 thousandths of an inch. 
 technological^ advances to produce hoods, roofs, etc. from non-reinforced materials 
are expected to require very large molding machines, probably having a capacity of about 
6,000 tons and costing $1 to $2 million each. Popular molding machines used today for 
automotive applications are typically under 3,000 tons. Many of the large 10,000-ton 
machines used in other industries, such as for the manufa.cture of boat hulls, bath tubs, 
and refrigerators are made mostly in Europe and Japan. There will be advantages for 
these equipment manufacturers to be located4near automotive customers if the piastic com- 
posite use takes off as some project. The Michigan Department of Commerce should es- 
tablish communications with the foreign molding machinery manufacturers to acquaint 
them with advantages of Michigan as a manufacturing site. 
The relatively slow paint curing times of plastic coxnposites also show promise of 
being accelerated. Automotive companies have been searching for better paint materials 
and application systems, and especially for nev plastic composite materials which tolerate 
higher paint-curing temperatures. Painted steel components are cured at temperatures 
around 325 to 350 degrees F. Because of the susceptability to thermal damage, most plas- 
tic components could not be baked at a temperature in excess of 250 degrees F. Now cer- 
tain new non-reinforced plastics show excellent resistance to thermal damag3 when baked 
at the same oven temperature used for painted steel panels. Further tests are required by 
the auto companies before the full durability of these new non-reinforced plastic materials 
are proven. 
Another important attraction suggesting the increased use of plastic composite body 
panels is the forecast usage of more space frames. Because of the flexibility provided by 
the space frame's body panel mounting pads, vehicle designers find it easier and much less 
expensive to configure a different-looking body off a common space frame. With tooling 
costs for plastic composite body panels only 40 to 60 percent of the tooling costs for steel 
panels, auto companies c3n economically justify tooling up body skins of a new design to 
attack a smaller niche than would be possible for steel. One future car, designed with a 
space frame, is planned to have four distinctive body shapes off one frame. The decision to 
use fiber-reinforced plastic rear doors, hoods and roof spacers on the 1985 front-wheel 
drive Fleetwood limousine is a contemporary illustration of how GM took advantage of 
lower tooling costs to confi,we a special vehicle for a rela.tively small market seepent. 
Some tooling experts speculated that General Motors likely cut the tooling costs at  least by 
a half in using plastics, rather than steel. 
Should the move to plastic body panels sharply accelerate as some of the executives 
believe, this transition will have substant;ial industrial development implications for 
Michigan. Not only will there be a shift in the types requirements for machinery, and tool- 
ing, and in material handling-equipment, but many of Michigan's large steel stamping 
facilities that produce body panels will see a business decline. Examples are the stamping 
facilities of Ford and Chrysler in the Detroit area as well :is GM facilities in Kdamazoo, 
Grand Rapids, and other Michigan cities. Added to those will be adversely impacted busi- 
ness opportunities of the many small stamping companies heavily represented in lower 
Michigan which for decades have been producing some'of the smaller stamped components 
going into vehicle bodies, doors, hoods, deck lids, etc. 
The developments in plastic composite manufacturing technologies need to be fol- 
lowed closely during Mi91 11. As noted earlier, a technological breakthrough in the critical 
factors currently limiting the utilization of plastic composites for body panels will have 
serious implications for many Michigan industries. The challenge will be to identify the 
growth areas in, for example, resins and other plastic materials, molding machinery, etc., 
and to establish programs to encourage their location/expansion in Michigan. 
The space frame as an independent concept was frequently mentioned as one of the 
more significant manufacturing changes expected in the future. However, when it is corn-. 
bined with plastic composite panels and tooling economies, it may have revolutionary 
potential. Variations of the space frame have been used in race cars, and in at least one 
high-priced European sports car. In one space frame application, the structural 
framework of the car is fabricated from approximately 300 separate starnpings. The 
frame consists of the front compartment subassembly, the floor pan, the rear or engine 
compartment (all welded together to form the underbody assembly), and the body sides, 
roof, and doors. The individual components are welded toget,her by over 4,000 spot welds. 
While U.S. space frames are presently manufactured from. steel, plastic composites will 
also be used later, and likely will reduce manufacturing costs and weight. 
A quality advantage results from both the design of the frame's structure and the 
methods used to produce it. After the individual stamped parts of the structure are welded 
together, it is placed in a precision fixture equipped with drilling and milling heads. Here, 
approximately 40 mounting body panel pads are precisely mj.lled to exact X, Y, and Z coor- 
dinate points. Rather than adjusting the outer panels of the car to achieve fit-quality, the 
milled frame-mounting pads provide consistently precise positions to locate and support the 
body panels. This dimension control creates extreme uniformity between the frames and 
promotes outstanding fit-quality of adjoining body panel surfa.ces. 
On one space frame, the Pontiac Fiero, there are 39 mounting pads to which the ex- 
terior body panels are located and bolted. At the base of' the Fiero mounting pads are 
blocks of sheet metal, approximately 314" square and 112" high, which are filled with an 
epoxy compound and spot welded to the space frame at  points where the panels will be at. 
tached. 
Besides the inherent precision benefits, many manufacturing efficiencies drive from 
the space frame design. Because the body skin panels are the last components bolted on, 
all the hard-breach inner modules, e.g., instrument panels, seats, etc. may be installed by 
technicians less encumbered by obstructions. Technicians no longer have to install the in- 
strument panel lying on their backs and extending their arms. With the frame providing 
the structural strength, more extensive use of modules is also possible. For example, some 
manufacturing engineers would like to fabricate as a complete module door - and the frame, 
and once all door-frame fits are secured, then install the door-frame module by connecting 
the set of bolts to the mounting pads. Besides providing for the off-line fabrication of the 
door and frame complete with hinges, windows, handles, etc., consistent margins around 
the periphery of the door frame could be more easily achieved than is possible with present 
methods. 
Centralized vs. Decentralized Production 
Many future assembly plants are expected to have just-in-time parts supplier plants 
clustered around them. In some assembly plants, the vehicle manufacturer may actually 
lease out space to independent parts suppliers. If this production reorganization proves ef- 
fective, it could signal the breakup of large centralized part:; manufacturing plants, many 
of which are located in Michigan, because they will need to redistribute their production to 
several decentralized facilities. Potential examples are fouridry operations, en,+e opera- 
tions, stamping plants, and transmission plants. 
There is some disagreement among manufacturing esecutives on the universal 
economic justification of "magnet" assembly plants surrounded by ma,ior component parts- 
production operations. One executive, while acknowledging the economic merits of the 
clustered approach for high-volume cars, commented that production of some vehicles may 
not be large enough to justify multiple sets of tools for decentralized part/module produc- 
tion a t  assembly plants. For smaller volume operations, ha speculated, it might be more 
efficient h bring vehicle final assembly to where the component parts' tooling is clustered. 
Others foresee, more decentralized than clustered operations for different reasons. 
Foridwide sourcing of parts would restrict cluskring around the magnet assembly plant. 
As somewhat of a surprise, some executives suggested that parts supplying companies 
might simply locate warehouses near assembly plants to satisfy an important goal of the 
vehicle manufacturer, i.e., substantial inventory reductions. However, simply shifting the . 
inventories form the vehicle manufacturer down through the system to various component 
suppliers does little to enhance quality. 
Simple or Complex Automation 
Throughout the auto industry's ambitious efforts to reduce costs by $2,000 to 
$3,000 per vehicle, there has been considerable emphasis on developing and implementing 
advanced, but appropriate, manufacturing technology. Some executives are concerned that 
expensive technology will create a much higher operating breakeven point for "high- 
technology" plants. One person commented, "We are concerned that with all this ad-. 
vanced technology in our expensive flexible! and dedicated manufacturing systems, the 
depreciation costs will eat us alive during inevitable car sales downturns." 
The CWToyota plant in Fremont, California was cited as an example of a some- 
what different philosophy based on relatively simple manufacturing technology. It was a 
surprise ra some that Fremont is a high productivity but low investment facility. Com- 
parable plants of U.S. vehicle manufacturers were estimated to cost two to four times 
more than the equipment selected by the Toyota managers a t  Fremont. The Japanese 
strategy apparently has been to select simple, flexible, and efficient equipment, but then to 
rely on the plant personnel to be properly motivated and dedicated to provide the ingenuity 
for high productivity. One U.S. Executive commented, "We tend to throw money and 
sophisticated equipment a t  quality and productivity problems while the Japanese a t  the 
Fremont plant emphasize a people approach." 
When General Motors announced its plans to establish a joint venture with Toyota, 
one motivation was to "study how the Japanese build cars." -4Ithough the Fremont plant 
has been operating only a short time, their approach suggest that American manufactur- 
ing engineers may re-evaluate how they design piant automation relative to rational in- 
ves trnent levels. 
I t  is curious to observe that manufacturing technology trends, projected by the ex- 
ecutives interviewed, suggest the use of increasingly sophisticated automation. Flexible 
manufacturing systems, complete with computers and software cost anywhere from 20 to 
50 percent more than past conventional automation. This trend heads in a different direc- 
tion from that of the low investmenthigh productivity approach used a t  Fremont. 
The Fremont facility raises several provocative. questions, which increase even more 
the uncertainty about how much automation, and especially flexible manufacturing sys- 
tems, are economically justified for automotive manufacturing in the U.S. I t  was not pos- 
sible to answer conclusively this question in AIM I; a better evaluation may be possible in 
-4IM I1 by supplementing the interviews of executives from American companies with 
visits to U.S. plants of Japanese auto companies, One possibility is that new technology is 
more essential in casting, molding, and machining than in assembly. 
To finally re-emphasize the range of uncertainty which still prevails regarding the 
simple or complex automation question, especially as it applies to the U.S. approach to 
flexibility, the following comment of one manufacturing executive seems especially instruc- 
tive. "In determining the degree of automation needed, we need to locate a proper balance 
between two extremes: no inventories and cixcessive manufacturing flexibility, or exces- 
sive inventories with full dedicated automation." The implication here is that the limits of 
these two options virtually cover the full range of possible approaches to the selection of 
manufacturing technology-implying that the more likely array of possibilities still cannot 
be narrowed down very much. Experiences gained over the last few months from the 
Fremont start-up would seem to imply that a universal answer to the question may in fact 
not be possible for some time. 
DATABASE DEVELOPMENT 
One of the key features of the Auto-In-Michigan (AIM) Project that distinguishes it 
from other studies of the auto industry is its emphasis on tihe current situation and future 
prospects of the industry in Michigan. The investigations of the Central Research Team 
are aimed at determining the industry's prospects in general terms and as they relate to 
the state. To support these efforts, an establishment-specific database of automotive 
manufacturers and suppliers has been constructed. 
Purpose 
This database is designed to: 
Provide information on the size of Michigan's auto-related industries, in terms of 
product, industrial category, business size, and geographic area. 
Provide a current mailing list for targeted mailings and research efforts focused upon 
the Michigan auto industry, including the continuation of the AIM project. 
Enable state and local economic development agencies to effectively service their 
auto-related facilities and market their areas to potenldal investors. 
Characteristics of the  Database 
Economic development activities (including research) elre most effectively carried out 
on an establishment-specific basis. It is a t  this level that many of the decisions that most 
directly affect a company's workforce are made. Retention and attraction efforts are also 
implemented a t  this level; hence the focus of the database on. establishments. 
The AIM database is constructed from establishme!nt-specific information where 
each distinct location of a corporation is included as a separate entry. While our research 
focus is upon production facilities, ail known distinct physical locations of auto-related cdm- 
panies are included. For example, over 110 separate entries are included for General 
Motors, representing each of their physical locations in T~lichigan. This method allows for 
a detailed analysis of industrial changes on particular geographic areas, the State as a 
whole, or on a variety of industrial se,gnents that make up the state's automotive 
economy. For each establishment the following demographic information is generally 
available: 
Name of business 





Chief executive a t  
that location 
DUN and MESC numbers 
Parent company information 
Annual sales (when available) 
Total employment 
Standard industrial classification 
code(s) (four and six digits) 
Short description of business 
activity 
Other contact persons 
The database has been formed by a mer,&g of several sources: 1) the Enhanced 
Duns Market Identifiers (obtained from Dun and Bradstreet Marketing Services), 2) the 
ES-202 file used in connection with the Unemployment Compensation Program and main- 
tained by the Michigan Employment Security Commission, 3) the Iron Age Metalworking 
Data Bank (obtained from Chilton, Inc.), and 4) information provided by a number of local 
economic development agencies on the auto-related establishlnents in their area. 
All establishments are included in the database, regartiless of size. The list has been 
generated from a larger list of Michigan establishments by focusing on the approximately 
sixty Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes at the four-digit level that were known 
to ihclude the bulk of the automotive industry. Businesse!~ in both manufacturing and 
business services (which provide technical support to manufacturers) are included. Infor- 
mation provided by the local agencies has enabled us to include some establishments that 
would typically not be included by the use of a set of SIC codes, since many agencies had 
information on additional establishments that were auto-rel.ated. As the following tables 
present, the database currently includes approximately 12,250 establishments. Not dl of 
these establishments are auto-related, of course. A key objective of our work has been to 
detelinine those that are. 
Potential Auto Supplier Database 






City of Detroit 





Grand Rapids Area 
Bay County 
Saginaw County 
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The Office of Systems and Computer Serrices of the Department of Commerce has 
provided the essential computer expertise to integrate the various sources into a coherent 
and usable database. They have also produced a variety of reports and specialized routines 
to assist the users of the database. Data and technical assistance have also been provided 
by the Information Systems Center a t  the Industrial Technology Institute. The informa- 
tion is stored on the ADP Onsite computer and is accessible by Information Processing 
Language, a software package designed to manipulate large databases. 
Survey Description 
To enhance the descriptive power of the database, a survey has been administered 
to :dl of the automotive establishments included. This survey was designed to: 
n Verify the existing demographic information on the establishments 
- .  
Determine their relationship (if any) to and position in the auto industry 
i~ Provide more information on product, process, and rniiterial, going well beyond SIC 
code, so that CRT information on specific industry trends could be applied directly to 
Michigan estabiishrnents 
a Obtain detail on the linkages between the various establishments in Michigan's 
automotive industry, both in terins of suppliers and customers 
a Collect data directly from the industry on the key challenges that must be dealt with 
to remain competitive 
a Define the current and future technological capabilities and plans of the firms includ- 
ing the means of implementation. I 
Summary results from the survey are provided in the next section. Data are shown 
primarily a t  the statewide level; detailed regional implications will be dealt with in the 
seminars conducted in local areas. 
Survey Results 
Of the 10,000 surveys mailed to the establishments in the database, approximately 
2,500 have been returned, for a 25 percent response rate. 1,000 of these returned sur- 
veys are from auto-related establishments; the remainder are from firms not involved in 
the auto industry or from businesses no longer at the address listed (with no forwarding 
address available). As in the initial database, the largest number of establishments are 
concentrated in plastics, stamping, metal working, auto parts, and engineering services. 
Approximately 23 percent of the completed surveys are from unionized companies, al- 
though a larger percentage of the larger establishments are u.nionized. 
.Approximately 39 percent of the respondents supply components directly to auto , . '  
manufacturers, while 37 percent supply components to other supplier establishments. 
(Many establishments are in both categories.) About 32 percent of the companies supply 
tooling directly to auto manufacturers, while 32 percent provide tooling to other suppliers. 
14 percent of the establishments supply raw materials to other h s ,  while 32 percent of 
the respondents supply en,&eering or manufacturing services to auto manufacturers, and 
, 28 percent provide these services to other suppliers. The total sums to considerably more 
than 100 percent, since firms are usuaily involved in multiple activities. Detailed informa- 
tion on products, processes, and materials is also available. 
Information has also been collected on the major domestic auto manufacturers sup- 
plied by these establishments. The survey results indicate that 77 percent of the respond- 
ents supply General Motors, 62 percent supply Ford, 53 percent transact with Chrysler, 
24 percent work with AMCfinauIt, and 24 percent supply U. S. operations of foreign 
auto manufacturers. Once again, the total is considerably over 100 percent due to the in- 
clusion of multiple answers. Information on particular establishments and products sup- 
plied is also available. 
The survey also deals with the current usage and future plans for various forms of 
manufacturing technology. The most popular forms of technology are computer numerical 
control (CNC) machine tools (39 percent currently use or are considering using such equip- 
ment), computer-aided design (37 percent;), programma.ble controllers (30. percent), 
computer-aided engineering (27 percent), and computer-aided manufacturing equipment 
(25 percent). Again, multiple responses are permitted. 
The survey has been very successful in assessing industry attitudes concerning the 
most critical business challenges, technology usage, 'and possible stace government assist- 
ance in technology programs. One question specifically asked for the greatest obstacle in 
remaining competitive in the automotive industry. Since this survey has been partially 
conducted by State government, the expected business cost issues are often mentioned. 
Other responses such as  improved communication with the automotive manufacturers, the 
need for a skilled workforce, foreign and domestic competi.tion, iinmcing, and operating 
costs are also mentioned frequently. 
A question concerning the usefulness of State assistance in technology implementa- 
tion was helpful both in evaluating past and current programs, and designing new ones 
such as the Technology Deployment Service launched in Fall 1985. Overall, there was a 
desire for localized training, with community colleges being the most frequently requested 
provider. We also learned that a large number of businesses are unaware of what assist- 
ance the State can and will offer. 
A completed survey is included a t  the end of this cha,pter to illustrate the responses. 
The surveys chosen illustrate a parts plant of one of the auto mmufacturers, s medium 
sized independent parts maker, and a small tooling firm. 
Survey Administration 
The survey was designed by members of the A M  project, in consultation with local 
economic development agencies (LEDAS) m d  survey specialists, and then piloted to several 
firms. I t  was then administered by twelve LEDAs throughout the State. Local agencies 
and AIM staff have coded the responses, which have been added to the State's corn. 
puterized database. In the fall, local agencies will have access to the .computerized infor- 
mation for the establishments in their area. This informai;ion is also being used in AIM 
presentations to the LEDAs. 
The LED& performed the critical function of coding the returned surveys. They 
were dso involved in extensive follow-up, which enhanced t3.e response rate. The coding of 
the response forms was a complicated and time-consuning'task, but was required so that 
the data would be easily accessible by computerized searching routines. 
The length of the survey may have been a detrimental factor in the quantity and 
quality of the responses received. This was evidenced by the decreasing number of respon- 
ses on the final questions of the survey. This is a difficult issue to resolve, since the sur- 
vey covered a number of independent topics, and therefore had to be rather lengthy. 
The layout of the form may also have had a major irripact. For example, one ques- 
tion asked the respondents to list their auto-related customers. Although company name 
and location were requested, the location of the facility was often not provided, thus 
making it difficult to pinpoint the proper establishment. This may have been due the in- 
clusion of only one Line for this information, rather than separate lines for the plant name 
and its location. 
Electronic Clipping Service 
To ensure the timeliness of the database, the AIjM project is maintaining an 
"Electronic Clipping Service" that includes current information from the trade and popular 
press on investments, products, site locations, and other factors that pertain to particular 
establishments. This information has been shared on the electronic conference, so that the 
varied expertise of the ALN1 Project is reflected and added t;o the original press report. In- 
formation of this type is invaluable to economic developmerlt officials as they contact com- 
panies for retention or expansion. 
The following examples illustrate some of the major categories of the articles in- 
cluded: 1) Information on the future of a major Michigan assembly facility, 2) Data 
relating to a major Michigan parts facility and its suppliers, many based in Michigan, and 
3) Articles concerning the use of technology as they affect Michigan plants. This informa- 
tion is generally applicable not only to the facilities explicitly mentioned, but also to other 
similar facilities. 
REPLY from: Dan Luria 19:OO Jun16185 TGKJ3:iLLF 
REPLY from: Alan Baum 12:26 Jun16/85 TGKC:MF 
REPLY from: Dan Luria 09:2 1 Jun10/85 TGKB:bIF 
MESSAGE from: Alan Baum 2 1: 40 Jun09185 TGKC:iLIF 
LABOR TALKS AT JEFFERSON ASSEMBLY 
' 
Source: DN, 6/4/85 
Categories: Detroit, Labor 
Chrysler has reportedly told local UAW officials (Local, 7, president is W. "Wolf" 
Lawrence) that future production a t  Jefferson Assembly depends on union cooperation in 
improving efficiency. However, a Chrysler official denied thiat the plant would close in late 
summer of '86 without an agreement. (Does it seem crazy to talk about the closing of Jef- 
ferson given Chrysler's shortage of assembly capacity?) 
Lawrence says that Chrysler labor folks have asked for improvements in productivity, 
quality, and reductions in absenteeism. Bargaining on the Iocal contract will occur this 
sunmer as the national agreement expires October 15. The future a t  Belvidere, IL is also 
being tied to favorable local agreements, so maybe this is a general negotiating strategy. 
Jefferson builds Ks, which will be replaced in MY 87 by the As. Lawrence maintains that 
the workforce is good, and that quality levels were being praised by company officials 
several months ago. False d a m ? )  Any comments? 
REPLY from: Dan Luria 09:21 JunlC)/85 TGKB:lMF 
Important stuff, this. Chrysler's too short of capacity to shut anydung, so even if Jeff 
doesn't get A's, it gets something. Depends on demand, seems to me. 
REPLY from: .4lan Baum 12:26 Jun16/85 TGKC:iMF 
DAUCH STATES THAT JEFFERSON CLOSING NOT PIIANNED 
Source: DN, 6/14/85 
Categories: Location, Detroit, Labor 
Richard Dauch, Chrysler Exec V P  for manufacturing, states that there is no specific plan 
to close Jefferson Assembly, but that no models have yet been scheduled there for produc- 
tion beyond 1987. He also stated that more efficient work practices will be a priority 
negotiating item throughout the company when negotiations begin with the UAW this 
summer. The Jefferson piant is unique in that it is bisectad by a major street, Jefferson 
-4venue. 
REPLY from: Dan Luria 19:00 Jun16lS.5 TGKB:MF 
I'll ask around about what the UAW hears on A.bodies - iir plants 8: order of Jefferson, 
Newark, and St Louis. I assume that City & State have enough $ in Jefferson to warrant 
a close watch-and a plan-on this. 
MESSAGE from: Dave Andrea 2236 Mar27185 TGf(H:lMF 
CHRYSLER TO LIPGRADE TRENTON ENGINE FOR 2-51, PRODUCTION 
SOURCE: AlMM (2/25/85) 
FILES: WAYNE, SCAMP, PRODTECH 
Chrysler Corp. is purchasing a non-synchronous transfer-type assembly system for 
cylinder heads, which is designed to run without human assistance. 
The system incorporated European (Grob Werke of Mindelheim, Germany supplied by 
Grob Systems, Inc. of Bluffton, OH). design to put together the various parts of the heads 
for four-cylinder engines made at Trenton. Those parts include the main castings, valves, 
rocker arms, springs, retainers, and bolts. 
The new system will be installed by late summer/early f d  1.985 for production of the 2.5L 
engine (an upgrade of the 2.2L) The engine will be useti in the T- l l5 , 'New Yorker, 
LeBaron, 600, CaraveUe, and K. 
Final assembly system will be furnished by Wilson Automation Div., of Newcor (Warren, 
MI)  and Visitrol Corp. (Detroit, Mn.. Washers and leak tesbrs will be provided by Centri- 
Spray (Livonia, MI). Centri will also supply other between-machine equipment. 
It is the first Grob cylinder head assembly system to be built in the U.S. Grob is also 
capable of producing flexible systems. 
PESSAGE from: Lauren Hamme tt 12: 00Aug0 1/85 SUBP:MF 
FUTURE IS NOW FOR 2 FORD PLANTS 
Source: Automotive News 4/29/85 (page 17) 
Categories: Wayne Sourcing Labor 
Ford's transmission and engine operations a t  Livonia and Lima, Ohio, respectively, will 
make the drivetrain for the 1986 front-wheel-drive Forci Taurus and Mercury Sable. 
These two facilities are closer to the "paperless" factory of the future than any other 
North American transmission or engine plant. Both facilities will rely on high-speed 
flexible machining, robotics, local computer networking (so that machines can communi- 
cate with each other), computer-controlled machine functions and inventory, AGVs, 
modular assembly, and just-in-time inventory supply. 
The Livonia plant will build the automatic 4-speed overdrive transaxle, (AXOD). It 
has implemented diamond and solid carbide tooling, laser vvelding and computer network- 
ing of machines on the plant floor, personal computers and data-processing equipment as 
well as an extensive use of AGVs, ail in an effort to increase efficiency and qudity. 
There is a new, technically oriented production job classification for hourly and 
salaried personnel. The plant management and the UAW have established 
"manufacturing technician" jobs within the hourly work force. These multi-skilled 
"tttchiciansn have undergone special technical training and are given new responsibilities 
with increased job authority. 
The plants 62 technicians went through 10-14 weeks of full-time course work in prepara- 
tion for the job. Training was done inside the plant using a multimedia operation. At 
Lima, Ford will turn out the 3.0-liter, V-6 engine for l'aurus/Sable. Here the com- 
pany claims to have instailed more robots than any comparable engine line in the U.S. 
Links With Other AIM Data 
The data developed in the survey and the electronic clippings supplement the esten- 
sive data collected by the -4IM project and described in detail elsewhere in this report. The 
survey's data on customers and suppliers augments the data contained in the input sourc- 
ing chapter, and focuses on the "chains of value added" in the supplier tiers below the 
major manufacturers. Although the response rate of the mailed survey precludes a sys- 
tematic and complete description of the chains of supply, a significant amount of data is 
available and can be used to evaluate the likely supplier impact of a variety of product and 
technological changes. 
Product codes assigned to each respondent from their completed surveys can also be 
used to determine the product(s1, material(s), andlor procese(es) of the establishment. This 
information, when combined with industry trends (describeti elsewhere in this report), can 
be used to pinpoint particular establishments in the state where risks or opportunities may 
exist. 
Plans for Updating and Broadening Survey in AIM I1 
In order to keep the existing database current and expand its coverage to new es- 
tablishments, .4IM surveys will be administered again in the coming year. The original 
survey will be sent to establishments in six additional areas of the state. 
In addition, a new survey will be implemented to som,e subset of the approximately 
13,500 establishments (increased from 12,260 in the current database due to a new source 
that includes additional unique establishments) in all eighteen areas. Some of the new sur- 
vey's queries will be identical to the old, in order to follow developments over time. Others 
will be new, reflecting project findings about sourcing patterns or eliciting new kinds of 
technoiogy=specific information needed by the Technology Deployment Service, with whose 
staff it will be crafted. 
Future Evaluation and Use of AIM 1 Survey Data 
The data derived from the survey will be compared with other sources to insure its 
validity, and will be the basis for further survey efforts. In addition, longitudinal employ- 
ment histories will be utilized to evaluate the extent of response bias (if any) in the survey 
sample. This step is designed to ensure that policies derived from these data are based 
upon a representative sample of the target establishments. 
The data have been used extensiveiy in state and local economic development func- 
tions including retention, expansion, and attraction activities. In addition, the database 
has been used to identify the lMichigan impact of many of the conclusions stated elsewhere 
in this report. 
The survey results have been coded and are now available to the state to supple- 
ment the original database. This information will be useful in illustrating the impact of 
very detailed developments a t  the product andlor establishment level. For example, if al- 
krnators were subject to a major process and/or materials change, some of the producers 
could be identified. In addition, suppliers and customers of the producing firms, as well as 
establishments that used the particular process and/or materials in question, could be 
found. With this information in hand, economic developinent officials and the affected 
businesses could then take appropriate action. 
The section of the survey dealing with technology issues will be useful to the Tech- 
nology Deployment Service as it develops and irnplernenk its programs. As the project 
continues into its second year, the database will be improved with continued updating and 
enhancement and will serve as a partial guide to some of the areas of future investigation. 
Longitudinal Auto-Related Employment Data 
A chart illustrating employment trends in the auto industry from 1979 to 1984 fol- 
lows. Data from the cornpany.specific database was not used here, since the database in. 
cludes only one year of data. In some cases, fi,aures have been constructed, since consis- 
tent information is difficult to obtain across time and a t  the detailed industrial level. 
Auto employment has fallen substantially from its 1979 peak, although a recovery 
has taken place both in the state and nation since 1982. it appears, however, that this 
recovery has been stronger at  the national level than in Michigan. ' In line with this fact, 
th,e share of the national industry in Michigan (in tenns of employment) has dropped. 
Several factors should be noted in evaluating these results: 1) The Michigan data 
for 1979-82 are from County Business Patterns, a source! that tends to underestimate 
employment, 2) The 1983-84 Michigan data are from MXSC surveys which utilize dif- 
ferent sampling techniques than County Business Patterns, :md therefore may not be com- 
parable both to the national figures and the! Michigan statistics for 1979-1982, and 3) 
Major new investments in Michigan's auto industry (suck as Buick City, Mazda, and 
Detroit-Harntrarnck Assembly) are not yet included in these i ipres.  
AUTO-RELATED EMPLOYMENT ID MICHIGAN AND U.S. 
1979 .- 1984 
- - -  
Industrial Sector 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
Employment in Thousands - Michigan 
Auto Assembly* 122.0 114.9 107.0 119.0 120.5 165.0 
Auto Parts 120.0 111.7 102.4 122.6 134.8 172.5 
Other Auto Related 196.3 182,2 175.7 196.2 220.0 267.2 
TOTAL 438.3 405.8 385.1 437.8 475.3 604.7 
Percent Change from Prior Year - LMichigan 
Auto Assembly 6.2 7.4 -10.1 - 1.2 -27.0 
Auto Parts 7.4 9.1 -16.5 -9.1 -21.9 
Other .Auto Related 7.7 3.7 -10.4 .-10.8 -17.7 
TOTAL 7.2 6.2 -12.0 -7.9 -21.4 
Employment in Thousands - U.S. 
Auto Assembly 
Auto Parts 
Percent Change from Prior Year -, U.S. 
'Auto Assembly 
Auto Parts 
lMichigan as a Percent of U.S. 
Auto Assembly 
Auto Parts 
- - - -  - - - -  - -  
Employment in Thousandsl - U. S. Except Michigan 
Auto Assembly 
Auto Parts 
Percent Change from Prior Year - U. S. Except Michigan 
Auto Assembly 
Auto Parts 
Percent Change from 1979 to 1984 
Lndustrial Sector Michigan U. S. U. S. except Michigan 
Auto Assembly - 26.1 - 17.3 -9.2 
Auto Parts -30.4 - 14.5 0.5 
Other Auto Related - 26.5 N/ A NI A 
TOTAL -27.5 N/A NIA 
Notes: 
* in the Input Sourcing chapter, we cite a figure of 70,000 assembly workers. 
There, we refer to assembly pl;int workers only; in this table, "auto assembly" in- 
cludes chassis manufacturing employment as well. 
N/A=Not available. 
Auto assembly and parts are production employment only, 1984 national figures are 
as of July, others are annual averages. 1984 state figures are as of July; 1983 are 
annual averages, and 1979-1982 are as of March of each yew. 
Sources: 
Employment and Earnings, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
County Business Patterns, Michigan, 1979-1982. . 
Michigan Employment Security Commission, BLS 790 Report, 1983-1984. 
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Study of Auto-Related Employment, 
1981, 1984. 
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TEE AUTO IN MICHIGAN PROJECT SURVEY 
SURVEY PROCEDURES 
L 
The following survey is desiped for Michigan establishments that are auto-related. 
We are requesting responses from establishments whose operations are auto-related 
by meeting one or more of the following' criteria: 
a. Manufacturing, design, engineering, and research operations of vehicle 
manufacturers. 
b. Production of parts, materials, or components that will be incorporated 
as original equipment in passenger cars or trucks. 
c. Production of machinery, tools, or tooling accessories used in the 
production of passenger cars or trucks. 
d. Provision of manufacturing or engineering services to establishments 
defined in a, b, or c above. 
Are any of yourestabiishment's activities auto-related by the above criteria? 
If your response is NO, please complete only the tint five questions so that 
we may update our database. 
If your response is YES, this questionnaire should be completed by some- 
one who has broad knowledge of your establishrr~enc's customen and 
suppliers and of future plans for technological advancements. It takes 
approximately one hour to complete. 
Your responses to this questionnaire should refer specific:aily to your facility 
location and not to the overall activities of your division, subsidiary, or parent 
company. 
- 
PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN THE SlJRVEY IN THE 
ENCLOSED POSTAGE-PAID ENVELOPE BY ?vlAY 15, 1985. 
Thank you for your time and considera'rion. 
Official name your establishment at this location: 
2. Address of your establishment at this location: 
S e t  . 
City - . . State Zipcode . 
3. Name and title of the person in charge at this location: 
Name , . . .  . ..- ,-. 
Position 
4. Name, title, and phone of preferred contact for this survey at this locdon: 
Position 
Phone -. 
5. Name of your parent corporation, if any: 
6. What is the single largest obstacle your establishment faces at his location if it is eo participate 
successfully in the automotive industry? 
, '  
Inf lux o f  c h e a ~  Ja~anese s t ee l  to  Mexican and Canadian comoetitors. ' 
This is causfnq extreme c o m ~ e t i t i v e  ~res su~e ,  ' retch I*4, a f  aur do1 Tars 
and the import r e s t r i c t i o n s  aga lns t  steel commodities are destroying 
our markets. 
7, Average number of employees at this location during January-blarch. 1985: 250 
8. Avenge annual dollar sales of this establishment: 925.5  mill i o n  
Of this amount, approximately what percent is automotive-related: 
9. Does a union(s) represent any of the workers at this location'! 
If yes, what union(s) and which local(s): 
Union: U.A.W. Local: a 
Union: Local: 
10. Please provide a short description of your operations at this location. 
t ~ n ,  m i l  1 i o n  \ ~ a l v ~  and 
Torque Converter Clutch spri,ngs per month. ' 
1 1. Which of the following most closely fit your firm's activities at this bcation'? (Check al l  that apply, 
and list up to three of the products, materials, or services you supply), 
a. We supply components or parts directiy to vehicie manufacturers. 
List of parts supplied: Valve/Torc~ue C c m e r t ~ r  C l u t c h  
fJ'j b. We supply components or parts to suppliers of vehicle manufacturers. 
List of parts supplied: Valve 
Q c. We produce components or parts for the automotive aftermarket. 
List of parts supplied: \/a1 I/@ 
d. We supply machine tools, tooling and accessories, or other production equipment to vehicle 
manufacturers. 
List what you supply: 
13 e. We supply machine tools, tooling and accessories, or other production equipment to auto 
supplier fms. 
List what you supply: 
Q f. We supply materials to vehicle m a n u f a c m .  
hIaterial(s) supplied: 
C] g. We supply materials to auto supplier firms. 
Materiai(s) supplied: 
a h. We provide manufacturing or engineering services to vehicle manufacturers. 
Senicgs,suppplied: Technical assistance. ' P e r i w i c  opeinn t p w  
Q i. We provide manufacturing or engineering services to auto supplier tiirns. . 
Services supplied: Same as above 
17 j. Other (describe): 
page j 
12. Durins the past two years, has your firm conducted business with any of the U.S. operations of these 
vehicle manufacturers (check all that apply): 
General Motors (any Division) C] Volkswagen 
Q Ford Honda 
a Chrysler a Nissan 
a AI\/IC/Renault NUMn(1I (GM-'Toyota) 
13. If you suppiy vehicle manufacturers directly, please list those auto company plants that are your 
largest customers and the product, process, or semice that you supply. For example: "Ghf-Orion - 
Vinyl Trim" or "Ford Livonia - Casings." If you supply a centxai warehouse and do not know 
which auto company facility uses one or more or your products, please indicate that. . 
Auto fiiIocation: Product or service you supply: 
1. .G.M./Oelco Marafne 1. T n r w v ~ r t  a r (171&-h 
2. Ford Motor - Lb 2. am: 
Chevrolet - F7tnt 3.-  , 3.. Valve - 
3. Hvdramatic 0 Yasflantf 3. .  Tr? ncmi c-= 
d - 
: Oldsmobile - Lansi,ng 5 .  5 . .  Ya lve  Spr inqs  
14. If you supply auto supplier companies, piease list those auto supplier plants that are your largesr 
customers and the product, process, or service that you supply. For example: "Kelsey Hayes, 
Jackson - Heat Treat" or "Lear Siegler, Detroit - Light Stampings." 
Supplier fidlocation: Product or. senice you suppiy: 
1. 8orq and B ~ c k  % an7 j nn 1. Torbue Canq~rt~r ~1 ~ r t r  h 
d 
Caterpjlfar Tractor'= Massvlf7lp . . 2. 3. Valve Surf nos - 
3. Cummfns Ensine4.SoutR Ca.rolim 3, Value Surinqs 
3. Tel i d m e  Continentla1 -Muskeoon 4, Surinas 
nes Graua j. 8ar rn rv. Pa- 
15. Please indicate the approximate number of plants that supply parts, materials, tooling, andor 
manufacturing services directly to your operations at this location: .30 
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16. Approximately what percent of the manufacturing establishments that supply your plant at this 
location are located in Michigan'? 
a Less than 25% 
@ 2539% 
a 50-74% 
75% or more 
17. Please indicate up to five (5) Michigan manufacturers that are the most important suppliers to your 
operations at this location, in terms of dollar sales. 
Michigan piant that supplies you: Product they supply to you: 
1. Frank Bancroft Co, 1. A s  i v  P W ~ P P ~  Q 
2, Ervin Industries 2. Shot-!l. fe5 
3. Ann Arbor Mach1 nery 3, Tool-inq 
3. Packfnu Mat~rfa1 4. Packacrinq Items 
j, Tubular Sales 5.  r n n l - i  ng 
18. Is your fm considering acquisition of any of the following computer-based technologies during the 
next two years? , , 
HAVE CONTEM* 
HAVE PURCHASE U T E  C O N S U  
lYOW OXDER WITHlNYEU ERING - -
a. Computer Numerical Control Machine Tool (CNC) CI I3 i3 
Use of a computer to provide automatic control of the 
machining sequence of a machine tool. 
b . Direct Numerical Control of Machine Tools (DNC) a fl [ZI 
h system in which IYC machines are connected to a 
d 
computer and to computer.tontrolled machine tools. 
c. Automatic Too1 Changing a 0 1%J 
Changing of cutter, bit, etc., automaticdy by tape or 
computer controi. 
d. Indusuid R O ~ O ~  S 0 u n 
Reprognmmable, multifunctional manipuinlor used 
to move parts or end effectors thmus$ variable, 
programmed motions. 
HAVE CONTEhI- 
HAVE PURCHASE PWTE CONSID* 
YOW ORDER WITHINYEAR ERING - -
C1 C1 0 Bl e. Automated Stonge & Retrieval System (ASRS) 
System used to store and access parts and materids 
automatically. 
f. Automated Guided Vehicle System (AGVS) 
Computerdirected vehiciea used for factory floor 
materials handling. 
3. Machine Vision 
Ability to scan opt id ly  parts or assemblies to 
determine size, shape, position; or quality. 
h. Programmable Controller 
A solid state control system with user-progranimable 
memory for storage of speciilc function instructions, 
i. Other CGiM HYdwarelSofnvare 
Computer-Wed machinery or computer-readable 
instructions used in prognmmable manufacturing. 
j. Computer- Aided Design (CAD) 
Creating or altering a gaphic design using a 
computer. 
k. Computer-Assisted Enginering (CAE) 
Use of a computer to assist the total engineering 
bctioa, including design, testing, devetopment, 
planning, and manufactwing. 
1. Group Technology 
The clustering of parts into "families" using codes 
based on part shape, projection, or other 
characteristic. 
m. Computer-Assisted Process Plannin,a (CXPP) 
;in application program that interacts with C.Q 
or CAE (see above) and assists in devdoping 
a manufacturing process/production plan. 
n. Other (Describe): 
19. With reference to the two technologies that you are most likely to implement at this location in the 
near future, what are the main factors in the purchase decision? 
will b~ ~ @ d  nn i'ar f ha tarhnn- 1 I . - dv a nce ' 
t h @  aro&)I. Hu ;t utl7 ~ U L L - A  c . n r P  i 
service or services available t o  support the equipment, and capital 
expense required. 
20. Will your finn seek outside technical assistance in selecting specific computer-based technologies for 
your firm? 
If YES, from what kind of source does your tim plan to seek usistance? (check dl that apply) 
Equipment Vendors 
@ Professional, Technical, or Trade Associations 
IJ Private Consultants 
0 Educational Institutions 
IJ Others: 
31. Would your firm be interested in State of Michigan assistance in training your workforce in any 
compurer-based technologies you acquire'? 
a YES NO 
Why are you interestedlnot interested in assistance from the State of Michigan? If interested, for 
which kinds of training would you look to the State? hhat  sort of assistance from the State would be 
most useful to you at this location? 
PLEASE PROVIDE THE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF THE 
PERSON WHO FILLED OUT THIS SURVEY SO THAT WE MAY 
VERIFY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE INFORMATION PRO- 
VIDED, IF NECESSARY: 
Name 
Phone Number 
We woufdlike to thank you for your cooperation. 
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES PARTICIPATION 
The .4M Project work with Local Economic Development A.gencies (LEDAS) has centered 
on: 
a. identifying the LEDAs to approach regarding participz~tion 
b. contacting these LEDAs to arrange for discussion of the Project 
c. meeting with them to reach agreement on their participation in the Project 
d. preparing and mailing agreement letters 
e. arranging for and hosting the first LEDA group meeting with members of the CRT 
and Project staff 
f. arranging for and hosting a dinner meeting of LEDAs, CRT, Project Staff, and AIM 
Advisory Board members 
g. preparing, printing and distributing the survey instrument 
h. preparing and providing to the LEDAs instructions and suggested methods for ad- 
ministering the survey 
i . .  arranging for payments to the LEDAs af incentive fees based on the number.of sur- 
veys mailed, returned, and tabulated 
j. initiating plans with LEDAs for scheduling local conferences with CRT members to 
review Project findings 
The identification of the appropriate LEDAs began in January. The establishment 
of Community Growth Agencies (CGA4) in the State contributed at this stage of the process 
by helping to consolidate many regional economic development activities. This helped the 
Project by establishing county-wide agencies with the authority to survey on a broad base, 
thus avoiding potential territorial questions. The CGA development also included an in- 
centive that encouraged LEDAs to obtain computers. Wit.h the use of computers, the 
LEDAs could handle the AIM data to be provided by the Star&, and also record and access 
the data that would by gathered by the AIM survey, 
By analyzing the location of the major auto manufacturing plants in the State and 
reviewing concentrations of suppliers, it was fairly easy to identify the LEDAs to approach 
for the initial AIM Project. With the pilot LEDAs, approximately 80% of the auto-related 
establishments are included in targeted areas. The addition of other LEDAs during the 
second year of the Project will bring even more of the State's auto-related establishments 
into the Project. 
The next phase of the Project was to contact the identified agencies and mail to them 
a description of the AIM Project along with a summary of the role that LEDAS would be 
expected to play. The Project Director and the LEDA Coordinator called on several of the 
LEDAs to discuss personally the Project and request an agreement to cooperate. The 
Database Coordinator attended many of these meetings to explain what was planned and 
to assess the computer capability in each area. Time did not permit personal meetings 
with all LEDAs, but extensive telephone conversations were held to describe the Project 
and the expected agreement. A formal letter of agreement was prepared and mailed to the 
LEDAs after the "handshake agreement meetings" were held. This letter described in 
detail what the Project would provide to the LEDA and, idso, what the LEDA was ex- 
pected to provide to the Project. 
A major event was held March 13th a t  the University of Michigan North Campus 
Commons. .4t this four-hour meeting, representatives of each LEDA attended, as did 
members of the CRT and Project Staff. A brief description of the AIM Project was given 
by the Project Director, with special emphasis on the role of' the LEDAs. Each member of 
the CRT of then described one area of the CRT's research, and explained how the informa- 
tion gained would have implications for manufacturers and suppliers in the LEDA regions. 
Time for questions was allowed and used extensively. The Database Coordinator ex- 
plained how information would be provided to the LEDAs and how it should be handled. A 
copy of the core database was distributed; LEDAs were en,couraged to review the Iist of 
firms and make deletions, additions, and corrections to the list before the find survey mail- 
ing lists were prepared. The Project timeframe was discussed, and the meeting concluded 
after LEDA representatives from Jackson County and Fl,int/Genesse County described 
projects they currently had with their respective auto-related industries. This was done to 
assist in the building of networks, one of the planned outcom~~s of the Project. 
A draft of the LEDA survey instrument was prepared in January and used in early 
meetings with the LEDAs. After review by a survey specialist, revision, and pretesting, it 
was prepared for printing and distribution to the LEDAs. 
At the suggestion of a LEDA, the survey had an introductory letter from the Gover- 
nor printed on its cover sheet. An instruction letter detailing a suggested method of dis- 
tributing the survey was sent to the LEDAs. The intent was that the survey would be 
done by mail, but two of the LEDAs planned to use the survey along with a corporate call 
program they were concurrently scheduling, All LEDAs were encouraged to work for as 
high a response rate as possible. Funding was obtained from the Independent Business 
Research Office of Michigan (IBROM), and used to offer a significant monetary incentive to 
the LEDAs for achieving a high survey response rate. 
After the surveys were distributed, the LEDA Coordinator communicated with the 
LED.4s and offered assistance and advice as needed. Two meetings were scheduled and 
held with the Database Coordinator and seIected LEDAs to test the response coding forms 
that were required for preparing survey information for datii entry. 
LEDA representatives were also.included in the first meeting of the AIM Advisory 
Board. This dinner meeting, held a t  the University of Mi.chigan's Inglis House on May 
21st, included AD1 Project Staff, members of the CRT, as we11 as LEDA representatives 
and ~ d v i s o b  Board members. This event was significant in obtaining induotry suppbrt for 
the Project and building network contacts for the LEDAs. 
Anticipated ,AIM I Deliverables to LEDAs 
The local economic development agencies that are participating in the AIM Project 
are important team members. Their input and activity have helped to determine the suc- 
cess of the Project. While the Project has asked that the LEDAs contribute substantial ef- 
fort and resources, the LEDAs all stand to gain a substantial amount of information and 
understanding about their manufacturing base. The deliverables that have benefited and 
will continue to benefit the LEDAs are: 
Direct contact with all A M  Project researchers. 
Core data on the automotive manufacturers and suppliers in the LEDA's geographi- 
cal area. This was provided in hard copy and machine-readable form for LEDA's 
requesting it. 
1, A professionally.designed survey instriunent to be used in obtaining additional infor- 
mation from the establishments in the database. This survey was printed and 
provided in sufficient quantity to each LEDA. The LEDAs were able to add ad- 
ditional questions to the survey if they wished, thus allowing them to gather ad- 
ditional information that might fit with specific, local activity. 
@ Direct identification with the Project, which was announced to State and national 
press. Additional, extensive press coverage will be generated with the release of the 
final report. 
6 -411 additional data gathered by the surveys in their respective areas will be available 
for the LEDAs to review and use as appropriate. The information should be added 
to the core data and retained by the 1,EDAs for future use. An electronic clipping 
file (explained in the database development section) has also been established, and 
can be accessed by each LEDA 
Meetings of the LEDAs and CRT are held to d o w  thc! LEDAs to share in plans and 
findings of the Project. 
One direct consultation by the AIM Project CRT wit11 the staff of each LEDA or a ' 
presentation of the findings of the Project at an event planned and hosted by the 
LEDA. The findings will be reviewed, and specific attention paid to the impact of 
the findings not only on the State and region as a whole, but also on the specific 
geographic region represented by.the LEDA. 
Summary findings will be prepared in printed form for use by the LEDAs and others 
in the State. A slide show will be used as part of the Project in its briefings with the 
LED As. 
LEDAs P.4RTICIPATING IN THE AIM PROJECT 
City of Flint 
Dept. of Community Development 
Detroit Economic Growth 
Corporation 
Downriver Community Conference 
Economic Development Corporation 
of Wayne County 
Flint Genesee Corporation 
Forward Bay County, Inc. 
Grand Valley State College 
Office for Economic Expansion 
Greater Jackson Chamber 
of Commerce 
Jackson Alliance for 
Business Development 
Jackson Community College 
Lansing Economic Development 
Corporation 
Macomb Community College 
Macomb County Planning 
Commission 
Oakland County Economic 
Development Group 
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THE CONFER SYSTEM 
Overview 
The primary inkraction between the participants of the AIM project takes place 
electronically over a communication system known as Confer. Confer is a computer con- 
L 
ferencing software package which allows the organization of written entries, transmission 
of electronic mail, broadcasting of public bulletin messages, and interfacing of participants' 
personal computers. This communication system provides the following benefits to the 
AIM project: l 
1. There is no need to coordinate the schedules of those who want to talk with one 
another. 
2. People can stay on the job rather than spend hours traveling to a meeting. 
3. Confer provides an automatically-orgeed written record of the group discussion. 
4. Confer allows one to collect and compose thoughts, and to contribute them at a con- 
venient time and place. 
5. Everyone in the group can contribute fully without impinging on anyone else's 
wishes to speak. 
6. You can discuss rnultipie topics with all members of the group and communicate 
privately with particuiar individuals at the same time. There is no interference 
among these exchanges. 
7. Everyone can experience rapid and multiple feedback to an idea, and can give and 
receive feedback on such responses. 
Confer Characteristics 
Confer is the "brand name" for a computer software package that allows a multi- 
tude of personal computers to be linked together through a mainframe computer to provide 
a structured flow of information between. participants. The Confer communication 
software was developed by Dr. Robert Parnes at the University of lMichigan for use with 
the Michigan Terminal System (&ITS) and is available through Advertel Communication 
Systems, Inc. (Ann Arbor, MI). Presently, the software is being supported on the 
mainframes at Wayne State University, the University of .Alberta, and the University of 
Michigan. 
' ~ r ,  Robert Parnes and Dr. Edgar Taylor, "Tie User's Guide to Confer 11," November 1983, p. 7. 
The structure of Confer allows the participants to electronically supplement face-to- 
face meetings and other forms of communication in order u, raise issues, set agendas, fol- 
lowup on tasks, direct and coordinate geographically dispersed persons, and distribute in- 
formation. The system allows this electronic exchange easily, quickly, and inexpensively 
betiween a group that normally would have difficulty coordin:atin,o schedules for face-to-face 
meetings. Through a micro-computer hookup (either at  the ofice or at home), Confer is 
available twenty-four hours a day for input or retrieval of information. 
Although Confer itself is capable of tying 960 participants together, a conference 
typically ties 10 to 100 participants together. Conferences running on Confer software 
have facilitated three hundred participants without any serious system or software failure. 
In practical terms, Confer itself does not create any software constraints to the number of 
items, responses, or messages that can be organized within the system. These limits are a 
function of budget constraints concerning computer time artd data storage fees. Time of 
operation is also not a physical constraint. Conferences ma:y run one day or may be ex- 
tended indefinitely. 
Elements of an Electronic Conference 
The failowing definitions provide the terminology used in the Confer system and the 
various elements that structure the input and output of information." 
A conference is the basic social structure in Confer. It is where a group of users 
interact with each other. There are many conferences running in parallel under Confer. 
An - item is text composed by any participant in the conference. It is immediately 
available to everyone who uses the conference. It becomes a permanent part of the con- 
ference and can be viewed by everyone in the conference until it is deleted. 
A response is a short reaction to an item. -4ny participant is free to respond. Every 
response is immediately available to everyone who can use tile conference. Through items 
and responses, Confer makes it easy for someone to present ideas to the group, to let the 
members give their feedback, and for all to share and comment on the feedback of other 
members. 
- 
'~arnes and Taylor, pp. 8, 96. 
A message lets any participant communicate in private with any other participant 
in the conference. blessages may be composed at any time, They are transmitted instan- 
taneously to designated recipients, to be read and replied to at their convenience. The 
message recipient may delete the message after it has been read, or archive it for later 
reference. 
A bulletin is a short, dated announcement. Any participant can post a bulletin 
which will be shown to the rest of the conference members. Bulletins can be used to an- 
nounce important events, or to draw attention to a problem or an item. 
A - note is a reminder to the participant. The participant entering the note is the only 
one who can see the entry. The participant can instruct Coder to show the note on a par- 
ticular day (such as a meeting reminder) or for a specific period of time (such as a 
timetable). 
The agenda is a listing of a number of descriptive category names. Associated with 
each category is a list of the items that fit into the category. The conference organizer 
maintains the agenda. 
The organizer is the person who has administrative responsibility for the conference. 
One of the main responsibilities of the organizer is to maintain the conference agenda. 
Jack Russell served as the conference organizer during the F'roject's first year. 
AIM'S Use of Confer 
The operation of an electronic conference system is the only practical method of 
providing a continuous interaction among the participants of the .AIN project. The 
schedules, geographic dispersion, and work habits of the members of the CRT would have 
inhibited the exchange of information among the members and would have made impos- 
sible the coordination of such a project, 
The -4IM conference has been in.operation since December 18, 1984. Between the 
conference's beginning and August 18, 1986, the sixtee11 participants (Table I) have 
entered 173 items and 422 responses to those items, and sent 5,666 messages to each 
other. This equates to twenty-three messages sent per day, or two per each participant's 
signon. 
Confer was used throughout the Project to facilitate the administrative tasks of the 
director and the coordinator, provide a medium for exchanging information and ideas, ar- 
chive and organize approximately two hundred news article summaries, and disseminate 
trip reports of personal interviews. 
Table I 
Confer System Participants 
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MICHIGAN OEM FACILITIES AND THEIR LEADERSHIP i , ?-- 
-. I '\A 
This section is a partial listing of the Michigan facilities of General Motors Corpora- 
tion, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Corporation, and American Motors Corporation. The 
directory that we have compiled is of the OEM's major manufacturing, office (corporate 
and divisional headquarters), and engineering facilities w i t h  the State. 
The primary emphasis of this directory is the manufacturing facilities of the cor- 
porations. In this regard, the entries are as accurate and complete as possible. There 
was greater difficulty in compiling accurate entries for the various en,gineering, sales, 
research and development, and subsidiary establishments of the OEMs. This difficulty is 
in direct relation to the merger and reorganization activity taking place throughout the in- 
dustry. This directory will be updated and expanded in the second year of the Project. 
Each entry lists the facility or operation, its address and (where available) phone 
number, plus its associated UAW local, if any. Where possible, information on plant 
managers and union presidents is identified. 

AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATI ON MI CHI M N  F A C I L I T Y  DIRECTORY 
American Moto rs  Wor ld  Headquarters 
2777 F r a n k l i n  Road S o u t h f i e l d ,  M I  48034 
MANAGER: Jose J ,  Dedeurwaeder (Pres,  & CEO) PHONE: 313-827-1000 
U4W LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE : 
A . . * . . A * A A * * A A A A A * A A . . * * . . . A A A . A A A A A A A A . * . . . A . A A * A A A * . ~ * A A A * A * A ~ A A A . A A . * ~ .  
American Muto rs  T e c h n i c a l  Center (AMTEK) 
14250 Plymouth Road D e t r o i t ,  M I  48232 
W G E R :  John W, Muwrer (V,P,-Product P lann ing)  PHONE: 313-493-2000 
w LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESI D E W :  PHWE : 
...~A.*.*.*A.A..***...A..AAA..*.....~**A*.*~A.~.A...A.*.A.*.*A.*AA*A.*AAA* 
E v a r t  P roduc ts  Co. 
601 W. 7 t h  S t r e e t  E u a r t ,  M I  4963 1 
MANAGER: Angus McGregor PHONE: 313-734-5522 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE : 
Eve r t  P roduc ts  Luman Road P l a n t  
6251 Lauman Road E v a r t ,  M I  49631 
W G E R :  Angus McGregor PHONE: 313-734-5522 
UACJ LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESI D M :  PHONE : 
* A * A ~ A I A A * A * * * A . A A A 4 A A A * 4 A A A A A * A * A A * A . A a A * A A ~ * ~ * * * * ~ ~ A * A ~ . A . ~ * . * * A . * A A A A * ~  
AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION MICHIWN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
-. 
Iron River Plant (Coleman Products) 
West U.S. #2 P.0, Box 112 Iron River, M I  49935 
MANAGER: Donald G ,  McMaster PHONE: 904-265-9965 
WSW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE : 
. * . * . 4 . * * * * * . * * A * . * * * * * . 4 * 1 . * . . * * * . * . . . * * * * . * . ~ * . * * * * . * * ~ * ~ ~ ~  
Mercury Plastics.Co. 
34501 Harper Avenue Mt, Clernens, MI 48043 
MANAGER: David R, Moenssen 
W LOCAL 155 
5230 El  8 Mile Road Detroit, 
L O M L  PRESIDEM': R i  chard Karas 
PHONE: 313-791-8100 
Vehicle Test Facilities 
12626 U,S ,  #12 Brooklyn, MI 48230 
MANAGER: Dennis Hahnke PHONE: 517-572-8811 
w LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: P H W E  : 
**4~*.*.****..*..***.****.*.**.****.**A.*A*AA****.**.*.4.~4*A*****.***AA~A 
CNRYSLER CORPORATION M I C H I W  F A C I L I M  DIRECTORY 
Eldon Ax le  P l a n t  
6700 Lynch Raad D e t r o i t ,  MI  48234 
PWAGER: Doug Cowdrey PHWE : 3 13-267-3750 
UAW LOCAL 961 
22826 Arcad ia  S t ,  C l a i r  Shore, MI 48082 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: F r a n c i s  Dm McKinnon PH13TJE : 
D e t r o i t  Forge P l a n t  
6700 Lynch Road D e t r o i t ,  MI  48234 
MAEWGER: Donald Santo la  PHONE: 31 3-267-3750 
w LOCAL 47 
18725 Van Dyke D e t r o i t ,  MI  48234 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Ronald R e  Gossett PHONE: 313-464-9015 
A A L * l 4 ~ A . A A A A A A A A . A A ~ A A A . A A A A A A . C A A A A A h A A A A A A A % A 4 ~ A A A A A . b A A A 4 A A A A ~ A . A A  
D e t r o i t  T r i m  P l a n t  
12501 Dequ i ndre D e t r o i t ,  MI 4821 2 
MANAGER: R, D. Zimmerman PHQNE: 313-956-6383 
W LOCAL 213 u n i t  38 
12101 Mack A v e .  D e t r o i t ,  MI  4821 5 
LOCAL PRESIDEM': John R. Coyne PHQNE : 
MeGrau Glass P l a n t  
9400 McGraw D e t r o i t ,  MI  48288 
UAW LOCAL 227 
6790 Buhr D e t r o i t ,  MI 4821 2 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: W i l b e r t  Spencer PHONE : 
CHRYSLER CORPORATI I)N M I  CHI CjAN FACI L I N  Dl RECTORY 
Jefferson Assembly Plant  
12200 East Jef ferson D e t r o i t ,  MI 4321 5 
W G E R :  Dennis Edwards PHONE: 313-823-8900 
w LOCAL 7 
1531 Har t  D e t r o i t ,  M I  4321 4 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: W i l l i a m  Lawrence PHONE : 31 3-835-9245 
i 
Outer Dr ive  Mfg, Tech, Center 
3675 East Outer Dr ive  Detroi  t , MI 48234 
MANAGER: Stan Paurazas PHONE: 313-369-7469 
UAW LOCAL 212 u n i t  92 
12101 Mack Aue, D e t r o i t ,  MI 4821 5 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: John R, Corne PHONE : F 
W ~ r l d  Headquarters 
1'200 Lynn Townsend Dr i ve Highland Park,  MI 48288 
MANAGER: 'Lee A .  Iacocca PHONE: 313-356-5741 
UM LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESI DENT : PHONE : 
S t e r l  ing Stamping P lant  
35777 Van Dyke S t e r l i n g  He ight ,  MI 480 77 
MANAGER: N e i l  Harbin PHONE: 313-977-4700 
W LOCAL 1264 
7430 15 M i l e  Road S t e r l i n g  H t s , ,  M I  48077 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Lawrence Leach PHONE: 313-294-3926 .- 
CHRYSLER CORPORATI ON M I  CHI GAN FACI L I N  D l  RECTORY 
Ste r l  ing Hts. Assemblr Plant  
38111 Wan Dyke S t e r l i n g  Height, M I  48077 
W G E R :  D, W. Ro l le r  PHCNE : 31 3-978-6422 
UAW LOCAL 1264 
7450 15 M i l e  Road S te r l  ing H t s , ,  M I  48077 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Lawrence Leach PHONE : 31 3-294-3926 
Trenton Chemical Plant  
5437 West Jef ferson Trenton, M I  481 83 
MAbMGER: Lapry A, Roman WOE: 31 3-671 -4741 
UAW LOCAL 372 u n i t  '1 
16016 Jackson St. T a y l o r ,  M I  481 80 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: P, Sa Wolford PHONE: 313-284-6535 . 
A A * * * A * * A & * A . A A * A A A A A . * A * A A A * A 1 * L & A & A A ~ A * A A A A 4 A * * A + A A A & A A . * A * * . * 4 A . A ~ A  
Trenton Engine Plant  
2000 Van Horn Trenton, M I  481 83 
MAEYIGER: Robert Garlo 
W LOCAL 372 un i t 2 
16016 Jackson S t ,  Taylor, M I  481 80 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: P. S. Wolford PHONE: 31 3-284-6535 
. A * . . * . * A * . * * . . * ~ * * A * . a * A A * ~ * * . ~ ~ * 4 * 1 . ~ 4 * * * * * * * 4 A * . * * A A . ~ A A ~ * * A . * . A A * .  
Warren Stamping Plant  
22800 Mound Road Warren, M I  48091 
MANAGER: Jim Unis PHWE: 313-497-3430 
UAW LOCAL 869 
36059 0oyce M t ,  Clemens, M I  48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Tl:n Sundej PHONE : 
CHRYSLER CORPORATION MICHIGAN FACI LIlY DIRECTORY 
Warren Truck Assembl y $1 art l 
21500 Hound Road Warren, MI 48091 
MANAGER: Harold Jones 
UAW LOCAL 140 
20150 S to t te r  De t r o i  t , M I  48234 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: G .  E m  Wojcik PHONE : 31 3-891 -5773 
Mound Road Engine P lant  
20300 Mound Road Warren, M I  48091 
&WAGER: Denn i 5 Mason PHONE : 31 3-369-760 1 
UcSW LOCAL 51 
11731 M t ,  E l l i o t  Det ro i  t ,  HI 4821 2 
LOCAL PRESI D f M  : Ray B i anch i PHONE : 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY MICHIGI4N FACILITY DIRECTORY 
P i l o t  p lant  
17000 Oakwood Blvd.  A1 l e n  P a r k ,  MI 48121 
MANAGER: E .  E. Pitman P H W E :  313-322-3000 
W LOCAL 931 
23310 Notre Dame Dearborn, MI 48124 
LOCALPRESIDENT: C. Hamil ton PHONE: 313-582-5819 
A ~ A A A A A 4 4 A b A ~ 4 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A ~ i l i l 4 A A A 4 A A A A A ~ A A A A A A A A A A A A * ~ ~ ~ A A A A A A A A  
Dearborn Enu i ronmen t a1 L a b s  
190QO'Qakwood B l  vd. Dearborn, MI 481 21 
W G E R :  G. G, Staf ford PHONE: 313-322-3000 
tkcrW LOCAL 
LOWL PRESIDEF4T: PHONE : 
Dearbarn Assembly Plant  (Rouge) 
3001 M i l l e r  Road Dearborn,MI 48121 
?fAMGER: Louis M e  Callaway, J r .  PHONE: 31 3-322-3000 
W LOCAL 600 u n i t  2A 
10550 D i x  AVQ.  Dearborn,MI 48120 
LOCAL PRESIDOVT: Robert T.  King PHONE: 313-459-8068 
Dearborn Engine P l a n t  (Rouge) 
P .O .  Box 1416 Dearborn, M I  48121 
W G E R :  E. E ,  Wise 
UllW LOCAL 600 u n i t  4 
10550 D i x  A v e .  Dearborn, M I  48120 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert TI King 
PHONE : 31 3-322-3000 
PHONE: 313-459-8068 
FORD MOTOR CW1PW MICHIGAN FACIL IN  DIRECTORY 
Dearborn Frame P lan t  (Rouge) 
P,O. Box 1644 - Dearborn, M I  48121 
H G E R :  J, 8, Hares PHONE: 313-322-3000 
W LOCAL 600 un i t 12 
10550 D i x  Aue, Dearborn,MI 48120 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T ,  King PHONE: 313-459-8068 
Dearborn Glass (Rouge) 
3001 M i l l e r  Road Dearborn, MI 48121 
MANAGER: J, F, Clark PHONE : 31 3-322-2ii~10 
UAW LOCAL 600 u n i t  14 
10550 D i x  Ave. Dearborn,MI 48120 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert TI King PHONE: 31 3-459-8068 , ,. , 
Dearborn Stamping (Rouge) 
P,0. Box 1694 Dearbarn,MI 48121 
MANAGER: M. T. Sara PHONE: 313-322-3000 
W LOCAL 600 un i t  10 
10530 D i x  Ave. Dearborn, M I  48120 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: Robert T ,  K ing  PHONE: 31 3-459-8068 
Dearborn Tool & Die (Rouge) 
P.0. Box 1687 Dearborn,MI 48121 
MANAGER: C. H. Lewis PHONE: 313-322-3000 
!JAW LOCAL 600 u n i t  28 
10550 D i x  Aue, Dearborn, M I  48120 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T, K ing PHONE: 313-459-8068 
FORD MOTOR C13MPM MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
Rouge Steel  Company 
P. 0 ,  Box 1639 Dearborn, M I  48121 
MANAGER: M, P. W o j t w i c z  PHONE: 313-322-1068 
UAW LOCAL 600 u n i t  24 
10550 Dix Ave. Dearborn ,MI  48120 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: Robert T ,  King PHONE: 31 3-459-8068 
Vulcan Forge Works 
3900 Wruning Avenue Dearborn ,M I  48121 
PkWGER: Bruno Larese PHONE: 31 3-594-0387 
UAW LOCAL 174 u n i t  156 
6495 West Warren Ave, D e t r o i t ,  MI  48210 
LOG4L PRESIDENT: Jim Eaker PHONE: 313-485-4688 
Research And Engineering Center 
2000 Rotunda Dr ive  Dearborn, M I  48121 
W W G E R :  Fred Herr (V,P.> PHONE : 31 3-322-300 0 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE : 
* A L * * * A A * * * * A 4 * * A . * * * 4 * * A * * * 4 ~ A A * * A * ~ * A A * * ~ A A ~ 4 * * A * A * * . * . * * A * . * * * * * * A * A A  
D i v e r s i f i e d  Products Technical Center 
17000 Rotunda Dr ive  Dearborn, MI  48121 
MANAGER: J ,  G ,  Rivard PHONE : 31 3-322-3000 
W LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: PHONE : 
FORD MOTOR COMPRNY MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
World Headquarters 
The h e r  i can Road Dearborn, MI 48121 
W G E R :  Donald Petersen (Chairman) PHONE : 31 3-322-300 0 
Mw LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: 
Renaissance Center O f f i ces  , 
300 Renaissance Canter De t r o i  t , M I  48243 
W G E R :  Of f i ces  f o r  var ious s t a f f s  PHONE: 31 3-568-7500 
w LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHWE : ,- 
I * . . *  .....*......*.** 1 L A A A 1 . * & . * . A . . ) . . A 4 . . 6 A * . b . ~ A . * * . * A . & . ~ * . - A A A A . A - A  
Glass Technical Center 
25500 W .  Outer Dr ive  L inco ln  Park, M I  48121 
W G E R :  D, E.  Siddal PHr3JE : 3 13-322-300 0 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: 
Livon i a Transmi ssiun P lant  
36200 Plymouth Road Livonia,  M I  48150 
W G E R :  Eugene E. Wise PHCNE: 313-523-3000 
UAlJ LOCAL 182 
35603 PI mouth Rd, L i v o n i a ,  FH 48150 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert L i t t l e  PHOtJE : .- 
. . * * A * . . * * * . . * . * . . * * * * . * . * A . * * A * I ) A . . A . A * . A A , . A A * . . . h A A . * A . . * * . A * . * . . A * *  
FORD MOTOR COMPANY MI CHI GAN FACI L I P  D I  RECTORY 
Mi1,an P l a s t i c  P lan t  
800 County S t ree t  M i l a n , M I  48160 
MANAGER: A1 P. Uer PHONE: 313-439-8811 
WSGl LOCAL 600 u n i t  36 
10550 Dix Ave. Dearbprn,Ml  48120 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T. King PHONE: 313-459-8068 
Monroe Stamping P lan t  
3200 E. Elm S t r e e t  Monroe, M I  48161 
W G E R :  Stanley C. Cronenwett PHONE: 313-243-4702 
UAW LOCAL 723 
9650 Telegraph T a y l o r , M I  48180 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Dan i e l  Brooks PHONE: 313-964-1345 
C h e s t e ~ f  i el  d Tr  i m  P l a n t  
26090 23 M i l e  Road Mt, Clemens, M I  48045 
MANAGER: Wi l l i am  R. Brooks PHONE: 313-466-0800 
UAW LOCAL 400 
20745 Catalan0 D r .  Mt ,  Clemcrus,MI 48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T iseo PHONE: 313-792-0689 
A * A & 1 A A A . A 4 & . A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A * A A A . A A A A A A A A * % L * a A A A A A & * A A A A * * . A A A a a * a A  
Mt. Clemens Pa in t  P lan t  
400 Groesbeck Highway Mt ,  C l  emens, MI 48043 
MANAGER: Greg H ,  Wold PHONE: 313-466-1700 
UAW LOCAL 400 u n i t  4 
20745. Cata1.ano D r .  Mt , Cl emens, MI 48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T isea PHONE: 313-792-0689 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY M I C H I W  FACILITY DIRECTORY 
M t ,  Clemens V i n y l  P iant  
131 Lafayet te M t a  Clemens,MI 48043 
MANAGER: David GI Vo i ta  PHONE: 313-466-3300 
UAW LOCAL 400 
20745 Cat a1 ano Or, Mt , Cl emens, M I  48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: 4ober t T i  seo . PHONE: 313-792-0689 
N o r t h v i l l e  P lant  
235 E, Main St reet  N o r t h v i l l e ,  H I  48147 
MANAGER: John W. Sherr ick PHWE: 313-523-3803 
UW LOCAL 896 
31610 Shaw Farmington, MI 48024 
-. 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Norman E, Fu 1 t z  PHONE: 31 3-474-21 99 
Sheldon Road P lant  
14425 Sheldon Road Plymouth, M I  48170 
t?+WAGER: Dav id  H. Boerger PHONE: 31 3-451 -8750 
UAW LOCAL 843 
16227 Washburn D e t r o i t , M I  48221 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Nearlean Young PHONE: 313-861-0923 
....................................................................... 
Manufactur ing Process Laboratory 
24900 GI endal e Redford, M I  48239 
MANAGER: Fred Bolling PPilZiE: 31 3-592-21 00 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESI O E M  : PHONE : 
........................................................................ 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY MI CHI GAN FACI LIn' D l  RECTORY 
Pl as t  i cs Dev. & Appl , Center 
24300 G l  endal e Road Redford, MI 48239 
MAlrWGER: Fred B o l l i n g  PHONE: 313-592-2100 
!JAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE : 
......................................................................... 
Michigan Proving Grounds 
4305 Mack Road Romeo, MI 48065 
M W G E R :  John F,  Conrad PHWE: 313-752-8500 
UAW LOCAL 400 un i t 18 
20745 Catal ano D r .  Mt , Cl emens, MI 48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T iseo PHONE: 313-792-0689 ' 
Rmeo Trac tor  & Equipment P lant  
701 East 32 M i l e  Road Romeo, M I  45065 
MANAGER: J, van de Kerckhof PHONE: 313-752-8000 
UCKJ LOCAL 400 un i t 8 
20745 Catalano D r .  M i ,  Cl ernens, MI 48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T iseo PHONE: 313-792-0689 
. ~ ~ * a . ~ ~ ~ * ~ a . . A l ~ ~ A . A * ~ A A 1 . 4 1 ) * . ) 1 ~ A 4 A ~ ~ ~ L . ~ ~ r ) . L A . I b . I . * . ~ A ~ ~ . \ ~ . ~ * * A A A A d ' A A 4 A  
Sal ine Instrumentat  ion & P l a s t i c  Plan 
7700 Michigan Avenue Sal i ne, M I  481 76 
MFINAGER: Mohindrapal (Paul) G i l l  PHONE: 313-429-6311 
UAW LOCAL 892 
211 Monroe St, ,  0ox 391 Sal ine,  M I  481 76 
LOCAL PQESIDENT : Denn i s Br ran PHONE: 313-423-7611 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
FORD MOTOR CUMPANY MICHIGAN F A C l L I N  DIRECTORY 
S t e r l i n g  He igh ts  P l a n t  
39000 Mound Road 3 17 M i l e  S t e r l  i n g  Height ,  M I  48077 
MANAGER: Ea r l  C. Koops PHONE: 313-826-5000 
ldcSW LOCAL 228 
39209 Mound Rd, S t e r l  i ng Hts., M I  48708 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: E. Ralph Poszich PHWE : 
. . . A ~ I . * . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . A . A A A . . . A . 4 . * . A * A b . . A A . . A A A . . . * . * . * * . 4 A . * A . . * . . .  
Wan Dyke Ax le  P l a n t  
41111 Van Dyke S t e r l i n g  Height-, MI 48078 
MANAGER: K a r l  Wat ler  PHONE: 31 3-826-6000 
W LOCAL 2280 
39058 Van Dyke S t e r l i n g  Hts., M I  48078 
LOCAL PRESIDOYT: W S I l i a m ~ ~ t e v e n s o n  PHONE: 313-731-7113 
I -. 
4 . * A . . A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . . * . . * 4 . A . b . . . . ~ . * . ~ * . ~ * A . . . A ~ . . A A ~ ~ . .  
Trac to r  D i v i s i o n  General O f f  ices 
2500 E. Maple Road T r o 7 , M I  48084 
W G E R :  Robert F, Mog l i a  (UP, GM> PHONE: 313-643-2000 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDEEFT: PHUNE : 
U t i c a  T r i m  P lan t  
48087 50500 Mound Raad U t i c a ,  MI 
W G E R :  Roger J. Storves PHONE: 313-826-0603 
UAW LOCAL 400 u n i t  4 
20745 Catalano Dr. M t ,  Clemens, MI 48043 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert T iseo  PHONE: 313-792-0689 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
Michigan Truck P lant  
38303 Mi ch i gan Avenue Wayne, M I  48184 
MWGER: R. G. Wallace PHONE: 313-467-0353 
UAGI LOCAL 900 
38110 Michigan Aue, ,  Box 227 Warne, MI 48184 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Walter J. ?d.ishington PHONE : 31 3-439-7082 
A * .  4 ~ A A . . A . . . A A ~ . A . . A . A 4 . \ . b A A 4 b & A ~ A d 4 A A ~ 4 b 4 4 4 A d b A A A A 4 A 4 4 A A A A a 4 4 A ~ ~ A & A A A .  
Wayne Assembl y Pl ant  
37625 M i  c h i gan Avenue Wayne, MI 48183 
MANAGER: John L a t i n i  PHONE: 313-447-0355 
UAW LOCAL 900 
38110 Michigan Ave, ,  Box 227 Wayne, M I  48184 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Wal t e r  J. Washington PHONE: 313-439-7082 
Wixm Assembly P lan t  
5000 Grand River  Expressway Wixm, M I  48096 
W G E R :  Paul R, Nolan PHf3NE: 313-344-5000 
W LOCAL 36 
28700 Wixm Rd. U i x w , M I  48096 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: Orv i 1 1  e Spencer PHONE: 313-965-5545 
Rawsonv i 1 1 e P; 2n t 
McKean and T e x t i l e  Roads Ypsi  l a n t  i , M I  48197 
MANRGER: J, A. Hudson PHONE: 313-487-8000 
UAW LOCAL 895 
8975 T e x t i l e  Rd, Y p s i l a n t i , M I  48197 
LOCAL PRESID:',I'JT : ' Jake Smi t h  PHONE : 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY MICHIGW FACI LIN DIRECTORY 
Yps i l an t i  Plant  
128 Factory St reet  Y p s i l a n t i , M I  48197 
W G E R :  Frank J. CrosKer PHONE: 31 3-484-8000 
1 
UAW LOCAL 849 
454 Chidester S t .  Y p s i l a n t i , M I  48197 
LOCAL. PRESI DENT : 0. J, Bowen PHONE: 313-483-9748 
b . A . A A . A . . A . . . ~ A . ~ . * . . A . A . d d ~ . I A . . * A . A . A . A . A A . A . A A b . A . A ~ A ~ ~ A . I . A A A A 4 . ~ A . .  
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATI ON MI CHI GAN FACILITY D I  RECTORY 
CPC Adr ian Manufactur ing D i v .  
1450 East Beecher S t ree t  Adrian, M I  49221 
M G E R :  Fred Meissinger PHONE: 517-265-4222 
W LOCAL 2031 
11480 Shepherd Road Onsted, M I  49265 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Mike Budwit PHONE: 517-467-4567 
.................................................................... 
CPC Bay C i t y  
100 F i t g e r a l d  St reet  Bay City, M I  48706 
MANAGER: P a t r i c i a  M, Carrigan PHONE: 517-894-7210 
W LOCAL 362 
232 Lagoon Beach Bar C i t y ,  MI 48706 
t.OCAL PRESIDENT: Edward Huizar PHONE : 51 7-684-231 1 
.................................................................... 
Rochester Products D i v i s i o n  
999 Randall S t reet  Coopersvi l le ,  M I  49504 
bfANAGER: David F. Stepanovich PHNE: 616-837-7476 
UAW LOCAL 2151 
12201 Rich Avenue Grant, M I  49327 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Michael Bieber PHONE : 
BOC Cad i l l ac  Motor D i v i s i o n  
2860 Clark Avenue D e t r o i t ,  MI 48232 
FaANAGER: John 0. Grettenberger PHONE: 313-554-5066 
UAW LOCAL 15 
1020 Spr ingwel ls  D e t r o i t ,  M I  48209 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: J. M ,  Wilson PHONE : 
.................................................................... 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
D e t r o i t  Forge D i v i s i o n  
8435 St. Aubin D e t r o i t ,  MI 482 12 
WNAGER: C i  i f f o r d  J ,  Smith PHONE: 313-556-1717 
UAGl LOCAL 262 
9050 Warw i c k D e t r o i t ,  MI 48228 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: Thanas C, Marsh PHONE : 
AAA*..b..a...*..AA...A..A~~~..a.*A4a*.LA..~...~...A.AAA...bAA~.4.... 
Saginaw Det ro i  t P lan t  
1840 Holbrook D e t r o i t ,  M I  4821 2 
MANAGER: Jerome W ,  Zimmer PHONE: 3 2 3-554-6550 
UAW LOCAL 235 
4784 Eal &u i n D e t r o i t ,  MI 4821 4 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Rufus C. F luker  PHWE: 31 3-921 -0831 
Truck & Bus D e t r o i t  Assembly 
1840 Piquet te  D e t r o i t ,  MI 4820 2 
MPRJAGER: R. L ,  Thornton PHONE: 313-356-6305 
lklW LOCAL 157 
29841 Van Born Road Rumulus, MI 481 74 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Wi l l i am R. Robinson PHONE: 313-728-7600 
....**.*A. A.~.4.4A.A..~A.A.A..~A4.A.. 
D e t r o i t  Diesel  A l l i s o n  
13400 West Outer Dr ive  D e t r o i t ,  M I  . 48228 
MAWGER: Ludvik Koe i  PHONE: 313-592-5000 
UAW LOCAL 163 
22635 Pl mouth Road D e t r o i t ,  MI 48239 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Earnest t, Wil l iams PHQNE : 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION MICHICM FACILITY OZRECTORY 
Fisher-Guide D i v i s i o n  
6307 West F o r t  S t r e e t  D e t r o i t ,  M I  4821 6 
MANAGER: John W. Pawser PHONE: 313-554-4700 
W LOCAL 329 
14154 Colpaert  Warren, M I  48093 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert Miodonski PHONE : 
General Motors Headquarters 
3044 West Grand 81 ud, D e t r o i t ,  M I  48202 
MANAGER: Roger B ,  Smith PHONE: 313-356-5000 
W LOCAL 572 
3044 West Grand Blud, D e t r o i t ,  M I  48202 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Conrad K o z l i n s k i  PHONE : - 
b A b A 1 . ~ A . * & 4 1 a . . A A 4 4 1 . I . ( 4 A * 4 * A . 4 A A A A ~ b A A * A * . ~ . a ~ ~ b A A * . ~ * ~ d A A 6 A A A A A A A A ~ ~  
AC Spark P lug  D i v i s i o n  
1601 Averill Avenue ' F l i n t ,  MI 48506 
M G E R :  John R.  W i I son PHWE: 313-766-5000 
LfPkl LOCAL 651 
5431 A n t i o n e t t e  D r i v e  F l i n t ,  MI 48507 , 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert Shaw PHONE : 
~ ~ ~ A A ~ A * A A ~ ~ ~ * ~ * A * A A A A ~ A ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ A ~ A ~ . L A ~ A * A * A A ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A A ~ A A ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A A * ~ . ~ A A *  
BOC F l i n t  P lan t  
4300 South Saginaw F l i n t ,  M I  48507 
MtWQjER: Robert A ,  Harneister PHONE: 31 3-766-391 1 
UAW LOCAL 581 
4425. South Saginaw S t ,  F l  i n t ,  M I  48507 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: B i l l  D ,  Reno PHONE: 313-743-6400 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATIGN MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
BOC Buick Motor D i v i s i o n  
902 East Hamilton F l i n t ,  M I  48505 
MANAGER: Don E, Hackworth PHONE: 313-766-1828 
w LOCAL 599 
812 Le i  t h  S t ree t  F l i n t ,  M I  48505 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Fred Myers PHONE: 313-686-0119 
Truck & Bus Group 
6-2238 West B r i s t o l  Road F l i n t ,  MI 48507 
MANAGER: D o n a ? d E , f l u e l l e r  PHONE: 313-766-5000 
UAW LOCAL 598 
310& West Reid Road Swartz Creek, MI 48473 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Ear l  L, Henry PHEINE: 313-653-4323 
CPC F l i n t  Engine 
6-3248 Van Sl yke Road F l  i n t ,  MI 48507 
MANAGER: P h i l  J, Pierce  PHONE: 31 3-766-5000 
UAW LOCAL 659 u n i t  4 
11115 East B r i s t o l  Rd. Davi son, M I  48423 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Herschel N i x  PHONE : 
CPC F l i n t  Manufactur ing 
300 Nor th  Chevrbiet Avenue F l i n t ,  MI 48555 
MANAGER: Robert E. Boru f f  PHONE: 31 3-766-5000 
U A W  LOCAL 659 un i t 6 
11llS East B r i s t o l  Rd, Davison, M I  48423 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Herschel N ix  PHCNE : 
A A . . * . * * * * . * * * ~ * A * A A * 4 A A * A * A . * * * * 4 . A 4 * . . * * * A * * A * A ~ A A * A ~ 4 * 4 4 * A . A . * * ~ A  
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATI ON MI CHI GAH FACI L I N  D l  RECTORY 
Fisher-Guide D i v i s i o n  
48559 East Coldwater Road F l i n t ,  M I  48559 
MANAGER: A1 S,, Herold PHONE: 31 3-234-4636 
W LOCAL 326 
1272 Coldwater Rd. F l  i n t ,  M I  48505 
LOCAL PRESIDEM: Michael E, Bennett PHONE: 31 3-736-7084 
BOC Grand Blanc Manufactur ing 
10800 South Saginaw Grand Blanc, M I  48439' 
W G E R :  Donald Burkhold PWONE: 31 3-234-1 1 44 
LWW LOCAL 1292 
6-6153 South Dart Highway Grand Blanc, M I  48439 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: J imrnr J, Osborne PHONE: 51 7-743-3782 
CPC Grand Rapids Metal , P l a n t  1 
300 36th S t r e e t ,  S,W. Grand Rap ids, M I  49508 
W G E R :  Harold W, Kruse PHONE: 616-247-5494 
UAW LOCAL 730 
3852 Buchanan Ave. S.W, Grand Rapids, M I  49508 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Donald 8y le  PHONE : 
.................................................................... 
Rochester Products D i v i s i o n  
2100 Bur l  ingame S.W. Grand ~a~ i ds, MI 49509 
MANAGER: Ronald T, Korte PHONE: 616-247-5397 
W LOCAL 167 
8078 20th Ave, Jenison, M I  49428 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: P ,  A, H i l l a  PHONE: 616-457-4281 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION MICHIGW FACILIN DIRECTORY 
In land D iv i s ion  
2150 Alp ine Avenue N.W. Grand Rapids, MI 49504 
MANAGER: Robert K. Schuler PHUNE: hid-747-3830 
W LOCAL 1231 
4269 A l p i n e  N.W. Cornstock Park, M I  49321 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Ronald McMichael PHONE: 61 6-931 -5205 
00C Metfab P l a n t  
5200 East Cork Street  Kal amazoo, MI 4900 1 
MAE1AGER: Michael J, Hanley PHCINE: 616-385-1201 
UAW LOCAL 488 
3731 Caoington Rd, Kal mazoo, MI 49002 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Robert E. A i 1 stock PHONE: 616-381-2703 
BOC Lansing 
401 North Ver l inden Lansing, MI ' 4891 5 
MANAGER: Frank Schotters PHONE: 51 7-377-521 0 
UAW LOCAL 652 
426 Clare St.  Lansing, MI 4891 7 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Gary Watson PHONE: 517-372-7581 
BOC Oldsrnobile D i v i s i o n  
920 Twnssnd Street L.ansing, MI 48921 
MANAGER: W ,  W ,  Lane PHCNE: 517-377-5000 
I)cXJ LOCAL 1618 
R1 11740 S t a t e  Rd. Eagle, MI 48822 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Ross F, Sherman PHONE: 517-627-7916 
GENERAL.MOTORS CORPORATION MICHIC-AN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
BOC Cad i l l ac  Engine 
12200 M idd lebe l t  Road L i von ia ,  MI 481 50 
W G E R :  Robert W. F e r r a r i  PHONE: 31 3-523-031 6 
UAW LOCAL 22 
4300 M.ichigan Ave.  D e t r o i t ,  M I  4821 0 
LOCAL PRESIDEN'T: M I  I.. Doug1 as PHONE: 313-861-0873 
. . A A A . A A A A A * . A . . A * A . ~ * A . . . . A . A A . A A . * A A * A A A . A . A ~ . A A A . ~ * A * . . A A A A . A A ~ * * . *  
Fisher- In land D i v i s i o n  
28400 Plymouth Road L ivon ia ,  M I  481 50 
W G E R :  Ana-Marie Vegas PHONE: 31 3-523-8200 
UAGI LOCAL 174 
6495 West Warren Ave. D e t r o i t ,  M I  4821 0 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: J im Baker 
CPC L i v o n i a  Spr ing And Bumper 
13000 Eckles Road L i von ia ,  M I  481 90 
FiANAGER: Helrnuth H, Majer PHONE: 313-464-5000 
W LOCAL 262 
9050 Warw i ck D e t r o i t ,  MI 48228 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Thomas C. Marsh PHONE : 
Gf.l Proving Grounds 
Hi cl<ory/General Motors Rda M i l f o r d ,  M I  48042 
MANAGER: F, D ,  Smi thsom PHONE: 31 3-685-5000 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE : 
A I * A A A A . A A ~ ~ A * A ~ A A A ~ * . * A ~ * A ~ ~ * A ~ A I ~ A A A & ' A ~ * I . A A ~ A * A ~ A ~ A * * A A A A ~ ~ A A * A A A A A A A  
GWERAL MOTORS CORPORATI ON M I  CHI GAN FACI  LIN DIRECTORY 
Centra l  Foundry D i v i s i o n  
70 1 Nor th  G l  enwood Pont iac ,  MI 48306 
MANAGER: C ,  Michael Tay lo r  PHONE: 313-857-1007 
w LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESI O E M  : PHONE : 
BOC Or ion Assembly P lan t  
4555 Giddings Road Pont iac,  MI 48055 
W G E R :  L e s l i e  (Les) 5. Richards PHWE: 31 3-377-51 00 
UcSW LOCAL 5960 
821 Ba l& in  Pont iac,  M I  48053 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: W ,  H, Spencer PHONE : 
CPC Pont iac Motors 
900 Baldwin Avenue Pont iac ,  H I  48055 
MANAGER: J, Michael Losh PHONE: 313-857-0303 
UAW LOCAL 653 
2535 Normade l e Pont iac,  M I  48055 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Haro ld  D. Cox PHONE: 313-673-1339 
A A A A . * A * A A * A * * * . . A A . A * * 4 A ~ 4 . A A A . A * A A A * . ~ * A A A A A ~ * . * A A A A A A ~ A A * * A . * * A A .  
CPC Pon t i ac Mot o r  s 
One Pont iac Plaza Pont iac,  M I  48053 
MANAGER: J .  Michael Losh PHONE: 313-857-5000 
UAGl LOML 417 u n i t  120 
1640 Stephenson PMY, Troy, MI 48083 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Bern ice Adams PHONE : 
GENERAL MMORS CORPORATION M I  CHI W FACI L I M  DIRECTORY 
Truck And Bus D i v .  
660 South Blud,  E,  Pont iac ,  M1 58053 
M G E R :  P a t r i c k  J ,  C o l e t t a  PHONE: 313-456-3311 
w LOCAL 594 
525 East B lvd,  S.  Pontiac, MI  48053 
LOCAL PRESIDENT : Don Doug1 as PHONE: 31 3-334-2459 
D e t r o i t  D iese l  A l l i s o n  
36880 Ecorse R ~ ~ ~ u l u s ,  M I  481 74 
MANAGER: Robert Ranka PHONE: 31 3-395-5387 
W LOCAL 483 
24411 Unian Dearborn, M I  481 26 
LOCAL PRESIDEM': James J, Kowal ik PHQNE: 313-561-4372 
Cent ra l  Foundry Div ,  
77 West Con t e r  Saginaw, M I  4860 1 
MANAGER: George G. Johnston PHONE: 51 7-776-3364 
w LOCAL 455 
110 Florence Saginaw, MI 48602 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Rudy Rueda PWONE : 51 7-752-6342 
Oelco Moraine Saginaw Mfg. Diu 
2328 East Gcnesee Saginaw, M I  4860 1 
MANAGER: C ,  E. White PHONE: 51 7-776-280 1 
UAW L o w L  467 
2104 Farmer Saginaw, M I  4860 1 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: F rede r i ck  Z ieh i  PHWE : 
A * . 4 A A 4 A A A A . A ~ ~ A * . . A . A 4 . ~ * * 4 . . . A * ~ * < b A A A . L A ~ ~ * 4 A . , . * * * ~ * . * ~ * . . * . . A . . ~ A *  
GENERAL MOTORS :: GliPORATI ON MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
CFO Nodular Iron Casting 
2100 Veterans Memorial PRwy Saginaw, MI 48L.O 1 
MANAGER: Michael 8, Hamilton PHONE: 5i7-776-2063 
UAtJ LOCAL 668 
1601 North 6th St, Saginaw, MI 4860 1 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Clayton N. Moll PHONE : 
CFD Saginaw Grey Iron Casting 
1629 North Washington Saginaw, MI 4860 1 
W G E R  : Gordon J , Mar i no+ S PHQNE: 51 7-776-5000 
UAlJ LOCAL 699 
191 1 Bagl er +Saginaw, MI 4860 1 
LOCAL PRESI DDVT: bforma~ P7i.w PHWE: 51 7-755-0569 
Sag.i naw Produc t s 
628 North Hamil ton Saginaw, MI 48602 
MANAGER: A1 Mouner PHWE: 517-776-5101 
UUW LOCAL 699 
1911 Bagler Saginaw, M I  4860 1 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Norman Myer P H W E :  517-755-05d9 
Sa inaw Products 
3980 Hal 1 and Road Saginaw, MI 
MANAGER: Mark R,  McCabe PHONE: 517-774-3900 
W LOCAL 467 
2104 Farmer Saginaw, MI 4860 1 
LOML PRESIDEMT: Fredrick Ziehl PHONE : 
EDS Headquarters B u i l d i n g  
23077 Green f ie ld  Road Southf i e l d ,  MI 480 75 
MANAGER: Roy Re id l i nge r  PHONE: 313-443-3000 
UAW LOCAL 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: PHONE: 
~ . A . A A A A I I I A A * ~ L A A ~ A A A ~ ~ A ~ A A . L ~ \ . A A * A L A A A ~ A ~ ~ A A A A A A A A A A A ~ A A * . ~ A A A ~ A ~ A ~  
Fisher - In land Div. Tecumseh 
5550 Occidental H w y .  Tecumseh, M I  49286 
M G E R :  Richard Norton PHONE: 517-423-0300 
lfAGi LOCAL 1341 
2756 Bent Oak Adr ian,  MI 49221 
LOCAL PRESIDM: Thomas Laugh l in  PHONE: 51 7-265-4002 
Hydra-Mat i c  D i v i s i o n  
1 H y d r a w a t i c  Dr ive  Three R ivers ,  HI 4 90 93 
W G E R :  Gary C. Armstrong PHONE: 616-278-0211 
Uc4W LOCAL 2093 
f5802 Hoffman Rd, Three Rivers,  MI 49093 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Ernest Eain PHONE: 517-683-6555 
Balance Engineer ing D i v i s i o n  
6490 E ,  12 M i l e  Road Warren, MI 48090 
MANAGER: Gerhard K, Haas PHONE: 313-575-8743 
UAW LOCAL 140 
28504 Lorna Warren, M I  48092 
LOML PRESIDENT: Pete K e l l y  PHONE: 313-575-1014 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION MICHIGAN FACILITY DIRECTORY 
CPC Chevrolet Motor D i v i s i o n  
30007 Van Dyke Warren, M I  48093 
MANAGER: Robert D, Burger PHONE: 313-492-8822 
11W LOCAL 160 
28504 Lorna Warren, M I  48092 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: P e t e  Kelly PHONE: 313-575-1014 
A A A A A A A A A A b A & A ~ A A A A A A A 4 ~ A A A A A ~ & A A & A A A ~ A A A A A & A A A A A A ~ ~ & ~ A A A & & & A ~ A ~ A A & A  
Hydra-Matic D i v i s i o n  
23500 Mound Road Warren, M I  48091 
W G E R :  Eugene J, Rymar PHONE: 31 3-375-0405 
UAW LOCAL 909 
24249 Mound l?d, Warren, M I  4890 1 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: B i l i  Apple PHONE : 
b A h A A A a A A * A A A A A A 4 A A A . A & A * A A A A & A . \ A * A A A A A 4 A * A A A A A & b A A A & A A . A & A A A A A A ~ A A a  
Research Labora tor ies  
12 M i l e  And Mound Road Warren, M I  48090 
MANAGER: Robert A ,  Frosch PHONE : 31 3-575-31 27 
UPkl LOCAL 160 
28504 Lorna Warren, M I  48092 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Pete Kelly PHONE : 31 3-575-1 0 1 4 
& . ~ A A ~ ~ A ~ A 1 A A ~ ~ ~ ~ A ~ A A A A A A A A A A A A a * A ~ & b A 4 ~ A A A A A ~ A 4 ~ A A ~ A * ~ * . ~ . * ~ ~ ~ A * * ~ .  
Hydra-Matic D i v i s i o n  
2623 T r  1 er  Road Y p s i l a n t i ,  M I  481 98 
MANAGER: Thomas R ,  Zimmer PHONE : 3 1 3-485-50 00 
UAW LOML 735 
1422 81 o s s m  Y p s i l a n t i ,  MI 481 97 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Ronal d Murry PHONE: 313-485-2224 
I 
5 A 4 . 4 A * * * . * . A ~ * . & A * * * * * ~ A L . * A * . . & n i \ A * . * . . * * A * A . . ~ A A A 4 a A ~ A a A * A A A . . * b .  
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION M I C H I G M  F A C I L I N  DIRECTORY 
BOC W i 1 1 ow Run Assembl y 
2625 Tyl  er Road Ypsilanti, M I  481 98 
MANAGER: Frank D,  Faga PHOEIE: 313-485-5000 
W LOCAL 1 1  76 
1070 Mc Cartnsy Rd. Ypsilanti, MI 481 97 
LOCAL PRESIDENT: Richard D e b s  PHONE : 

THE CONFER SYSTEM 
Overview 
The primary interaction between the participants of the AIM project takes place 
electronically over a communication system known as Confer. Confer is a computer con- 
ferencing software package which allows the organization of written entries, transmission 
of electronic mail, broadcasting of public bulletin messages, end interfacing of participants' 
personal computers. This communication system provides the following benefits to the 
AIM project:' 
1. There is no need to coordinate the schedules of those who want to talk with one 
another. 
2. People can stay on the job rather than spend hours traveling to a meeting. 
3. Confer provides an ~utomatically-organized written record of the group discussion. 
4. Confer allows one to collect and compos~e thoughts, and to contribute them a t  a con- 
venient time and place. 
5.  Everyone in the group can contribute fully without impinging on anyone else's 
wishes to speak. 
6. You can discuss multiple topics with ;dl members of the group and communicate 
privately with particular individuals at  the same time. There is no interference 
among these exchanges. 
7. Everyone can experience rapid and multiple feedback to an idea, and can give and 
receive feedback on such responses. 
Confer Characteristics 
Confer is the "brand name" for a computer software package that allows a multi- 
tude of personal computers to be linked together through a mainframe computer to provide 
a structured flow of information between participants. The Confer communication 
software was developed by Dr. Robert Parnes at  the Univer:sity of Michigan for use with 
the Michigan Terminal System (MTS) and is available through Advertel Communication 
Systems, Inc. (Ann Arbor, MI). Presently, the software is being supported on the 
mainframes a t  Wayne State University, the University of Alberta, and the University of 
Michigan. 
' ~ r ,  Robert Parnes and Dr. Edgar Taylor, "The User's Guide to Confer 11," November 1983, p. 7. 
The structure of Confer allows the participants to electronically supplement face-to- 
face meetings and other forms of communica.tion i? order to raise issues, set agendas, fol- 
lowup on tasks, direct and coordinate geogra.phically dispersed persons, and distribute in- 
formation. The system allows this electronic exchange easily, quickly, and inexpensively 
between a group that normally would have difficulty coordinating schedules for face-to-face 
meetings. Through a micro-computer hookup (either at  the office or at  home), Confer is 
available twenty-four hours a day for input or retrieval of information. 
Although Confer itself is capable of tying 960 participants together, a conference 
typically ties 10 to 100 participants together. Conferences running on Confer software 
have facilitated three hundred participants without any serious system or software failure. 
In practical terms, Confer itself does not create any software constraints to the number of 
items, responses, or messages that can be organized within the system. These limits are a 
function of budget constraints concerning computer time arid data storage fees. Time of 
operation is also not a physical constraint. Conferences may run one day or may be ex- 
tended indefinitely. 
Elements of a n  Electronic Conference 
The following definitions provide the terminology used in the Confer system and the 
various elements that structure the input and output of informati~n.~ 
A conference is the basic social structure in Confer. It is where a group of users 
interact with each other. There are many conferences running in parallel under Confer. 
An - item is text composed by any participant in the conference. It is immediately 
available to everyone who uses the conference. It becomes a permanent part of the con- 
ference and can be viewed by everyone in the conference until it is deleted. 
A response is a short reaction to an item. Any participant is free to respond. Every 
response is immediately available to everyone who can use the conference. Through items 
and responses, Confer makes it easy for someone to present ideas to the group, to let the 
members give their feedback, and for all to share and comment on the feedback of other 
members. 
- - - - - - - - 
'pwnes and Taylor, pp. 8,96. 
A message lets any participant communicate in private with any other participant 
in the conference. Messages may be composed a t  any time. They are transmjtted instan- 
taneously to designated recipients, to be read and replied to a t  their convenience. The 
message recipient may delete the message after it has been read, or archive it for later 
reference. 
A - bulletin is a short, dated announcement. Any participant can post a bulletin 
which will be shown to the rest of the conference members. Bulletins can be used to an- 
nounce important events, or to draw attention to a problem or an item. 
A - note is a reminder to the participant. The participant entering the note is the only 
one who can see the entry. The participant can instruct Confer to show the note on a par- 
ticular day (such as  a meeting reminder) or for a specific period of time (such as a 
timetable). 
The agenda is a listing of a number of descriptive category names. Associated with 
each category is a list of the items that fit into the category. The conference organizer 
maintains the agenda. 
The organizer is the person who has administrative responsibility for the conference. 
One of the main responsibilities of the organizer is to maintain the conference agenda. 
Jack Russell served as the conference organizer during the Project's first year. 
AIM'S Use of Confer 
The operation of an electronic conference system is the only practical method of 
providing a continuous interaction among the participants of the AIM project. The 
schedules, geographic dispersion, and work hal~its of the members of the CRT would have 
inhibited the exchange of information among the members and would have made irnpos- 
sible the coordination of such a project. 
The AIM conference has been in operation since December 18, 1984. Between the 
conference's beginning and August 18, 1985, the sixteen participants (Table I) have 
entered 173 items and 422 responses to those items, and sent 5,666 messages to each - 
other. This equates to twenty-three messages sent per day, or two per each participant's 
signon. 
Confer was used throughout the Project to facilitate the administrative tasks of the 
director and the coordinator, provide a medium for exchanging information and ideas, ar- 
chive and organize approximately two hundred news article summaries, and disseminate 
trip reports of personal interviews. 
Table I 
Confer System Participants 
Name I Title I Organization 




David E. Cole . 
Michael S. Flynn 
Lauren Hammett 




























Central Research Team 
Technology Deployment 
Service 
Mich. Dept. of Commerce 
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Center, IT1 
Business Information Div. 
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Office for the Study ' 
of Auto. Transp., U-M 
Cfenter for Social 





Pyrenees Consulting Corp. 
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THE CRT INTERVIEWS 
Universal Questions 
In this set of questions, we're interested in getting a broad overview of the situation in, and prospects for, 
the ailtomotive industry in Michigan. 
U.1. What will be the three (3) most important changes in cars and light trucks themselves between now 
and 1992? How will the first such change you mentioned impact facilities in Michigan? 
U.2. What will be the three (3) most important changes in the way cars and light trucks are made 
between now and 1992? How will the first such change you mentioned affect facilities in Michigan? 
U.3. Do you think that computer-based manufacturing technologies will significantly enhance the 
prospects of retaining automotive manufacturing activity in the U.S. in the 1985-92 period? In Michigan? 
In your own operations in the State? 
U.4. Please indicate the three (3) Michigan automotivtr facilities - OEM or independent, excluding final 
vehicle assembly plants - that you believe will be the strongest, and the three that will be the weakest, 
performers in the 1987-1993 period. 
U.5. What can the State of Michigan do to help a changing automotive industry - both O W  and 
independent suppliers - remain strong in Michigan in the next five to seven years? 
Vehicle Program Siting Questions 
Now .we'd like to ask you some questions that focus on vehicle programs and their siting. This area is 
important in itself, but also because of the implications for supplier location and investment of where cars 
and light trucks are assembled. 
V.1. What car and light truck programs are currently sited in Michigan assembly plants, and when are 
they scheduled to terminate? How much "play' is there in each program's termination date? We are 
particularly interested in Detroit Cadillac Assembly and Flint Plant 40 (Whom, Wayne, and Dearborn; 
Jefferson). 
V.?. UTe have constructed a chart showing the current and reported future vehicle programs of Michigan 
assembly plants. Will you please examine it, and help us fill in gaps in our knowledge? What new 
vehicle programs are planned? Which are assured and which still speculative? At which market segments 
will each be aimed? 






















Current Program Future Program 
Vehicles Ends Vehicles 'Begins 
B 88 ? 
D: limos 
S15 
med 86 GMT400 87 
hvy, bus 













Esc/Lynx 90 ? 
EXP 85 
Mstng/Cpri 86 ? 
K: Ar/Rel 88 A ' 89 
E: LeB/6OO 
E/NYer C 87 




v.1. What program if any is likely to replace the Bs when their run at Detroit Cadillac Assembly ends? 
When will that be? 
v.2. Where is GM80, the Camaro/Firebird successor, going to be sited? If a decision has not yet been 
made, when will i t  be? 
v.3. What is Wayne's future if no domestic successor t,o Escort/Lynx is launched? Can that plant outlive 
its current program? 
v.4. What is Dearborn Assembly's future, if any, after Mustang? If no new vehicle 'program is 
contemplated, what are the implications for other plants and departments in the Rouge? 
v.5. Is Jefferson Plssembly assured of a new C in 1987 to replace E and New Yorker? If Aries and Reliant 
are replaced in 1988 as scheduled, is it sure that Jefferson would get the successor? 
V.3. For both current and future multiplant vehicle programs, which is (are) the core plant(s)? Which, 
instead, would be the first to lose a shift or to be shut down if demand fell? What factors determine the 
order of shutdown or shift loss? Are non-core plants given less hard automation? Given your planned 
product array, which products and facilities do you view as safe and which at greatest risk? 
v.6. Of the three U.S. plants slated for Hs (GM70), how do Willow Run and Buick City rank? 
v.7. If GM30s from Poletown cut into C sales, which would lose a shift or be shut down first, Wentzville 
or Orion? Why? 
v.8. How does Wayne rank relative to  Edison in the future of Escort/Lynx if sales volumes drop off due 
to the non-extension of the W? 
v.9, If there is a new program successor to Mustang/Capri, is i t  assured that Dearborn would get it? 
v.10. What is Jefferson's rank,relative to Newark for IC cars and their successor program? Will that new 
program need two plants? Three? What's Jefferson's rank relative to St. Louis for the E body successor? 
Will that program be multiplant? 
V.4. Which if any Michigan assembly plants are likely to have a future even if no firm commitment of a 
new vehicle program has yet been made? Which are unlikely, and why? How important in this are plant 
size, age, architecture, and labor climate? Do you have a system you would share with us that combines 
these "plant viability" factors into an overall measure that can be compared across plants? 
v.11. How, if at  all, do age, size, and architecture affect the chances that a new program will be sited at 
Clark once the B run ends in 1988 or 1989? 
v.12. How, if at  all, so age, size, and architecture affect the chances that a new program will be sited at 
Dearblorn beyond Mustang? 
v.13. Is Jefferson's age, size, or architecture a major risk factor, relative to Newark and/or St. Louis, in 
the post-I< and post-E decision? 
V.5. Of the new programs planned, which will require greenfield sites? 
v.14. Which programs are seen as radical departures, requiring clean sheet facilitizing? Which are 
"semiradical" and could go either way? Which are only "incrementally new1'? 
v.15. Is there likely to be one or more non-domestic greenfield cluster like Nissan's in Smyma? Will 
Saturn (Alpha, Concept 90) tend to make future non-domestic projects more green- and less brownfield? 
How would this affect Michigan's prospects for attracting additional non-domestic assembly operations? 
[For V.G., V.7., v.lG., and v.17. respondents:] Some industry observers predict that the U.S. new car 
market will be increasingly split between a "commodity market" composed of long production run 
vehicles in each size class, and a series of "niche markets" served by a profusion of lower volume product 
offerings. 
V.6. Which programs are anticipated as long production run vehicles? Which are more niche-oriented, 
and what is the minimum acceptable niche size? How much does that minimum depend on market 
segment? 
V.S. What is the role of segment mix and demographics? Will future upscale models tend to be 
assembled nearer to coastal markets where European sales are concentr.ated? 
v.16. If captive imports and/or joint venture vehicles can be counted as domestic for CAFE purposes, 
what joint ventures might this prompt? Is Michigan al good US.-Japan joint venture site, or would the 
typical U.S. OEM prefer its JV partner to be on a cowt near where parts and subassemblies are shipped 
in? 
v.17. Are performance cars, e.g., GM80, likely to be assembled in the South or West because of the 
stronger muscle car market there? 
V.8. What is the outlook for investment by foreign-based OEMs in the U.S. and especially Michigan 
between now and 1992? If NUMMI, Smyrna, Marysville, and Flat Rock were to be joined by a purebred 
Toyota facility and a Mitsubishi (or Mitsubishi-Chrysler) plant, where do you think those two new 
facilities would be most likely to be sited? 
v.18. What are the capacity, plant age, technology, and Japanese market circumstances of each Japanese- 
based OEM? How might these impact the decision about whether - and if so when and where - to 
initiate or add to U.S. production? 
V.9, What vehicle programs of the U.S.-based OEMs will be sited outside the U.S. and Canada? Would 
a profusion of niche products increase the volume of captive imports (U.S. market absorbs "extra" output 
in Japan and Europe), or decrease it (U.S. more competitive in niche vehicles)? 
v.19. Are there likely to be more upscale niche vehicles such as Ford's Merkur imported by the Big 
Three? How many and when? Do you see such captive import niche cars costing sales at existing 
Michigan assembly plants such as Orion (Wixom, Sterling Heights)? 
v.20. [For OEMs:] Do you anticipate that Canada will. host a smaller, larger, or unchanging proportion 
of your North American assembly and engine- and transmission-building investment in 1992 as compared 
to 1983-85? If smaller or larger, by how much? 
Vehicle a n d  Component  Characteristics Questions 
We'd now like to pose some questions concerning how the product and some of its major subsystems are 
likely to change in the next five t.o seven years. Please keep in mind that we're particularly interested in 
how these changes might affect facilities in Michigan. 
Drive Train 
c.1. The table below shows the current, and the 1983 University of Michigan Delphi forecast for the 1992, 
dGtribution of US.-assembled passenger cars according to front or mid-engine and front or rear drive. 
Please indicate your expectations for 1992 in the blanks provided. 
1984 1992 Delphi Your 1992 
Front engine, rear drive 48% 
Front engine, front drive 51 
Mid-engine, rear drive 1 
c.2. Which Michigan automotive facilities, OEM and independent, will be most affected if your 1992 
forecast proves accurate? 
c.3. List the up to five (5) components for which demand would be seriously reduced if the shift you 
predicted away from rear drive occurs. 
c.4. The current, and 1992 Delphi forecast of, transmission mix is shown in the table below. Please 
indicate your expectations for 1992 in the blanks provided. 
1984 1992 Delphi Your 1992 
Manual 
Four-speed 6.4% 
Five-speed (incl overdrive) 9.0 
Total manual 15.4 
Automatic 
Three-speed 19% ---- % 
Four-speed 41 ---- 
Continuously Variable (CVT) 0 14 
Five- & six-speed 0 ---- 
Total automatic 85.6% 74 ---- 
c.5. Most observers agree that there remains a major high-volume production problem for the belt of a 
CVT transmission. Do you believe this problem will be solved and, if so, when? Are there other 
significant problems that have to be overcome before CVTs can be brought to the mass market? 
c.6. What, in your opinion, is the maximum engine displacement arid curb weight for CVT-equipped 
vehicles? If the CVT proves successful, do you expect it to displace automatic or manual 
transmissions/transaxles to a different extent? 
c.7. In addition to the belt, what other elements of the CVT are unique and new? If the CVT begins to 
make inroads in the U.S. market in the next five to seven years, which transmission components and 
which suppliers are most a t  risk? Which stand to gain, and why? 
c.8. Which company or companies are likely to produce CVTs if they prove out? Where will they be 
produced, and where will there major components be cast and machined? 
c.9. What ,  in your view, is the minimum annual ecclnomic production volume (%shift operation) for a 





c.10. What  product and process technology changes do you foresee in the 1986-92 period in conventional 
trans~missions, transaxles, and axles? 
c.11. The current, and 1992 Delphi forecast of, frame mix among separate body frame, integral body 
frame (unibody), and Fiero-type space frame are shown in the table below. Please indicate your 
prediction of the mix in 1992. 
1984 1992 Delphi Your 1992 
Separate Body Frame 
Integral Body Frame 
Space Frame 
c.12. Which major body and structural components will be most affected by the changes you predicted 
above? 
c.13. Which Michigan automotive facilities, OEM and independent, would be most affected if your 
forecast proves accurate? 
c.14. What is your 1992 forecast for reinforced plastic and steel body panels for the components listed 
below? (each row must sum to 100%) 






c.15. What is your forecast for the material mix - steel, aluminum, and plastic-reinforced composites - 
in frame/structural members in integral body/frame and space frame designs in 1992? (each row must 
sum to 100%) 
Steel Alumir~um Composites 
Integral BodyIFrame - - - - % ---- % ---- % 
Space Frame ---- ---- ---- 
c.16. Some newer assembly plants have their own on-:site stamping facility. Some niche vehicles have 
plastic body panels. In your view, will either of these developments intensify significantly enough by 1992 
to affect any of the OEM's current stamping plants? Which one(s)? Any of the large independent 
stampers? Which? 
Spark-Ignited Engines 
c.17. The current, and the Delphi forecast of the 1992, engine mix are shown in the table below. Please 
indicate your forecast in the blanks provided. 
1984 1992 :Delphi Your 1992 
c.18. Many of the engines installed in US.-assembled light vehicles are of proven, mature design. Many 
of the technologies are in turn mature and long-st'anding. Is this about to change significantly? 
Specifically, what percentage of the engines that power US.-made cars and light trucks are likely to 
undergo major redesign between now and 1992? What are the implications of your answer for automotive 
facilities, OEM and independent, in Michigan? 
c.19. The current, and the Delphi forecast for the 1992, penetration rates of aluminum engine blocks and 
cylinder heads are shown in the table below. Please indicate your 1992 forecast for aluminum use in 
heads and blocks in the blanks provided. 
1992 Delphi Your 1992 
Heads 
Blocks 
c.20. What major design changes or features do you foresee in spark-ignited car and light truck engines 
between now and 1993? Please indicate such changes together with your forecast of how widespread they 
will become by 1992, i.e., in what percentage of new car and light truck engines they will be embodied. 
(Prompts: 3- or &valve cylinder heads, roller lifters, turbochargers) How would each affect automotive 
facilities, OEM and independent, in Michigan? 
c.21. Ceramics 
c.22. What major changes do you expect in how engines are produced over the next five to seven years, 
and how will such changes, if any, affect Michigan facilities? 
c.23. What is the minimum annual economic production volume (%shift operation) of an engine module 
today, and what do you think it will be in 1992? (in 000s per year) 
Electronics 
c.24. The 1983 University of Michigan Delphi forecast was for electronics to constitute about 12 percent 
of vehicle cost in 1992, up from about 5 percent toclay. What is your forecast for the 1992 share of 
vehicle cost accounted for by electronics? 
c;35. Which major components (e.g., valves), sensors and controls that now are manually-controlled will 
be fundamentally changed by the application of electronics between now and 1992? What implications 
does your answer have for Michigan facilities, OEM and independent? 
c.26. Which significant factors, if any, limit the auto industry's ability to move quickly to increase the 
use of electronic technology in vehicles? (Prompts: cost, technical personnel, capital) 
Engineering Process 
c.27. What percentage of your engineering employees have a microprocessor-based workstation or 
computer a t  their desk? Alternatively, what is the ratio of microcomputers to engineers? 
c.38. What percentage of product design in your engineering operation is performed with the aid of 
computers? 
c.29. Improved structural efficiency has been termed crucial to weight and cost reduction and to 
improved quality. Do you have the capacity in-house to  perform computer-based structural analyses such 
as finite element analysis? If so, are these techniques regularly employed in the design and development 
process? 
c.30. What is the lead time in your component/system from the end of forward planning through design 
test and production? What steps, if any, are you taking to reduce it? What do you estimate the lead 
time .will be in 1992? 
c.31. Do you have in-house design and process capability and knowledge of potentially competitive 
materials? For example, can you judge what i t  would take to design and manufacture your part in a 
variety of materials? 
C.1. 'How do Michigan universities and technical institutions compare, in your view, to those elsewhere in 
the U.S. and abroad in basic and applied research on automotive product tech_nologies? 
Body and Component  Materials Questions 
Now we'd like to ask you a set of questions that focus on changes in automotive materials. Please keep in 
mind that we are especially interested in how such changes, should they occur, might affect 
manufacturing facilities in Michigan. 
M.1. To what extent by 1992 will fiber optics replace copper wiring harnesses in domestic car and light 
truck electrical systems? If to a significant extent, what will be the impact on Michigan suppliers of 
copper wiring harnesses? To what extent could those facilities adapt their technologies and skill 
endowments to fiber optics technology? Which of the second- and third-tier Michigan suppliers of 
connectors, insulation, clips, and so on for copper wiring harnesses are inost at  risk? 
M.2. What is the likelihood - and the likely extent - of ceramic or other high-temperature plastic parss 
being usecl in engines and/or transmissions? In the 1935-1992 time frame, will their market penetration 
(if any) be limited to heavy duty applications? In which programs? Produced where? 
M.3. What are the major trends in soft trim styling and manufacture? How sensitive are Michigan's 
trim operations to changes in product mix and market segmentation? 
M.4. How much basic knowledge exists about the solidification mechanics of aluminum castings alloys, as 
compared to iron alloys? How much has this been translated into practical gating assistance for major 
automotive components? 
M.5. What speeds and feeds are required ta machine properly the types of aluminum castings 
contemplated, and are these practical with today's machine tool technology? What impact do recent 
cutting tool developments (e.g., practical diamond tools) have on the rate at which aluminum castings 
replace iron and steel? 
M.6. 'What  developments in aluminum casting and mischining technologies (if any) have motivated the 
contemplated shift to aluminum for many more cylinder heads and engi:ne blocks? 
m.1. What will be the extent of usage of car and light truck aluminum engine blocks and cylinder heads 
in 1988 and in 1992? 
Percent of Engine Blocks 
Percent of Cylinder Heads 




m.3. What will be the distribution of block design among unsleeved and sleeved and, within, sleeved, of 
wet and dry sleeve? In light of your answer, do you think it is existing engine plants or the foundries that 
supply them that are more a t  risk over the 1985-92 period from aluminum engine blocks? 
m.4. By what casting technique(s) will aluminum blocks and heads be made in the 1985-93 time period? 
* Sand Casting 
* Shell Molding 
* Lost Foam Casting 
* Gravity (Semi-) Permanent Mold Casting 
*Normal Density Die Casting 
* Pore-Free Density Die Casting 
* Other(s) - - - - - 




















m.7. To what extent may the projected aluminum scrap supply and recycling capacity of Michigan affect 
the State's prospects in the shift to aluminum engine castings? What are Michigan's strengths and 
weaknesses with regard to attracting or retaining secondary smelters needed in the shift? 
M.7. What impact if any does the fact that many of the industry's engine plants are located in Michigan 
have on the siting decisions about new aluminum casting facilities? 
M.8. What will happen to Michigan's captive and in,dependent ferrous and nonferrous foundries now 
casting iron heads and blocks should there be a widespread shift to aluminum by 1992? What investment 
in plant and equipment would be required for them to adapt? 
m.8. How amenable are OEM captive head and block machining facilities in Michigan to the change from 
iron to aluminum? Will they keep the machining work despite the materials change, or will .much of the 
work be resourced to save the cost of refitting existing machining plants? 
m.9. What opportunities, if any, are there for Michigan's independent machining facilities in the shift to 
aluminum? 
M.9. Will the shift to greater aluminum usage for heads and blocks require new machining lines or will 
changes (how major?) to existing lines suffice? How well based are .Michigan's machine tool builders, 
compared to their domestic and foreign competitors, in the special requirements of machining aluminum? 
m.10. How well developed are shrink models for precision aluminum head and block castings? How 
available are.these models to Michigan pattern makers? 
m.11. Do the heat treatment, impregnation, and other requirements for aluminum heads and blocks 
present any opportunities for Michigan firms in these lines of business? 
M.10. Are there labor intensity implications of the shift from iron to aluminum casting of heads and 
blocks? If so, what are they? Are there different skill requirements in pattern- and mold-making, in 
casting, in machining, and in tooling? 
M.11. What is the current state of the art in automotive applications of reinforced plastics and 
composites (hereafter, RPC), and what developments in the U.S. and abroad are foreseen in terms of resin 
cost, filler cost and amount required, material formulation consistency, and resistance to temperature? 
Which mechanical properties of RPCs are most imp~r t~ant  to automotive engineers, and how is the state 
of knowledge likely to evolve between now and 1992 with regard to modulus, tensile strength, compressive 
strength, and coefficient of thermal expansion? Finally, are there new RPC materials that are likely to 
have a significant effect on utilization rates between now and 1992? 
M.12. In which automotive applications are significant increases in functional (i.e., not just decorative) 




Other Body Parts 
Engine and Related Parts 
0 ther Power Transmission Parts 





Which classes of RPCs are likely to be used in which applications, and how is the choice made? In any of 
the applications listed above, is there likely to be significant import competition? If so, why? - 
M.13. It has been estimated that the economic tradeoff point between reinforced plastic bodylspaceframe 
and state-of-the-art steel unibody has risen from 25-50,000 a decade ago to about 100,000 today? What 
would you estimate to be the volume flashpoint in 19887 In 19921 
M.14. What effect if any do the following reported trends have on the probable rate of RPC usage? 
* Smaller, more differentiated model runs 
* Modular construction 
* Shorter development and implementation leadtimes 
* Part count simplification 
m.12. For which models or classes (e.g., sports, luxury) will RPCs be applied in priority? Will that 
change between 1986 and 1992? If so, how? 
m.13. Of those bodies with a space frame, what will be the materials distribution for the parts of the 
frame? 
Electro-Galvanized Steel 
Hot-Dipped Galvanized Steel 
Uncoated Steel 
RPC 
Other - - - - - 
m.14. What will be the comparative production equipment and tooling investments, and the comparative 
operating (maintenance, changeover, etc.) costs, between RPCs and sbeels? Please estimate RPCs as a 
percentage of steel: 
Investments Operating Costs 
Molding Machines/Stamping Presses 
Molds/Dies 
Secondary Operations 
Quality Verification Equipment 
Other - - - - - - - - - 
m.15. What will be typical houriy production rates for body component stamping/molding plants in 
1988 and in 1992? 
Steel Stampings 
Molded RPCs 
If you forecast a major improvement in RPC production rate, please indicate how much of the 
improvement will be due to new molding equipment ( %), new plastic materials (- - - %), and to 
other factors - - - - - - (- - - %)? 
m.16. What will be the total paint cure/dry cycle time and maximum temperature for RPC exterior 
I 
components in 1988 and in 1992? 
Time (minutes) 
M u .  Temp, (deg. F) 
If you foresee a significant decrease in either cycle time or temperature, how much of the advance will be 
due to new paint materials (- - -%), new paint equipment (- - - %), new plastic materials (- - - %), 
and to other factors - - - (- - - %)? 
M.15. How do Michigan universities and technical institutions compare, in your view, to those elsewhere 
in the U.S. and abroad in (a) casting technology in general, and aluminum casting technology in 
particular; and in (b) RPC technology? 
Major Input Sourcing Questions 
Now we'd like to pose a set of questions concerning which Michigan md non-Michigan facilities - OEM 
and independent - manufacture the components and subsystems that go into Michigan-assembled cars 
and light trucks. 
1.1. First, however, please indicate what OE automo,tive product(s) you manufacture in your Michigan 
facility(ies), regardless of where the cars and light trucks they go into are assembled. 
i.1. For each current GM car and light truck program assembled in Michigan, which facilities - captive 
or independent - supply which and how many (percen.t, or 000s per year) of the major components and 
subassemblies that appear in the tables below? 
DETROIT CADILLLAC ASSEMBLY 
Cadillac (D) Delta(B) 
Major body stampings (hoods, 
decks, roofs, doors, floor 
pans, fenders, etc.) and 
stamped subassemblies 
Engines 
Chev 3.8 V6 231 
Olds 5.0 V8 307 
Cadi 4.1 V8 249 
Transmissions 
Rear axles, U-joints, 
& differentials 
Major body stampings 
& stamping plant 
subassemblies 
Engines 
Buic 3.0 V6 181 
Buic 3.8 V6 231 
LAKE ORION ASSEMCBLY 
SedanDeVille, 98, Electra (C) 
Transaxles 




Pont 2.5 I4 151 
Chev 2.8 V6 173 
Buic 3.0 V6 181 
Transmissions 
Rear axles, U-joints, 
& differentials 
Major body stampings 
8: stamping plant 
subassemblies 
Engines 
Chev 4,3 V6 262 
Chev 5.0 V8 305 
Transmissions 
Rear axles, U-joints, 
& differentials 
PONTLAC PLANT 1 
Fiero (P) 
PONTIAC PLANT 8 
Regal, Supreme (G) 
Major body stampings 
& stamping plant 
subassemblies 
Engines 
Pont 2.5 I4 151 
Buic 3.0 V6 181 
Transaxles 
Major body stampings 




Rear axles, U-joints, 
& differentials 
LANSING ASSEMBLY 
Somerset, Calais, GrmdAm (N) 
CHEVY FLINT TRUCK 
Utilities C/K 
i.?. For each current Ford car and light truck program assembled in iwichigan, which facilities - captive 
or independent - supply which and how many of the rnajor components and subassemblies that appear in 
the tables below? 
DEARBORN ASSEMBLY 
MustangICapri (Fox) 
Major body stampings (hoods, ---.- 
decks, roofs, doors, floor ---.- 
pans, fenders, etc.) and ---.- 
stamped subassemblies - - -. - 
Engines 
Ford 2.3 I4 140 
Ford 3.8 V 6  232 
Ford 5.0 V8  302 
Transmissions 
Rear axles, U-joints, 
$ differentials 




Ford 1.6 I4 98 
Transmissions 
CVAYrJE (CAR) ASSEMBLY 
Escort/Lynx, EXP (Erika) 
Major body stampings 
& ssamped/molded 
subassemblies/panels 




Rear axles, U-joints, 
& differentials 




Ford 5.0 V8 302 
BMW 2.4 I6 149 T/D 
Transmissions 
Rear axles, U-joints, 
85 differentials 
WlXOM ASSEMBLY 
Mark, Continental, Town Car (S) 
i.3. For each current Chrysler car and light truck program assembled in Michigan, which facilities - 
capcive or independent - supply which and how many of the major components and subassemblies that 
appear in the tables below? 
JEFFERSON ASSEMBLY 
K Cars E Cars 
Major body stampings (hoods, ---- ---- 
decks, roofs, doors, floor ---- ---- 
pans, fenders, etc.) and ---- ---- 
stamped subassemblies - - - - ---- 
Engines 
Chry 2.2 I4 135 
Mits 2.6 I4 156 
Transaxles 
Major body stam pings 
& stamped/molded 
subassemblies/panels 




Chry 2.2 I4 135 




DODGE CITY ( W m N  TRUCK) 
Pickups Utilities 
Transmissions 
Rear axles, U-joints, 
Bt differentials 
i.4. For each known future GM car or light truck program with at  least one expected hlIichigan assembly 
site, which captive and independent supplier plants will (could) supply the major components and 
subassemblies listed in the tables below? 










4.1-1 V8 (Livonia) 
---.- 










Major body stampings 
$ stamped/molded 
subassemblies/panels 




i.5. For each known future Ford car or light truck program with a t  least one expected Michigan 
assembly site, which captive and independent supplier plants will (could) supply the major components 
and subassemblies listed in the tables below? 
[Does not apply: as of now, no future Ford vehicle programs have been announced for Michigan 
assembly. CRT interviewers should expiore with Ford interviewees whether and to what extent the 
State's supplier endowment is, or could become, an important influence in the Company's thinking about 
post-Escort Wayne and post-Mustang Dearborn Assembly.] 
i.6. For each known future Chrysler car or light truck program with a t  least one expected Michigan 
assembly site, which captive and independent supplier plants will (could) supply the major components 
and subassemblies listed in the tables below? 
JEFFERSON ASSEMI3LY 
A Cars in '89 C Cars in '87 




i.5. Which captive and independent supplier plants will (could) supply the major components and 
subassemblies listed in the tables below t,o Mazda's Flat :Rock stamping/assembly complex? 
MAZDA (FLAT ROCK) 





i.8. For each of the major components and subassemblies that go into the cars and light trucks that GM 
assembles or expects to assemble in Michigan, which captive and independent facilities in Michigan (if 
any) supply (are likely to supply) the most important inputs? 
Inputs for Major Stampings/Moldings - - -. - - - - - - -_ 
(sheet steel, resins; presses, molds, dies, tooli.ng) 
Inputs for Engines (block, heads; transfer lines) 
Chev 2.8 V6 173 
Chev 3.8 V6 229 
Chev 3.8 V6 231 
Chev 4.3 V6 262 
Chev 5.0 V8 305 
Pont 2.5 I4 151 
Buic 3.0 V6 181 
Buic 3.8 V6 231 
Olds 5.0 V8 307 
Cadi 4.1 V8 249 
Planned new engines 
alum block: - - - - .- 
Inputs for Transmissions/Transaxles - - - - - - - - - 
(casing, housing, CV joint; transfer lines) 
Inputs for Rear Axles, U-joints, 8: Differentials 
(major castings and forgings; transfer lines) 
i.9. For each of the major components and subassemblies that go into the cars and light trucks that Ford 
assembles or expects to assemble in kiichigan, which captive and independent facilities in Michigan (if 
any) supply (are likely to supply) the most important inputs? 
Inputs for Major Stampings/Moldings - - - - - 
(sheet steel, resins; presses, molds, dies, tooling) 
Inputs for Engines (block, heads; transfer lines) 
Ford 1.6 I4 98 
Ford 2.3 I4 140 
Ford 3.8 V6 232 
Ford 5.0 V8 302 
Planned new engines 
Inputs for Transmissions/Transaxles - - - - - - - - 
(casing, housing, CV joint; transfer lines) 
Inputs for Rear Axles, U-joints, & Differentials 
(major castings and forgings; transfer lines) 
i.lO. For each of the major components and subassemblies that go into the cars and light trucks that 
Chrysler assembles or expects to assemble in hllichigan, which captive and independent facilities in 
Michigan (if any) supply (are likely to supply) the most, important inputs? 
Inputs for Major Stampings/Moldings - - -. - - 
(sheet steel, resins; presses, molds, dies, tooling) 
Inputs for Engines (block, heads; transfer lines) 
Chry 2.2 I4 135 
Planned new engines 
Inputs for Transmissions/Transaxles - - -. - - 
(casing, housing, CV joint; transfer lines) 
Inputs for Rear Axles, U-joints, & Differentials 
(major castings and forgings; transfer lines) 
i.11. For each of the major components and subassemblies that go in.k the car (~)  (and light truck) that 
Mazda expects to assemble in Michigan, which captive and independent facilities in Michigan (if any) 
supply (are likely to supply) the most important inputs? 
Inputs for Major Stampings/Moldings - - - - - - - - 
(sheet steel, resins; presses, molds, dies, tooling) 
Inputs for Engines (block, heads; transfer lines) 
Inputs for Transaxles -------- 
(casing, housing, CV joint; transfer lines) 
1.9. Which current vehicle programs - and their successors - are likely to be most impacted by U.S. 
OEM captive import plans between now and 19921 [Note. that each OEM will be commenting not just on 
its own, but on the others', plans and their impacts] 
1.3, Which captive and independent producers of frames, stampings/moldings, engines, transmissions, 
and transaxles are most at risk from the captive import plans announced for the 1985-1992 period? 
L4, Which captive and independent componentmaking; facilities are most at risk from OEM offshore or 
Mexican sourcing of engines and transaxles? 
1.5. How big and how closeable, in your view, is the cost gap, if any, between the US. current typical 
and best practice, on the one hand, and our least-cost competitor, on the other? 
Current ('85) Gap Estimated '92 Gap 





To ta l  Vehicle 
1.6. How will anticipated market shifts affect captive imd independent component facilities in Michigan? 
Will an increasing share for low- and mid-volume niche vehicles help suppliers - and, if so, which ones - 
by providing a profusion of short- and medium-run length product demands? Or is i t  more likely that 
greater vehicle differentiation will coexist with greater parts standardization, permitting suppliers that 
depend on long runs to gain sales? 
1.7. What generic factors predict danger for domestic component production, both by the OEMs and by 
independent suppliers? If one wanted to forecast which parts, or types of parts, were most likely to (a) be 
pulled in-house by the OEMs, (b) sourced out to domestic suppliers, and (c) sourced offshoreor to Mexico, 
what variables would one want to consider? Value-toweight ratio? Level of technology embodied in the 
part? Run length? 
1.8. Please give us your view of whether each of the following developments is likely to be a net plus or a 
net minus for Michigan OEM and independent facilities between now and 1992: 
New Frames 
Greater Use of Plastic Body Panels 
Modular vehicle assembly 
Modular ("chunk") subassembly sourcing 
Rising ratio of EFI to Carburetion 
Rising ratio of FWD to RWD 
i.12. [OEMs only] What are the product-specific economics of engine and transaxle transportation, and 
do you expect them to change between now and 1992? How much extra, if any, would you be willing to 
pay to source engines or transaxles domestically for reasons of logistics, engineering continuity, and so on? 
1.9. What effect on major component sourcing do you expect from the ongoing reorganization of GM? 
Will the possibility of greater "entrepreneurshipY by GM component plants be a major competitive factor 
for independent supplier facilities in Michigan? For which suppliers, making which parts? 
1.10, Which original equipment automotive components and subassemblies (up to five) now typically 
made inside the OEMs' Michigan facilities are most likely to be sourced outside by 19921 Please, indicate 
to what extent the outside source will be (a) Mexico or offshore; (b) U.S. or Canada but non-Michigan; or 
(c) Michigan. 
1.11. Which original equipment automotive components and subassemblies (up to five) now typically 
supplied to the U.S.-based OEMs by independent suppliers are most likely to be pulled into the OEMs? 
Please indicate the extent to which the OEM facilities receiving - and the suppliers losing - the work are 
located in Michigan. 
OEM-Supplier Relations Questions 
Now we'd like to get your views on a set of issues collcerning how OEMs and their suppliers - current 
and prospective - relate to each other. Please bear in mind that one of our main goals in this area is to 
assess which suppliers, making which parts of the vehicle, are most likely to prosper - or most likely to 
need help if they are to prosper - as participants in Michigan's automotive economy in the next five to 
seven years. 
R.1. What effect on major component sourcing do you expect from the ongoing reorganization of GM? 
14'ill the possibility of greater "entrepreneurshipn by GM component plants be a major competitive factor 
for independent supplier facilities in Michigan? For which suppliers, making which parts? [same as I.8., 
but asked of different respondents] 
R.2. Which components and subassemblies are most likely to be pulled in-house by the OEMs between 
now and 1992? Why? Which independent supplier facilities in Michigan would be impacted? 
R.3. How free are the OEMs to alter substantially their current pattern of domestic subcontracting and 
offshore sourcing, in light of contractual obligations .with suppliers and the UAW, and in light of the 
"political" clout of captive component plants within thlp OEMs? 
R.4. If the OEMs decrease their level of vertical integration between now and 1992, which parts and 
subassemblies are they most likely to send out to independent suppliers, both domestic and foreign? In 
which of these parts/subassemblies would you expect Michigan suppIiers to have the best chance to gain 
work? Why? 
R What are the likely developments in OEM sourcing of parts from offshore locations? Which 
components are most likely to be sent offshore or to Mexico? How do cost differentials balance against 
JIT and other logistical concerns? For which parts does the desirability of proximity to assembly site 
justify paying substantially more for the component tham it would cost to buy it  offshore? 
r.1. To what extent are current independent supplier problems rooted in dependence on long production 
runs? To what extent could supplier implementation of programmable technologies reduce unit cost to 
permit survival based on many low- and medium-run orders? In which components/subassemblies will 
long run lengths remain essential to low unit cost? 
r.2. What contractual or gentlemen's agreements are required to get suppliers to implement JIT? What 
additional understandings will have to be reached to entice suppliers to locate within an OEM facility? 
r.3. What proportion of your sales to the OEMs are t c ~  facilities located more than 300 miles from your 
plant? Is OEM emphasis on JIT causing you to undertake or consider undertaking new operations closer 
to the OEM facilities you supply? In Michigan? For which parts or subassemblies? 
R.6. How will Mazda's Flat Rock operation affect Michigan independent suppliers? In general, when 
non-domestic OEMs site production in Michigan, in which cases (i.e., for which parts) are they likely to 
"bring their own suppliers" versus giving business to Michigan firms? For Mazda in Flat Rock, what 
does your answer imply about which Michigan facilities stand to gain and which to lose? 
R.7. In which parts and subassemblies will modular, or "chunk," sourcing to independent suppliers 
become common by 1993? In the answer predictable by knowing value-to-weight ratios or relative 
supplier labor costs? How will the OEMs pick their "module suppliers"? What can suppliers do to 
improve their chances of selection? 
r.4. What are your plans with regard to diversification? Are you aiming to diversify your products 
within automotive or to move away from automotive? What proportion of your current sales are in 
automotive this year (1985)? What do you predict t,he proportion will be in 1992? Do you see the 
automotive aftermarket playing a larger role in your business in 1992 than in 1985, a smaller role, or 
about the same? 
r.5. Have you made - and, if not, why not? - recent major investments in your Michigan automotive 
facilities? In capital equipment? In new plants? Wh.at percentage of your sales dollar goes to R&D? 
How much of your R&D is automotive-related? 
r.6. Is your process technology tied to specific materiah? Are there indications of impending materials 
change in any of your automotive products? If so, which products? If such a change does occur, can your 
current manufacturing process adapt?. Or will major new investment's be required and, if so, can you 
afford them or will you have to cede that business? 
r.7. With whom, and at what level, does your facility staff interface with the OEMs? With their 
purchasing people? Their engineering staffs? Both? 
r.8. &e you electronically linked to one or more OElbi customer(s)l If so, Is that link used only for 
.delivery scheduling, or also for exchanging engineering data? If the latter, do you have capabilities for 
prototype and production-level drawings and specifications? 
R.8. How important is suppler engineering competence likely to be in the 1986-1992 period? Which 
engineering activities are likely to remain in the OEMs due to proprietary product or process and/or 
system integrity reasons, and which are likely to be a shared OEM and supplier responsibility? 
r.9. Will process and/or product innovation capacities protect suppliers? Will shifting more engineering 
responsibilities to independent suppliers help Michigan firms, or will it tend to hurt them? In which 
products are Michigan suppliers most and least competent technically? Which Michigan firms' 
automotive business is most secure as a result of their perceived engineering and design competence? 
R.9. Please list the three (3) parts/subassemblies in which you believe time is most likely to run out for 
independent suppliers doing original equipment automoti.ve business in Michigan? 
R.10. [For all independents and for OEM component makers] Do you perform regular, periodic 
competitive analyses of the firms in your line(s) of business? Do the analyses include offshore 
competitors? Who are your top three (3) automotive product line competitors - domestic or foreign - 
and where are their plants that produce parts that go head to head with those you produce in Michigan? 
Labor Relations Questions 
Now we'd like to turn to the area of labor relations. Our primary concern is to assess which aspects of 
labor-management relations are likely to have the greatest impact on manufacturing costs in Michigan, 
and to get your sense of how well - or how poorljr - Michigan is likely to fare in maintaining or 
increasing its share of U.S. automotive employment. 
L.1. What changes are new technologies - both programmable and dedicated - bringing with regard to 
skill requirements in the auto industry? Which jobs, if any, are being deskilled? Which upskilled? Are 
the skill requirement effects different in the skilled trades than in production work? Are they different in 
different kinds of skilled work or production work? 
1.1. Will modular assembly of vehicles and/or components tend to upskill production jobs a n d  skilled 
jobs, or only the former? 
1.2. Do workers perceive the move toward greater use of programmable technologies as being in their 
interests? Do you believe that the ways in which the new technologies are implemented are inherent in 
the technologies, or are there a variety of options for their deployment? 
L.2. Between 18 and 20 percent of the blue-collar jobs in the U.S. automotive industry today are skilled. 
What will the figure be in 1992? In which trades, if any, and in which parts of Michigan, if any, is there 
likely to be a skilled worker shortage? How can/should it be addressed? 
L.3. Which are the "basicu skilled trades? By that definition, which job classifications, if any, can and 
cannot legitimately be combined? 
1.3. Which new umegaclasssificationsu is auto management trying to implement? In local negotiat.ions 
over classifications, does management make the argument that programmable technologies require 
flexibility in job assignment and hence wider classifications? 
1.4. What reaction have skilled and production workers had to the new, more streamlined classification 
systems now in place at NUMMI, Sterling Heights, St. Louis, and elsewhere? 
1.5. Are there important differences in the area of job classifications and their combination between 
OEMs and suppliers? Do first tier suppiiers tend to follow the "patternsu established in local bargaining 
at OEM plants producing similar components? 
L.4. Which work rules and lines of demarcation, if any, have a substantial impact on unit production 
cost in Michigan OEM and independent supplier facilitits? How much impact? 
1.6. At which Michigan facilities, to your knowledge, are there daily outpub quotas beyond which 
employees are not required to work? To what extent have such quota systems been eliminated since 1980? 
1.7. Which work rules or lines of demarcation, if any, would have to change significantly to have a 
material effect on the citing of small car assembly in the! U.S. as opposed to offshore? 
1.8. Which work rules or lines of demarcation, if any, would have to change significantly to have a 
material effect on the citing of 4cylinder engines in the US.  as opposed to offshore? 
1.9. Which work rules or Iines of demarcation, if any, would have to change significantly to have a 
material effect on the citing of manual transaxles in the U.S. as opposed to offshore? 
L.5. With regard to blue-collar employee compensation, do you believe that there will be a two-tier pay 
system in the future? Lf so, will it be service- or hire-tiate based? How large a gap will there be between 
the upper and lower tiers? Will the tiering occur in actual pay or be confined to fringe benefit grow-in 
periods? 
L.6. Will Saturn, Mazda, hiUMMI, and Honda mean an end to a single Big Three-based wage-and-benefit 
pattern? Is Saturn-sharing, in which workers' pay ir; partly fixed by contract, partly based on overall 
Saturn profits, and partly based on the work team's productivity and quality rating, spread beyond . 
Saturn? How far beyond? In what time frame? Will i t  extend beyond small cars? 
1.10. Will small car assembly plants become a lower tier? Is that part of the message of the (production, 
not marketing) GM reorganization into a large car (:BOG) and small car (CPC and Saturn) divisions? 
Could this occur in the 1987 bargaining round? In 1990? 
L.7. Will OEM component plants become a lower tie]:? Will that new lower tier, if there is one, set the 
standard for first-level independent suppliers as well? 
L.8. How will demands for job security be fashioned in the 1987 and 1990 bargaining rounds? Will the 
JOBS Program be a viable system beyond its expiration in 19901 [see also L.10., 1.12., and 1.13 below] 
1.11. How will area hire and other recall and transfer provisions of the UAW national agreements operate 
if the industry has more than one tier of wages and benefits? 
1.12. The JOBS approach does not readily apply to many supplier firms. What forms will the demand 
for greater job and income security take, if any, in supplier labor contracts in the 1987-1992 period? 
L.9. What, if anything, are the implications for U.S. firms of the Canadian-U.S. UAIV split? Will 
Michigan facilities benefit significantly ? 
[For respondents to employment maintenance questions below:] Now we'd like to move from the area of 
labor-management relations to the question of employment levels. Our main concern here is with 
Michigan's prospects for maintaining or increasing its share of total U.S. automotive employment in the 
next five to seven years.] 
L.lO. Total U.S. employment - blue- and white-collar combined ,- in the U.S. Motor Vehicle and 
Equipment (i.e., vehicles and OE parts) industry - SIC 371 - declined from 1,005,000 in 1978 to 699,000 
in 1982, recovering about half of the decline by early 1985 to stand a t  867,000. What do you predict the 
figure will be for 1987 (- -- ,000) and for 1992 (- -.-,000)? Michigan hosted 35 percent of the 1978 
and 1982 totals and 37 percent of the 1985 total. What share of the national total do you predict 
Michigan will host in 1987 (- -%) and in 1992 (- -%)? If you predict a change, please indicate why. 
1.12. Bluecollar U.S. employment in the U.S. Motor Vehicle and Equipment (i.e., vehicles and OE parts) 
industry - SIC 371 - declined from 782,000 in 1978 to 512,000 in 1982, recovering about half of the 
decline by early 1985 to stand a t  669,000. What do you predict the figure will be for 1987 (- - -,000) 
and for 1992 (--- ,000)? Do you think Michigan will maintain or gain in relative blue-collar 
employment share between now and 1992? Why? 
1.13. White-collar U.S. employment in the U.S. Motor Vehicle and Equipment (i.e., vehicles and OE 
parts) industry - SIC 371 - deciined from ?23,000 in 1978 to 187,000 in 1982, recovering about onethird 
of the decline by early 1985 to stand a t  198,000. What do you predict the figure will be for 1987 
(--- ,000) and for 1992 (- -- ,000)? Do you think Michigan will maintain or gain in relative white-. 
collar employment share between now and 1992 Why? 
Programmable  Technology Questions 
Now we'd like to get your views in the area of programmable manufacturing technologies. While we 
woul'd value your assessment of the state of the art in various aspects of computerized automation, please 
remember that our main interest is in how the changes you expect in the 1985-92 time frame will affect 
automotive facilities and their workforces in the State of Michigan. 
P.1. In the broad effort by the OEMs to deploy programmable automation (hereafter, PA) and 
computer-integrated manufacturing (CM) practices, what is the current status report? What are the 
success stories? What implementation problems need priority attention'? 
p.1. To what extent has computer-based, .TIT-driven production scheduling now been achieved in your 
[OEM] internal operations? In your [OEM] relations with major suppliers? Overall? Do you expect to 
see remaining difficulties in this area taken care of by 1!992? If not, which problems will remain? 
P.2. Where has computer-aided design (CAD) been installed? IVhat percentage of the automobile is now 
CAD-designed? Will this ever reach 95-100% and, if cia, when? What range of CAD workstations has 
your firm purchased, and from which vendor(s)? What is your ratio of CAD workstations to drafting 
personnel? What are your expectations about future purchases of CAD workstations? 
P.3. What role, if any, does computer-aided engineering (CAE) play in your product development 
activities? In which areas, if any, do you expect CAE to become more important in the future? What 
range of CAE workstations has your firm purchased, and from which vendor(s)? What is your ratio of 
CAE workstations to design engineers? What are your. expectations about future purchases of CAE 
workstations? 
P.4. How do you view the role and potential of computer-aided process planning (CAPP)? In which 
applications will CAPP be most significant? 
p.2. How do you view the distinction between 'variant' and 'generative' approaches to CAPP? 
p.3. How might increased use of CAPP impact your relations with the facilities that supply you? 
P.5. In which areas has the most progress been made in exploiting the advantages of flexible PA? In 
which areas of automotive manufacturing will flexibility be most significant in the next five to seven 
years? In which components/subassemblies and operations will volumes or design stability requirements 
keep hard automation preferable? 
P.6. In which manufacturing operations will CIM be most important in the 1985-1992 period? Where 
will stand-alone tooling operations be replaced by flexible machining systems (FMS)? Where will current 
hard, or dedicated, automation be most widely replaced by PA systems? What are the factors that 
underlie decisions about the order in which to flexibly automate particular operations? 
P.7. What scales of integration do you aim to achieve by 199?? How much will the answer differ from 
facility (or facility type) to facility? In which components is integration a more important goal, and why? 
Will there be some fully-integrated flexibly-automated plants, while others will have only "islands of 
automation"? Are older assembly plants likely to get PA beyond robotic applications and, if so, what 
sorts of systems are the priority? Similarly, will older Michigan engine, transmission/transaxle, and rear 
axle plants be getting significant investments in PA in the next seven years? 
p.4. For each element of CIM, where are the 1ead.ing OEM "beta sites," the first, path-breaking, 
problem-solving applications? Which of these sites are, or will be, in Michigan? 
p.5. How will the further development and deployn~ent of CIh? influence the character of your new 
facilities? Will CIM push things in the direction of more fully-integrated Saturn-style complexes? If so, 
do you believe that by 1988 (1992) CIM will deliver enough flexibility to allow such in-complex stamping, 
engine, and molding operations to supply other assembly plants as well? 
p.6. Which technologies - tooling, computer hardware, software, etc. - do you expect to produce in- 
house, and which will be acquired outside? What influences will shape the OEM market for CIM 
technology? Which vendors with a presence in Michigzm are positioned for success, and for problems, in 
the 1985-92 period? Which of those vendors have a manufacturing presence in the State? 
P.8. What, in your view, are the key labor relations issaes raised by the move toward CAM and CIM? 
P.S. Do you see multi-firm design and production consortia as a viable strategy for supplier base 
rationalization and for cost  and risk-sharing in the :PA/CIM transition? How might it work? How 
prevalent might such arrangements become by 1992?. 
P.lO. To what extent is Michigan likely to play host to captive and independent PA/CM manufacturing 
facilities? Do the major PA/CIM vendors' location caiculations vary by technology? By customer 
location? How important a role could the State's technological infrastructure (e.g., ITI, university 
engineering departments, etc.) play in increasing Michigan's share of the PA/CIM industry? 
P.11. It has been alleged that PA increases the penalty associated with inflexible work practices. Do you 
agree? If so, could you please describe one or two such practices and the problems it (they) pose(s) for the 
successful deployment of PA? Can you suggest any kind of "dealqetween labor and management that 
might address this problem, if you think a problem exists in this area? 
P.12. How do Michigan universities and technical instj.tutions compare, in your view, to those elsewhere 
in the U.S. and abroad in their capacities with regard to programmable manufacturing technology, both 
in general and specifically in its automotive applications? 
Nonprogrammable Technolorn Questions 
Now we'd like to get into some questions that focus on developments in nonprogrammable manufacturing 
technologies. We are particularly concerned with how advances in this area are likely to be introduced in 
Michigan OEM facilities, both existing ones and the greenfield complexes likely to host clean-sheet 
programs such as Saturn, Alpha, and Liberty. 
(Virtually all respondents in this basket are from OEM!:.] 
N.1. With regard to plans for the 198592 time period, and excluding projects slated especially for Saturn 
(Alpha, Concept go), what new nonprogrammable manufacturing technologies are likely to be 
implemented in the U.S. plants of the OEMs and major independent suppliers that produce the following 
vehicle subsystems? k\There.possible, please suggest which of these technologies are most likely to be 
deployed in product programs assembled in Michigan o~:'in Michigan component facilities. 
Final vehicle assembly ------- 
Engines ------- 
Transmissions/transaxles ------- 
f Rear axles & suspensions ------- 
Chassis/body structure ------- 
Body Components ------- 
Other vehicle subsystems ------- 
n.1. What are the most important changes in manufacturing technique associated with Saturn? 
Final vehicle assembly 
Engines 
Transmissions/transaules 
Rear axles & suspensions 
Chassis/body structure 
Body Components 
Other vehicle subsystems 
n.2. What are the most important changes in manufac1;uring technique associated with Alpha? 
Final vehicle assembly 
Engines 
Transmissions/transaxles 
Rear axles & suspensions 
Chassis/body structure 
Body Components 
Other vehicle subsystems 
n.3. What are the most important changes in manufacturing technique associated with Liberty? 
Final vehicle assembly 
Engines 
Transmissions/transaxIes 
Rear axles 22 suspensions 
Chassis/body structure 
Body Components 
Other vehicle subsystems 
N.2.a. Putting aside manufacturing processes being considered specifically as part of the Saturn (AIpha, 
Liberty) Project, what are the most important technological advances likely to be manifested in OEM and 
major supplier plants in the 1985-1992 period? Which, if any, of these advances hold the greatest promise 
of reducing manufacturing cost enough to alter current make-buy decisions? 
n.4. Machining (incl. grinding) 
n.5. Forming 
n.6. Die Casting 
n.7. Near Net Shape Casting 
n.8. Forging 
n.9. Assembly 
n.10. Joining (welding, bonding, ...) 
n.11. Coating St Plating 
n.12. Plastic Molding Sc Painting 
n.13. Soft Trim 
b. What priority problems are anticipated in implementing these technologies? What could help resolve 
those problems? 
c. Which, if any, of the developments you forecast are likely to increase, and which to decrease, the 
importation of automotive parts and subassemblies? Why? 
d. Which, if any, of the developments you forecast are most likely to affect facilities - both OEM and 
independent - currently involved in automotibve manufacturing in Michigan? 
n.14. With regard to the Saturn Project, what are the most important technological advances likely to be 
manifested in your and your major suppliers' plants in tihe 1985-1992 period? 
~ a c h i n i n ~  (incl. grinding) 
Forming 
Die Casting 
Near Net Shape Casting 
Forging 
Assembly 
Joining (welding, bonding, ...) 
Coating & Plating 
Plastic Molding B Painting 
Soft Trim 
b. What priority problems are anticipated? 
n.15. With regard to the Alphk Project, what are the 'most important technological advances likely to be 
manifested in your and your major suppliers' plants in the 1985-1993 period? 
Machining (incl. grinding) 
Forming 
Die Casting 
Near Net Shape Casting 
Forging 
Assembly 
Joining (welding, bonding, ...) 
Coating & Plating 
Plastic Molding & Painting 
Soft. Trim 
b. What priority problems are anticipated? 
11.16. With regard to the Liberty Project, what are the most important technological advances likely to 
be manifested in your and your major suppliers' plants in the 1985-1992 period? 
Machining (incl. grinding) 
Forming 
Die Casting 
Near Net Shape Casting 
Forging 
Assembly 
Joining (welding, bonding, ...) 
Coating & Plating 
Plastic Molding & Painting 
Soft Trim 
b. What priority problems are anticipated? 
N.3. How do Michigan universities and technical institutions compare, in your view, to those elsewhere in 
the U.S. and abroad in regard to their capacities in the field on nonprogrammable manufacturing 
technology, both in general and specifically with respecr; to automotive applications? 
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Robert M. Sinclair 




EDS, Account Mly. 
Plant Manager 
C-P-C Group 
Flint Engine Plant 
Mfg. Engineering Sys. 
'C-P-C Group 
Cadillac - Detroit 
B-0-C Group 




Auto Materials Center 
Chief Engineer, Body 
~lectrical Engineering 
President 
Stamping & Frame Div. 
Adv. Engineering Staff 
President 
Director, Design 




Central Foundry Div. 
Vice President 
Engineering 
Director, Office for 
Economic Expansion 
I CORPORATION 
Chrysler Corporation r 
General Motors Corporation 
I General Motors Corporation 
General Motors Corporation 
I General Motors Corporation 
General Motors Corporation 
General Electric Corp. 
I Chrysler Corporation 
The Budd Company 
I General Motors Corporation 
Industrial Advisors of 
America 
General Motors Corporation 
Chrysler Corporation 




NAME I TITLE I CORPORATION 
Rick S teinhelper 
Charles W. White 
Steven A. Weiner 




Detroit Tooling Assc. 
Corporate Strategic 
Planning Staff 
Mfg. Systems ancl 
Machining 
Executive Director 
Product Strategy Dev. 
Special Consultant 
to the President 
General Motors Corporation 
Ford Motor Company 
Ford Motor Company 
United Auto Workers Union 

